Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1996, two 17-year-olds, Harris and Gaines, approached soldiers at the Fort Campbell Army base. Attempting to rob them, Gaines pulled out a handgun, which discharged. A bullet struck Private Alonso-Caravia, killing him. Harris and Gaines pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1111, aiding and abetting attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 2111, and aiding and abetting using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c). The district court sentenced Harris to 420 months plus a consecutive 60-month prison term for the section 924(c) conviction.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Harris argued that the consecutive 60-month sentence must be vacated because it is possible that the court imposed that punishment under the unconstitutionally vague “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that the sentence cannot be saved under the “elements clause” of section 924(c)(3)(A) because neither of his other convictions could have been considered a “crime of violence” under then-existing precedent. Harris cannot establish harm that he suffered from any error. At best, Harris can show that the record of his sentencing is silent as to whether the court relied upon 924(c)(3)’s elements clause or residual clause when imposing his sentence. The 18 U.S.C. 2111 crime of aiding and abetting attempted robbery necessarily constitutes a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

Gillispie was convicted of two 1988 rapes and spent more than 20 years in prison before Ohio courts vacated his convictions, based on his claims of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and actual innocence. Gillispie brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Moore, the police officer responsible for much of the investigation and the identification of Gillispie as the likely perpetrator. Gillispie alleges that Moore suppressed exculpatory evidence, arranged an unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedure, fabricated inculpatory evidence, assisted in maliciously prosecuting him, and destroyed exculpatory evidence. Moore claims entitlement to qualified immunity. The district court determined that each of Gillispie’s claims should proceed to trial.The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Moore’s argument on appeal is simply a challenge to the district court’s determinations that genuine issues of material fact exist on the core claims. Defendants cannot appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. “An appeal choosing to take this tack anyway delays the administration of our justice system and is a waste of judicial resources.” View "Gillispie v. Miami Township" on Justia Law

Presley pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to burglarize more than 90 pharmacies, 18 U.S.C. 2118(d), and to assault of a police officer, 21 U.S.C. 2118(c). Presley had attempted to flee from arrest by speeding off in a car, almost striking the arresting officer, and had led a high-speed chase through residential areas before becoming stuck in a yard. Presley received a full reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He stipulated to “specific offense characteristics” for the conspiracy count: the burglary involved a structure other than a residence, the offense involved more than minimal planning, and the loss was more than $20,000 but less than $95,000. The court added one level because a controlled substance was taken, two levels for possession of a crowbar as a “dangerous weapon,” six levels for the assault of the officer, and two levels for the risk created to others by Presley’s flight. During his plea colloquy, Presley twice confirmed that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney and was “giving up the right to appeal the sentence to be imposed.” With a Guidelines range of 92-115 months, after addressing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a 102-month sentence.Though Presley’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, he challenged his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. Presley knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and was aware of the consequences; both his appellate waiver and his plea agreement are enforceable. View "United States v. Presley" on Justia Law

Hale, charged with failing a drug test while on pretrial diversion in Boyle County, was detained at the Marion County Detention Center ahead of her trial. The Boyle County Sheriff’s Office transported Hale between the counties for her monthly court appearances. Court Security Officer Pennington was the driver. Hale and Pennington repeatedly performed oral sex on each other and had unprotected penetrative vaginal sex in Pennington’s van. Before and during the encounters, Pennington showered Hale with perks—she rode cuffless in his van’s front seat, he bought her sodas, and he allowed her to smoke. He also offered to intervene in Hale’s pending criminal case. Hale gave birth to their child.Hale filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Pennington, Boyle County, and Sheriff Robbins. The district court found that Hale’s consenting to sexual contact and intercourse with Pennington negated her constitutional claims, and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hale’s assertions against Pennington are properly viewed as an excessive-force claim that should be evaluated under an objective test. Hale asserted intimidation and coercion. She presented a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the encounters with Pennington were consensual. View "Hale v. Boyle County" on Justia Law

