Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hollins-Johnson pleaded guilty to student loan fraud and theft of government funds, conspiracy to commit those crimes, making false statements to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and witness tampering. The Sixth Circuit dismissed her appeal based on the appellate-waiver provision in Hollins-Johnson’s plea agreement, rejecting her argument that her plea agreement does not expressly cover a challenge to “the manner in which a sentence is to be served and the timing of the sentence.” Hollins-Johnson did not argue that the appellate waiver was not knowing or voluntary and the sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum for any of Hollins-Johnson’s crimes. Her waiver is not ambiguous. Hollins-Johnson agreed to waive her right to challenge her sentence on any grounds so long as she was not sentenced above the statutory maximum. View "United States v. Hollins-Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2008, another inmate, Macari, assaulted Himmelreich, who had pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, Himmelreich alleges that Macari was placed in the general population despite making comments about targeting “pedophiles.” Himmelreich filed a Tort Claim Notice with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Himmelreich alleges that Captain Fitzgerald warned him not to complain and threatened to have him transferred. Prison officials subsequently placed Himmelreich in the special housing unit (SHU). Himmelreich claims that Fitzgerald told him it was because of the Tort Claim. Prison officials claim they placed Himmelreich in the SHU for his own protection after he complained of threats from other inmates.Himmelreich’s subsequent lawsuits alleged numerous claims against prison officials, including a “Bivens” claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment based on Fitzgerald’s alleged threats and statements. Fitzgerald unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment only on the ground that there is no Bivens remedy for a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Fitzgerald’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine. View "Himmelreich v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Kensu, a resident of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. He has filed several actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 during his sentence; he won $325,002 after the jury found that five defendants had been “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need[s].” Since then, Kensu has filed several more suits against MDOC and Corizon, a correctional health care contractor, including putative class actions, some of which remain pending.The complaint, in this case, had 808 numbered allegations plus additional sub-allegations, spanning 180 pages. Although his counsel failed to identify this case as related to any of his earlier actions (in violation of a local rule) the district court determined that it was a companion to Kensu v. Borgerding, and reassigned it. Finding his complaint too long and unclear, the district court dismissed, allowing Kensu to try again. His second effort was still too long and unclear. The district court explained the problems with Kensu’s complaint in more detail and gave him one last chance to amend it. Kensu made his complaint longer instead of reducing it to a plain statement of his grievance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. View "Kensu v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

Pioch and co-defendants were convicted based on their scheme to defraud the multimillion-dollar estate of an elderly widower. Pioch was sentenced to 111 months’ imprisonment with a special assessment of $3,700 and restitution of $2,037,783.30. Pioch shares joint-and-several liability with her co-defendants for $1,990,342.76 of the restitution to McLaughlin (victim’s son), under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 3664(i)). Pioch personally owes the remaining $47,440.54 to the IRS, so she is liable for a total of $2,041,483.30 for the assessment and restitution. The government sought garnishment and, invoking the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3011(a)), requested a 10% surcharge, $204,148.33.The district court granted the garnishment and surcharge requests. The Sixth Circuit remanded, rejecting Pioch's argument that the surcharge should be calculated based on the “debt” that the government “actually recover[s] through enforcement of a collection remedy” (10% of the $367,681.48 subject to garnishment) and not the total debt resulting from her crimes (10% of the $2,041,483.30 judgment). When the government initiates an FDCPA action to recover debt owed to the United States, the government is entitled to recover a 10% surcharge on the entire outstanding debt; the debt must be paid off before the United States may collect the surcharge, which is added to, not subtracted from, the judgment. View "United States v. Pioch" on Justia Law

Sands pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR recommended a four-level sentencing enhancement because the firearm had an altered or obliterated serial number, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).. The final PSR acknowledged that the serial number in two locations was significantly defaced, but still readable. The district court did not examine the weapon itself but examined photographs that magnified the size of the gun and applied the enhancement, stating that the serial number “is clearly made less legible and is clearly altered for the purpose of trying to mask the identity of this weapon.” The Seventh Circuit instructed the district court that it had the option to reexamine the serial numbers or rely on its prior factual findings and use the “naked eye test” to determine the sentence enhancement’s applicability.At the resentencing hearing, the district court examined the firearm itself and made factual findings that the serial number was not readable in two of the three places it appeared on the weapon and again applied the four-level enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court applied the correct legal framework, and there was no clear error with the factual finding that the gun had an altered serial number. View "United States v. Sands" on Justia Law

In 2018, Brenner pled guilty without a plea agreement to being a felon in possession of a firearm and in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Brenner had three Tennessee felony convictions: aggravated assault in 2005, aggravated assault while acting in concert in 2014, and reckless aggravated assault in 2014. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), Brenner had to be sentenced to a 15-year minimum for her section 922(g) convictions if the government proved that she had three prior convictions for “violent felonies” having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”The district court agreed with Brenner that her reckless aggravated assault conviction is not a “violent felony” and sentenced Brenner to a within-Guidelines term of 110 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit held the government’s appeal in abeyance and dismissed the appeal after the Supreme Court’s 2021 Borden holding that the ACCA’s elements clause does not “include[] offenses criminalizing reckless conduct.” ACCA’s use of the phrase “against another” “demands that the perpetrator directs his action at, or target, another individual,” and “[r]eckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.” Borden analyzed the statute under which Brenner was convicted. View "United States v. Brenner" on Justia Law

