Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McNeill was convicted in 1995 and sentenced to death in Ohio state court for aggravated murder. Seeking federal habeas relief, McNeil argued that the prosecution failed to turn over material under Brady v. Maryland and created a false impression in violation of Napue v. Illinois. The alleged Brady material included two police reports, one summarizing an interview with the prosecution’s primary witness, Rushinsky, who initially failed to—but ultimately did—identify McNeill as the killer, and the other detailing a potential suspect who was quickly dismissed as a suspect. It also included three audio recordings, one of the same Rushinsky interview addressed in the report, a second Rushinsky interview, and an interview with a potential alibi witness.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. None of the evidence was material under Brady. The only favorable, undisclosed evidence was the Rushinsky report, which would have given McNeill more material with which to impeach Rushinsky. The wealth of other evidence on which the jury could have relied, plus the fact that Rushinsky did actually identify a photo of McNeill before trial, indicates that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of McNeill’s trial would have been different if the prosecution had turned over the report. The prosecution did not create a false impression by playing the audio recording of Rushinsky identifying McNeill without clarifying that Rushinsky initially failed to identify McNeill. View "McNeill v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. In 2018, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard. The Supreme Court vacated.On remand, the panel again granted Hill relief on his “Atkins” claim, but, following en banc review, affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. the state court decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Ohio court considered evidence of Hill’s past abilities including Hill’s medical history, public school records, and prior standardized test results, and evaluated criteria mentioned in Atkins such as intellectual functioning, adaptive skills, and the onset age of disability. In light of the evidence presented, it was not unreasonable for the Ohio court to rely on the reasoned judgment of two experts over another. Hill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on its merits. View "Hill v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Phillips, currently incarcerated for a 2001 armed bank robbery, filed a pro se motion seeking to waive the accumulated interest on his $51,086.10 restitution sentence. He had not challenged that order on appeal or when the court set up a payment plan in 2005. As of December 2019, Phillips’s outstanding principal balance was $13,191.04, with $25,550.51 owed in interest.The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a restitution order post-sentencing. Phillips argued that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3612(f)(3), which provides: If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest under this subsection, the court may-- (A) waive the requirement for interest; (B) limit the total of interest payable to a specific dollar amount; or (C) limit the length of the period during which interest accrues.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although the circuits are split on the issue, and the statutory language is not clear, the fairest reading of the statute is that the district court’s power to waive interest on restitution because of a defendant’s inability to pay can be exercised not only at initial sentencing but also at a point after initial sentencing in light of changed circumstances regarding the ability to pay. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At about 4:30 a.m., an anonymous 911 call reported a break-in at neighboring apartment 103, with screaming, Seven Southfield Police officers responded, entered the building, and heard screaming but could not identify the source; the door to 103 was not broken. The officers determined that the window was not a point of entry; they received no response to intermittent knocking. The dispatcher called the anonymous caller back; the caller said that she “can’t be positive what apartment it was coming from.” After about eight minutes, Mitchell opened the door to 103. She denied that there were any problems. Although none of the officer noticed any injuries on Mitchell or saw any signs of suspicious activity, they pushed their way inside, injuring Mitchell’s knee. Mitchell continued to object to the warrantless entry. The officers arrested Mitchell’s guest, Williams, allegedly employing unnecessary force. The officers found no evidence of illegal activity in the apartment. Charges against Williams for resisting arrest and obstruction of police were dismissed.Mitchell and Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting unlawful entry and excessive force. Williams also asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution. Certain claims were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to Williams on his false arrest claim for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the officers’ qualified immunity motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and Mitchell’s excessive force claim. View "Williams v. Maurer" on Justia Law

A deputy observed a vehicle swerving in traffic and initiated a stop. Kerns was operating the vehicle. When the car stopped, Kerns’s prior romantic partner exited and yelled that Kerns had kidnapped her at gunpoint. Kerns was arrested. He admitted to driving from Kentucky to Colby’s Michigan residence and threatening to kill her family if Colby did not leave with him. Colby had jerked the wheel of the car to get the deputy's attention. Kerns was indicted for kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)), interstate domestic violence (2261(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (924(c)(1)(a)(ii)). After being found competent to stand trial, Kerns pleaded guilty to kidnapping and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Kerns confirmed he had reviewed the PSR and had no objection to its findings. The court explained that the recommended sentencing range for the kidnapping count was 87-108 months’ imprisonment and that the section 924(c) count carried a mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Kerns to 192 months: 108 months on the kidnapping count plus months on the firearm count. The court also referenced a fine. Neither party objected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an inconsistency existed between the court’s oral reference to a fine of $1,000 and its imposition of a total fine of $2,000. The guilty plea was valid and the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kerns" on Justia Law

