Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officers executing a warrant for Cooper’s arrest on firearms and narcotics charges learned that Cooper was a high-ranking gang member and saw a Facebook photo of Cooper holding a Glock handgun. At the home of Cooper’s girlfriend, Walton, Officer Fox knocked on the door. When Walton answered, Fox saw Cooper inside. Concerned about spooking Cooper, Fox showed Walton a photograph of another individual and asked whether he could come inside to look for the individual. According to Fox, Walton agreed. Fox arrested Cooper while other officers rushed in to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Jensen noticed a lump in the mattress, flipped it, and discovered the Glock handgun depicted in Cooper’s Facebook post. Fox then presented rights-waiver and consent-to-search forms. Walton initialed lines stating that she was consenting freely. Officers then conducted a thorough search but recovered only the hat seen on Facebook.Charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Cooper unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court largely engaged in an attenuation analysis focused on whether Walton’s subsequent consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal protective sweep. That was the wrong analysis The gun was seized during the initial unlawful search, so inevitable discovery is the correct analysis. On remand, the court should focus on whether officers would have sought (and obtained) Walton’s consent to search If the illegal protective sweep had never happened and whether the ensuing consent search would have led to the gun. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1985, Manning was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Manning was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Manning’s first and second habeas petitions. Since then, Manning has filed multiple unsuccessful motions for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.Manning, pro se, again sought an order authorizing a second or successive habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit again rejected his petition. Manning did not make a prima facie showing that his petition relied on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Manning cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” cannot be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Manning sought to extend Miller’s new rule to persons who (like Manning) were 18 years old at the time of their offense. Miller unambiguously applies to only those who were under 18 at the time of their offense; for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks a bright line. View "In re: Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault, 18 U.S.C. 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), 1512(b). Based on his criminal history, he was sentenced to 864 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Johnson did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The district court erred in allowing Johnson to proceed pro se. During the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Johnson if he understood the ramifications of his decision to represent himself without knowledge of the law but a review of the record indicates that the court’s questions did not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met. The judge commented that he had already asked the “taxpayers to pay for two of the finest lawyers in the district to represent [him].” Instead of confirming that Johnson knew the maximum potential sentences, as required by the model inquiry, the court downplayed his potential sentence. Stemming from that error, the court likewise should have directed Johnson’s counsel to file subpoenas and witness lists on Johnson’s behalf. The district court did not adequately apply the section 3553(a) factors when determining Johnson's sentence. The court ordered assignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

McKinnie, a recidivist drug dealer, was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, based on a career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. He had a 2011 crack cocaine conspiracy conviction and an Ohio attempted trafficking conviction. The enhancement increased McKinnie’s Guidelines range from 60-71 months to 151-188 months. After McKinnie’s sentence became final, the Sixth Circuit decided in “Havis,” that an attempted crime is not a predicate “controlled substance offense” under section 4B1.1. McKinnie then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 The district court denied McKinnie’s petition, reasoning that error in calculating the advisory Guidelines range, such as a Havis error, is not cognizable on collateral review, where relief is available only when a sentence violates the Constitution or a federal statute.McKinnie separately moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the Havis error, his obesity and hypertension, and the risk of contracting COVID-19 as “extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Havis error was not, as a matter of law, an extraordinary and compelling reason. McKinnie’s vaccination against COVID-19 mitigated his COVID-19 risk; his obesity and hypertension were insufficient to grant relief. His potential rehabilitation was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

