Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McKenzie purchased 13 firearms from federally licensed dealers. The ATF tracked McKenzie, who signed a federal form acknowledging that he was not purchasing it for someone else, then gave Clark the Glock in exchange for cash. Officers arrested Clark. Text messages from Clark’s phone revealed discussions with McKenzie; they never discussed why Clark did not buy the gun himself. McKenzie made a second purchase weeks later, again signing the "straw purchaser" form. Officers watched him give Schwartz the gun, conducted a traffic stop, and recovered the firearm. Schwartz stated that McKenzie bought the gun for him. McKenzie did not ask Schwartz why he could not buy the gun himself.McKenzie pleaded guilty to making a materially false statement to a licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The PSR applied U.S.S.G. 2K2.1, which calls for a higher base offense level if the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm, the defendant was convicted under 922(a)(6), and the defendant “committed the offense with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that the offense would result in the transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a prohibited person[.]” The district court found that McKenzie had reason to believe that Clark and Schwartz were prohibited persons, calculated McKenzie’s guidelines range as 30-37 months, and imposed a 30-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guideline requires only that a straw purchaser knew of facts creating a fair probability that the true buyer could not possess a firearm. View "United States v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

Morgan was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, ADHD, and depression. While incarcerated at Wayne County Jail, charged with assaulting a prison guard, Morgan suffered from hallucinations, heard voices, and attempted suicide. She was transferred to UCH, a private entity contracted to provide mental health services. Usually, three deputies and two-three UCH employees were present in the UCH ward. Despite blind spots, unlocked bedroom doors, and the necessity that deputies leave the ward to use the restroom, there had never been a reported incident at UCH involving sexual activity between inmates until November 15, 2005. That afternoon, Morgan asked UCH employee Williams for toilet paper. Other staff had left the ward to use the restroom and for lunch breaks. When Williams returned, he discovered Morgan n the room of a male inmate, Miles, apparently engaged in sexual intercourse. Morgan stated that she took “responsibility for everything.” Morgan and Miles declined to continue the investigation. In August 2006, Morgan gave birth to a child, apparently fathered by Miles. Morgan filed suit.The district court granted the county governmental immunity on her state law claims, found that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity, rejected a claim of supervisory liability, and held that Morgan’s Monell claims failed as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of deliberate indifference nor authority for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires men and women to be housed separately. View "Morgan v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

After Ramirez-Figueredo entered the U.S. from Cuba, he amassed convictions for the delivery and manufacture of controlled substances, domestic violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, retail fraud, stalking, assault and battery, disorderly conduct, possession of a switchblade, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and indecent exposure. In 2020, a woman claimed that Ramirez-Figueredo had raped her and kept her for two days. About a month later, officers arrested Ramirez-Figueredo. A search of his backpack revealed heroin and methamphetamine. After receiving his Miranda rights, Ramirez-Figueredo confessed that the drugs were from the Sinaloa Cartel and that he intended to sell them. He admitted to distributing methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine in Lansing. He pleaded guilty to drug crimes under Michigan law.In federal court, he pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court performed a Rule 11 colloquy but, contrary to FRCP 11(b)(1)(O), did not tell Ramirez-Figueredo that his guilty plea might have immigration-related consequences. Ramirez-Figueredo’s counsel claimed that his client had cooperated and proffered, but that the government had not moved for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. After calculating a Guidelines range of 168-210 months, the district court sentenced Ramirez-Figueredo to 192 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ramirez-Figueredo was already deportable when he pleaded guilty. The district court considered the minimal evidence of his cooperation. View "United States v. Ramirez-Figueredo" on Justia Law

Carson, indicted for engaging in a racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and for murder in aid of racketeering, section 1959(a)(1), agreed to plead guilty to racketeering conspiracy in exchange for a 360-month prison term, to run concurrent to Carson's seven-year sentence on a state conviction for aggravated robbery. A magistrate found Carson to be “fully competent” and found his plea to be knowing and voluntary. In February 2020, the district court accepted the plea. Carson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea in August 2020, arguing that he entered the plea “before [he] fully understood what [he] was actually saying [he] was guilty of,” and that he thought he would otherwise receive the death penalty. He later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel argument.The district court appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary hearing; determined Carson was not “operating under a misunderstanding when he entered into his plea,” despite the “muddy” record regarding what exactly counsel told Carson about the amount of actual time to be served; and found that counsel had told Carson that the government was not seeking the death penalty before Carson’s entering the plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carson’s 360-month sentence. The district court acted within its discretion; each of the seven “Goddard” factors weighs against withdrawal. Carson cannot show deficient performance by counsel or prejudice as to his length of incarceration argument. View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Meek was fired from his job when “pictures of young girls in underwear” were discovered on his work computer. Upon receiving a tip from Meek’s former co-worker, FBI agents verified that Meek’s email contained partially clothed images of girls and found eight images and two videos of child pornography on Meek’s other electronic devices. Meek admitted to viewing child pornography for several years and to downloading child pornography from peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, and that he may have “inadvertently shared and traded it.”Meek pled guilty to receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and possessing child pornography, 2252A(a)(5)(B). He sought a two-level reduction in his offense level under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(1) because his conduct was limited to receiving or soliciting child pornography. The district court disagreed and settled on a Guidelines range of 97-121 months, then varied downwards, sentencing Meek to 87 months’ imprisonment, with two mandatory $5,000 special assessments (one for each count of conviction) under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A defendant is not necessarily entitled to the two-level reduction just because he did not receive the enhancement for distribution; it is conceivable that a defendant could unknowingly distribute child pornography. The district court stated that it reviewed the PSR description of Meek’s financial situation and was aware of Meek’s financial circumstances before imposing the special assessment. View "United States v. Meek" on Justia Law

