Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police officers pulled over the vehicle in which Brooks was riding for a seatbelt violation. The officers approached, smelled marijuana, and saw Brooks making a “stuffing motion” under his seat. The police found a gun partially hidden there. After a jury convicted Brooks of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the lone African-American juror emailed the court that the other jurors had pressured her into a guilty verdict.On appeal, Brooks claimed that the stop and search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he “possessed” a gun, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, to investigate the racial biases of the other jurors.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Brooks’s conviction and 66-month sentence. The number of officers who conducted the traffic stop did not affect whether it was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The felon-in-possession statute does not require a defendant to control a gun for any significant period of time. Peña-Rodriguez does not permit an evidentiary hearing to impeach a jury verdict even when no jurors made race-based statements. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

During the early morning hours of October 20, 2017, McShann was asleep in the driver’s seat of a locked, running car with his right hand resting on a pistol in his lap and music blaring from the car stereo. Officers, responding to a complaint, determined that the car was registered to a woman whom they were unable to contact. Seconds after officers roused him from sleep, McShann stopped complying with their orders that he keep his hands up and away from the gun. He grabbed the gun and swung it toward the driver-side door, where two officers were positioned. Fearing for their safety and that of their fellow officers, the officers opened fire, killing McShann. After the shooting, the officers immediately called for medical assistance and attempted first aid.The district court concluded the use of deadly force was reasonable and granted the officers summary judgment on excessive force claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, by McShann’s estate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that “[t]he lack of damage to the gun provides clear evidence that Mr. McShann was not holding the gun when he was shot in the hand” did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Such speculation is not enough to controvert consistent officer testimony. View "Jordan v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2015, Sherwood pleaded guilty to transporting visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and possessing child pornography and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Sherwood moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with his age and medical conditions together constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed in favor of release. The district court denied Sherwood’s motion, stating: “[Sherwood] has failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. Not only was he convicted of possession of child pornography, but he was convicted of transportation as well.”The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is no longer an independent basis upon which a court may deny a defendant-filed motion for release. Because Sherwood was denied relief exclusively due to his failure to satisfy section 1B1.13(2)’s requirement that a defendant not be a danger to the community, the district court must apply the remaining section 3582(c)(1)(A) factors. On remand, the court may consider Sherwood’s history and characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community, and the nature and circumstances of his offense. View "United States v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In 2017, Quintanilla pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and illegally reentering the U.S. after having been removed subsequent to a felony conviction. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and did not appeal. In April 2020, Quintanilla sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Court-appointed counsel asserted that Quintanilla has underlying medical conditions that put him at high risk, including diabetes, obesity, and hypertension; that his facility, FCI Oakdale, was among those hardest hit by the pandemic; and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. The government argued that he had not demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons and that he is a danger to the community, so his release would be inconsistent with section 3553(a).The district court denied the motion, stating on a form order that it had considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors and policy statements and conducted a “complete review” of the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Quintanilla’s request for compassionate release and the denial thereof reflects a “conceptually simple” matter suitable to resolution via a form order; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Quintanilla’s motion. View "United States v. Quintanilla-Navarro" on Justia Law

In 1975, schoolteacher and drug dealer Ingram was robbed and shot dead in her Detroit home. Watkins’s 20-year-old high school classmate, Herndon, testified that he and Watkins robbed and murdered Ingram together. Detroit Evidence Technician Badaczewski testified that a hair found on Ingram’s clothing matched Watkins's hair sample. After Watkins’s conviction, Herndon repeatedly recanted. In sworn affidavits, letters, and testimony, Herndon attested that Wayne County Prosecutor Healy and Detective Schwartz threatened to charge him with Ingram’s murder and another murder if Herndon did not implicate Watkins and testify at Watkins’s trial. Watkins’s efforts to overturn his conviction had no success for four decades.In 2017, Watkins presented new evidence that Badaczewski’s hair analysis methods were seriously flawed. The Michigan court dismissed the case against Watkins without prejudice. Months later, Watkins filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Healy, Schwartz's estate, Badaczewski, and Detroit.The district court denied Healy’s motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of Healy’s arguments but held that Healy is not entitled to absolute immunity and that Healy forfeited the issue of qualified immunity at this stage. Even considering Healy’s equitable contentions that it would not be “fair” to hold him to today’s standards, the 1975-76 standards of prosecutorial immunity were the same: a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman’s.” View "Watkins v. Healy" on Justia Law

X pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. While serving his sentence at a North Carolina federal correctional institution, X heard another inmate state that “if you ever want to get rid of a body, hogs is the way to go” and that “it was easy to kill someone without leaving evidence.” X told the FBI and police about the comments. X subsequently persuaded the inmate to confess to the murder of his adopted daughter. The inmate led the police to where he and his wife had disposed of the body. The inmate and his wife pleaded guilty to the murder. The government filed a motion to reduce X’s sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on his substantial assistance and recommended that the court reduce X’s prison sentence by 12-18 months.The district court granted the motion the same day that the motion was filed and reduced X’s prison sentence by 12 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded and issued a redacted opinion. The district court erred in ruling without giving X the opportunity to present evidence and argument. View "United States v. ____ ____" on Justia Law

Nelson pleaded guilty to distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the parties disputed whether Nelson’s prior Ohio conviction for attempted rape of a minor qualified as a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement. The district court sentenced Nelson to the enhanced statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nelson’s argument that his attempted rape conviction under a statute that does not require that the defendant have physical contact with the victim, did not trigger the section 2252(b)(1) enhancement, which applies to prior convictions “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Sexual abuse covers actions that “injure, hurt, or damage for the purpose of sexual or libidinal gratification.” Applying the categorical approach, the court examined the elements of the Ohio statute, not the specific facts underlying the conviction, and reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “relating to” is broad. An attempt conviction “clearly stands in some relation to or pertains to the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” and qualifies as a predicate offense for the enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hudson was shot and killed in his Louisville apartment. Detective Roberts sought DNA testing for items at the murder scene. DNA on a hat came back “consistent with a mixture” from Lester, Baker, and an unknown person. Lester and Baker had been implicated by a witness. The case went cold. In 2012, Roberts interviewed Sullivan, an inmate who had contacted the police years before about the murder. Sullivan had dated Hudson and had been friends with Jasmine (the woman living with Baker,). She stated that Jasmine had told her that Baker killed Hudson “over money.” Roberts then interviewed Jasmine, who stated that, on the day of the murder, she, Baker, and “Desean” went to Hudson’s apartment. The men emerged from the apartment with bandanas covering their faces. Baker confessed that he murdered Hudson. Jasmine could not recall “Desean’s” last name and pronounced his first name differently from how Lester pronounces it. She identified Lester’s photo array picture as “Desean.”At trial, Jasmine distanced herself from her identification of Lester. The jury acquitted Lester. Baker was convicted after a second trial. Lester had spent 20 months in jail and three months in home confinement. After his acquittal, he sued Roberts and the Louisville Metro Government.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary-judgment rejection of malicious-prosecution claims against Roberts. The Fourth Amendment and Kentucky law required only probable cause for Lester’s pretrial detention and prosecution. Jasmine’s earlier identification of Lester, combined with corroborating evidence like DNA, met that standard. View "Lester v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Hampton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. His 204-month sentence was eventually reduced to 180 months based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. Hampton sought a further reduction by way of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Hampton had to exhaust all administrative rights, or, alternatively, wait 30 days after the warden’s first “receipt of [his] request.” Hampton sought administrative relief but filed his motion with the district court before the warden’s 30-day response period had run. The court opted to hold the motion “until the 30-day window ran” and later denied Hampton’s motion “for the reasons stated” in the government’s brief, without further explanation.The Sixth Circuit remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, district courts facing defendant-filed motions seeking release under section 3582(c)(1)(A) should analyze whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction and whether the applicable section 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. It is not clear whether the court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals searching for Milliron in Ohio, based on an outstanding Florida warrant, located Milliron driving his truck. Milliron led the Marshals and local police on a 35-mile chase, hurling glass bottles and makeshift plastic Molotov cocktails toward the officers' vehicles. Milliron eventually crashed into a building. Milliron’s truck was a mobile methamphetamine lab. Milliron's “one-pot methamphetamine” Molotov cocktails contained flammable liquid and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Milliron had 13 rounds of ammunition in his pocket. Milliron was charged with: using a dangerous weapon to forcibly interfere with federal officers performing official duties, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b); possession of a firearm not registered to him; carrying and using a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence; possession of products which may be used to manufacture methamphetamine; intent to manufacture approximately 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; and being a felon-in-possession of ammunition. Milliron pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7.Months later, Milliron unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea, arguing “counsel acknowledge[d] that his representation . . . was deficient” because he had failed to explain that an 18 U.S.C. 111(b) conviction “requires that the defendant intended to cause injury.” With a two-level enhancement for possessing a “dangerous weapon,” a three-level enhancement because a dangerous weapon was possessed and its use was threatened, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Milliron’s Guidelines range was 77-96 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 110-month sentence. The appeal waiver bars review of Milliron’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. The district court correctly assigned the sentencing enhancements. The sentence was reasonable; Milliron “was a violent offender, both on the day in question and previously.” View "United States v. Milliron" on Justia Law