Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On three occasions, Harrison sold methamphetamine to B.B., a confidential informant who recorded the transactions on video. Police arrested Harrison. B.B. died before trial and was unable to testify about the controlled buys. As a substitute, the government played B.B.’s videos of the transactions for the jury, over Harrison’s objection. Recordings of statements from B.B. to law-enforcement personnel were excluded on Sixth Amendment grounds.The jury convicted Harrison on multiple drug counts and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that Harrison’s prior conviction for complicity to commit murder was a serious violent felony and that Harrison was subject to a sentencing enhancement, raising his mandatory minimum on the possession-with-intent-to-sell count from 10 years to 15. 21 U.S.C. 841. Harrison was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the introduction of B.B.’s videos violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers and the district court improperly characterized his prior conviction as a violent felony at sentencing. B.B.’s statements in the videos were not offered for their truth and were not hearsay. Complicity to commit murder always requires the use of physical force, because murder always requires the use of physical force. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The PROTECT Act of 2003, 117 Stat. 650, required the Sentencing Commission to vary penalties for child-pornography offenses depending on the number of images involved. Addressing a perceived ambiguity in Congress’s command, the Commission added a Sentencing Guidelines commentary application note instructing courts to equate one video to 75 images when calculating the applicable sentencing range, the “75:1 Rule,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(7) n.6(B). Recent Supreme Court precedent has clarified when courts can defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations (“Auer deference”).Phillips, convicted of possessing child pornography, argued that this recent clarification meant that courts can no longer rely on the 75:1 Rule and that the court erred in relying on it when imposing his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 151-month sentence. Applying traditional statutory construction, determining the number of images in a video is the kind of genuinely ambiguous exercise that the Commission was entitled to address in its commentary. The 75:1 Rule fits within the zone of ambiguity because it considers that videos contain multiple images; the purpose of tying offense levels to the number of images; and Congress’s choice to create four tiers of punishment, based on a scale of 10-600 images. The Rule has the character and context of an interpretation entitled to controlling weight. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Windham was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Windham’s attorney told the court that he had gone over the indictment “word by word” with Windham. The court advised Windham that he was “charged with kidnapping and with aiding and abetting kidnapping” in violation of the federal kidnapping statute. In a pro se motion, Windham later wrote that he had “been indicted [on] one count of ‘kidnapping[,]’” confirming that he understood that he had been charged with a single count. Windham’s negotiated plea agreement provided that he pleaded guilty to a single count of kidnapping and listed the elements of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. 2. The agreement also included Windham's admission that he and his accomplices held M.S. at gunpoint for an extended period of time and confirmed that he used a cell phone and a motor vehicle in furtherance of that offense. At his plea hearing, Windham confirmed that he: signed the plea agreement; initialed each page; and read and reviewed each paragraph with his attorney.The court sentenced Windham to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Windham’s arguments that no factual basis supported his guilty plea and that he was unaware of the nature of the charges against him. View "United States v. Windham" on Justia Law

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies investigated Bravo for drug trafficking. Those investigatory efforts revealed that Bravo sat at the head of an interstate drug trafficking organization: a contact in Mexico connected Bravo to drug suppliers, one of whom was Mercado-Lozano. When Bravo received drugs from those suppliers, he would route them to associates for distribution. Those associates included Bush, Gibson, and Mosley. Bush maintained one of Bravo’s stash houses, tended to marijuana growing on the property, and occasionally distributed drugs on Bravo’s behalf. Gibson was a street-level drug dealer who bought distribution quantities of cocaine from Bravo on five or six occasions. Mercado-Lozano, a 14-year veteran of the Sinaloa Cartel, was one of Bravo’s methamphetamine suppliers. Mosley bought distribution quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and marijuana from Bravo and sold them. After a two-year investigation, a federal grand jury indicted Bravo, Bush, Gibson, Mercado-Lozano, and Mosley for violating federal drug laws.In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. The court agreed with Gibson that his post-conviction letter to the district court asserting a perfunctory denial of guilt was an improper basis to impose a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, but otherwise rejected arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Mercado-Lozano" on Justia Law

