Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Clark was arrested for obtaining and distributing controlled substances, including cocaine and heroin, and for selling heroin to undercover agents on three occasions, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Clark had committed various felonies in the past, including two Tennessee convictions for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing enhancement if a defendant has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a).Clark pled guilty to the possession count. The PSR calculated Clark’s total offense level at 29, taking into account his career offender status. The Guidelines range was 151–188 months. Clark objected to his career offender designation, arguing that before Clark’s 2019 arrest, the Agriculture Improvement Act narrowed the federal definition of marijuana to exclude hemp, 21 U.S.C. 802(16). Tennessee narrowed its definition a few months later. The district court overruled Clark’s objections and sentenced Clark to 151 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines’ use of the term “controlled substance” in the career offender enhancement should be defined with reference to the drug schedules in place at the time of the prior convictions at issue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Paulk pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 921(a), and 924(e). The PSR concluded that three of Paulk’s prior convictions were “violent felon[ies]” as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). He did not object to that finding. The district court sentenced him as a career offender and imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a section 922(g) conviction if the defendant has three or more previous convictions for “violent felon[ies],” “serious drug offense[s],” or both.Paulk challenged the conclusion that his 2011 conviction for Michigan third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under ACCA. Reviewing his challenge for plain error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court applied the categorical approach and rejected Paulk’s argument that it is possible to imagine scenarios in which there is no intent to commit a crime, yet a defendant could be convicted of third-degree home invasion. “This creative legal imagination is insufficient.” Paulk demonstrated at best “a theoretical possibility[] that [Michigan] would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of [burglary].” View "United States v. Paulk" on Justia Law

A DEA task force investigated Jacobs, a Kentucky drug dealer. Jacobs sold drugs to a couple who allegedly were “good friends” with the local Commonwealth Attorney (CA). After Jacobs' arrest on state drug-trafficking charges, the couple had extensive conversations with the CA. After one conversation, an assistant state prosecutor requested Jacobs’s cell phone records from the task force, alerting the DEA to the CA’s relationship with Jacobs’s customers. The CA became involved in the case in other ways, impeding Jacobs’ use as a cooperating witness in other federal investigations by opposing a bond reduction and refusing to seek a state search warrant for an unrelated case if the DEA agent from the Jacobs investigation was involved. The DEA began investigating the CA’s conduct, “Operation Speakeasy.” Evidence was presented to the U.S. Attorney, who refused to bring obstruction charges against the CA.A Cincinnati Enquirer reporter filed a Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 request with the DEA, seeking any document related to the Jacobs investigation or Operation Speakeasy. The DEA denied that request, citing an exception for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Enquirer’s suit. The documents “only minimally advance[d] a public interest in shedding light on the decision” to not prosecute the CA and “significant privacy interests outweigh[ed] the proffered public interest.” View "Cincinnati Enquirer v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

A Romanian organization, the Alexandria Online Auction Fraud Network (AOAF), used fraudulent online advertisements on websites like eBay, Craigslist, and Amazon to convince unknowing U.S. purchasers to send payments for high-value items that did not actually exist. After receiving the payments through vehicles like gift cards and prepaid debit cards, AOAF money launderers in the U.S., including Brown, converted the payments into Bitcoin currency, which was then transferred back to Romania. Foreign Bitcoin exchange businesses including RG, Iossifov’s Bulgaria-based business, then transferred the Bitcoin balances to cash on behalf of AOAF fraudsters. About 900 victims never received the items for which they paid. The government learned about the scheme in 2014 when it discovered that an American citizen living in Kentucky was laundering funds on behalf of an online fraud organization; the individual became a confidential source.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Iossifov and Brown’s convictions and sentences under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and Iossifov’s additional conviction for conspiring to launder money 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The court rejected venue, jurisdiction, and Due Process claims, a contention that Bitcoin does not fall under the money laundering statute, and challenges to sentencing enhancements and evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Iossifov" on Justia Law

