Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Townsend’s final pretrial conference, the district court expressed its belief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Michigan had recently adopted a policy of offering only plea deals that contain sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. The court stated its disapproval of these types of waivers and its intention to continue rejecting plea agreements that contain them. Later, the parties negotiated a plea agreement in private that limited Townsend’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence. The court responded that it would not accept the agreement. The government and Townsend filed a joint motion asking the court to accept the plea agreement. The court then canceled the plea hearing. Six months later, the court denied the motion and rejected the proposed plea agreement.The prosecution sought mandamus relief, which was granted by the Sixth Circuit. A district court does not possess unrestrained discretion to reject a plea agreement. It must, among other things, make an individualized assessment of the agreement and predicate its decision on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Because the district court here failed to do that, this is the narrow circumstance in which the district court abused its discretion. The prosecution has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus on this ground. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Sears was imprisoned for federal drug crimes. His supervised release began in New York in 2016. It was revoked in 2017 for possessing a controlled substance. As he was serving this revocation sentence, Sears was convicted of Sexual Battery in Ohio state court from a 1996 offense and was sentenced to one year of incarceration. In November 2018, Sears began his parole in Ohio. In July 2020, officers found bags of drugs and loaded firearms at his residence. Sears pled guilty. Sears’s combined Guidelines range on those charges was 111-123 months. The New York federal court issued a supervised release violation warrant. Sears’s case was transferred from Ohio. A Violation Report outlined his July arrest and “Failure to Notify the Probation Officer of a Change of Address.” The Guidelines range for revocation of Sears’s supervised release was 18-24 months.The court discussed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced Sears to 18 months, consecutive to the 111-month sentence for the new charges. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court miscalculated the supervised release Guidelines range by exceeding the maximum length under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited toward and does not limit the statutory maximum for subsequent supervised release violations. The court articulated its balancing of the sentencing factors and imposed a sentence at the low-end of Sears’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Sears" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, a drug-trafficking conspiracy distributed more than 100 kilograms of powder and crack cocaine and involved dozens of actors from Michigan, Texas, and Arkansas, including Mayfield, the Grand Rapids-based ringleader; Gentry, who supplied Mayfield from Houston, with kilogram quantities of cocaine; and the Grand Rapids couriers, distributors, and dealers (Gardner, Marvin Nix, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Martinellus Nix). Of 27 co-conspirators convicted, six appealed: Gardner, Brown, Carey, Kolarich, Marvin Nix, and Martinellus Nix.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuing judge’s finding of necessity for three wiretaps and the reviewing judge’s denial of the motion to suppress. Each wiretap application met “Title III’s necessity standard,” 18 U.S.C. 2510–2520. Investigators did not use the wiretaps as an initial step; they provided detailed explanations as to why traditional investigative techniques failed to expose the entire scope of the drug-trafficking enterprise. The court upheld the admission of voice-identification testimony and the use of a “constructive possession” jury instruction. The government presented sufficient evidence of Brown’s and Kolarich’s role in the drug-trafficking ring to support each count of conviction. Rejecting challenges to the sentence imposed, the court upheld the drug-quantity determinations and the imposition of a drug-premises enhancement. The court vacated the imposition of a 21 U.S.C. 862(a) lifetime ban on federal benefits for Gardner; his drug conspiracy conviction falls outside of 862(a)’s reach. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

In 1992, Burns, with five accomplices, approached a car in which four men were drinking and smoking. Looking for a fight, Burns and his accomplices robbed the car's occupants, then began shooting them, killing two. Blackman escaped with a minor gunshot wound. Thomas, despite having been shot several times, survived; his testimony was instrumental in the trials. Burns was convicted on two counts of felony murder, receiving a death sentence for one murder and a life sentence for the other. Seeking habeas relief, Burns claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage and that the Tennessee prosecutor wrongfully relied on inconsistent testimony and knowingly presented false testimony at the guilt stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has never established that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to introduce, at sentencing, residual-doubt evidence, offered to undermine the prosecution’s case, which led to the conviction. Burns’s counsel did not err by failing to pursue the introduction of residual-doubt evidence at sentencing. Burns’s sentencing counsel did a fair amount of investigation in preparation for the mitigation phase and adopted a strategy of focusing on Burns’s religious background and other signs of good character, which was not unreasonable. Burns fails to establish that the testimony was actually inconsistent or false. View "Burns v. Mays" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008-2009, three partners ran Florida medical clinics and hired Hofstetter, who became the office manager. One of the partners admitted that, over time, pain management dominated their business, so that the other practice areas dwindled, and the clinics eventually became “pill mills.” Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. The clinics displayed numerous indicators of illegal opioid prescription practices, so the government investigated all four women. A jury convicted each defendant of maintaining at least one drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also found guilty of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. With respect to the drug-involved-premises convictions, the court rejected an argument that the underlying statute, 21 U.S.C. 856(a), was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them; the defendants’ conduct put them on notice that they violated the statute, regardless of any potential vagueness when applied to differently situated medical practitioners. Those convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the district court properly instructed the jury; the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. With respect to Hofstetter’s convictions, the court upheld evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning the distribution charge. The court rejected claims of spoliation, Brady violations, and improper remarks during closing arguments. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law