In 2001, after being convicted of forgery, Estrada-Gonzalez was removed to Guatemala. Twenty years later, he was arrested for domestic violence. Estrada-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the U.S, 8 U.S.C. 1326; the government agreed to recommend a within-Guidelines sentence. The agreement added: “Neither party will recommend or suggest in any way that a departure or variance is appropriate, either regarding the sentencing range or regarding the kind of sentence.” The agreed guidelines range was six-12 months. The prosecutor noted that the state had dismissed Estrada-Gonzalez’s domestic-violence charges, then played an officer’s body-camera footage from Estrada-Gonzalez’s arrest, and stated that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range “would be at the least appropriate”: I realize that the statutory maximum is 20 years based on his prior forgery conviction … I would echo [the court’s] sentiments in regards to the safety of not only the wife, the children … certainly a high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate." The court imposed an 18-month term, rejecting the defense argument that the government had violated the plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court heard the prosecution’s ambiguous statement and rejected Estrada-Gonzalez’s reading of it, finding that the prosecutor had been advocating only “for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines.” What the prosecutor expressed is a type of fact question; the district court did not clearly err in its resolution of the question. View "United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

At Townsend’s final pretrial conference, the district court expressed its belief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Michigan had recently adopted a policy of offering only plea deals that contain sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. The court stated its disapproval of these types of waivers and its intention to continue rejecting plea agreements that contain them. Later, the parties negotiated a plea agreement in private that limited Townsend’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence. The court responded that it would not accept the agreement. The government and Townsend filed a joint motion asking the court to accept the plea agreement. The court then canceled the plea hearing. Six months later, the court denied the motion and rejected the proposed plea agreement.The prosecution sought mandamus relief, which was granted by the Sixth Circuit. A district court does not possess unrestrained discretion to reject a plea agreement. It must, among other things, make an individualized assessment of the agreement and predicate its decision on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Because the district court here failed to do that, this is the narrow circumstance in which the district court abused its discretion. The prosecution has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus on this ground. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Sears was imprisoned for federal drug crimes. His supervised release began in New York in 2016. It was revoked in 2017 for possessing a controlled substance. As he was serving this revocation sentence, Sears was convicted of Sexual Battery in Ohio state court from a 1996 offense and was sentenced to one year of incarceration. In November 2018, Sears began his parole in Ohio. In July 2020, officers found bags of drugs and loaded firearms at his residence. Sears pled guilty. Sears’s combined Guidelines range on those charges was 111-123 months. The New York federal court issued a supervised release violation warrant. Sears’s case was transferred from Ohio. A Violation Report outlined his July arrest and “Failure to Notify the Probation Officer of a Change of Address.” The Guidelines range for revocation of Sears’s supervised release was 18-24 months.The court discussed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced Sears to 18 months, consecutive to the 111-month sentence for the new charges. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court miscalculated the supervised release Guidelines range by exceeding the maximum length under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited toward and does not limit the statutory maximum for subsequent supervised release violations. The court articulated its balancing of the sentencing factors and imposed a sentence at the low-end of Sears’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Sears" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, a drug-trafficking conspiracy distributed more than 100 kilograms of powder and crack cocaine and involved dozens of actors from Michigan, Texas, and Arkansas, including Mayfield, the Grand Rapids-based ringleader; Gentry, who supplied Mayfield from Houston, with kilogram quantities of cocaine; and the Grand Rapids couriers, distributors, and dealers (Gardner, Marvin Nix, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Martinellus Nix). Of 27 co-conspirators convicted, six appealed: Gardner, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Marvin Nix, and Martinellus Nix.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuing judge’s finding of necessity for three wiretaps and the reviewing judge’s denial of the motion to suppress. Each wiretap application met “Title III’s necessity standard,” 18 U.S.C. 2510–2520. Investigators did not use the wiretaps as an initial step; they provided detailed explanations as to why traditional investigative techniques failed to expose the entire scope of the drug-trafficking enterprise. The court upheld the admission of voice-identification testimony and the use of a “constructive possession” jury instruction. The government presented sufficient evidence of Brown’s and Kolarich’s role in the drug-trafficking ring to support each count of conviction. Rejecting challenges to the sentence imposed, the court upheld the drug-quantity determinations and the imposition of a drug-premises enhancement. The court vacated the imposition of a 21 U.S.C. 862(a) lifetime ban on federal benefits for Gardner; his drug conspiracy conviction falls outside of 862(a)’s reach. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

In 1992, Burns, with five accomplices, approached a car in which four men were drinking and smoking. Looking for a fight, Burns and his accomplices robbed the car's occupants, then began shooting them, killing two. Blackman escaped with a minor gunshot wound. Thomas, despite having been shot several times, survived; his testimony was instrumental in the trials. Burns was convicted on two counts of felony murder, receiving a death sentence for one murder and a life sentence for the other. Seeking habeas relief, Burns claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage and that the Tennessee prosecutor wrongfully relied on inconsistent testimony and knowingly presented false testimony at the guilt stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has never established that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to introduce, at sentencing, residual-doubt evidence, offered to undermine the prosecution’s case, which led to the conviction. Burns’s counsel did not err by failing to pursue the introduction of residual-doubt evidence at sentencing. Burns’s sentencing counsel did a fair amount of investigation in preparation for the mitigation phase and adopted a strategy of focusing on Burns’s religious background and other signs of good character, which was not unreasonable. Burns fails to establish that the testimony was actually inconsistent or false. View "Burns v. Mays" on Justia Law