Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigations searches social media for people soliciting sex from children and saw that Hruby, a Texas resident, was advertising as a “[g]randpa looking for open family.” Posing as the mother of two girls under the age of 12, Detective D’Hondt responded; during the sexually charged conversation that followed, D’Hondt concluded that Hruby had molested a child. Hruby flew to Kentucky to meet D’Hondt’s children but was arrested when he landed. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Hruby admitted that his friend “sent” his five-year-old daughter “to bed” with him. Investigators found child pornography on Hruby’s cell phone.Hruby was charged with crossing state lines with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The government was permitted to offer Rule 414(a) evidence: Hruby’s online messages regarding his history of child molestations and his post-arrest confession. Under Rule 414(a) a court may admit evidence that a defendant previously molested a child to show that he is inclined to molest children if the evidence is offered on a relevant matter. The court rejected Hruby’s argument that the statements should be excluded under Rule 403 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hruby’s convictions, rejecting his argument that the government should have to corroborate a Rule 414(a) confession before the jury can consider it. View "United States v. Hruby" on Justia Law

Hymes pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C). Hymes had multiple prior state convictions. The district court initially sentenced Hymes to 188 months’ imprisonment. While Hymes’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided “Havis” (2019), casting doubt over the district court’s reading of the Sentencing Guidelines in Hymes’s case. On remand, with the career offender provision off the table, Hymes faced a Guidelines range of 110-137 months imprisonment. Hymes argued that his prior driving offenses artificially inflated his criminal history score and that several post-incarceration developments warranted a variance, including his behavior in prison and the COVID-19 pandemic.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 124-month sentence. The district court, acting on a limited remand, did not abuse its discretion in evaluating Hymes’s criminal history or rehabilitation arguments. A district court is not required to consult the Sentencing Commission’s collected data in order to avoid sentencing disparities. In two separate sentencing proceedings, the district court thoughtfully explained why a sentence near the bottom of the Guidelines range was appropriate and, citing Hymes’s recent drug trafficking convictions, concluded that Hymes was a chronic recidivist and that a sentence below the Guidelines recommendation would be inappropriate. View "United States v. Hymes" on Justia Law

In 1996, two 17-year-olds, Harris and Gaines, approached soldiers at the Fort Campbell Army base. Attempting to rob them, Gaines pulled out a handgun, which discharged. A bullet struck Private Alonso-Caravia, killing him. Harris and Gaines pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1111, aiding and abetting attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 2111, and aiding and abetting using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c). The district court sentenced Harris to 420 months plus a consecutive 60-month prison term for the section 924(c) conviction.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Harris argued that the consecutive 60-month sentence must be vacated because it is possible that the court imposed that punishment under the unconstitutionally vague “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that the sentence cannot be saved under the “elements clause” of section 924(c)(3)(A) because neither of his other convictions could have been considered a “crime of violence” under then-existing precedent. Harris cannot establish harm that he suffered from any error. At best, Harris can show that the record of his sentencing is silent as to whether the court relied upon 924(c)(3)’s elements clause or residual clause when imposing his sentence. The 18 U.S.C. 2111 crime of aiding and abetting attempted robbery necessarily constitutes a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

Gillispie was convicted of two 1988 rapes and spent more than 20 years in prison before Ohio courts vacated his convictions, based on his claims of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and actual innocence. Gillispie brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Moore, the police officer responsible for much of the investigation and the identification of Gillispie as the likely perpetrator. Gillispie alleges that Moore suppressed exculpatory evidence, arranged an unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedure, fabricated inculpatory evidence, assisted in maliciously prosecuting him, and destroyed exculpatory evidence. Moore claims entitlement to qualified immunity. The district court determined that each of Gillispie’s claims should proceed to trial.The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Moore’s argument on appeal is simply a challenge to the district court’s determinations that genuine issues of material fact exist on the core claims. Defendants cannot appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. “An appeal choosing to take this tack anyway delays the administration of our justice system and is a waste of judicial resources.” View "Gillispie v. Miami Township" on Justia Law

