Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Watkins confessed to killing Varner. In jail, he refused to eat and urinated on himself. After four pretrial psychological evaluations, Watkins’s problematic behavior continued at trial; the judge removed him to a secured room. Watkins was convicted. In 2008, Watkins filed a pro se habeas petition but did not pay the filing fee or seek to proceed in forma pauperis. His petition was dismissed. In 2010, Watkins filed a “motion for equitable tolling,” alleging sentencing errors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court stayed the federal case, pending exhaustion of his claims in state court.In 2014, after state courts rejected his claims, Watkins filed a “supplemental” federal petition, with additional claims. The district court construed Watkins’s petition as a motion to amend his 2010 petition and awarded habeas relief based on counsel’s failure to request another competency evaluation after his trial outbursts. The court reasoned that the claim related back to Watkins’s 2010 petition under Federal Rule 15 because both petitions raised ineffective-assistance claims and equitably tolled the limitations period due to Watkins’s mental-health struggles. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the ineffective-assistance claim in the amended petition did not “relate back” to the generic 2010 ineffective-assistance claim and that Watkins was not entitled to equitable tolling.On remand, Watkins argued, for the first time, that his amended petition related back to the 2008 petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended petition will “relate[] back to the date” of the original petition if the new claims arose from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as the old ones. A subsequent new suit does not “relate back to the date” of the petition in a dismissed suit. View "Watkins v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

Detective Kopchak, investigating drug trafficking, observed Rivers leaving a house, driving a red Nissan Ultima to sell drugs to an informant, and returning to the same house. After days of surveillance, investigators determined that Rivers lived at the house, and executed a search warrant. Kopchak again observed the Nissan, looked through its window, and allegedly observed a cigar wrapper, a piece of paper in the center console, and a small plastic bag that he identified as “a bag of dope.” Lieutenant DiPenti verbally indicated that he also saw the “bag of dope.” Officers found Loines and others in Rivers’ residence and read them their Miranda rights. Loines volunteered that car keys, belonging to the Nissan, were his. The car was towed for an inventory search. Officers took a picture of the car’s center console, showing a small plastic bag underneath a cigar wrapper, with a lottery ticket beside it. Officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm, two bags of suspected narcotics, and a scale. Police did not obtain a warrant to search the automobile.Loines, charged with drug crimes under 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and a firearm offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. The Sixth Circuit reversed; the “bag of dope” was not in plain view, there was no probable cause to search the vehicle, and the government did not satisfy the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "United States v. Loines" on Justia Law

Around 11:14 a.m., Deanna called 911, claiming that she feared for her life because her husband was “threatening [her] with guns,” was on “new medication from the doctor,” and had “tremendous guns” in their house. Deputy Swick arrived knowing that Puskas had weapons and observed stuff scattered across the lawn and Puskas holding a rifle. Puskas put the rifle down. Swick told Puskas multiple times to get on the ground. Puskas walked toward the house instead. He stopped, picked up a bag, and pulled out a shotgun, and told Swick to “run.” From his vehicle, Swick reported that Puskas had a shotgun. Puskas dropped the shotgun. Sunbury Police Officers arrived, tried to verbally engage Puskas, and requested a negotiator. Deputy Gibson arrived, with a canine, Cash. Puskas ignored the officers and continued meandering around the yard, tossing a shirt at the officers. Gibson released Cash. Puskas ran toward the house. Cash initially targeted the shirt. Gibson refocused Cash. The officers followed Cash with their guns drawn. Puskas darted behind a tree and picked up a pistol case. Someone yelled, “he’s got a pistol.” Puskas pulled out a revolver. The officers shot him at 11:38 a.m. Puskas died at the hospital.Deanna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force in deploying Cash and shooting Puskas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. Body camera footage confirms that their actions were reasonable under the circumstances. View "Puskas v. Delaware County., Ohio" on Justia Law

Indicted in Florida and Connecticut, Villa cooperated with prosecutors. Meanwhile, Villa was indicted in Kentucky. Villa was unaware of those charges when he pled guilty (represented by Perez) in the other cases. Those courts sentenced him to concurrent terms of 140 and 98 months. The Kentucky prosecutor, Judd, emailed Meier (Villa’s attorney) a proposed plea agreement, which assumed no further cooperation but stated that if Villa were willing to cooperate further, Judd would consider recommending a concurrent sentence. Later, Villa spoke to Meier and Perez in a three-way phone call. Meier allegedly did not mention Judd’s offer. Villa met with Judd, an FBI agent, and an investigator. Judd told Villa that the government wanted him to testify against a co-defendant but did not mention the possibility of a cooperation agreement. Villa pled guilty without an agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, consecutive to his other sentences.Villa moved to set aside his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. When Meier provided the case file, Villa allegedly discovered that Judd had mentioned a cooperation agreement and a concurrent sentence. Villa moved to amend his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, attaching an affidavit in which he said that Meier never told him about Judd’s offer and that he would have accepted it, plus an affidavit from Perez. The government submitted an affidavit from Meier, asserting that he told Villa about Judd’s offer.The district court denied Villa's motion, reasoning that Judd’s wanting Villa to testify against Rodriguez-Hernandez should have put Villa on notice of a potential agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The district court expected too much of an uncounseled defendant conversing in his second language with a federal prosecutor. Nothing about Villa’s meeting with Judd resolved the factual dispute presented by the affidavits. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

