Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Whitley was the subject of a traffic stop for failing to come to a standstill before exiting a driveway onto a street. Before the stop, officers had been surveilling Whitley for suspected drug trafficking. During the stop, officers noticed a digital scale sitting on Whitley’s lap. They asked Whitley to exit the vehicle Whitley initially refused but complied after his mother arrived. A drug-detection dog arrived and alerted to the presence of narcotics in Whitley’s vehicle. The officers then conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. They found a Glock handgun with an extended magazine, ammunition, $7,600 in cash, a digital scale, and a pound and a half of marijuana.Whitley unsuccessfully moved to suppress that evidence, and several post-Miranda statements, as fruits of an unlawful stop and search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers abandoned the permissible traffic stop after seeing the scale but had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Whitley such that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In addition to the scale and apparent marijuana residue on the dashboard., the officers observed Whitley entering and leaving a suspected drug house, counting a wad of cash, making short stops, and moving a bag from the seat to the trunk. The drug-detection dog was certified, so its positive alert was sufficient to establish probable cause. View "United States v. Whitley" on Justia Law

Burnett was charged with failure to appear for a work-detail program. At Burnett’s arraignment hearing, his behavior was so erratic that the court held Burnett in contempt and sentenced him to jail. A mental health representative advised Sergeant Griffith that Burnett should be placed on suicide watch. While being escorted to a cell, Burnett attempted to break away. Griffith pulled Burnett backward. Burnett continued his efforts. Griffith took him down to the floor with significant force, then knelt over Burnett in an effort to control him. Burnett continued moving. Officer Tessar joined Griffith. Burnett claims that he temporarily lost consciousness. Griffith called for assistance when he noticed that Burnett had a laceration on his head and was bleeding. Other officers and a nurse arrived. Burnett was taken to a hospital, where he received three stitches, then was discharged in good condition. Burnett claims that he suffers from PTSD, migraines, back pain, and personality changes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The law at the time that Griffith acted did not provide him with fair warning that his actions would violate Burnett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force; his actions were not so egregious as to obviate the requirement of identifying precedent that places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. View "Burnett v. Griffith" on Justia Law

In 2019, Miller was arrested at his home for failure to appear. Police woke Miller up in his bedroom and searched his room and his person. They found methamphetamine, marijuana, and a shotgun at the end of his bed. Miller pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government objected to the PSR’s recommended offense level, arguing Miller’s prior convictions for Tennessee drug delivery were “controlled substance offenses” under the U.S.S.G. The district court rejected the government’s argument, citing Sixth Circuit precedent (Havis), which held that “the least culpable conduct” proscribed by Tennessee’s drug delivery statute was “the attempted delivery of a controlled substance” and attempt crimes were not “controlled substance offenses” because they were omitted from the Guidelines’ text.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that it has repeatedly acknowledged that “the parties’ assumption in Havis was wrong.” The parties in Havis were mistaken about the scope of Tennessee’s drug delivery statute. Evaluating the statute anew, the court concluded it is a controlled substance offense and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rife moved from Kentucky to Cambodia, took a position as an elementary school teacher, began a relationship with a Cambodian woman, and adopted a young Cambodian girl. For six years, Rife lived and worked exclusively in Cambodia, obtaining annual “Extension of Stay” temporary visas through his U.S. passport. Rife did not visit the U.S. during that period but maintained a bank account and property in Kentucky. In 2018, Cambodian authorities investigated allegations that Rife had sexually assaulted his young female students. Rife’s school terminated his employment. He returned to Kentucky, where federal agents interviewed him. Rife eventually confessed to abusing two female students.Rife was charged with two counts of illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place, 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The government did not allege that Rife offered anything of value in connection with his abuse of the girls; his “illicit sexual conduct” was non-commercial in nature. Rife argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to punish him for non-commercial acts of sexual abuse that occurred in a foreign country years after he had traveled there. The district court denied Rife’s motion to dismiss, passing over the foreign commerce issue but upholding section 2423(c) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to implement the Optional Protocol. The court sentenced Rife to 252 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent; section 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. View "United States v. Rife" on Justia Law

In 2011, Portis and Thompson committed several robberies. Each pleading guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); they “expressly and voluntarily waive[d]” their rights to appeal their convictions or to challenge their convictions through a postconviction proceeding, “including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.” Seven years later, the Supreme Court determined, in Davis, that section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague concerning “crimes of violence,” ultimately requiring the government to prove that a defendant met the requirements of the statute’s elements clause. Davis applies retroactively. After Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not count as a predicate “crime of violence” under section 924(c);s residual clause or the elements clause.Portis and Thompson sought habeas relief. The government responded that the men waived their rights to file section 2255 motions and that the robberies (rather than the conspiracy) served as the predicate offenses. The district court denied the motions on the merits. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The plea agreement, in no uncertain terms, waives each defendant’s right to challenge his convictions in “a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

