Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carson, indicted for engaging in a racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and for murder in aid of racketeering, section 1959(a)(1), agreed to plead guilty to racketeering conspiracy in exchange for a 360-month prison term, to run concurrent to Carson's seven-year sentence on a state conviction for aggravated robbery. A magistrate found Carson to be “fully competent” and found his plea to be knowing and voluntary. In February 2020, the district court accepted the plea. Carson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea in August 2020, arguing that he entered the plea “before [he] fully understood what [he] was actually saying [he] was guilty of,” and that he thought he would otherwise receive the death penalty. He later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel argument.The district court appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary hearing; determined Carson was not “operating under a misunderstanding when he entered into his plea,” despite the “muddy” record regarding what exactly counsel told Carson about the amount of actual time to be served; and found that counsel had told Carson that the government was not seeking the death penalty before Carson’s entering the plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carson’s 360-month sentence. The district court acted within its discretion; each of the seven “Goddard” factors weighs against withdrawal. Carson cannot show deficient performance by counsel or prejudice as to his length of incarceration argument. View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Meek was fired from his job when “pictures of young girls in underwear” were discovered on his work computer. Upon receiving a tip from Meek’s former co-worker, FBI agents verified that Meek’s email contained partially clothed images of girls and found eight images and two videos of child pornography on Meek’s other electronic devices. Meek admitted to viewing child pornography for several years and to downloading child pornography from peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, and that he may have “inadvertently shared and traded it.”Meek pled guilty to receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and possessing child pornography, 2252A(a)(5)(B). He sought a two-level reduction in his offense level under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(1) because his conduct was limited to receiving or soliciting child pornography. The district court disagreed and settled on a Guidelines range of 97-121 months, then varied downwards, sentencing Meek to 87 months’ imprisonment, with two mandatory $5,000 special assessments (one for each count of conviction) under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A defendant is not necessarily entitled to the two-level reduction just because he did not receive the enhancement for distribution; it is conceivable that a defendant could unknowingly distribute child pornography. The district court stated that it reviewed the PSR description of Meek’s financial situation and was aware of Meek’s financial circumstances before imposing the special assessment. View "United States v. Meek" on Justia Law

In 2001, after being convicted of forgery, Estrada-Gonzalez was removed to Guatemala. Twenty years later, he was arrested for domestic violence. Estrada-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the U.S, 8 U.S.C. 1326; the government agreed to recommend a within-Guidelines sentence. The agreement added: “Neither party will recommend or suggest in any way that a departure or variance is appropriate, either regarding the sentencing range or regarding the kind of sentence.” The agreed guidelines range was six-12 months. The prosecutor noted that the state had dismissed Estrada-Gonzalez’s domestic-violence charges, then played an officer’s body-camera footage from Estrada-Gonzalez’s arrest, and stated that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range “would be at the least appropriate”: I realize that the statutory maximum is 20 years based on his prior forgery conviction … I would echo [the court’s] sentiments in regards to the safety of not only the wife, the children … certainly a high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate." The court imposed an 18-month term, rejecting the defense argument that the government had violated the plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court heard the prosecution’s ambiguous statement and rejected Estrada-Gonzalez’s reading of it, finding that the prosecutor had been advocating only “for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines.” What the prosecutor expressed is a type of fact question; the district court did not clearly err in its resolution of the question. View "United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

