Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The IRS began a criminal investigation of Gaetano, who owns Michigan cannabis dispensaries. Portal 42, a software company that provides the cannabis industry with point-of-sale systems, confirmed that Gaetano was a client. Agents served a summons, ordering Portal 42 to produce records “and other data relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability or for the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws concerning [Gaetano] for the periods shown.” The IRS did not notify Gaetano about the summons. Portal 42 sent the IRS an email with a hyperlink to the requested records. An IRS computer specialist copied the documents. None of the personnel in the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division have viewed the records.Gaetano filed a petition under 26 U.S.C. 7609, seeking to quash the summons, arguing that the IRS should have notified Gaetano about the summons and that it was issued in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Gaetano lacked standing. Section 7609 waives the government’s sovereign immunity to allow taxpayers to bring an action to quash certain third-party IRS summonses. An exception applies because the summons here was issued by an IRS criminal investigator “in connection” with an IRS criminal investigation and the summoned party is not a third-party recordkeeper. Without a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot obtain. View "Gaetano v. United States" on Justia Law

At 1:20 a.m., Harden, an African-American, went to buy beer at a Thornton store, where a uniformed Heritage Creek police officer, Hillman, provided security. The clerk told Harden, “I think you’ve had too much to drink already.” Harden left but returned. Hillman allegedly slammed him down onto the floor. Harden requested medical attention and was transported to the hospital, where he was cited for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and public intoxication, then released. The charges were dismissed after Hillman failed to appear.Harden's claims against Thornton and Heritage Creek were dismissed. Harden’s excessive force claim against Hillman was rejected by a jury. Harden first unsuccessfully sought a new trial based on the court’s refusal to order the Marshals Service to serve his subpoenas and on Hillman’s counsel allegedly making improper arguments to the jury.Harden’s counsel obtained permission to contact a juror post-trial. That juror claimed that Harden did not get a fair trial because of his race and that another juror concealed from the judge that he was related to a police officer. The court denied Harden’s second motion for a new trial.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Harden’s claim that he was arrested without probable cause and the order denying Harden’s first motion for a new trial but vacated the denial of the second motion. The juror’s affidavit showed that jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. View "Harden v. Hillman" on Justia Law

In 2005, Pouncy opted to represent himself and was convicted of four counts of carjacking, four counts of armed robbery, and three firearm counts. He was sentenced to 586-824 months' imprisonment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Pouncy’s argument that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In 2013, Pouncy filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the state courts erred in allowing him to represent himself. In 2016, the district court granted a conditional writ. While Michigan's appeal proceeded, the district court released Pouncy on bond. After his release, Pouncy tried to enter the chambers of the judge who presided over his trial; later Michigan charged him with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon. The court revoked bail.In 2017, the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas relief and remanded for consideration of Pouncy’s other claims. A cell phone was subsequently found in Pouncy’s cell, containing messages, suggesting that Pouncy had paid $10,000 to secure false testimony in his federal habeas proceeding. The district court declined to dismiss the petition in full. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, Pouncy unsuccessfully sought release on bond pending review of his petition. When the pandemic worsened, Pouncy unsuccessfully asked for bail again. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court reasonably concluded that the “interests of justice” did not support Pouncy’s release, given the “looming reality” of his conduct, which included time-consuming collateral litigation. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Memphis Officers suspected Reed of distributing marijuana. Reed had prior drug convictions. Detective Evans filed affidavits seeking search warrants for OK Tire, Orchi Road, and Bond Road. At OK Tire, owned by Reed's girlfriend, a reliable confidential informant had made a controlled buy from Reed and had seen Reed “selling and storing marijuana.” Evans had surveilled the couple leaving their home (Bond Road) and traveling to OK. Each had keys to the business. Reed’s mother lived on Orchi Road. Reed’s driver’s license listed it; Evans had watched the informant make a controlled buy from Reed there. Evans sought a warrant to search Bond Road for financial records and drug proceeds (not for drugs).A state judge issued three search warrants. Officers seized nothing from OK and only baggies and a digital scale from Orchi Road. The search at Bond Road uncovered guns, ammunition, 18.7 grams of marijuana, 2.1 grams of THC wax, and $5,636 in cash. Reed confessed that the guns and drugs were his and that he had been selling marijuana. He later successfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained from at Bond Road, including his statements.The Sixth Circuit reversed, declining to address the constitutional question of whether, when officers have probable cause to arrest a suspect, they need additional evidence of a “nexus” between the drug dealing and the dealer’s home in order to search that home. Even when a search violates the Fourth Amendment, courts should not suppress evidence if the police reasonably relied on a judge’s decision that probable cause justified a warrant. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

In March 2012, Edington and his father agreed Edington would apply for a Farm Services Agency (FSA) farm operating loan and list assets belonging to his father as collateral. Edington listed as collateral many assets he did not own. In 2012, Edington also presented documents to the FSA falsely claiming he had purchased cattle from his friend. Edington defaulted on the loans; his father died. Edington did not inherit the assets listed in the security agreement. In 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed felony charges for conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits: “knowingly make[] a false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the” FSA. The district court dismissed, citing the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. 3282(a).The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded; 18 U.S.C. 3293(1) expressly provides a 10-year limitations period for certain offenses including “a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate . . . section . . . 1014.” Section 3293 extends the statute of limitations from five to 10 years for certain crimes including a violation of and conspiracy to violate section 1014. The most recent alleged overt acts listed in the information occurred in 2012; the charges were timely. View "United States v. Edington" on Justia Law

