Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McKinnie, a recidivist drug dealer, was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, based on a career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. He had a 2011 crack cocaine conspiracy conviction and an Ohio attempted trafficking conviction. The enhancement increased McKinnie’s Guidelines range from 60-71 months to 151-188 months. After McKinnie’s sentence became final, the Sixth Circuit decided in “Havis,” that an attempted crime is not a predicate “controlled substance offense” under section 4B1.1. McKinnie then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 The district court denied McKinnie’s petition, reasoning that error in calculating the advisory Guidelines range, such as a Havis error, is not cognizable on collateral review, where relief is available only when a sentence violates the Constitution or a federal statute.McKinnie separately moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the Havis error, his obesity and hypertension, and the risk of contracting COVID-19 as “extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Havis error was not, as a matter of law, an extraordinary and compelling reason. McKinnie’s vaccination against COVID-19 mitigated his COVID-19 risk; his obesity and hypertension were insufficient to grant relief. His potential rehabilitation was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

An undercover Kentucky police detective used a computer program to search for individuals who were illegally trading and downloading child pornography on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, and, on several occasions in May-June 2017, downloaded child pornography from a computer with an IP address located in Independence, Kentucky. Officers used the information to obtain a warrant to search Michael Clark’s residence.In April 2018, officers executed the search warrant. Clark and others were home. The officers seized multiple computers, interviewed Clark, and recorded the interview. They told Clark that he was not under arrest, and they did not give him Miranda warnings. Clark stated that the MacBook laptop was his work computer. The three seized computers were sent to a forensic examiner. An examination of the MacBook computer found 295 images and 62 videos of child pornography, a user profile named “Mike,” and evidence suggesting the former presence of additional illegal content and filesharing programs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Clark’s conviction on five counts of knowingly distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and 192-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the interstate-commerce and “knowing distribution” elements of the conviction, to the admission of the recorded interrogation, to the admission of evidence concerning old computers found in Clark’s home, and to evidence of Clark’s computer knowledge. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Tempo’s convictions and 30-year sentence for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(C), 846; drug possession and distribution, section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and drug possession and distribution near a school, sections 841, 860. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that he was sentenced under an unconstitutionally vague sentencing provision.The court upheld Sadler’s convictions for drug conspiracy, drug possession and distribution near a school, felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), conspiracy to obstruct justice (section 1512(k)), and witness tampering, section 1512(a)(2)(A). The court held that jury instructions correctly stated the causation standard under 841(b)(1)(C), where serious bodily injury or death results from the use of the drugs distributed. The court vacated Sadler’s sentence and remanded for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) based on the overdoses. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law

Mizori pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; his PSR recommended a finding that Mizori had acted as a manager or supervisor within a conspiracy. A police investigator and an informant testified that Mizori had played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Mizori did not call any witnesses. The district court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.Mizori sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel’s failure to offer any witnesses at the sentencing hearing amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Mizori attached supporting affidavits from three co-conspirators. Almost four years later the district court denied Mizori’s motion. Mizori, then confined in a high-security Special Housing Unit, “SHU,” had 60 days— until September 15, 2019—to file a notice of appeal but had no access to stamps or a law library. He was confined in the SHU until September 29. Days later, Mizori timely moved, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.The district court denied his motion, stating that “Mizori has not met his burden of establishing excusable neglect" but did not address whether Mizori had shown “good cause” for an extension, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), the ground on which Mizori sought relief. The Sixth Circuit held that Mizori does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion and that the district court abused its discretion by denying that motion. View "Mizori v. United States" on Justia Law

Greene was booked into the Crawford County Jail after having his bond revoked for attending a plea hearing while intoxicated. Over the next four days, Greene began hallucinating and exhibiting other symptoms of delirium tremens, a life-threatening complication of alcohol withdrawal that the Sixth Circuit has recognized as an objectively serious medical need. Greene ultimately suffered acute respiratory failure. He died four days later. Crawford County officials did not provide any medical care to Greene before his incapacitation but only sought a mental health evaluation from a Community Mental Health Authority and purportedly relied on that evaluation in deciding not to seek medical assistance.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to Greene’s medical need and that Crawford County is liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of not providing medical care to inmates suffering from delirium tremens, the district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to some county officials and denied Crawford County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Greene experienced a clearly established life-threatening medical condition for at least two days. The defendants did not provide any medical assistance during that time. The court dismissed Crawford County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Greene v. Crawford County" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip, Cleveland police arranged for a controlled buy from Hall at his residence, using a confidential informant. The next day, officers executed a search warrant for Hall’s residence. They recovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. This cycle was repeated the next month. Weeks later, officers saw Hall conducting a drug transaction in a parked vehicle; they pulled him over, searched the vehicle, and arrested him. He was released from custody with an ankle monitor. Police received information that Hall was continuing to sell drugs and conducted another controlled buy, followed by a search of Hall’s residence, where they recovered drugs, cash, and a cell phone. Officers monitored his telephone calls from the jail, executed another controlled buy, and recovered from Franklin’s vehicle roughly 500 grams of cocaine, 300 grams of heroin, a loaded gun, and marijuana. They found $1,000 on Franklin’s person, $60 of which was the prerecorded money from that day’s controlled buy, and two cell phones that had used to schedule the controlled buys.Hall and Franklin were convicted of drug and firearm offenses; each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the sufficiency of the evidence and to the racial composition of the jury. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence found in Hall’s vehicle and the district court’s admission of certain testimony by officers. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigations searches social media for people soliciting sex from children and saw that Hruby, a Texas resident, was advertising as a “[g]randpa looking for open family.” Posing as the mother of two girls under the age of 12, Detective D’Hondt responded; during the sexually charged conversation that followed, D’Hondt concluded that Hruby had molested a child. Hruby flew to Kentucky to meet D’Hondt’s children but was arrested when he landed. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Hruby admitted that his friend “sent” his five-year-old daughter “to bed” with him. Investigators found child pornography on Hruby’s cell phone.Hruby was charged with crossing state lines with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The government was permitted to offer Rule 414(a) evidence: Hruby’s online messages regarding his history of child molestations and his post-arrest confession. Under Rule 414(a) a court may admit evidence that a defendant previously molested a child to show that he is inclined to molest children if the evidence is offered on a relevant matter. The court rejected Hruby’s argument that the statements should be excluded under Rule 403 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hruby’s convictions, rejecting his argument that the government should have to corroborate a Rule 414(a) confession before the jury can consider it. View "United States v. Hruby" on Justia Law

Hymes pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C). Hymes had multiple prior state convictions. The district court initially sentenced Hymes to 188 months’ imprisonment. While Hymes’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided “Havis” (2019), casting doubt over the district court’s reading of the Sentencing Guidelines in Hymes’s case. On remand, with the career offender provision off the table, Hymes faced a Guidelines range of 110-137 months imprisonment. Hymes argued that his prior driving offenses artificially inflated his criminal history score and that several post-incarceration developments warranted a variance, including his behavior in prison and the COVID-19 pandemic.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 124-month sentence. The district court, acting on a limited remand, did not abuse its discretion in evaluating Hymes’s criminal history or rehabilitation arguments. A district court is not required to consult the Sentencing Commission’s collected data in order to avoid sentencing disparities. In two separate sentencing proceedings, the district court thoughtfully explained why a sentence near the bottom of the Guidelines range was appropriate and, citing Hymes’s recent drug trafficking convictions, concluded that Hymes was a chronic recidivist and that a sentence below the Guidelines recommendation would be inappropriate. View "United States v. Hymes" on Justia Law