McKenzie purchased 13 firearms from federally licensed dealers. The ATF tracked McKenzie, who signed a federal form acknowledging that he was not purchasing it for someone else, then gave Clark the Glock in exchange for cash. Officers arrested Clark. Text messages from Clark’s phone revealed discussions with McKenzie; they never discussed why Clark did not buy the gun himself. McKenzie made a second purchase weeks later, again signing the "straw purchaser" form. Officers watched him give Schwartz the gun, conducted a traffic stop, and recovered the firearm. Schwartz stated that McKenzie bought the gun for him. McKenzie did not ask Schwartz why he could not buy the gun himself.McKenzie pleaded guilty to making a materially false statement to a licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The PSR applied U.S.S.G. 2K2.1, which calls for a higher base offense level if the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm, the defendant was convicted under 922(a)(6), and the defendant “committed the offense with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that the offense would result in the transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a prohibited person[.]” The district court found that McKenzie had reason to believe that Clark and Schwartz were prohibited persons, calculated McKenzie’s guidelines range as 30-37 months, and imposed a 30-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guideline requires only that a straw purchaser knew of facts creating a fair probability that the true buyer could not possess a firearm. View "United States v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

Morgan was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, ADHD, and depression. While incarcerated at Wayne County Jail, charged with assaulting a prison guard, Morgan suffered from hallucinations, heard voices, and attempted suicide. She was transferred to UCH, a private entity contracted to provide mental health services. Usually, three deputies and two-three UCH employees were present in the UCH ward. Despite blind spots, unlocked bedroom doors, and the necessity that deputies leave the ward to use the restroom, there had never been a reported incident at UCH involving sexual activity between inmates until November 15, 2005. That afternoon, Morgan asked UCH employee Williams for toilet paper. Other staff had left the ward to use the restroom and for lunch breaks. When Williams returned, he discovered Morgan n the room of a male inmate, Miles, apparently engaged in sexual intercourse. Morgan stated that she took “responsibility for everything.” Morgan and Miles declined to continue the investigation. In August 2006, Morgan gave birth to a child, apparently fathered by Miles. Morgan filed suit.The district court granted the county governmental immunity on her state law claims, found that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity, rejected a claim of supervisory liability, and held that Morgan’s Monell claims failed as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of deliberate indifference nor authority for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires men and women to be housed separately. View "Morgan v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

After Ramirez-Figueredo entered the U.S. from Cuba, he amassed convictions for the delivery and manufacture of controlled substances, domestic violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, retail fraud, stalking, assault and battery, disorderly conduct, possession of a switchblade, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and indecent exposure. In 2020, a woman claimed that Ramirez-Figueredo had raped her and kept her for two days. About a month later, officers arrested Ramirez-Figueredo. A search of his backpack revealed heroin and methamphetamine. After receiving his Miranda rights, Ramirez-Figueredo confessed that the drugs were from the Sinaloa Cartel and that he intended to sell them. He admitted to distributing methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine in Lansing. He pleaded guilty to drug crimes under Michigan law.In federal court, he pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court performed a Rule 11 colloquy but, contrary to FRCP 11(b)(1)(O), did not tell Ramirez-Figueredo that his guilty plea might have immigration-related consequences. Ramirez-Figueredo’s counsel claimed that his client had cooperated and proffered, but that the government had not moved for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. After calculating a Guidelines range of 168-210 months, the district court sentenced Ramirez-Figueredo to 192 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ramirez-Figueredo was already deportable when he pleaded guilty. The district court considered the minimal evidence of his cooperation. View "United States v. Ramirez-Figueredo" on Justia Law

Carson, indicted for engaging in a racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and for murder in aid of racketeering, section 1959(a)(1), agreed to plead guilty to racketeering conspiracy in exchange for a 360-month prison term, to run concurrent to Carson's seven-year sentence on a state conviction for aggravated robbery. A magistrate found Carson to be “fully competent” and found his plea to be knowing and voluntary. In February 2020, the district court accepted the plea. Carson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea in August 2020, arguing that he entered the plea “before [he] fully understood what [he] was actually saying [he] was guilty of,” and that he thought he would otherwise receive the death penalty. He later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel argument.The district court appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary hearing; determined Carson was not “operating under a misunderstanding when he entered into his plea,” despite the “muddy” record regarding what exactly counsel told Carson about the amount of actual time to be served; and found that counsel had told Carson that the government was not seeking the death penalty before Carson’s entering the plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carson’s 360-month sentence. The district court acted within its discretion; each of the seven “Goddard” factors weighs against withdrawal. Carson cannot show deficient performance by counsel or prejudice as to his length of incarceration argument. View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law