During an investigation into whether Elmore sexually abused a seven-year-old girl, officers obtained and executed a warrant to remove Elmore’s vehicle from his stepmother’s home and search the vehicle. Elmore’s stepmother gave officers a key fob for Elmore’s car. Searches of the car and of a storage unit revealed no evidence. Weeks later, Elmore’s stepmother found that Elsmore had two more key fobs and notified the officers of her nagging suspicions that Elmore was hiding child pornography on one of the fobs. The officers also had a tip from Elmore’s fellow inmate. Aided by a warrant, a subsequent search of the fobs revealed a memory card containing child pornography. Elmore was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography. Elmore twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the memory card evidence, then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Elmore’s conviction (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)) and the revocation of his earlier term of supervised released (based on a prior child pornography conviction). Elmore’s suppression argument rests on his view that his stepmother’s actions were the “tainted consequences of law enforcement’s unlawful searches and seizures” but the search of the key fobs was separated from the earlier searches. The affidavit passes constitutional muster. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Michigan Department of Corrections inmates may hold formal group services or possess certain religious property only if the Department has formally recognized their faith. Though the Department recognizes the Ifa faith, it is one of only three recognized religions that was denied group services. A group is not guaranteed religious services if there are less than five prisoners within the same security level in a facility; the Department may bar group services if they may pose “safety and security” concerns. When an inmate submits a request for group worship or religious property, the warden must forward the request to the Special Activities Coordinator, who must evaluate the request. The deputy director makes the final decision. Discretion is minimal.Between his conversion to the Ifa faith in August 2015 and filing this lawsuit more than two years later, Byrd sent four requests for Ifa group services and nine items that he considers essential to his faith (a straw prayer mat, herbs, and beads). Although Byrd enlisted the chaplain’s assistance, none of his requests received a response. Byrd sued, alleging violations of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The district court erred in viewing the problem as procedural; the long delay is tantamount to a substantive denial. View "Byrd v. Haas" on Justia Law

Wesson was charged with murdering 81-year-old Varhola and attacking (and nearly killing) his 77-year-old wife, after they invited him into their home on February 25, 2008. A three-judge panel convicted Wesson of several charges, including two counts of aggravated murder, and imposed the death penalty. Wesson unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confession to police due to his alleged intoxication and other factors when they questioned him. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court vacated one of Wesson’s aggravated murder convictions but affirmed his remaining convictions and the death sentence; the court rejected Wesson’s claim that his alleged intoxication vitiated his Miranda waiver.Wesson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, and the government violated his right against self-incrimination when it introduced his post-Miranda statement. The district court found that Wesson made a credible claim of intellectual disability and dismissed that claim and a related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to allow the state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on Wesson’s second claim. The state courts did not unreasonably apply the law or facts with respect to his confession, which occurred when he allegedly was intoxicated. View "Wesson v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Howell’s girlfriend, Thompson, testified for the government at Howell’s trial. Thompson had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Howell in the robbery of a bank in Finger, Tennessee, and aiding and abetting Howell in the attempted robbery of a bank in Reagan, Tennessee. Security cameras at each bank recorded the events and the video footage was shown to the jury. Howell was convicted of armed bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during the robbery, a separate attempted armed bank robbery, discharging a firearm during the attempted robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Howell’s convictions and 466-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly: interfered with his right to testify; allowed the identification testimony of a bank teller; refused to bifurcate the felon-in-possession charge that was “vindictively added” 16 months after the initial indictment; applied the base offense level for attempted first-degree murder; and imposed a two-level offense enhancement because a victim was “physically restrained.” Although the possibility of being subject to impeachment by the use of a prior conviction on cross-examination may deter a defendant from taking the stand, that possibility does not amount to a constitutional violation. Any error in allowing the teller’s identification was harmless. The firearm charge was brought later because it was based on new evidence. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

In 2003, Bass, a Michigan “drug kingpin,” was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and firearms murder during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Bass had murdered a hitman whom Bass had hired to kill Bass’s half-brother. The government sought the death penalty. Bass was ultimately sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In 2020, Bass moved for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the pandemic. Bass claimed that as a 51-year-old African-American male suffering from morbid obesity, he faced a higher risk of severe illness.The district court granted Bass’s request in January 2021 and ordered his immediate release. In March, the Sixth Circuit imposed an emergency stay; the court then reversed on the merits. The district court committed legal errors when it compared Bass’s federal sentence to his co-defendant’s state sentence and gave little weight to the concern that Bass’s release might endanger the public. By analogizing its role to that of a parole board, the court framed the legal question in a manner that Congress expressly condemned when it shifted away from the rehabilitation focus of criminal sentencing. On remand, the court must reevaluate the request based on current circumstances, which have materially changed; in April 2021, Bass was offered the COVID-19 vaccine but refused it. View "United States v. Bass" on Justia Law

In 2018, Traylor was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347; conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. 371; and five counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The district court initially sentenced Traylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 120 months at her recent resentencing. In a pro se third motion for a sentence reduction, Traylor argued that, due to her various health ailments (e.g., diabetes, sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, being a recent organ transplant recipient, and use of immunosuppressive therapy), she is susceptible to contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19 in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Traylor did not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction because she had received two doses of the Pfizer vaccine, significantly reducing her risk of contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19. The district court was not required to address the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. View "United States v. Traylor" on Justia Law