Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief from his first-degree murder conviction, holding that there was no merit to any of Appellant's claims on appeal.In his section 2255 petition, Appellant claimed that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel (IAC). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on Appellant's IAC claim concerning an alleged conflict of interest, a Brady claim, an IAC claim regarding the investigation at the guilt stage, and a final IAC claim regarding the presentation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error. View "Gabrion, II v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that, in Tennessee, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a defendant's procedural default of a substantive claim of ineffective assistance at the motion-for-a-new-trial stage of the proceedings.Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and criminal impersonation. The jury sentenced Appellant to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court with respect to the guilt phase of Defendant's trial; (2) held that Appellant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase, requiring remand with instructions to grant habeas on this claim as to the penalty phase; and (3) vacated the district court's findings that Appellant failed to overcome his procedural default on certain claims; and (4) reversed the court's finding that the Martinez-Trevino exception to procedural default cannot excuse a procedural default when the underlying ineffective assistance occurred in a motion for a new trial. View "Rogers v. Mays" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the government's motion to admit records documenting a terrorist group's organizational structure, logistics, and activities as statements of co-conspirators under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), holding that the district court erred.A grant jury indicted Defendant for his ISIS-related activities. Before trial, the government identified certain exhibits recovered from various ISIS facilities and moved to admit the documents as statements of co-conspirators admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The district court denied the government's motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the government adequately defined the scope of the conspiracy that it claimed existed, and the district court clearly erred in ruling otherwise. View "United States v. Musaibli" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to 120 months for his federal drug trafficking and firearm offenses, holding that a procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence.Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and two firearm possession offenses. The district court imposed concurrent sixty-month sentences on counts one and two followed by a mandatory consecutive sixty-month sentence on count three. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that one of Defendant's prior Ohio Robbery offenses was a predicate offense warranting a career-offender enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines; but (2) the error did not warrant a remand because it was harmless. View "United States v. Butts" on Justia Law

Jarvela drank several rum-and-cokes, then drove his Silverado to a Shell station to buy cigarettes. Afterward, the store clerk called the police to report that “a drunk guy" had just left driving a black Silverado. In a nearby police cruiser, Officer Trevino spotted the Silverado, speeding and drifting over the road’s center line. Trevino activated his lights and pursued the truck. Jarvela led Trevino on an extended chase. After about five minutes, the road turned to gravel and the Silverado struck a tree. Jarvela fled on foot into a darkened wooded area. Trevino called for backup. Deputy Houk and his service dog, Argo, arrived and began searching with Argo leashed. After about five minutes, Argo found clothing. Moments later Jarvela was visible in the weeds, wrestling with Argo, who was clinging to Jarvela’s arm. Jarvela tried to injure Argo. Houk delivered seven blows to Jarvela's back, yelling “Let go of the fucking dog.” Trevino shot his taser at Jarvela, who rolled onto his back. Trevino again deployed his taser.In Jarvela’s excessive force suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit held that Houk had no constitutional duty to shout out a warning to Jarvela before searching for him with the dog and was entitled to summary judgment. View "Jarvela v. Houk" on Justia Law

After a decade in state prison for gross sexual imposition and kidnapping, Sharp was released on parole with conditions that required him to refrain from unsupervised contact with minors; obtain his parole officer’s approval of any adult who might supervise his contact with minors; and submit to “warrantless search[es]” of his person and property “at any time.” Under Ohio law, a parole officer may search a parolee without a warrant if he has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the parolee has violated the law or a parole condition. During his parole, a woman told police that, 10 days earlier, Sharp had sexually assaulted her at his house while her children slept nearby and that Sharp had been assisting her children with transportation. Sharp’s parole officer concluded that Sharp had violated his parole. Nearly three weeks after the alleged assault, officers arrested Sharp, transported Sharp to his home, then conducted a warrantless search and found a loaded firearm.Sharp was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the gun. Under the special-needs framework, a parolee search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances if it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Bailey reasonably suspected that he would find evidence of a parole violation at Sharp’s home. A parolee’s search conditions factor into the reasonableness balance. View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

In its 2014 “Mitchell” decision, the Sixth Circuit held that robbery, as defined under Tennessee law, is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). Based on that holding, the district court sentenced Belcher to a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence under ACCA after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The Sixth Circuit rejected Belcher’s arguments that the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Elonis” and 2021 “Borden” decisions undermine Mitchell. Those decisions clarified that ACCA’s definition of violent felony excludes offenses where the defendant’s use or threatened use of force can be reckless or negligent (as opposed to intentional). Tennessee defines robbery as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” The court rejected Belcher’s argument that Tennessee precedent leaves room for cases where the defendant did not intend to cause fear, but where the victim actually did experience (or reasonably could have experienced) fear nonetheless; no Tennessee court has construed the fear element that way. The court also rejected Belcher’s argument that a jury, rather than the court, must determine whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of ACCA. Three of his prior offenses each came at least six years apart. View "United States v. Belcher" on Justia Law

Inman was part of the majority of the Michigan House of Representatives who, along with a majority of the Senate, voted to repeal the prevailing-wage law. Inman was charged with soliciting bribes for his prevailing-wage vote: attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951; soliciting a bribe, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); and making a false statement to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (Count III). A jury acquitted Inman on Count III but hung on Counts I and II. The district court dismissed those counts, concluding that the acquittal precluded a retrial on the other counts.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The acquittal on the false-statement charge did not decide any fact that necessarily precludes a verdict against Inman on the extortion and bribery-solicitation charges, so issue preclusion does not apply. To show the underlying corrupt agreement, the prosecution did not need to produce evidence that Inman lied to the FBI. It needed to produce evidence that Inman extorted or attempted to solicit an agreement where Inman would vote on the prevailing-wage law in exchange for payment. At retrial, a jury must decide whether Inman actually extorted or attempted to solicit such an agreement—a question not answered by the acquittal on Count III. View "United States v. Larry Inman" on Justia Law

Akron Police received an anonymous call that men were smoking marijuana in Whitney Park, "a high-crime area." Several officers, including Detective Elam, went to investigate. They arrived at the park in the early evening and saw a group of 10-15 men, including McCallister; they detected the odor of marijuana and began stopping people. Four men, including McCallister, tried to walk away. An officer instructed them to stop moving and place their hands on their heads. McCallister did so. Elam saw a “little bump out on his shirt,” which the detective concluded was a gun, and saw McCallister “turn[] his body in towards the huddle so no one would see.” Elam asked McCallister if he was carrying any weapons; McCallister did not respond. As McCallister raised his hands, his shirt lifted, and Elam saw a firearm magazine tucked into McCallister’s waistband. Elam retrieved the weapon.McCallister was indicted for illegal possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), and possessing an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion that all of the men were smoking marijuana, justifying the detention, and reasonable suspicion that McCallister was armed and dangerous, justifying the search. View "United States v. McCallister" on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on four previous Kentucky robbery convictions, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). When Williams was 16, he pled guilty to robbery in the first degree, Ky. Rev. Stat. 515.020, and three counts of robbery in the second degree, section 515.030. The four robberies, committed on separate days by the same individuals, were charged in the same indictment. Williams argued that the second-degree robbery convictions were not ACCA predicate offenses because they were not violent and not separate offenses. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment, considered 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, and sentenced Williams to 200 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Looking at Kentucky law as a whole, robbery occurs when the defendant steals using force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will and does not encompass taking without the victim’s awareness or without physical force; second-degree robbery in Kentucky requires a sufficient level of force to satisfy ACCA’s elements clause. It is not a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law