In 2014-2017, Carlson and his friends, using private chartered planes, trafficked about 1,680 kilograms of cocaine, 2,050 pounds of marijuana, 40 pounds of methamphetamine, and between $500 million and $1 billion of cash in drug proceeds, for the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. Carlson got caught and turned in his coconspirators, including Matthews and Wallace.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Matthews’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, sections 846, 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the 60-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed on Wallace (one of the pilots) for his guilty plea on one count. Matthews’ convictions were based on sufficient evidence; the district court did not err in providing a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction. Matthews’ confrontation rights were not violated after the court allowed Carlson to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination as to certain questions on cross-examination and she was not prejudiced by a variance between the indictment and proof at trial on conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

Gould responded to an online advertisement that offered to allow someone to “engage in a live online session with an 8-year-old in exchange for child pornography.” That advertisement included a photo of a minor. Gould responded, offering to send money. Gould was speaking to a real individual, but law enforcement apprehended that person. Gould then began speaking with an undercover DHS agent who had assumed the arrested person’s online identity. The agent offered to let “his” minor daughter have sex with Gould, explaining that he would “video” the encounter. Gould sent the undercover agent links to child pornography, and Gould’s password to a cloud account with thousands of images of minors, including toddlers. Gould flew to Tennessee to meet the "daughter" and presented a blood test indicating he had no sexually-transmitted diseases. After he was arrested, Gould admitted that he responded to the advertisement and confirmed that he saw the images of the 8-year-old in that advertisement.Gould was charged with Enticing a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Gould entered a plea agreement with no appellate waiver. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Gould’s 210-month sentence (the bottom of the Guidelines range). A FaceTime call constitutes a “visual depiction” for purposes of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(c)(1) and responding to an advertisement “involved” “offering or seeking by notice or advertisement” under that Guidelines provision. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

Nunley’s brother, Basil, learned that Nunley had a firearm and tried to persuade him to “get rid” of it. A fight ensued. Nunley fired seven shots at Basil, who nonetheless left unharmed. Officers responded to a call of shots being fired and encountered Nunley in a car. Nunley pointed the firearm at an officer, then led the officers on a high-speed chase. Nunley abandoned his car and ran, firing at the officers, then barricaded himself in a building. Officers used an armored truck to breach the building. Nunley was arrested in possession of a 9-millimeter pistol. Nunley pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The sentencing court rejected Nunley’s objections to a four-level “Additional Felony” sentencing enhancement and a six-level “Official Victim” enhancement. Nunley argued impermissible double counting because the enhancements punished the same conduct—his shooting at the officers; he claimed that shooting at Basil was self-defense.With a Guidelines range of 120-150 months, compressed by a 120-month statutory maximum sentence, the court sentenced Nunley to 112 months’ imprisonment. The court detailed the nature and circumstances of the crimes, Nunley’s long criminal history, his history of drug abuse and mental health issues, and his acceptance of responsibility, citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. View "United States v. Nunley" on Justia Law

Dr. Heyd, the prison's medical officer, treated inmate Murray, who had a heart attack in 2008, before his incarceration, and was hospitalized in 2010 for deep-vein thrombosis in his leg. Murray was prescribed a treatment regimen of Coumadin. He was hospitalized multiple times during 2011 for his deep-vein thrombosis. His hematology-consult team recommended “a fair trial of Coumadin with an (INR) [international normalized ratio] ranging between 2.5 and 3.” In 2012, Murray suffered from a cerebral blood clot that left him permanently blind.Murray filed a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. His expert declaration from a hematologist stated that Heyd and his staff allowed the INR to fall into subtherapeutic levels, failed to follow the hematology recommendations, and failed to appropriately adjust the Coumadin doses; Heyd failed to personally evaluate Murray when he complained of headaches and nausea, symptoms of cerebral edema.Heyd sought qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find facts from which the inference of a substantial risk of serious harm to Murray’s health could be drawn, and that Heyd knew of and disregarded that substantial risk. An inmate’s rights to medical care that is not unreasonably delayed and to adherence to a prescribed treatment plan were clearly established at the time of Heyd’s conduct. View "Murray v. State of Ohio Department of Corrections" on Justia Law