Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Kendrick fatally shot his wife outside a Chattanooga gas station. He insisted that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired without Kendrick pulling the trigger. Before trial, officer Miller accidentally shot himself in the foot while handling the rifle, A jury convicted Kendrick of first-degree murder. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Kendrick raised 77 claims alleging either ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or prosecutorial misconduct. He succeeded in the Court of Criminal Appeals on two IAC claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to both, holding that counsel’s decision not to adduce the testimony of a firearms expert was not constitutionally deficient performance nor was counsel’s failure to introduce Miller's favorable hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. Kendrick’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient in failing to admit Miller’s “excited utterance” statements that he did not pull the trigger when he shot himself but “took great pains to inform the jury that the weapon apparently misfired’ for Miller. It was within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of firearms experts. View "Kendrick v. Parris" on Justia Law

Bethel is serving a capital sentence at CCI. Following Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy, CCI officials implemented a policy prohibiting “orders for printed material placed by third parties through unapproved vendors.” An inmate’s family or friends could only place orders on their behalf through an approved vendor; orders from unapproved vendors had to “be initiated by the inmate and approved by CCI.” If an inmate received a package from an unapproved source, the inmate could return the package at the inmate’s expense or have it destroyed. Officials withheld books from Bethel that were not ordered by Bethel; he received notices explaining why the books were withheld and offering him the option of having the books returned or destroyed. Bethel later learned that other inmates had received religious books, which were initially withheld for being ordered by a third party but were exempted after being reviewed by the chaplain.Bethel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an Establishment Clause claim but remanded Free Speech and Procedural Due Process claims and later affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The “publisher only” policy was neutral and supported by the legitimate penological interest of preventing the entry of contraband into the prison; there were reasonable alternative means for Bethel to acquire these books. Bethel received sufficient process following the withholding of his books through written notice, the grievance procedure, and the ability to return the book. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they did not violate Bethel’s clearly established rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. View "Bethel v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2004, Kimball was convicted of multiple drug-trafficking, weapons, money-laundering offenses, soliciting murder, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 15 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In April 2020, Kimball sought compassionate release, asserting that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release because he is at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on his age (67) and medical conditions (hypertension, heart problems, high cholesterol, and gout) and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Kimball’s argument that the time he has already served—approximately 17 years—is sufficient to serve the section 3553(a) goals because his offense did not involve any “actual violence” and he is statistically unlikely to re-offend based on his age. The court noted that when it affirmed his effective life sentence, he was the “undisputed kingpin and mastermind” of a “massive cocaine-trafficking conspiracy.” The district court’s order noted that its decision rested at least in part on the section 3553(a) factors; courts may deny relief under those factors “even if ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons would otherwise justify relief.” Even if the district court “mistakenly limited itself to the commentary’s list of extraordinary and compelling reasons," that would not entitle him to relief. View "United States v. Kimball" on Justia Law

Reedy, a Michigan prisoner, was a 47-year-old African American, serving a DUI sentence. His cellmate, Hensley was a 53-year-old much larger Caucasian, convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a child. Reedy claims that in June 2016, he told Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Wade about Hensley's threats against his life. In July, Reedy told prison counselor West “that [his] bunkie had threatened [him] and we needed to move.” West allegedly responded, “I’ll get back with you,” but never did. Days later, Reedy and Hensley went together to West’s office. Reedy claims he “reiterate[d] [his] fear” West allegedly replied, Hensley "ain’t going to do nothing.” West claims Reedy remained silent, while Hensley stated, “You guys got to move this motherfucker” or “whatever happens . . . is going to be onto [you].” West claims that he told the men to work it out and that Reedy returned later and said that “everything was good.” The next morning, Hensley used a softball-sized rock in a laundry bag to beat Reedy while he was sleeping.In Reedy’s Eighth Amendment “failure to protect" lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court dismissed the other prison officials and, with respect to West, concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Reedy as to both an objective, substantial risk of serious harm to Reedy before the assault and that West was deliberately indifferent to that risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Reedy, he has not created a triable issue of fact to support an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. View "Reedy v. West" on Justia Law

In March 2005, Miles was indicted for murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and being a persistent felony offender. Eight months later, law enforcement sent a hat recovered at the crime scene to a lab for DNA testing. The court granted the prosecutor several continuances, waiting for the DNA results for the hat. Miles himself filed an unsuccessful speedy-trial motion, arguing that the DNA testing was a “stall tactic.” The hat was negative for Miles’ DNA. Miles’s trial began 21 months after he was indicted.On appeal, the issues concerned a gun, found under Miles’s mattress but not linked to the shootings, and Miles’s nicknames. Miles appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing that the 21-month delay between his indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Applying the four-factor test established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that court affirmed his convictions.In Kentucky habeas proceedings, Miles argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s references to the gun and to the prosecutor’s use of his nicknames. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that there was not a reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different if his counsel had objected to the gun or nickname references. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Miles’s petition for federal habeas relief; the district court appropriately deferred to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reasonable resolutions of Miles’s claims. View "Miles v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Cretacci, a Coffee County Jail detainee, claims he was injured during a 2015 inmate protest, that the jail failed to distribute essential supplies after that protest, and that he was injured again in 2017 when he did not comply with an order to get on the ground. Cretacci's attorney, Justice, intended to file his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint electronically. On the evening before the limitations period expired on Cretacci’s claims stemming from the 2015 incident, Justice realized he was not admitted to practice law in the district encompassing the jail. The next day, Justice drove to the Winchester courthouse. That courthouse does not have a staffed clerk’s office; documents cannot be filed there. Justice took the complaint to Cretacci at the jail and told him to deliver it to an officer immediately because he could take advantage of the prison mailbox rule, which assesses the timeliness of inmate filings on the day they are handed to jail authorities. Cretacci did so.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that two claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that there were no constitutional violations underlying the remaining claims. The prison mailbox rule does not apply to prisoners who are represented by counsel; that rule is premised on the relaxed procedural requirements traditionally afforded to pro se prisoners who have no choice but to rely on the prison authorities to file their pleadings. View "Cretacci v. Call" on Justia Law