Hughey, speeding, passed Michigan State Trooper Easlick, who flipped on his dashcam and stopped Hughey. Hughey’s car was uninsured and unregistered and there was an outstanding warrant for Hughey’s failure to appear. Easlick relayed that Hughey needed to pay the $400 bond on her warrant in cash immediately or he would have to take her to the courthouse. Hughey did not resist arrest. Easlick handcuffed Hughey’s hands behind her back and placed her in his car. Hughey expressed suicidal thoughts, so Easlick took her to the hospital.Hughey alleges that Easlick twisted her arm behind her back as he handcuffed her and did not check for tightness, that her shoulder hurt “[a]lmost immediately,” and that after Easlick removed the handcuffs at the hospital, a nurse observed “rings around [Hughey’s] wrists.” No part of the handcuffing is visible in the dashcam footage.Hughey sued Easlick for excessive force and deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Easlick summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hughey created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Her allegations are enough to satisfy the “handcuffing test” at summary judgment. The dashcam audio does not foreclose the possibility that Hughey repeatedly complained about pain. A plethora of excessive-force handcuffing cases put Easlick on notice that the way that he yanked Hughey’s arm, placed overly tight handcuffs, and ignored her complaints violated her right to be free from excessive force. View "Hughey v. Easlick" on Justia Law

In the Lucas County Corrections Center, prisoners are prohibited from having certain items, including cell phones and tobacco. The FBI organized a sting operation, enlisting an inmate and his girlfriend to approach a guard (Henderson) and offer him money to smuggle contraband into the jail. For $500 Henderson smuggled in a phone and tobacco. Henderson was charged with misdemeanor providing contraband in prison, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(1), and felony Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 18 U.S.C. 1951. A jury convicted Henderson of providing contraband, but could not reach a verdict on the Hobbs Act count.Before Henderson’s second trial on the Hobbs Act count, Henderson again asked the court to instruct the jury that an official act must be “similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.” This time, the court decided that the language was unduly confusing and removed it from the instructions. The government argued that the exercise of government power was Henderson’s decision to insulate the inmate from punishment by not reporting his possession of contraband. It compared a police officer taking a bribe in exchange for not writing a speeding ticket.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Henderson's conviction, upholding the jury instruction. The government’s evidence was sufficient to convict Henderson because the statutory definition of "official act" does encompass his actions. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

On May 13, 1987, William and Juanita Leeman were killed in their Hamilton County home. There was no trace evidence nor fingerprints. In 1997, the defendant’s brother and his father informed police that Hughbanks had murdered the Leemans. Hughbanks admitted breaking into the house with two accomplices. Later, Hughbanks said that a fourth man might have been present. Hughbanks admitted to confronting William but stated that an accomplice had stabbed William, Hughbanks stated that he did not know where Juanita was and said that his accomplice had “probably got her first.” Hughbanks acknowledged telling his father, brother, and uncle, “I killed somebody” and that he was by himself when he broke into the home. A jury convicted Hughbanks. The trial court imposed a death sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Rejecting a “Brady” claim, the court found that Hughbanks was not prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose information identifying other suspects; documentation concerning the actions of one of the victims’ sons, that implicated him in the murders; the absence of trace evidence at the scene of the crime that implicated Hughbanks; eyewitness statements that did not match a description of Hughbanks; evidence that impeached the prosecution’s theory of the case; and evidence that impeached the prosecution’s witnesses. The court also rejected Hughbanks’ argument that trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing adequately to investigate, prepare, and present mitigation evidence. View "Hughbanks v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's second Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on five of his requested grounds for relief, and the court granted an expansion of the COA to include two additional claims.The court concluded that petitioner is entitled to relief on his claim that his constitutional rights under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), were violated. In this case, the trial court never conducted a Faretta-complaint hearing and, on both May 14, 1998 and April 23, 1999, petitioner properly invoked his constitutional right to self-representation and is therefore entitled to relief. The court explained that none of the Ohio Supreme Court's reasons for holding that petitioner's April 23, 1999 statement did not properly invoke his constitutional right to conduct his own defense at trial are entitled to Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act deference. Furthermore, when viewed in context, "Is there any possibility I could represent myself?" was a clear and unequivocal reinvocation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. Therefore, in addition to granting the petition based on the trial court's denial of his May 14, 1998 Waiver of Counsel, petitioner's conviction also cannot stand due to the trial court's denial of his April 23, 1999 invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The panel conditionally granted the petition for a writ of habeas relief. View "Cassano v. Shoop" on Justia Law