Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A government informant arranged to buy meth at Kilbourne’s home. When the informant arrived, Kilbourne was not there. The informant purchased meth from Reinberg and asked Reinberg about purchasing a gun. Reinberg stated she would “have [Kilbourne] hit you up on that.” Later, Kilbourne sold the gun to the informant. Kilbourne was arrested. Reinberg pled guilty, without an agreement, to drug offenses. Reinberg’s attorney stopped her from answering questions about the gun because she was not charged with any gun offenses. The government opposed Reinberg’s for safety-valve relief at sentencing. Reinberg later claimed “she was aware of the gun” but was not involved in its sale. The government opposed her safety-valve request again, claiming that a video of the meth sale showed Reinberg knew more.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of safety-valve relief and a 60-month sentence. The safety-valve provision allows a court to impose a sentence shorter than the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that she meets "every criterion,” including telling the government all information she has concerning the offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme. The district court found the conversation with the informant indicated that the gun was present. Reinberg withheld information. That finding was not clearly erroneous. Reinberg identified the gun by name, twice remarked “it’s pretty,” and facilitated its later sale. View "United States v. Reinberg" on Justia Law

Brothers Marshane and Terry were convicted in 2005 of conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine. Each brother had at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense.” Their latest convictions required life sentences. The Guidelines ranges for both brothers was 360 months to life, regardless of whether they were deemed career offenders. Both were sentenced to life in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger the statutory penalties. The Sentencing Guidelines changed how multiple prior sentences are counted in calculating an offender’s criminal history and changed the drug-equivalency tables to reflect the Act. Marshane's Guidelines range dropped to 292-365 months. Terry's range fell to 324-405 months. If treated as career offenders, the brothers would still have a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.In 2020, the brothers sought sentence reductions. Conceding that they are career offenders, they asked for a downward variance, emphasizing their rehabilitation and a recent report recommending that offenders convicted only of drug-trafficking crimes should not be deemed career offenders. The government argued that the Act had not modified the penalties for their offense that involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and that they remained career offenders. President Obama had already commuted their sentences to the bottom of their Guidelines ranges. The district court granted reduced sentences of 306 months for Marshane and 324 months for Terry. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to recognize that, under current law, they were not career offenders. While an error occurred, it was invited by the defendants and was not so plain as to warrant remand. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Waide encountered the Lexington police after a shed fire occurred on the property next to his. Although no one suspected Waide of being involved with the fire and there was no evidence of arson, the fire investigator noticed surveillance cameras attached to Waide’s duplex residence and asked Waide to turn over his DVR. When Waide declined, the investigator obtained a warrant to enter Waide’s apartment and retrieve the DVR. When six officers arrived at Waide’s duplex to execute that warrant, their threatened entry and questions about whether Waide had drugs on the premises caused Waide to admit that his apartment contained a small amount of marijuana. This confession led to the issuance of two subsequent warrants to search both units of Waide’s duplex for narcotics–the other unit was occupied by Waide’s mother. The searches yielded a firearm plus large quantities of drugs and money.After the district court denied Waide’s motions to suppress evidence, he entered into a conditional guilty plea to the offense of possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute the drugs and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The affidavit in support of the DVR warrant lacked reliable evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the shed fire was due to arson or any other criminal activity. The incriminating evidence should be suppressed because it stemmed from the exploitation of the unlawful DVR warrant. View "United States v. Waide" on Justia Law

In 1985, two people were shot to death in rural Garrard County. Haight, who had escaped from jail days earlier, was captured in a nearby cornfield. During a chase, police discovered the victims’ possessions and both handguns used to commit the murders in a stolen truck abandoned by Haight. Haight pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a life sentence without parole for 25 years. The court accepted Haight’s plea but sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated. Haight unsuccessfully sought specific enforcement of the plea agreement, was allowed to withdraw his plea, and went to trial. Haight admitted to the murders from the witness stand, claiming that he was suffering from “extreme emotional disturbance” and intoxication. The jury found him guilty of two counts each of intentional murder and first-degree robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Haight’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Haight was denied postconviction relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.In 2002, Haight sought habeas relief. The district court stayed the federal action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court refused to consider his unexhausted issues. Haight successfully moved to have the now-exhausted issues included in his amended 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which raised 45 grounds. Haight’s motion and application for the appointment of experts and his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing were denied.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance; upholding the refusals to permit the defense to have Haight examined by a neuropsychologist before sentencing and to appoint medical experts; rejecting challenges to jury instructions and to the exclusion of certain potential jurors; and rejecting arguments concerning the refusal to enforce the plea agreement. Kentucky’s death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional. View "Haight v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Helphenstine was arrested for drug offenses on April 14 and taken to jail. Around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 16, Helphenstine vomited and was moved to a “detox” cell. A local doctor was contractually obligated to visit the jail once a week. He came on Tuesday nights. Helphenstine’s condition deteriorated. Knowing that the office was closed, deputies faxed the doctor a non-emergency medical request, stating Helphenstine was vomiting and soiling himself, refusing to eat or drink, and had not gotten out of bed for 24 hours. The doctor testified he called the jail and directed that Helphenstine be taken to a hospital but was told that Helphenstine refused. There is no record of these calls. The doctor faxed prescriptions for antiemetics; although it was a Tuesday and although he knew of Helphenstine’s condition, he did not visit the jail. Around midnight, Helphenstine laid on his mat, where he remained. Around 3:30 a.m., Helphenstine was unresponsive; jailers began CPR and called 911. Helphenstine was pronounced dead en route to the hospital.Plaintiff’s experts testified that Helphenstine died either from withdrawal or from severe dehydration caused by withdrawal. Helphenstine’s death certificate lists his cause of death as “acute (fentanyl) and chronic drug abuse,” with the interval between onset and death listed as 6 minutes; fentanyl was present in Helphenstine’s blood. The district court rejected a deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A jury could conclude that Helphenstine’s death was the result of deliberate indifference by the county and the doctor; the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Helphenstine v. Lewis County" on Justia Law