Ozomaro was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. After competency proceedings and the withdrawal of appointed counsel, the court allowed Ozomaro to proceed pro se, with standby counsel. Ozomaro repeatedly asserted that he would not attend his trial and submitted incoherent jurisdictional arguments. On the day set for trial, Ozomaro refused to leave his holding cell. The court adjourned until October 20. On October 20, Ozomaro appeared. The court empaneled 12 jurors and two alternates. After a day of deliberations, a juror informed a court staff member that she observed a juror drinking alcohol during lunch and that “the same individual hates the Government and doesn’t believe anything they say.” Another juror called to ask if “it was legal to drink on lunch break,” stating that “a juror openly admitted bias to the Government.” The court separately questioned each juror. Most of the jurors verified the allegations about Juror 109, who was excused and replaced with an alternate juror. The jury was told, “start completely brand new.” Following a guilty verdict, Ozomaro was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a sufficient factual inquiry from which to find good cause and conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the discharge stemmed from Juror 109’s views of the case. The court upheld the application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Ozomaro’s refusal to appear. View "United States v. Ozomaro" on Justia Law

Fields was charged with possession of 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The indictment alleged that Fields had two prior Kentucky “final conviction[s] for . . . serious drug felon[ies]” for which he served over a year in prison and was released within 15 years of the instant offense: “Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree,” and “Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor and Persistent Felony Offender,” The trial was bifurcated into two phases to prove the substantive drug offense and to prove that Fields had previously been convicted of two serious drug felonies.The Sixth Circuit vacated Fields’ 25-year mandatory-minimum enhanced sentence, rejecting one of the “serious drug offense” predicates. Kentucky’s meth-precursor statute applies when a defendant was not yet capable of manufacturing methamphetamine and does not “necessarily entail” manufacturing under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court rejected challenges to the procedure used to impose the enhancement, including arguments that 21 U.S.C. 851(b), which governs procedures for imposing the enhancement, facially violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling defendants to testify regarding previous convictions and that section 851(c) facially violates the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges to determine facts—the length and recency of incarceration—that the Constitution requires to be decided by a jury. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, two jail officers, and dismissing Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that Defendants caused his injuries, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that either defendant violated his constitutional rights.Plaintiff was booked into Boone County Detention Center on nonviolent drug charges and was placed in a cell with Jordan Webster, a fellow detainee. Webster attacked and beat Plaintiff during the night. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from the risk of harm posed by Webster. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm by failing to protect him from Webster. View "Stein v. Gunkel" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to suppress, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the circumstances of this case.Defendant entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently brought this appeal challenging the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop leading to the search of his car and unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to warrant a prudent person in believing Defendant had violated 4511.431(A); and (2) the officer had probable cause to detain Defendant, investigate the source of a marijuana odor, and continue search the entire vehicle for marijuana. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that the district court erred by denying Defendant's request to vacate his 18 U.S.C. 924(j) conviction.Defendant pled guilty to discharging a firearm during a crime of violence that resulted in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(j), and illegally possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the Court should vacate his crime-of-violence conviction under section 924(j) because of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). The Sixth Circuit agreed and vacated that conviction, holding that, given Davis, Defendant did not violate section 924(j) because his attempted robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the constitutional portion of section 924's definition. View "Wallace v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court vacating its previous judgment, in which it granted Defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and vacated his sentence, and reinstating Defendant's original sentence, holding that the district court did not enjoy the discretion to resentence Defendant de novo.More than a decade ago, Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. In part because Defendant had prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary the district court designated sentenced Defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Defendant later moved to vacate his sentence under section 2255, arguing that his prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary did not constitute violent felonies given recent developments in Armed Career Criminal Act jurisprudence. The district court granted the motion and vacated Defendant's sentence. Due to intervening Supreme Court caselaw decided before resentencing, the district court vacated the order granting Defendant's section 2255 motion, denied the motion, and reinstated the original sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant lacked any viable section 2255 claim. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law