Hewittel was convicted of armed robbery and related offenses based solely on the testimony of the victim. Three witnesses—one of them having little relationship with anyone in the case—were prepared to testify in support of Hewittel’s alibi that he was at home, almost a half-hour from the crime scene when the crime occurred. Hewittel’s attorney failed to call any of those witnesses at trial, not because of any strategic judgment but because Hewittel’s counsel thought the crime occurred between noon and 12:30 p.m. when Hewittel was at home alone. The victim twice testified (in counsel’s presence) that the crime occurred at 1:00 or 1:30 p.m.—by which time all three witnesses were present at Hewittel’s home. Counsel also believed that evidence of Hewittel’s prior convictions would have unavoidably come in at trial. In reality, that evidence almost certainly would have been excluded, if Hewittel’s counsel asked. Throughout the trial, Hewittel’s counsel repeatedly reminded the jury that his client had been convicted of armed robbery five times before.The trial judge twice ordered a new trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on the same mistake regarding the time of the offense. The federal district court granted a Hewittel writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, calling the trial “an extreme malfunction in the criminal justice system.” View "Hewitt-El v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Wellpath contracted with the jail to provide on-site medical staff and services. Wellpath assigned Dr. Cogswell, to work at the jail. While there, he sexually assaulted three inmates during their visits to the medical clinic. None of the women called out for help or otherwise indicated to the jail staff that anything untoward was occurring. One inmate, Bills recounted seeing an unidentified officer “glance through the little crack of the white curtain [and give] kind of like a head nod,” which Bills interpreted as the officer saying to Cogswell “I got your back.” Wellpath had a policy that if there was a sensitive exam going on, there would be a chaperone. During Cogswell’s tenure, Macomb Officer Horan reported to Wellpath’s nursing director and a Wellpath paramedic that Cogswell was potentially violating this policy by seeing patients unchaperoned, using a privacy screen. At Horan’s request, the nursing director “pop[ped] [her] head in” and saw “nothing out of the ordinary[ or] suspicious.”Days after their assaults, inmates reported the incidents to the jail. Wellpath learned of the reports the same day and immediately informed Cogswell not to report to work. Following an investigation, his employment was terminated. Cogswell was later convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In the inmates’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the lack of evidence that the defendants knew of Cogswell’s assaults before they were reported. View "Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail" on Justia Law

Police stopped Jones for a traffic violation. Ignoring demands that he step out of the car, Jones sped off, crashed the car, and ran until he was arrested. Police seized an AR-15 and a handgun from the car. Without a plea agreement, Jones pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court informed Jones of the maximum statutory penalties. Jones claimed he “thought [his] guideline was something different.” The government claimed the Guidelines called for 21-27 months’ imprisonment. Jones’s lawyer argued the range was 12-18 months. Jones was unaware that the court was not bound by those calculations. The court stated that it would use the PSR at sentencing. The PSR recommended 46-57 months’ imprisonment, Jones claimed that if he had known the court could sentence him to more time than the government originally requested, he would have fought the charge or taken a plea deal. The court informed Jones that he could move to withdraw his guilty plea but warned that if it denied the motion, Jones would lose credit for accepting responsibility. The prosecution then asked for a 57-month sentence. Jones went through with his guilty plea. The court sentenced him to 57 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated; the district court did not ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ruiz-Lopez was a frequent customer at a Memphis gas station and was friendly with the employees, including Hamid. One day, Ruiz-Lopez stopped at the gas station, carrying his new pistol in his pocket, and made a playful grab for Hamid’s hip-holstered firearm. According to Hamid, Ruiz-Lopez pulled his pistol out of his pocket and pointed it at Hamid’s face. As Ruiz-Lopez lowered the gun, he hit the trigger, discharging the weapon. The bullet ricocheted off the floor and struck Hamid’s leg. A surveillance camera captured this encounter; the district court found Hamid’s testimony credible.Ruiz-Lopez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as an undocumented alien, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The court imposed a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), reckless endangerment with a firearm, and ordered Ruiz-Lopez to pay $4,689.64 restitution to Hamid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court did not clearly err when it found that Ruiz-Lopez pointed a loaded firearm at Hamid’s face and committed no error by applying the enhancement. The restitution award was consistent with the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663. View "United States v. Leonel Ruiz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Reho, proceeding pro se, moved for an extension of time to apply for a certificate of appealability and to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 83 days after the district court entered judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was three weeks late, 28 U.S.C. 2107(b)(1); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i).The Sixth Circuit remanded. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was time-barred. However, the motion, which repeatedly asks for an extension of time and offered an explanation for his delay, is better construed as a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(c); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A); the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal based on “excusable neglect or good cause” if the petitioner moves for an extension within 30 days of the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal. On remand, the district court must determine whether Reho has shown excusable neglect or good cause so as to merit an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. View "Reho v. United States" on Justia Law

Officials switched Flint’s municipal water supply from the Detroit Water Department to the Flint River, reviving a dormant treatment plant. Flint residents immediately complained of water that looked, tasted, and smelled foul. There was evidence of E. coli contamination in the water, a localized outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease, and a dangerously high lead poisoning rate in children. Without proper corrosion-control treatment, lead leached from aging pipes into the water. The plaintiffs, children who suffered lead poisoning, brain damage, and other injuries, sued “governmental defendants” and “engineering defendants.” Criminal charges were prosecuted at the same time.The appellants, Flint Emergency Managers, and the former Flint Director of Public Works sought a protective order in the civil litigation after their initial criminal charges were dismissed, asking the court to delay discovery pertaining to them until the criminal statute of limitations expired or to seal the discovery. The district court denied the motion. Each sat for a deposition; none invoked the Fifth Amendment. All were later indicted.The governmental defendants settled the civil case. The remaining civil defendants served subpoenas on appellants, who moved to quash, contending that they would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied the motions, concluding that they had waived the privilege by testifying at their depositions. At trial, after each appellant invoked the Fifth Amendment, the court played videos of the depositions. After a mistrial, the court scheduled a retrial.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Appellants’ deposition waivers did not waive the privilege at trial because the waiver extended only through cross-examination at their depositions. View "Walters v. Snyder" on Justia Law