Officer Hazlewood applied to a Kentucky state judge for a warrant. In his supporting affidavit, Hazlewood stated that a confidential informant (CI) advised Hazlewood that Sanders was selling heroin/fentanyl from a specific apartment. Hazlewood set up two controlled purchases; officers observed Sanders leaving and returning to that apartment. The affidavit contained no information pertaining to the reliability of the CI. With a warrant, officers recovered controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and firearms from the apartment. Sanders was charged with drug and firearm offenses but was not charged with distributing the drugs sold during the controlled purchases.The court denied Sanders's motion for supplemental discovery relating to the controlled buys because disclosure would reveal the CI’s identity and the evidence was not material to the defense. Sanders also moved to suppress all evidence and statements that were obtained when executing the warrant and for a “Franks” hearing to challenge the accuracy of surveillance referenced in the affidavit. The court denied the motions determining that probable cause supported the search warrant or, in the alternative, that the “good faith” exception applied.The Sixth Circuit vacated Sanders’s conviction and 72-month sentence. Few facts supported a nexus between the drug evidence being sought and the apartment that was searched; entering and exiting an apartment, alone, provides no indication of criminal activity at the apartment. The affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that Sander resided at the apartment. No reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the apartment. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

A North Carolina social services department received a tip that Michael had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with his four-year-old stepdaughter. Michael and his family subsequently moved to Kentucky, where Family Services told detectives that Michael was possibly sexually abusing the children. All three children were placed into foster care.Before each interview, Michael received and waived his Miranda rights. He admitted to touching “between [Dorothy’s] legs and in her vagina area.” The detectives later said: “You’re going to continue to not have any contact with your children just until you admit to everything.” Michael said that he’d “like to talk to a therapist or something other than social services.” The detectives continued, saying: “You’re going to continue the rest your [sic] life without seeing your children because you want to bottle this up.” During a second interview, Michael admitted to multiple acts of sexual abuse that he had previously denied.Michael unsuccessfully moved to suppress the incriminating statements as coerced under “Miranda.” The Kentucky Supreme Court found that four of the officers’ statements “were delivered in a threatening manner” but noted that Michael had already admitted to three instances of sexual abuse. That court, the federal district court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Michael v. Butts" on Justia Law

Cincinnati police responded to a “shots fired” call..A witness provided a video recording of the incident. The person in the video said that White had pointed a gun at his face and demanded his property. Police observed White enter a vehicle being driven by someone else, performed a traffic stop, found the driver in possession of a firearm, and found a loaded firearm under White's seat. White pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and agreed that he had “at least two convictions for crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1. The parties did not agree on the applicability of ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)’s 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence for armed career criminals. In 2005, White had been adjudicated guilty of aggravated robbery with specifications for firearm possession and firearm facilitation, in Juvenile Court; in 2009, White pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated robbery (occurring on two different dates), with specifications for having a firearm on or about his person while committing the offenses, and for possessing, displaying, brandishing, or using a firearm to facilitate the offenses.The Sixth Circuit vacated White’s 180-month sentence. The district court plainly erred in finding that White’s aggravated-robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. The underlying theft offenses were not identified nor shown to have as an element the knowing or purposeful “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Hitch pleaded guilty to theft of multiple firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), and illegally possessing firearms after having previously been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His plea agreement recommended the application of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for the number of firearms involved and an enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Hitch possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The parties preserved their rights to present arguments about the application of 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)’s stolen-firearm enhancement. The PSR recommended grouping both counts together, applying both the 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancements, and the application of the stolen-firearm enhancement. Hitch argued that its application resulted in double counting.The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and calculations. Hitch’s Guidelines range was 46-57 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 51-month sentence. There was no double counting. Hitch’s two counts were grouped together, and the offense level was calculated based on his felon-in-possession count, which produced a higher offense level. His base offense level was not increased by the 922(u) violation; there was no multiple-count adjustment. The section 922(u) offense conduct is reflected in the Guidelines calculation only through the enhancements. View "United States v. Hitch" on Justia Law

Palma worked for FCA starting in 2013 and allegedly participated in a scheme that manipulated FCA's new diesel engine’s function during testing to produce artificially impressive results with respect to features that FCA was targeting to customers, including fuel economy greater than 30 mpg and a frequency of fluid changes similar to that of gasoline-powered cars. When the vehicles were tested for emissions, the program activated Exhaust Gas Recirculation, sacrificing fuel economy. When the vehicles were tested for fuel economy, Recirculation was lowered, increasing emissions. Palma knew that these results were critical to receiving the “best-in-class” fuel economy ratings and that the vehicles did not meet EPA requirements. A sticker affixed to the cars stated they complied with regulations and provided detailed emissions information, as influenced by Palma's scheme. FCA sold more than 100,000 of these vehicles. Customers who purchased the vehicles said that the misleading representations were material to their purchase decisions.Palma was charged with 13 counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The district court held that there was an insufficient causal nexus between Palma’s conduct and customers being induced to purchase vehicles and that Palma’s conduct was less a deprivation of consumer property and more a deception of regulators. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of that count, reasoning that Palma was only charged with conspiracy, not wire fraud itself, and the indictment alleges adequate facts tying Palma to a fraudulent scheme. View "United States v. Palma" on Justia Law