Wells was charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. At his request, the magistrate appointed new counsel and granted continuances. The trial was scheduled for May 2021. In April, Wells pleaded guilty, admitted to the factual allegations, and stated that he had no complaints about his lawyer’s performance. The court scheduled sentencing for August 18; on June 23, Wells sought to withdraw his plea and requested new counsel, alleging that he was misled "about the circumstances of the case.” Wells stated he entered into the plea because of his "assumption that [he] was being charged with another charge.” Counsel explained that Wells had allegedly engaged in conduct that constituted material false statements to a federal officer. Wells confirmed that he wanted to avoid additional charges. Wells then argued that he was not guilty of the conspiracy. Wells confirmed he was able to talk to and understand his counsel.The court declined to replace his counsel but moved the sentencing hearing to September so Wells and his counsel could confer. The court applied a four-level enhancement for Wells’s alleged role as an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, resulting in a Guidelines range of 210-262 months with a mandatory minimum of 120 months. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and mitigating factors, and sentenced Wells to 197 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court 1erred in denying the request to substitute counsel, erred in applying the four-level role enhancement, improperly balanced the 3553(a) factors, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualified as predicate offenses, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed. Consistent with the text of the compassionate-release provision of the First Step Act, and the principles, structure, and history of federal sentencing law, non-retroactive changes in sentencing law cannot be “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant relief. Rehabilitative efforts cannot supply “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. With vaccinations widely available to federal prisoners, not can McCall’s COVID-19 claims. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

In 2018, Haynes began dealing drugs as part of a larger drug-trafficking conspiracy near Knoxville, Tennessee. About a year later he was indicted on drug charges. In 2020, Haynes pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl and 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The quantity of drugs to which Haynes pled made him subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). Haynes argued that he was eligible for so-called “safety-valve” relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), which allows a district court to impose a sentence below an otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum if the defendant meets certain requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 32-month sentence, agreeing that Haynes had not met the requirements of section 3553(f)(1)(B) because he had a prior conviction for which he was assigned three points under the Sentencing Guidelines. Haynes was credited for his “substantial assistance” in prosecuting other members of the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Undercover FBI Agent Hurst made an online post feigning interest in incestuous sexual abuse. An anonymous user, later identified as Sammons, responded. He explained that he babysat his six-year-old niece every two weeks and offered to share videos of future interactions with her. Sammons sent Hurst child pornography and repeatedly requested videos of Hurst abusing his (fictitious) daughter. Hurst continued the correspondence as he tried to uncover the anonymous user’s identity. The FBI apprehended Sammons hours before he was scheduled to babysit his niece, and he confessed to taking and sharing explicit photos of her online. A jury convicted him of several child-pornography charges.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that under 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), the non-public, one-on-one messages did not amount to “mak[ing]” “any notice” “seeking or offering” child pornography. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed testimony by Dr. Bresler was not the product of reliable methods, reliably applied (Rule 702). Dr. Bresler concluded that Sammons possessed a compliant personality and therefore may have falsely confessed but his methodology amounted to little more than vouching for Sammons’ credibility with the weight of a Ph.D. The confession was amply corroborated. View "United States v. Sammons" on Justia Law

Carson was convicted of bank robbery and witness tampering. He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment and ordered to “immediately” begin paying $5,590 in restitution in installments of 25% of his gross monthly income through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Carson receives prison wages and cash deposits from his family in his inmate trust account, maintained by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). After discovering that BOP had control of $4,037.89 belonging to Carson, the government asked the court to order BOP to turn over all but $300 and apply the funds to Carson’s restitution obligation. The government cited 18 U.S.C. 3664(n), which requires a defendant who “receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed. The next day, without giving Carson an opportunity to be heard, the district court granted the motion. The order contained no findings and cited no authorities.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the government had moved to recover federal stimulus payments issued during the COVID-19 pandemic to thousands of inmates. The district court failed to make the minimal findings necessary under statutes cited by the government–18 U.S.C. 3664(n), 3664(k), 3613. . It did not determine the source of the funds, whether they are sufficiently “substantial” to warrant garnishment, or whether circumstances justified adjustment to the restitution order View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Warren, Ohio, police officers responded to a call about an unknown disturbance at a gas station in the early morning hours. They found Jones playing loud music from his SUV in the parking lot. Jones turned off the music. While the officers drove around the building to investigate, Jones drove away. Officers followed Jones, pulled him over, and told him that they had stopped him for a noise ordinance violation. The officers then smelled marijuana and searched the car, finding hidden compartments containing two firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones was convicted on four gun-and-drug-related counts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stop of Jones’s car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to warrantlessly arrest—to seize—a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The search of Jones’s SUV revealed loaded firearms in close proximity to drugs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale; sufficient evidence supports the conviction for possessing the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court rejected an argument that nine comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law