Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Beginning in 2008-2009, three partners ran Florida medical clinics and hired Hofstetter, who became the office manager. One of the partners admitted that, over time, pain management dominated their business, so that the other practice areas dwindled, and the clinics eventually became “pill mills.” Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. The clinics displayed numerous indicators of illegal opioid prescription practices, so the government investigated all four women. A jury convicted each defendant of maintaining at least one drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also found guilty of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. With respect to the drug-involved-premises convictions, the court rejected an argument that the underlying statute, 21 U.S.C. 856(a), was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them; the defendants’ conduct put them on notice that they violated the statute, regardless of any potential vagueness when applied to differently situated medical practitioners. Those convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the district court properly instructed the jury; the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. With respect to Hofstetter’s convictions, the court upheld evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning the distribution charge. The court rejected claims of spoliation, Brady violations, and improper remarks during closing arguments. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2014-2017, Carlson and his friends, using private chartered planes, trafficked about 1,680 kilograms of cocaine, 2,050 pounds of marijuana, 40 pounds of methamphetamine, and between $500 million and $1 billion of cash in drug proceeds, for the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. Carlson got caught and turned in his coconspirators, including Matthews and Wallace.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Matthews’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, sections 846, 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the 60-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed on Wallace (one of the pilots) for his guilty plea on one count. Matthews’ convictions were based on sufficient evidence; the district court did not err in providing a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction. Matthews’ confrontation rights were not violated after the court allowed Carlson to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination as to certain questions on cross-examination and she was not prejudiced by a variance between the indictment and proof at trial on conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

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Gould responded to an online advertisement that offered to allow someone to “engage in a live online session with an 8-year-old in exchange for child pornography.” That advertisement included a photo of a minor. Gould responded, offering to send money. Gould was speaking to a real individual, but law enforcement apprehended that person. Gould then began speaking with an undercover DHS agent who had assumed the arrested person’s online identity. The agent offered to let “his” minor daughter have sex with Gould, explaining that he would “video” the encounter. Gould sent the undercover agent links to child pornography, and Gould’s password to a cloud account with thousands of images of minors, including toddlers. Gould flew to Tennessee to meet the "daughter" and presented a blood test indicating he had no sexually-transmitted diseases. After he was arrested, Gould admitted that he responded to the advertisement and confirmed that he saw the images of the 8-year-old in that advertisement.Gould was charged with Enticing a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Gould entered a plea agreement with no appellate waiver. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Gould’s 210-month sentence (the bottom of the Guidelines range). A FaceTime call constitutes a “visual depiction” for purposes of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(c)(1) and responding to an advertisement “involved” “offering or seeking by notice or advertisement” under that Guidelines provision. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Nunley’s brother, Basil, learned that Nunley had a firearm and tried to persuade him to “get rid” of it. A fight ensued. Nunley fired seven shots at Basil, who nonetheless left unharmed. Officers responded to a call of shots being fired and encountered Nunley in a car. Nunley pointed the firearm at an officer, then led the officers on a high-speed chase. Nunley abandoned his car and ran, firing at the officers, then barricaded himself in a building. Officers used an armored truck to breach the building. Nunley was arrested in possession of a 9-millimeter pistol. Nunley pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The sentencing court rejected Nunley’s objections to a four-level “Additional Felony” sentencing enhancement and a six-level “Official Victim” enhancement. Nunley argued impermissible double counting because the enhancements punished the same conduct—his shooting at the officers; he claimed that shooting at Basil was self-defense.With a Guidelines range of 120-150 months, compressed by a 120-month statutory maximum sentence, the court sentenced Nunley to 112 months’ imprisonment. The court detailed the nature and circumstances of the crimes, Nunley’s long criminal history, his history of drug abuse and mental health issues, and his acceptance of responsibility, citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. View "United States v. Nunley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Dr. Heyd, the prison's medical officer, treated inmate Murray, who had a heart attack in 2008, before his incarceration, and was hospitalized in 2010 for deep-vein thrombosis in his leg. Murray was prescribed a treatment regimen of Coumadin. He was hospitalized multiple times during 2011 for his deep-vein thrombosis. His hematology-consult team recommended “a fair trial of Coumadin with an (INR) [international normalized ratio] ranging between 2.5 and 3.” In 2012, Murray suffered from a cerebral blood clot that left him permanently blind.Murray filed a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. His expert declaration from a hematologist stated that Heyd and his staff allowed the INR to fall into subtherapeutic levels, failed to follow the hematology recommendations, and failed to appropriately adjust the Coumadin doses; Heyd failed to personally evaluate Murray when he complained of headaches and nausea, symptoms of cerebral edema.Heyd sought qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find facts from which the inference of a substantial risk of serious harm to Murray’s health could be drawn, and that Heyd knew of and disregarded that substantial risk. An inmate’s rights to medical care that is not unreasonably delayed and to adherence to a prescribed treatment plan were clearly established at the time of Heyd’s conduct. View "Murray v. State of Ohio Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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Trozzi, a pre-trial detainee, reported gastrointestinal health issues related to gastric bypass surgery. Doctors had placed Trozzi on a specialized diet and prescribed antacids to prevent ulcers. Trozzi sought help filling her prescriptions and an adjustment in her diet, twice referring to an ulcer. Nurse Snow scheduled Trozzi to meet with a doctor. During the night before her appointment, Trozzi called for help. Officer Stakich found Trozzi doubled over in pain. Stakich's supervisor instructed that Trozzi be taken to a medical holding cell for observation. Trozzi received an over-the-counter antacid; she had a normal heart rate, blood pressure, and blood oxygen saturation. Snow advised Capron to continue monitoring. Trozzi alleges that she became covered in her own urine, feces, and bloody vomit as she waited in her cell. At the scheduled visit, the doctor sent Trozzi to the hospital, where she underwent surgery for a perforated ulcer.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Trozzi’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. An inadequate-medical-care claim requires proof that the plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need; a reasonable officer at the scene (knowing what the particular officer knew) would have understood that the detainee’s medical needs subjected the detainee to an excessive risk of harm; and the officer knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious risk to the detainee but ignored that risk. The defendants lacked the requisite knowledge. View "Trozzi v. Lake County, Ohio" on Justia Law