Presley pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to burglarize more than 90 pharmacies, 18 U.S.C. 2118(d), and to assault of a police officer, 21 U.S.C. 2118(c). Presley had attempted to flee from arrest by speeding off in a car, almost striking the arresting officer, and had led a high-speed chase through residential areas before becoming stuck in a yard. Presley received a full reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He stipulated to “specific offense characteristics” for the conspiracy count: the burglary involved a structure other than a residence, the offense involved more than minimal planning, and the loss was more than $20,000 but less than $95,000. The court added one level because a controlled substance was taken, two levels for possession of a crowbar as a “dangerous weapon,” six levels for the assault of the officer, and two levels for the risk created to others by Presley’s flight. During his plea colloquy, Presley twice confirmed that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney and was “giving up the right to appeal the sentence to be imposed.” With a Guidelines range of 92-115 months, after addressing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a 102-month sentence.Though Presley’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, he challenged his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. Presley knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and was aware of the consequences; both his appellate waiver and his plea agreement are enforceable. View "United States v. Presley" on Justia Law

Hale, charged with failing a drug test while on pretrial diversion in Boyle County, was detained at the Marion County Detention Center ahead of her trial. The Boyle County Sheriff’s Office transported Hale between the counties for her monthly court appearances. Court Security Officer Pennington was the driver. Hale and Pennington repeatedly performed oral sex on each other and had unprotected penetrative vaginal sex in Pennington’s van. Before and during the encounters, Pennington showered Hale with perks—she rode cuffless in his van’s front seat, he bought her sodas, and he allowed her to smoke. He also offered to intervene in Hale’s pending criminal case. Hale gave birth to their child.Hale filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Pennington, Boyle County, and Sheriff Robbins. The district court found that Hale’s consenting to sexual contact and intercourse with Pennington negated her constitutional claims, and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hale’s assertions against Pennington are properly viewed as an excessive-force claim that should be evaluated under an objective test. Hale asserted intimidation and coercion. She presented a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the encounters with Pennington were consensual. View "Hale v. Boyle County" on Justia Law

During an investigation into whether Elmore sexually abused a seven-year-old girl, officers obtained and executed a warrant to remove Elmore’s vehicle from his stepmother’s home and search the vehicle. Elmore’s stepmother gave officers a key fob for Elmore’s car. Searches of the car and of a storage unit revealed no evidence. Weeks later, Elmore’s stepmother found that Elsmore had two more key fobs and notified the officers of her nagging suspicions that Elmore was hiding child pornography on one of the fobs. The officers also had a tip from Elmore’s fellow inmate. Aided by a warrant, a subsequent search of the fobs revealed a memory card containing child pornography. Elmore was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography. Elmore twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the memory card evidence, then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Elmore’s conviction (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)) and the revocation of his earlier term of supervised released (based on a prior child pornography conviction). Elmore’s suppression argument rests on his view that his stepmother’s actions were the “tainted consequences of law enforcement’s unlawful searches and seizures” but the search of the key fobs was separated from the earlier searches. The affidavit passes constitutional muster. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Michigan Department of Corrections inmates may hold formal group services or possess certain religious property only if the Department has formally recognized their faith. Though the Department recognizes the Ifa faith, it is one of only three recognized religions that was denied group services. A group is not guaranteed religious services if there are less than five prisoners within the same security level in a facility; the Department may bar group services if they may pose “safety and security” concerns. When an inmate submits a request for group worship or religious property, the warden must forward the request to the Special Activities Coordinator, who must evaluate the request. The deputy director makes the final decision. Discretion is minimal.Between his conversion to the Ifa faith in August 2015 and filing this lawsuit more than two years later, Byrd sent four requests for Ifa group services and nine items that he considers essential to his faith (a straw prayer mat, herbs, and beads). Although Byrd enlisted the chaplain’s assistance, none of his requests received a response. Byrd sued, alleging violations of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The district court erred in viewing the problem as procedural; the long delay is tantamount to a substantive denial. View "Byrd v. Haas" on Justia Law

Wesson was charged with murdering 81-year-old Varhola and attacking (and nearly killing) his 77-year-old wife, after they invited him into their home on February 25, 2008. A three-judge panel convicted Wesson of several charges, including two counts of aggravated murder, and imposed the death penalty. Wesson unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confession to police due to his alleged intoxication and other factors when they questioned him. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court vacated one of Wesson’s aggravated murder convictions but affirmed his remaining convictions and the death sentence; the court rejected Wesson’s claim that his alleged intoxication vitiated his Miranda waiver.Wesson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, and the government violated his right against self-incrimination when it introduced his post-Miranda statement. The district court found that Wesson made a credible claim of intellectual disability and dismissed that claim and a related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to allow the state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on Wesson’s second claim. The state courts did not unreasonably apply the law or facts with respect to his confession, which occurred when he allegedly was intoxicated. View "Wesson v. Shoop" on Justia Law