Wright, a member of a motorcycle gang, distributed cocaine. When Wright’s co-conspirator, Moore, fought with other members of the conspiracy, Wright agreed to kill him for $50,000, drove to Ohio, and shot Moore in the head while he slept. Wright and his co-conspirators used a welding torch to destroy evidence, which they dumped into Lake Huron. Wright later helped steal several airplanes because he and his co-conspirators had stolen drugs belonging to the Medellín Cartel and needed to repay them. One plane belonged to the U.S. Forestry Service. Federal agents eventually arrested Wright and his co-conspirators. The co-conspirators cooperated; Wright was convicted of murder for hire, interstate travel in aid of a violent crime, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, plus five years.Nineteen years into his sentence, Wright sought compassionate release, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and health problems, including obesity, cataracts, diabetes, end-stage renal disease, and peripheral vascular disease, which has led to several amputations. Collectively, the illnesses are terminal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors did not warrant relief. The district court acknowledged Wright’s recent remorse, health problems, and rehabilitative efforts, but found that other considerations— his criminal history and disciplinary violations—outweighed these factors. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 2012, Manso-Zamora was convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery, three Hobbs Act robberies, and three counts of possessing and brandishing or discharging a firearm in furtherance of those robberies, and was sentenced to 776 months' imprisonment. In 2020, Manso-Zamora sought release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), asserting that he was at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19. He was hospitalized for several weeks in 2019 for bone marrow aplastic anemia, inflammatory bowel disease, and low white blood cells and platelets. He noted his rehabilitation efforts and that, had he been sentenced under the 2018 First Step Act, he would not have been subject to mandatory consecutive 300-month sentences for his firearm convictions. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit allowed appointed counsel to withdraw and directed the clerk to appoint new counsel, then declined to consider Manso-Zamora’s pro se motions to voluntarily dismiss his appeal and to appoint a medical expert. Prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in collateral post-conviction proceedings or in section 3582(c) proceedings. The "Anders" procedures are not required in section 3582(c) proceedings. Counsel is entitled to withdraw to honor his ethical obligation not to pursue a claim that he honestly believes to be frivolous. Given that Manso-Zamora and his attorney “disagree” about his medical conditions, it would be “unreasonable” to compel that attorney to continue providing services. View "United States v. Manso-Zamora" on Justia Law

Maxwell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin. The crack-cocaine offense then generated a sentencing range of 20 years to life and the heroin offense generated a range of 10 years to life, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). Applying the 2009 Guidelines, the court treated Maxwell as a career offender and sentenced Maxwell to 30 years. While Maxwell’s appeal was pending, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence but did not apply retroactively. Maxwell sought collateral relief. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his trial attorney violated Maxwell’s rights when he failed to argue that the two conspiracy counts were multiplicitous.On remand, the district court vacated Maxwell’s heroin conviction and imposed a 30-year sentence on the cocaine conviction alone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2018, the First Step Act authorized courts to lower sentences imposed for crack-cocaine offenses “as if” the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act had been the law during the original sentencing. Maxwell unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Fair Sentencing Act does not require plenary resentencing hearings and does not expressly permit a court to reduce a sentence based on other intervening changes in the law, such as those concerning career offender status. Operating within its broad discretion, the court considered and rejected each of Maxwell’s arguments. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Wills was indicted for various methamphetamine-trafficking offenses. The government gave notice under 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1) of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Wills’s prior felony drug conviction. Wills pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, 240 months’ imprisonment.After exhausting his administrative remedies, Wills sought compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) on the basis of “extraordinary or compelling circumstances.” Wills asserted that, if sentenced today, he would not be subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior felony drug conviction would not qualify as a “serious drug felony” under section 401 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Denying Wills’s motion, the district court pointed out that section 401 does not apply retroactively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that other courts have found that the First Step Act’s amendment of the sentence enhancement provisions constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Wills" on Justia Law

Duran transported drugs from California to Ohio on a bus. Duran carried 10 packages of methamphetamine, a total of 4,427 grams. The DEA intercepted Duran, who agreed to cooperate and allowed the government to copy calls, texts, and data from her cellphone. When officers surrounded Rosales, Duran’s contact, in a parking lot, Rosales destroyed his cell phone. Officers found cash totaling $6,962 in Rosales’ pocket. Officers searched his pickup truck and found money orders that matched details sent to Duran. In Rosales’ home, officers found $9,500 in cash. No controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, or drug ledgers were found. The court instructed the jury to find the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy as a whole, rather than just the amount that was foreseeable to Rosales. The jury convicted Rosales on conspiracy and attempt to possess counts and found that the conspiracy involved 4,427 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The court gave a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice because Rosales threw his cellphone down during his arrest but departed down from the Guidelines range and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. There was sufficient evidence to convict on both counts. The court erred in failing to provide defendant-specific jury instructions but the error was harmless because it could not have contributed to a different result. The court remanded for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether the obstruction of justice enhancement applies after making the necessary factual findings. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law