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Butler County Jail (BCJ) booked Westmoreland on a bench warrant for failure to appear. Westmoreland requested to be separated from fellow inmate St. Clair because St. Clair believed Westmoreland was an informant. Westmoreland was assigned to a general population dormitory with six cellmates that did not share a common area with St. Clair. Westmoreland’s mother called to express concerns that St. Clair was telling other inmates Westmoreland had “told on him.” The next day, St. Clair was permitted to mop floors outside of Westmoreland’s cell and allegedly told Westmoreland’s cellmates that he was a “rat.” Westmoreland's subsequent request to be moved was denied. That night, other inmates attacked Westmoreland, who required two surgeries for his injuries; his jaw was wired shut for several months. The district court rejected Westmoreland’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard in evaluating the liability of an individual jail supervisor. A failure-to-protect claim by a pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed to act) deliberately and recklessly. Whether BCJ is liable for that officer’s actions is contingent on whether a constitutional violation occurred. View "Westmoreland v. Butler County" on Justia Law

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Zheng became a permanent U.S. resident in 2004. He was a professor at the University of Southern California, Pennsylvania State University, and The Ohio State University and performed research under National Institute of Health (NIH) grants. Zheng had financial and information-sharing ties to Chinese organizations and received grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China. Including that information on NIH applications would have derailed Zheng’s funding prospects, so Zheng clouded his ties to China. By 2019, the FBI began investigating Zheng. Zheng left for China but federal agents apprehended him in Anchorage.Zheng pleaded guilty to making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Rejecting an argument that the research Zheng completed offset the amount of money lost, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 37-46 months and sentenced Zheng to 37 months. On appeal, Zheng argued that his counsel was ineffective by not seeking a downward variance based on Zheng’s immigration status as a deportable alien, which would have an impact on the execution of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, noting that the record was inadequate to establish ineffective assistance for the first time on direct appeal. Nothing in the record shows counsel’s reasons for making certain strategic decisions or why he advanced one argument over another. View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

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At the Detroit Detention Center, officers searched Lipford and did not find any contraband. Lipford denied being under the influence of drugs or carrying any medication. At 9:48 p.m., officers placed Lipford in a glass-walled room used to hold multiple detainees awaiting arraignment. Lipford nodded off. He slid to the floor at 11:02 p.m. Lipford laid on the floor motionless until 2:50 a.m. when he was found unresponsive. He was pronounced dead at 3:50 a.m. Hospital staff found cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl, concealed in Lipford’s rectum. The jail’s operating procedures required that officers conduct rounds every 30 minutes; “physically open the cell doors" and ensure that detainees are actually there; and check "that every detainee is living and breathing.” Although Officer Lewis ostensibly made his rounds that night, he did not physically enter the video-arraignment room nor speak with the detainees. Avoiding interaction with detainees was apparently common because detainees would become agitated at officers waking them up.The district court dismissed claims by Lipford’s estate against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lewis. The estate did not establish that a reasonable officer in Lewis’s position would have known that Lipford was potentially concealing drugs, subjecting himself to an excessive risk of harm, and that Lewis’s ignoring this risk was objectively reckless. Failure to follow internal policies does not, alone, equal deliberate indifference. View "Hyman v. Lewis" on Justia Law