Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lamb was involved in an altercation with a WCI correctional office. Lamb alleges that other correctional officers retaliated by beating him and deploying pepper spray against him while he was handcuffed outside the presence of surveillance cameras. That night, Lamb was transferred to the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LeCI), where he was placed in restrictive housing. Lamb filed an internal informal complaint. WCI responded with a computer entry on the prison’s internal system, stating “[y]ou will be able to give your statement during the use of force investigation.” Lamb asserts that he did not receive this response for two years because he did not have access to the System while in restrictive housing. Lamb also alleges that he filed second and third informal complaints and unsuccessfully asked LeCl officers for forms to escalate his grievance. Lamb was transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. Lamb allegedly sent an appeal letter to the Chief Inspector of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. There is no record of this letter.Lamb filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed. While Lamb did not exhaust his administrative remedies properly, there remain material disputes of fact about whether prison officials rendered those administrative remedies unavailable. View "Lamb v. Kendrick" on Justia Law

Memphis attorney Skouteris practiced plaintiff-side, personal injury law. He routinely settled cases without permission, forged client signatures on settlement checks, and deposited those checks into his own account. Skouteris was arrested on state charges, was disbarred, and was indicted in federal court for bank fraud. At Skouteris’s federal trial, lay testimony suggested that Skouteris was not acting under any sort of diminished cognitive capacity. Two psychologists examined Skouteris. The defense expert maintained that Skouteris suffered from a “major depressive disorder,” “alcohol use disorder,” and “seizure disorder,” which began during Skouteris’s college football career, which, taken together, would have “significantly limited” Skouteris’s “ability to organize his mental efforts.” The government’s expert agreed that Skouteris suffered from depression and alcohol use disorder but concluded that Skouteris was “capable of having the mental ability to form and carry out complex thoughts, schemes, and plans.” Skouteris’s attorney unsuccessfully sought a jury instruction that evidence of “diminished mental capacity” could provide “reasonable doubt that” Skouteris had the “requisite culpable state of mind.”Convicted, Skouteris had a sentencing range of 46-57 months, with enhancements for “losses,” abusing a position of trust or using a special skill, and committing an offense that resulted in “substantial financial hardship” to at least one victim. The district court varied downward for a sentence of 30 months plus restitution of $147,406. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and the sentence. View "United States v. Skouteris" on Justia Law

Wallace, a Kentucky constable, planted evidence in order to enhance the charges against suspects. Officers who had observed him doing so told a supervisor who contacted the FBI. During an undercover sting operation, Wallace engaged in false arrests and “set up” an incident of drunk driving and “stuck his hand up [the driver’s] skirt and felt [her] butt.” In 2020, FBI agents conducted a consensual search at Wallace’s home and found 5.9 grams of methamphetamine in the safe and nearly 30 firearms around the property.Wallace was convicted of conspiracy to violate civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for Wallace’s possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug trafficking crime. The enhancement led to an advisory Guidelines range of 188-235 months. The court emphasized that Wallace refused to take responsibility for his crimes, targeted victims on the “low[est] rung” of society, and engaged in “stomach-turning” abuse of his office but imposed a sentence of 140 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Wallace’s drug conviction and the dangerous weapon enhancement supporting his sentence. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati City Council member, was charged with honest-services wire fraud, bribery, and attempted extortion under color of official right. The jury trial comprised nine days. The court did not sequester the jurors but admonished them repeatedly against discussing the case or considering extraneous information. On the third day of jury deliberations, a court employee informed the judge that “Juror X” had been posting to her private Facebook page, which was visible only to Juror X’s Facebook friends, of whom the court employee was one. The court obtained printouts of Juror X’s private posts and comments and called the parties to chambers to discuss the situation. In the meantime, the jury reached a verdict. The parties and court accepted the verdict with the possibility of a post-verdict “Remmer” hearing on possible extraneous influences on the jury. The jury convicted Sittenfeld on two counts. The court discharged the jury, questioned Jurors X and Y in chambers, denied Sittenfeld’s motion for a forensic examination of Juror X’s electronic devices, and concluded that Sittenfeld was not prejudiced by the Facebook postings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A court’s inherent or statutory authority in conducting a Remmer hearing does not include an unlimited, inquisitorial power to order jurors to surrender their personal possessions, such as their electronic devices, or to divulge their passwords; the district court had no power to order a forensic examination of the juror’s devices. View "In re: Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

In 2010, a jury convicted Mammone of the aggravated murder of his two children and his former mother-in-law, aggravated burglary, violation of a protective order, and attempted arson. Mammone’s mother, his father, and a psychologist testified on his behalf at sentencing, and Mammone gave a five-hour unsworn statement. The jury recommended and the court imposed three death sentences plus 27 years of consecutive imprisonment for his noncapital offenses. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected Mammone’s arguments that pretrial publicity was so prejudicial that he did not receive a fair trial; that the jurors unconstitutionally prayed before penalty-phase deliberations; and that trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Ohio Supreme Court held that it could not conclude that pretrial publicity rendered Mammone’s trial a “hollow formality.” That decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Mammone cites no Supreme Court precedent holding that prayer by jurors amounts to the influence of extraneous information. Mammone’s underlying claim that trial counsel should have pursued a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is not substantial because he cannot overcome the presumption that the decision was strategic. View "Mammone v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

