Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While patrolling a known drug house, Sergeant Murch recognized a Buick that he had stopped twice before, each time culminating in a drug-related arrest. Murch ran the plates and discovered that the vehicle’s owner, Shehan, lacked a driver’s license. Murch saw the Buick speed away. Murch stopped the car for speeding and driving without a license. The driver identified himself as Garcia and admitted that he lacked a driver’s license. Because permitting someone without a license to drive a car violates Michigan law, the officers sought to discover whether Shehan was among the vehicle’s passengers. Two passengers gave names. The third refused to identify himself after repeated requests. A patdown of the unidentified man uncovered 11 empty plastic bags and $1033 in cash. Officers took him in for fingerprinting. Jail officials had the man remove his sweater. His arms bore tattoos: “Marc” and “Barrera.” After running the name through a database, officers confirmed that they had detained Barrera, a parole violator with outstanding arrest warrants. A strip search of Barrera revealed marijuana and cocaine. The Michigan trial court denied Barrera's suppression motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed his convictions.After leaving state prison, Barrera sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officers s with respect to qualified immunity. The officers had probable cause to take Barrera to jail; his refusal to identify himself under these circumstances violated Michigan law. View "Barrera v. City of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

Each of the petitioners obtained habeas relief in the Eastern District of Michigan because they were sentenced under Michigan’s formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines that included enhancements for judicially found facts. The state now agrees that Michigan’s mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and concedes that petitioners are entitled to some form of relief but argued that instead of remanding for resentencing, the district court should have remanded the cases for a more limited remedy, a Crosby hearing, where the trial court determines whether it would have issued a materially different sentence had the Michigan guidelines been advisory rather than mandatory at the time of the original sentencing.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district courts acted within their discretion to dispose of these habeas cases as law and justice require. The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly established whether a defendant sentenced under an unconstitutional sentencing scheme is entitled to a full resentencing or only a Crosby hearing but has a history of ordering resentencing hearings to correct Sixth Amendment violations. The fact that a full resentencing may require more state resources than a Crosby hearing is insufficient to find that ordering a resentencing is an abuse of discretion. View "Morrell v. Warden" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of six counts of aggravated murder (with capital specifications), three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of kidnapping, and one count of felonious assault, and sentenced to death. His first federal habeas corpus petition was denied in 2012. In 2020, Jackson filed the current federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that: the prosecution withheld material and exculpatory evidence in violation of "Brady," the prosecution presented false and coerced testimony in violation of "Napue," and Ohio’s postconviction scheme violates the Supremacy Clause. Jackson argued that his claims were not previously ripe for review and therefore not subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)’s requirements for permission to file a successive petition.The Sixth Circuit denied Jackson’s motion for remand to the district court but granted permission to file a successive petition. It is unclear precisely how Jackson obtained the witness statements that he claims were suppressed under Brady, which bears on the question of whether “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” However, Jackson’s proposed petition also explains that “the exculpatory evidence was first disclosed by the State in Clemency-related Public Records Act litigation,” which presumably would not have been available until Jackson’s date of execution approached. Jackson has also shown that “but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re Kareem Jackson" on Justia Law

Cartwright is serving a 24-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). When Cartwright was sentenced in 2005, seven of his past convictions qualified as violent felonies. In 2015, the Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision invalidated ACCA’s residual clause. Johnson removed at least four of Cartwright’s offenses from the category of violent felonies. Cartwright brought a habeas petition challenging his ACCA status by arguing that his remaining convictions for burglary and aggravated assault do not support his ACCA sentence. The district court held that, even after Johnson, Cartwright still had at least three ACCA predicates because his Tennessee first- and second-degree burglaries qualified as violent felonies.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The government acknowledged that Cartwright’s claim is based on Johnson, a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” All three degrees of Tennessee burglary include entering lawfully and then opening a “receptacle” inside, with no unlawful entry or remaining required, which extends the offense beyond generic burglary, which requires unlawful entry into or remaining in. A “receptacle” in the Tennessee burglary statute need not be attached to the house. View "United States v. Cartwright" on Justia Law