Reels operated a Cleveland drug-trafficking ring and regularly purchased large amounts of heroin, reselling the drug in smaller quantities. Reels and Wheat were social acquaintances. By phone, Wheat told Reels that he had come across “something” in Reels’s “field.” They met at a gas station; Wheat gave Reels a free “sample” of about .3 grams of heroin. Reels had a customer test the sample but ultimately did not purchase any heroin from Wheat. The two had no further interactions.Before that meeting, Reels had unwittingly sold large amounts of drugs to DEA confidential informants. DEA was tracking Reels’s movements and conversations. Weeks after Reels’s interaction with Wheat, officers executed search warrants at Reels’s properties, recovered large amounts of drugs, and charged Reels and others, including Wheat. Wheat was charged with a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin and 40 grams of fentanyl (with a minimum five-year sentence. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846) and with using a communication facility in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The government withdrew the drug-quantity allegation. Convicted on both counts, Wheat received an above-guidelines 27-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed Wheat’s conspiracy conviction. A buyer-seller agreement alone does not establish a section 846 “conspiracy.” The government presented overwhelming evidence that Reels operated a drug distribution scheme but Reels was not on trial. The logic underlying the buyer-seller exception extends to Wheat’s agreement to distribute a sample to Reels. The government did not present additional evidence of a broader agreement between the two to distribute heroin to third parties. The court upheld the “communication facility” conviction. View "United States v. Wheat" on Justia Law

Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. He exhausted state remedies, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied in 2009. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hanna’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance in mitigation because his counsel failed to present a psychologist to testify about organic neurological defects and his troubled childhood. In 2019, Hanna sought leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and moved to remand his pending petition, arguing that his second-in-time petition is not successive under section 2244(b).The Sixth Circuit denied both requests, rejecting Hanna’s argument that his new claims could not have been raised in his first petition because his previous habeas counsel suffered a conflict of interest. Hanna’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance in mitigation were raised in the previous petition. Hanna seeks to add new evidence. Hanna has also not shown that he meets the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Hanna does not claim that his new petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law; he seeks an evidentiary hearing to prove certain facts and all of his claims relate to trial counsel’s representation in mitigation. Mitigation evidence categorically does not meet section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s requirement that the new facts establish actual innocence. In addition, Hanna’s claims were procedurally defaulted or have been adjudicated in unchallenged state court decisions. View "In re Hanna" on Justia Law

The Laniers were charged with a scheme to fraudulently obtain government contracts. During deliberations, a juror contacted assistant district attorney Nelson—a social acquaintance, not involved with the Laniers's case. Nelson informed the district judge that Juror 11 called her and said that there was a “problem” with the deliberations. No juror alerted court personnel to any problems. Convicted, the Laniers unsuccessfully requested to interview the jurors and moved for a mistrial. No one interviewed the jurors nor questioned Nelson in open court. The Sixth Circuit remanded for a Remmer hearing in 2017.On remand, the district court summoned the jurors and Nelson, ordering them not to discuss or research the case. Juror 11 nonetheless texted Nelson, suggesting that the juror had researched the case online. Nelson reported the texts to the district judge, who failed to notify the Laniers but ordered Juror 11 to preserve her texts and web-browsing history. Weeks later, the court ordered Juror 11 to turn over her phone and laptop and asked his IT staffer and law clerk to examine the devices. They discovered that the web-browsing data had been deleted. The Laniers unsuccessfully sought a full forensic exam. After Sixth Circuit intervention, the court allowed the Laniers’ expert to forensically examine the devices. Juror 11 revealed that she had discarded her phone months earlier; any potentially deleted texts and web-browsing data are unrecoverable.The district court denied the Laniers’ motions for a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Laniers were deprived of a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate juror bias and are entitled to a new trial to be held before another district judge. View "United States v. Lanier" on Justia Law

Small and Johnson were indicted for aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), (c). Spoon, age 73, testified that she was alone when she noticed a black Chevrolet Malibu pull into her driveway. Small and Johnson ran into her Tennessee home, held Spoon at gunpoint, bound her feet and hands together, and took Spoon’s valuables. Spoon was captive for 20-25 minutes before they left. Spoon freed herself and called the authorities. Mercer County, West Virginia Deputy Addair, having received reports regarding similar home invasions and an anonymous tip that the defendants were driving a black sedan with an out-of-state registration, obtained surveillance footage of Small at a pawnshop. Small had an active Tennessee arrest warrant. Police located the Chevrolet in West Virginia and arrested Small. Johnson fled in a truck, which Small had purchased in Tennessee. Days later, police arrested Johnson.During deliberations, the jury asked the court for definitions of the terms “confined,” “seized,” and “abducted.” The court provided the dictionary definitions. Convicted, Small was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment and Johnson to 300 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the court’s advice to the jury, and to the sentences. Although the defendants did not transport the victim across state lines, sufficient evidence proves that they used a rental car to cross state lines, travel to Spoon’s home, and escape. A reasonable jury could conclude that the interstate commerce element is met. View "United States v. Small" on Justia Law