An undercover Kentucky police detective used a computer program to search for individuals who were illegally trading and downloading child pornography on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, and, on several occasions in May-June 2017, downloaded child pornography from a computer with an IP address located in Independence, Kentucky. Officers used the information to obtain a warrant to search Michael Clark’s residence.In April 2018, officers executed the search warrant. Clark and others were home. The officers seized multiple computers, interviewed Clark, and recorded the interview. They told Clark that he was not under arrest, and they did not give him Miranda warnings. Clark stated that the MacBook laptop was his work computer. The three seized computers were sent to a forensic examiner. An examination of the MacBook computer found 295 images and 62 videos of child pornography, a user profile named “Mike,” and evidence suggesting the former presence of additional illegal content and filesharing programs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Clark’s conviction on five counts of knowingly distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and 192-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the interstate-commerce and “knowing distribution” elements of the conviction, to the admission of the recorded interrogation, to the admission of evidence concerning old computers found in Clark’s home, and to evidence of Clark’s computer knowledge. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Tempo’s convictions and 30-year sentence for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(C), 846; drug possession and distribution, section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and drug possession and distribution near a school, sections 841, 860. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that he was sentenced under an unconstitutionally vague sentencing provision.The court upheld Sadler’s convictions for drug conspiracy, drug possession and distribution near a school, felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), conspiracy to obstruct justice (section 1512(k)), and witness tampering, section 1512(a)(2)(A). The court held that jury instructions correctly stated the causation standard under 841(b)(1)(C), where serious bodily injury or death results from the use of the drugs distributed. The court vacated Sadler’s sentence and remanded for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) based on the overdoses. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law

Mizori pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; his PSR recommended a finding that Mizori had acted as a manager or supervisor within a conspiracy. A police investigator and an informant testified that Mizori had played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Mizori did not call any witnesses. The district court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.Mizori sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel’s failure to offer any witnesses at the sentencing hearing amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Mizori attached supporting affidavits from three co-conspirators. Almost four years later the district court denied Mizori’s motion. Mizori, then confined in a high-security Special Housing Unit, “SHU,” had 60 days— until September 15, 2019—to file a notice of appeal but had no access to stamps or a law library. He was confined in the SHU until September 29. Days later, Mizori timely moved, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.The district court denied his motion, stating that “Mizori has not met his burden of establishing excusable neglect" but did not address whether Mizori had shown “good cause” for an extension, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), the ground on which Mizori sought relief. The Sixth Circuit held that Mizori does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion and that the district court abused its discretion by denying that motion. View "Mizori v. United States" on Justia Law

Greene was booked into the Crawford County Jail after having his bond revoked for attending a plea hearing while intoxicated. Over the next four days, Greene began hallucinating and exhibiting other symptoms of delirium tremens, a life-threatening complication of alcohol withdrawal that the Sixth Circuit has recognized as an objectively serious medical need. Greene ultimately suffered acute respiratory failure. He died four days later. Crawford County officials did not provide any medical care to Greene before his incapacitation but only sought a mental health evaluation from a Community Mental Health Authority and purportedly relied on that evaluation in deciding not to seek medical assistance.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to Greene’s medical need and that Crawford County is liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of not providing medical care to inmates suffering from delirium tremens, the district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to some county officials and denied Crawford County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Greene experienced a clearly established life-threatening medical condition for at least two days. The defendants did not provide any medical assistance during that time. The court dismissed Crawford County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Greene v. Crawford County" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip, Cleveland police arranged for a controlled buy from Hall at his residence, using a confidential informant. The next day, officers executed a search warrant for Hall’s residence. They recovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. This cycle was repeated the next month. Weeks later, officers saw Hall conducting a drug transaction in a parked vehicle; they pulled him over, searched the vehicle, and arrested him. He was released from custody with an ankle monitor. Police received information that Hall was continuing to sell drugs and conducted another controlled buy, followed by a search of Hall’s residence, where they recovered drugs, cash, and a cell phone. Officers monitored his telephone calls from the jail, executed another controlled buy, and recovered from Franklin’s vehicle roughly 500 grams of cocaine, 300 grams of heroin, a loaded gun, and marijuana. They found $1,000 on Franklin’s person, $60 of which was the prerecorded money from that day’s controlled buy, and two cell phones that had used to schedule the controlled buys.Hall and Franklin were convicted of drug and firearm offenses; each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the sufficiency of the evidence and to the racial composition of the jury. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence found in Hall’s vehicle and the district court’s admission of certain testimony by officers. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law