Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

In 2004, Chattanooga police executed a search warrant at the home of Johnson’s friend, searched Johnson’s person, and did not find any drugs on Johnson’s person. Officers found a revolver lying in a box, digital scales, 0.9 grams of crack cocaine, and 110 pills. Johnson admitted to possessing the firearm and the crack cocaine. He was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. 2; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The court sentenced Johnson to 360 months’ imprisonment, reasoning that he was a career offender and rejecting Johnson’s objection “based on the disparity between crack cocaine and other drugs.”The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. While the sentence was procedurally reasonable, it is substantively unreasonable. The court unduly weighed the nature of the offense, Johnson’s criminal history and characteristics, and the need to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public, while inadequately considering unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Lexington solicited bids for relocating its city offices, including one from CRM, a local real estate development firm. Wellman was an executive at CRM. While the committee deliberated on the CRM proposal, two City Council members began receiving campaign contributions from CRM employees. These actions prompted an investigation under 18 U.S.C. 666, which prohibits “federal funds bribery.” Agents suspected a straw contribution scheme arranged by Wellman and funded by CRM. Wellman falsified documents and cajoled his straw contributors to lie. Prosecutors opened a separate grand jury inquiry into potential obstruction charges against Wellman.Wellman was convicted on 11 federal charges, including obstruction of an official proceeding and aiding and abetting numerous associates to make false statements to the FBI, and was sentenced to a year and a day in prison with a $10,000 fine. The district court applied a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 but ultimately varied downward based on Wellman’s character and service to the community. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and Wellman’s argument that, at most, he obstructed an investigation into violations of Kentucky campaign finance laws, not federal bribery. A reasonable jury could conclude that Wellman corruptly obstructed, influenced, or impeded a federal grand jury proceeding. View "United States v. Wellman" on Justia Law

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Officers executing a warrant for Cooper’s arrest on firearms and narcotics charges learned that Cooper was a high-ranking gang member and saw a Facebook photo of Cooper holding a Glock handgun. At the home of Cooper’s girlfriend, Walton, Officer Fox knocked on the door. When Walton answered, Fox saw Cooper inside. Concerned about spooking Cooper, Fox showed Walton a photograph of another individual and asked whether he could come inside to look for the individual. According to Fox, Walton agreed. Fox arrested Cooper while other officers rushed in to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Jensen noticed a lump in the mattress, flipped it, and discovered the Glock handgun depicted in Cooper’s Facebook post. Fox then presented rights-waiver and consent-to-search forms. Walton initialed lines stating that she was consenting freely. Officers then conducted a thorough search but recovered only the hat seen on Facebook.Charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Cooper unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court largely engaged in an attenuation analysis focused on whether Walton’s subsequent consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal protective sweep. That was the wrong analysis The gun was seized during the initial unlawful search, so inevitable discovery is the correct analysis. On remand, the court should focus on whether officers would have sought (and obtained) Walton’s consent to search If the illegal protective sweep had never happened and whether the ensuing consent search would have led to the gun. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1985, Manning was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Manning was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Manning’s first and second habeas petitions. Since then, Manning has filed multiple unsuccessful motions for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.Manning, pro se, again sought an order authorizing a second or successive habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit again rejected his petition. Manning did not make a prima facie showing that his petition relied on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Manning cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” cannot be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Manning sought to extend Miller’s new rule to persons who (like Manning) were 18 years old at the time of their offense. Miller unambiguously applies to only those who were under 18 at the time of their offense; for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks a bright line. View "In re: Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault, 18 U.S.C. 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), 1512(b). Based on his criminal history, he was sentenced to 864 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Johnson did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The district court erred in allowing Johnson to proceed pro se. During the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Johnson if he understood the ramifications of his decision to represent himself without knowledge of the law but a review of the record indicates that the court’s questions did not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met. The judge commented that he had already asked the “taxpayers to pay for two of the finest lawyers in the district to represent [him].” Instead of confirming that Johnson knew the maximum potential sentences, as required by the model inquiry, the court downplayed his potential sentence. Stemming from that error, the court likewise should have directed Johnson’s counsel to file subpoenas and witness lists on Johnson’s behalf. The district court did not adequately apply the section 3553(a) factors when determining Johnson's sentence. The court ordered assignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law