At Townsend’s final pretrial conference, the district court expressed its belief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Michigan had recently adopted a policy of offering only plea deals that contain sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. The court stated its disapproval of these types of waivers and its intention to continue rejecting plea agreements that contain them. Later, the parties negotiated a plea agreement in private that limited Townsend’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence. The court responded that it would not accept the agreement. The government and Townsend filed a joint motion asking the court to accept the plea agreement. The court then canceled the plea hearing. Six months later, the court denied the motion and rejected the proposed plea agreement.The prosecution sought mandamus relief, which was granted by the Sixth Circuit. A district court does not possess unrestrained discretion to reject a plea agreement. It must, among other things, make an individualized assessment of the agreement and predicate its decision on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Because the district court here failed to do that, this is the narrow circumstance in which the district court abused its discretion. The prosecution has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus on this ground. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Sears was imprisoned for federal drug crimes. His supervised release began in New York in 2016. It was revoked in 2017 for possessing a controlled substance. As he was serving this revocation sentence, Sears was convicted of Sexual Battery in Ohio state court from a 1996 offense and was sentenced to one year of incarceration. In November 2018, Sears began his parole in Ohio. In July 2020, officers found bags of drugs and loaded firearms at his residence. Sears pled guilty. Sears’s combined Guidelines range on those charges was 111-123 months. The New York federal court issued a supervised release violation warrant. Sears’s case was transferred from Ohio. A Violation Report outlined his July arrest and “Failure to Notify the Probation Officer of a Change of Address.” The Guidelines range for revocation of Sears’s supervised release was 18-24 months.The court discussed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced Sears to 18 months, consecutive to the 111-month sentence for the new charges. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court miscalculated the supervised release Guidelines range by exceeding the maximum length under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited toward and does not limit the statutory maximum for subsequent supervised release violations. The court articulated its balancing of the sentencing factors and imposed a sentence at the low-end of Sears’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Sears" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, a drug-trafficking conspiracy distributed more than 100 kilograms of powder and crack cocaine and involved dozens of actors from Michigan, Texas, and Arkansas, including Mayfield, the Grand Rapids-based ringleader; Gentry, who supplied Mayfield from Houston, with kilogram quantities of cocaine; and the Grand Rapids couriers, distributors, and dealers (Gardner, Marvin Nix, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Martinellus Nix). Of 27 co-conspirators convicted, six appealed: Gardner, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Marvin Nix, and Martinellus Nix.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuing judge’s finding of necessity for three wiretaps and the reviewing judge’s denial of the motion to suppress. Each wiretap application met “Title III’s necessity standard,” 18 U.S.C. 2510–2520. Investigators did not use the wiretaps as an initial step; they provided detailed explanations as to why traditional investigative techniques failed to expose the entire scope of the drug-trafficking enterprise. The court upheld the admission of voice-identification testimony and the use of a “constructive possession” jury instruction. The government presented sufficient evidence of Brown’s and Kolarich’s role in the drug-trafficking ring to support each count of conviction. Rejecting challenges to the sentence imposed, the court upheld the drug-quantity determinations and the imposition of a drug-premises enhancement. The court vacated the imposition of a 21 U.S.C. 862(a) lifetime ban on federal benefits for Gardner; his drug conspiracy conviction falls outside of 862(a)’s reach. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

In 1992, Burns, with five accomplices, approached a car in which four men were drinking and smoking. Looking for a fight, Burns and his accomplices robbed the car's occupants, then began shooting them, killing two. Blackman escaped with a minor gunshot wound. Thomas, despite having been shot several times, survived; his testimony was instrumental in the trials. Burns was convicted on two counts of felony murder, receiving a death sentence for one murder and a life sentence for the other. Seeking habeas relief, Burns claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage and that the Tennessee prosecutor wrongfully relied on inconsistent testimony and knowingly presented false testimony at the guilt stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has never established that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to introduce, at sentencing, residual-doubt evidence, offered to undermine the prosecution’s case, which led to the conviction. Burns’s counsel did not err by failing to pursue the introduction of residual-doubt evidence at sentencing. Burns’s sentencing counsel did a fair amount of investigation in preparation for the mitigation phase and adopted a strategy of focusing on Burns’s religious background and other signs of good character, which was not unreasonable. Burns fails to establish that the testimony was actually inconsistent or false. View "Burns v. Mays" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008-2009, three partners ran Florida medical clinics and hired Hofstetter, who became the office manager. One of the partners admitted that, over time, pain management dominated their business, so that the other practice areas dwindled, and the clinics eventually became “pill mills.” Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. The clinics displayed numerous indicators of illegal opioid prescription practices, so the government investigated all four women. A jury convicted each defendant of maintaining at least one drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also found guilty of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. With respect to the drug-involved-premises convictions, the court rejected an argument that the underlying statute, 21 U.S.C. 856(a), was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them; the defendants’ conduct put them on notice that they violated the statute, regardless of any potential vagueness when applied to differently situated medical practitioners. Those convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the district court properly instructed the jury; the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. With respect to Hofstetter’s convictions, the court upheld evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning the distribution charge. The court rejected claims of spoliation, Brady violations, and improper remarks during closing arguments. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law

In 2014-2017, Carlson and his friends, using private chartered planes, trafficked about 1,680 kilograms of cocaine, 2,050 pounds of marijuana, 40 pounds of methamphetamine, and between $500 million and $1 billion of cash in drug proceeds, for the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. Carlson got caught and turned in his coconspirators, including Matthews and Wallace.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Matthews’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, sections 846, 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the 60-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed on Wallace (one of the pilots) for his guilty plea on one count. Matthews’ convictions were based on sufficient evidence; the district court did not err in providing a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction. Matthews’ confrontation rights were not violated after the court allowed Carlson to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination as to certain questions on cross-examination and she was not prejudiced by a variance between the indictment and proof at trial on conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law