In 1992, Hunter, a 23-year-old hitman for a Detroit drug enterprise, escaped from a parole camp and killed 23-year-old Johnson, to prevent her from testifying. Hunter was convicted of intentionally killing Johnson in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), and using or carrying a firearm in relation to that killing, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Hunter, acquitted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, four other intentional killings, and three related firearm counts, was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, the minimum under the Sentencing Guidelines then in existence. Hunter unsuccessfully sought to vacate his conviction in federal habeas proceedings and unsuccessfully sought to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based upon retroactive Guidelines changes. After serving 21 years in prison, Hunter sought “compassionate release,” citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court found that the risk from COVID-19 and Hunter’s asserted health conditions were not “extraordinary and compelling” because Hunter refused the vaccine but concluded that other factors together amounted to “extraordinary and compelling circumstances”: Hunter was sentenced before the Guidelines changed from mandatory to advisory; Hunter’s “relative youth”; sentencing disparities between Hunter and co-defendants who cooperated; and Hunter’s rehabilitation. The district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting Hunter’s “difficult childhood,” and letters submitted by Hunter’s family and friends, and discounted Hunter’s prison discipline record. The court reduced Hunter’s sentence to time served. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal and reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gibbs (then 16) and Henderson, robbed a Flint, Michigan store. Henderson struck the owner in the head with a gun, severing part of his ear. Gibbs was not armed but took property. Before jury selection began, the trial judge commented in open court, "get the jury to come upstairs now and so we’re going to have an order of sequestration for witnesses only. And if any spectators would like to come in they’re welcome but they do have to sit over here by the law clerk, not in the middle of the pool." Three of Gibbs’s relatives supplied sworn affidavits that they and others were prevented from entering the courtroom during jury selection. Gibbs did not object to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire. He represents that he did not learn that his family was excluded from voir dire until after trial.The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing; the trial court did not hold such a hearing but denied any relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals then found the claim defaulted because Gibbs did not contemporaneously object to the courtroom closure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of his petition for federal habeas relief. The application of the ordinarily adequate contemporaneous-objection rule would, in these unique circumstances, be an inadequate bar to federal review. View "Gibbs v. Huss" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and to commit money laundering. Johnson was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a) based on his two prior controlled-substance convictions. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing in light of its then-recent (Havis) holding that attempt crimes—including conspiracies—did not qualify as controlled-substance offenses under section 4B1.1. On remand, the district court held that Johnson no longer qualified as a career offender— bringing his criminal history down from Category 6 to Category 3—and sentenced him to 200 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Johnson’s argument that the district court should have conducted a de novo resentencing, rather than just reconsidering his career offender status. The previous order’s language makes clear that the remand was only for the limited purpose of determining whether Johnson still qualified as a career offender. The order exclusively discusses the impact of Havis on Johnson’s sentence. It does not discuss the procedural or substantive reasonableness of the sentence, nor did it identify any other alleged errors to be considered on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Twyford was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1993. Twyford filed a federal habeas petition and sought transport for neurological imaging. Twyford noted that he may have neurological problems due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and a gunshot wound to his head from a suicide attempt at age 13, which cost him an eye and left shrapnel in his head. Dr. Scharre, a neurologist and the director of the Cognitive Neurology Division at The Ohio State University, had evaluated Twyford, reviewed his medical records, and concluded that a CT scan and an FDG-PET scan were necessary for him to evaluate Twyford fully. The Chillicothe Correctional Institution, where Twyford is incarcerated, does not have the equipment to perform this imaging. Twyford alleged that the results could be relevant to his claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, coerced statements, competency, and mitigation evidence. The warden contended that the district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to bring a prisoner to the court in a 2254 action, but not to require that the state transport a prisoner to an outside medical facility and that Twyford was seeking new information that he did not present to the state courts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order granting Twyford’s motion. The court had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to order the warden to transport Twyford for neurological imaging because the results “may aide this Court in the exercise of its congressionally mandated habeas review.” View "Twyford v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Clark robbed three banks, stating that he had a gun. When police attempted to conduct a traffic stop, Clark fled at high speed and hit other cars. A 67-year-old suffered significant injuries. Clark was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) for two of the robberies and pleaded guilty. Clark admitted to committing another robbery. Based on the terms of the plea agreement, the PSR included the Ohio robbery as a “Pseudo Count” for calculation of Clark’s sentencing range. For each of the three bank robberies, the PSR assessed enhancements for a victim sustaining life-threatening bodily injuries during the car chase and for Clark recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Clark argued the enhancements should only apply to the Pseudo Count to avoid unlawful “triple counting,” and because there was an insufficient nexus linking the flight in Kentucky to the two Michigan robberies. The court overruled these objections and sentenced Clark to a total of 235 months' imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. There is no explicit indication that the Sentencing Commission “intended to attach multiple penalties to the same conduct” merely because counts are not grouped together; the stated intent of the grouping guidelines demonstrates that it would be improper to increase a defendant’s sentence based on the same conduct enhancing multiple counts. The court remanded for resentencing without application of the enhancements to all three bank robbery counts. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

While incarcerated and working as a laundry porter at Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility, Rhodes suffered a severe skull fracture and other injuries when an industrial laundry cart—weighing about 400 pounds—fell from a truck and struck her. Rhodes sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process. The court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Jones, an MDOC employee who was driving the laundry truck, and McPherson, an officer who was operating the truck’s hydraulic lift gate when the incident occurred.The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Jones and McPherson on Rhodes’s Eighth Amendment claim but affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Rhodes’s substantive due process claim. Precedent clearly established Rhodes’s asserted Eighth Amendment right before the incident. Although no case precisely dealt with factual scenarios where a prison official flung a 300–400-pound laundry cart at an unprepared prison worker, out-of-circuit cases uniformly held liable prison officials exhibiting deliberate indifference to a known risk in various prison workplaces, sufficient to put a reasonable prison official on notice that recklessly disregarding a known risk to a prison worker’s safety would violate that person’s right to be free from “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” under the Eighth Amendment. With respect to the substantive due process claim, the court held that the state-created-danger doctrine does not apply where a state actor directly causes the plaintiff’s asserted injury. View "Rhodes v. Michigan" on Justia Law