Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

VanDemark owns the Used Car Supermarket, which sells cars from two lots in Amelia, Ohio. In 2013-2014, VanDemark funneled away his customers’ down payments and left them off his tax returns. He used this stashed-away cash to finance the mortgage on his mansion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed VanDemark’s convictions for helping prepare false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), structuring payments, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The down payments were taxable upon receipt, not, as VanDemark argued, when customers purchased the cars after leasing them. With respect to his missing 2013 personal return, the court stated that a defendant is guilty even if he helps prepare, without presenting, the fraudulent return. View "United States v. VanDemark" on Justia Law

Ziesel entered a bank wearing a mask and a hooded sweatshirt, approached the tellers, and said “give me all the money.” At some point, Ziesel told the tellers that “no one was going to get hurt.” Before leaving with the money, Ziesel told the tellers to get on the floor. Ziesel did not have a weapon, nor did he imply he had a weapon. Ziesel pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for “physical restraint” under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), resulting in an imprisonment range of 46-57 months. Without that enhancement, the range would have been 37-46 months.The judge noted that application of the enhancement was “a close question” but overruled Ziesel’s objection, stating: the simple communication “This is a bank robbery” connotes a certain degree of potential harm, whether a weapon is shown or not, and certainly, control is exercised by the robber ... when you are standing upright, and then to be told to go into prone position by somebody who appears able to exercise substantial force over you …. They believed that you posed a clear and present danger. The Sixth Circuit reversed Ziesel’s 46-month sentence. Neither the plain language of the Guidelines nor precedent supports application of the enhancement under thesed facts. View "United States v. Ziesel" on Justia Law

Bell was charged with distribution of a controlled substance that resulted in death, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, section 841(a)(1). Bell pled guilty to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense--distribution of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the guilty plea but ultimately rejected the plea agreement. The court then sentenced Bell to 30 months’ imprisonment—a sentence approximately 82 percent lower than that contemplated under the plea agreement. The government appealed, alleging a right to withdraw its consent to a plea to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense when a district court rejects a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s arguments. Rule 11 contemplates that the rejection of a plea agreement allows the defendant, not the prosecutor, to withdraw or persist in the plea. Where, as here, the defendant pleads to all charges against him and chooses not to withdraw his pleas, there are no remaining charges for which the government may proceed to trial, and a subsequent re-indictment for the greater included offense implicates double jeopardy concerns under the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Alcoa Officers arrested an obviously inebriated Colson following a report that, while driving her SUV, she chased her 10-year-old son in a field and then crashed in a ditch, and transported her to a hospital. Colson then withdrew her consent. to a blood draw. Colson defied repeated orders to get back into the cruiser. During the struggle, an officer's knee touched Colson’s knee, followed by an audible “pop.” Colson started screaming “my fucking knee” but continued to resist. Once Colson was in the cruiser, officers called a supervisor, then took Colson to the jail where a nurse would perform the blood draw. Colson never asked for medical care. At the jail, Colson exited the vehicle and walked inside, with no indication that she was injured. As she was frisked, Colson fell to the ground and said “my fucking knee.” Jail nurse Russell asked Colson to perform various motions with the injured leg and compared Colson’s knees, commented “I don’t see no swelling,” and then left. A week later, Colson was diagnosed with a torn ACL, a strained LCL, and a small avulsion fracture of the fibular head. Colson pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, reckless endangerment, and DUI.Colson sued; only a claim for failure to provide medical care for her knee injury survived. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Colson v. City of Alcoa" on Justia Law

Maddux and his wife, Carman trafficked cigarettes in a way that bypassed governmental taxing authorities. They were indicted; Maddux pleaded guilty and Carman was convicted in 2016. Before their sentencing hearings, the government sought two multi-million-dollar money judgments against each of them—forfeiture orders representing the gross proceeds of their scheme. At sentencing, however, the district court failed to enter preliminary forfeiture orders, nor did it include the money judgments as “part of the sentence[s]” announced, 28 U.S.C. 2461(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B), (b)(4)(A)–(B). Years after their sentences were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, the district court imposed the money judgments sought, justifying its late-issued money judgments by calling Rule 32.2(b)’s procedural requirements time-related directives—deadlines that may be violated so long as the defendant receives adequate notice and a hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rule 32.2(b) is not a time-related directive. Its text, context, and purpose indicated that it is a mandatory claims-processing rule—one that ensures forfeiture is resolved fairly and fully before becoming final, which preserves judicial resources by avoiding wasteful appeals over avoidable errors. Once a criminal sentence is imposed, the judgment is final, both as to what it includes and what it lacks. If the government wishes to “enlarge [the] sentence” with forfeiture omitted from the sentence, it must timely appeal. View "United States v. Maddux" on Justia Law