Based on activity related to former Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes’ campaign for the U.S. Senate seat held by Mitch McConnell in 2014, Emmons and Lundergan (Grimes’s father) were convicted for knowingly and willfully making unlawful corporate contributions aggregating $25,000 or more, Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30118, and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; willfully causing the submission of materially false statements, 18 U.S.C 1001(a)(2) and 2; and the falsification of records or documents, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on corporate contributions as applied to intrafamilial contributions from a closely-held, family-run corporation. Such contributions present a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The district court adequately distinguished between independent expenditures and contributions in the jury instructions. The district court properly admitted evidence of Lundergan’s uncharged acts in connection with Grimes’ campaigns for Kentucky Secretary of State as res gestae evidence and under 404(b). The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Emmons had the requisite intent to cause unlawful corporate contributions and the Grimes campaign to submit false campaign-finance reports. View "United States v. Emmons" on Justia Law

Warren pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His plea agreement bound the parties to “recommend that the Court impose a sentence within” Warren’s Guidelines range, calculated at 51-63 months, and prohibited either party from “suggest[ing] in any way that a departure or variance” from Warren’s Guidelines range “is appropriate.” Before sentencing, the district court notified Warren that it was considering an upward variance and ultimately sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history,” the “extreme variance” based solely on Warren’s criminal history was “inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.”On remand, the district court again circulated a notice of possible upward variance. At the hearing, the court asked the parties to discuss the potential variance. The prosecuting attorney stated that she “wanted to clarify something that defense counsel brought up because she is asking the Court to have a standard of reliance upon this.” The prosecutor acknowledged the existence of a plea agreement, which “the government has no intention of violating” but indicated that, had the full extent of Warren’s history been known, there would have been a different recommendation. The Sixth Circuit vacated the 96-month sentence imposed on remand as substantively unreasonable. The government breached Warren's plea agreement. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

Phillips, then 39, was arrested for driving with a suspended license. At the Lansing City Jail, Phillips said he took Lyrica to treat his epilepsy and would need another dose that night Phillips denied being under the influence of other drugs or alcohol but was sweating. Phillips was taken to his cell at 2:15 p.m. Detainees are monitored through video cameras and cell checks, which involve a “physical inspection” of the cell. Video footage shows Phillips swaying, falling, and struggling. A pool of vomit formed around Phillips’s head at 3:23 p.m. No further movement was detected after 3:46 p.m. Several cell checks were recorded but officers did not follow department policy. At 5:11 p.m., when an officer entered his cell, Phillips was unresponsive, EMS transported Phillips to a hospital where he was officially pronounced dead at 5:44 p.m., most likely of “multiple drug intoxication,” having ingested oxycodone, alprazolam, and pregabalin.The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged deliberate indifference to Phillips’s medical needs and failure to train officers, and gross negligence under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. There was insufficient evidence from which to infer that any of the defendants subjectively perceived Phillips was suffering from a serious medical need, inferred he needed treatment, or ignored his medical needs. The court reversed as to one officer, who had the requisite state of mind for liability. View "Burwell v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

In 1994, Hall murdered his estranged wife by attacking her in her home, dragging her to the backyard swimming pool while at least one of her children looked on, and drowning her. A Tennessee state court jury convicted Hall of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause death. State courts affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hall unsuccessfully pursued state post-conviction relief, then sought federal habeas relief.The district court denied Hall any relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” claim concerning prison records about the mental illness of a fellow inmate (Dutton) who testified against Hall. Dutton’s prison records were records of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, which was not acting under the prosecutor’s control, so the prosecutor did not know about them, actually or constructively. Brady does not impose an unlimited duty to pursue such an inquiry. Given the initial determination of competence, the opinions of mental health professionals that evaluated Hall throughout his state court proceedings, and no question of mental incompetence being raised during that time, counsel’s performance was not unreasonable in failing to establish that Hall was incompetent to stand trial. The court also rejected an ineffective assistance claim concerning evidence of Hall’s family and social history View "Hall v. Mays" on Justia Law

Trevino was the sole owner of a chain of marijuana dispensaries throughout Michigan. A federal jury convicted him of conspiracy and nine substantive marijuana offenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Trevino's argued that he never should have been charged, citing a congressional appropriations rider, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, or “Section 538,” that bars the Department of Justice from spending funds to “prevent” states from “implementing their own State laws” permitting medical marijuana, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). Even construing Section 538 as broadly as Trevino suggests he is not entitled to relief because he was not in compliance with the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act.. Trevino also argued a limited exception to the general rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. The court rejected the argument, reasoning that the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801, under which Trevino was convicted, is not ambiguous. The court also rejected challenges to the denial of Trevino’s counsel’s motion to withdraw, filed less than two weeks before trial; the government’s use of summary charts at trial; and to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Trevino" on Justia Law