A confidential informant notified the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Department of Public Safety (KDPS) that methamphetamine was being sold from 913 Cooper Avenue and that two firearms were in the home. KDPS linked the Gates brothers, Trevon and Deonte, to the residence. In total, the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services concluded that the brothers were accountable for distributing 1.41 kilograms of methamphetamine during the relevant time. Trevon received a 72-month sentence for pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Deonte received a 110-month sentence for pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).The Sixth Circuit affirmed Deonte’s sentence, rejecting an argument that the district court improperly considered juvenile conduct when calculating his Guidelines range. The court vacated Trevon’s sentence as procedurally unreasonable. The district court did not openly address the Guidelines as they related to Trevon’s section 924(c) conviction. After the district court imposed a 12-month above-Guideline sentence, Trevon objected. The district court responded, incorrectly: “The crime itself is without a guideline,” and later stated, “all right. If that’s correct, then I have varied upward for the reasons that I stated.” View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

Several members of the Romania-based “Alexandria Online Auction Fraud Network,” including Nedelcu, were charged with conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C 1962(d); conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). Romania extradited Nedelcu to the U.S. He pleaded guilty to RICO conspiracy in exchange for the dismissal of his other charges and admitted that the government could prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt including that a Confidential Source would, in accordance with Nedelcu’s instructions, launder the proceeds of fraud by exchanging fraud proceeds into bitcoin to conceal the source, nature, ownership, and control of those proceeds. Nedelcu and the CS laundered approximately $5,600. The PSR concluded that two money-laundering provisions applied: U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) increases a defendant’s offense level by two “[i]f the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1956” and section 2S1.1(b)(3), provides that, if 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense involved “sophisticated laundering” a further two-level increase is necessary.With a Guidelines Range of 78-97 months’ imprisonment, the court imposed a sentence of 82 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the factual basis for Nedelcu’s plea agreement specifically established that he committed money laundering as a predicate for his RICO conviction, the Guidelines compelled the district court to sentence him “as if” he had been convicted of money laundering. View "United States v. Nedelcu" on Justia Law

On November 17, 1997, an Ashtabula Police dispatcher advised officers that Jones, who had outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted. Days earlier, Jones had told his cousin that he “was facing a lot of time” and “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.” Officer Glover found Jones, who pulled a revolver from his pocket and fired several shots at Glover. Jones kicked Glover in the chest, then fled the scene. Officers apprehended Jones and recovered the weapon, which used hollow-point bullets. Officer Glover died the following morning.Jones was convicted of murder. During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder and testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment was to “throw them away, lock them up.” The jury recommended and the court imposed the death penalty. The district court denied Jones’s petition for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The issue of whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because his attorneys failed to prepare expert witnesses properly, as shown by the psychologist’s racialized testimony, was not procedurally defaulted. On de novo review of the merits, the court held trial counsel performed ineffectively and Jones is entitled to a new sentencing. View "Jones v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Walker Officer Dumond began pursuing Meadows after he passed Dumond on the highway while traveling nearly 90 miles per hour. During the subsequent traffic stop, which was captured on dash-camera footage, Dumond instructed Meadows to keep his hands out of his vehicle and to open the door to his vehicle. Dumond and Meadows shouted back and forth as Meadows attempted to open his door. Once Meadows exited the vehicle, Dumond grabbed Meadows and slammed him to the ground. On the ground, Dumond kneed Meadows to try and roll him over, and Officer Wietfeldt punched Meadows multiple times. Wietfeldt fractured Meadows’s wrist while handcuffing him.Meadows sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers appealed the denial of their summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court stated that on interlocutory appeal, it is bound by the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply or resisting arrest. The dash-camera footage does not “blatantly contradict” the factual issues identified by the district court. View "Meadows v. City of Walker, Michigan" on Justia Law

Clark was arrested for obtaining and distributing controlled substances, including cocaine and heroin, and for selling heroin to undercover agents on three occasions, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Clark had committed various felonies in the past, including two Tennessee convictions for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing enhancement if a defendant has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a).Clark pled guilty to the possession count. The PSR calculated Clark’s total offense level at 29, taking into account his career offender status. The Guidelines range was 151–188 months. Clark objected to his career offender designation, arguing that before Clark’s 2019 arrest, the Agriculture Improvement Act narrowed the federal definition of marijuana to exclude hemp, 21 U.S.C. 802(16). Tennessee narrowed its definition a few months later. The district court overruled Clark’s objections and sentenced Clark to 151 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines’ use of the term “controlled substance” in the career offender enhancement should be defined with reference to the drug schedules in place at the time of the prior convictions at issue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law