Detroit police officers apprehended a fleeing suspect who had run across several yards, including White’s yard. Believing that the suspect had disposed of a weapon nearby, officers called in a canine unit to search. Bodycam and security camera footage captured the events that followed. Officer Cherry arrived with her trained canine, Roky. The White family had two dogs outside, White’s daughter, Mi-Chol, grabbed Chino, a pit bull, to put him inside but he escaped and ran to the front yard. Mi-Chol went inside to grab a leash. As Officer Cherry and Roky reached the corner of the adjoining yard, Chino lurched through the fence’s vertical spires and bit down on Roky’s snout. Roky yelped. Cherry turned and saw Roky trapped up against the fence with his nose in Chino’s mouth. Cherry tugged at Roky’s leash and yelled at Chino to “let go.” Chino began “thrashing.” Unable to free Roky and afraid for the dog’s life, Cherry shot Chino. Six seconds passed between Chino’s attack and Cherry’s shot. Chino died from the shot. The Whites sued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Officer Cherry acted reasonably. View "White v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2005, Adolphe was found murdered in front of his apartment building. Adolphe and Carr had been dating. Carr, age 16, was arrested and entered an Alford plea in 2008 to second-degree manslaughter, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. She was paroled in 2009 and discharged in 2018. In 2019, Kentucky Governor Bevin granted Carr “the full and unconditional pardon she has requested.”A year later, Carr sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants fabricated evidence, coerced false statements, and withheld exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed Carr’s complaint, finding that her section 1983 claims were not cognizable under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While a full pardon does not always indicate that the individual is innocent, Heck did not impose a prerequisite of innocence to seek relief under section 1983; a full pardon in Kentucky removes all legal consequences so that a plaintiff can proceed with her section 1983 claims. View "Carr v. Louisville-Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Bell asked why Officer Korkis pulled him over. Korkis responded that Bell first needed to provide his driver’s license, registration, and car insurance and that more officers were on their way. Bell claims the officers forcefully removed him from his vehicle, despite Bell volunteering again to exit on his own. Dash-cam videos show Korkis and Bell arguing for three minutes. Korkis asked for Bell’s information about 20 times, then reached into the window to unlock the door. A physical struggle ensued, not fully visible in the videos. Officers eventually pried open the door and told Bell to get on the ground; he repeatedly refused. Officers wrestled him to the pavement, where he refused to comply. An officer warned Bell about the taser. Bell still did not put his hands behind his back. An officer tased him.Bell sued the officers (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming they violated the Fourth Amendment’s bar against excessive force. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part after holding that the video footage could be considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine whether allegations in the complaint were implausible. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to claims concerning the officers removing Bell from his car, noting that factual issues remain. With respect to claims concerning the tasing, Bell had not shown that the officers violated his clearly established rights. View "Bell v. City of Southfield" on Justia Law

After going to Helton’s home to execute a warrant for his arrest, Knox County Deputy Mullins sought a search warrant. His affidavit stated that Mullins had received complaints about Helton selling methamphetamine; that a reliable source advised that a person he was with purchased methamphetamine at the residence; and that when the officers arrived Helton had a clear baggie that appeared to hold residue. Executing the search warrant, deputies found illegal drugs, currency, and multiple firearms. Deputies then obtained a warrant and searched the home of Helton’s mother, recovering money, firearms, and drugs. Helton was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of firearms. The court rejected motions to suppress, upholding both warrants. At trial, Moore testified about a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Helton. Juror 191 told the judge that she recognized Moore as someone that she would watch during her employment at a shopping center “in case she was going to steal,” but that she was not aware of Moore actually shoplifting. Over Helton’s opposition, the district court struck Juror 191 on the basis that she personally knew Moore and had twice responded “I think so” when asked if she could set aside her knowledge of Moore. The Sixth Circuit upheld Helton’s convictions and 264-month sentence. While the search warrant did not satisfy constitutional requirements, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "United States v. Helton" on Justia Law

Rangers, responding to an incident at Mammoth Cave, encountered a female technician who was monitoring a cave restoration project. She explained that Zabel, a contractor, had pinned her against a wall and attempted to kiss her, grabbed her buttocks and breasts, and exposed his penis. The rangers used an elevator to enter the cave and walked 25 minutes through dark, narrow passages until they found Zabel. They recorded the ensuing encounter. The rangers introduced themselves and explained that he was “not under arrest,” was “free to go,” and that he did not have to talk to them. Zabel made several incriminating statements, including that he had grabbed the woman’s butt and showed her his penis, which “may have been a little” erect.Zabel, indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2244(b), unsuccessfully moved to suppress those statements, arguing that the rangers improperly solicited those statements during a custodial interrogation without reciting his Miranda rights. Zabel then pled guilty, The PSR sought an upward variance and an upward departure (U.S.S.G. 5K2.8) for Extreme Conduct because Zabel’s behavior was more egregious than typical abusive sexual contact. The district court recessed so that Zabel and his counsel could review recorded statements by the victim and provided Zabel an opportunity to testify. Zabel declined. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment plus a life term of supervised release. The court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his custodial sentence and term of supervised release. View "United States v. Zabel" on Justia Law