Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elias pled guilty to drug possession and distribution conspiracy; in 2017, she was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. She is confined at FPC Alderson, with a projected release date of November 2024. Elias filed a pro se “Emergency Motion for Immediate Release Due to COVID-19” in April 2020. In June, with appointed counsel, she filed a supplemental motion for a reduction of her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that her hypertension exacerbated her risk of serious injury or death if she were to contract COVID-19. Elias requested that the warden file a compassionate-release motion and appealed the denial, satisfying the exhaustion requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate release motions under the First Step Act. In determining that there were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the district court properly considered the CDC guidance, which then did not include hypertension; reviewed a scientific journal which stated that “there is as yet no evidence that hypertension is related to outcomes of COVID-19”; examined the BOP’s webpage and noted there were no reported cases at FPC Alderson; and concluded that speculation that COVID-19 could spread to FPC Alderson was insufficient to justify Elias’s release. View "United States v. Elias" on Justia Law

Jackson and Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Both received elevated sentences. Jackson was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a).. Combs was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment due to his career-offender status, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Combs’s Kentucky trafficking offense categorically qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines; U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 covers all the conduct under the Kentucky statute and the district court properly deemed Combs to be a career offender. The court rejected Combs’s argument that distribution requires a commercial aspect. Jackson recruited and supervised participants, he held a substantial amount of the cash proceeds, and the conspiracy involved seven individuals. The court also rejected Jackson's challenge to the mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence he received in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), due to his prior marijuana-trafficking conviction. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Silvestre-Gregorio, then age 16, entered the U.S. illegally in 2001. He was detained within weeks. At his removal hearing, he did not have an attorney but was assisted by an interpreter and a social worker. The interpreter spoke Spanish; Silvestre-Gregorio spoke little English and some Spanish; his native tongue was a regional dialect of Guatemala. He answered open-ended questions in Spanish, including where he was born and how he crossed the border. The IJ had to repeat some questions and explained to Silvestre-Gregorio his ability to appeal and his right to be represented by retained counsel. The IJ asked several times whether he would like time to find an attorney. Silvestre-Gregorio declined, saying that he wanted to finish his case that day. Silvestre-Gregorio was removed from the U.S. in June 2001. Silvestre-Gregorio returned to the U.S. in 2002. He accumulated convictions for domestic assault, public intoxication, theft, DUI, and driving without a license.In 2018, he was charged with unlawful reentry of a removed alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Silvestre-Gregorio argued that his 2001 removal violated his right to due process and could not be the basis for a section 1326 conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Silvestre-Gregorio could understand the interpreter during his removal hearing and did not have a constitutional right to government-provided counsel or to be notified of discretionary relief (voluntary removal). View "United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio" on Justia Law

In 2013, Henry was convicted of three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), each related to the associated bank robbery count. A defendant’s first 924(c) conviction then carried a minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration; each additional 924(c) conviction carried a 25-year sentence, even if the convictions were part of the same indictment. Henry was sentenced to 730 months’ incarceration: 70 months for each bank robbery, to be served concurrently and 60 months for the first 924(c) count and 300 months each for the second and third counts, each to be served consecutively. Following a remand, the court sentenced Henry to 738 months’ incarceration.The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Dean” decision, permitting courts to consider mandatory-minimum sentences imposed under section 924(c) when determining the sentence for other counts. Congress passed the First Step Act, under which only a defendant who has a prior final 924(c) conviction is subject to the escalating mandatory-minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)). Henry argued that the 2018 remand meant that the court had not imposed a sentence before its enactment so that he could benefit from the amendment and have a total mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years. The district court sentenced Henry to 60 months for the bank robberies plus 55 years under 924(c). The Sixth Circuit reversed. The language of the limited remand in Henry’s case requires the district court to revisit the sentences for his 924(c) convictions and to resentence him in accordance with the First Step Act. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Mahaffey and another were arrested at the Cincinnati Airport for suspected drug trafficking. Each possessed luggage containing about 40 pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana. Hidden within one of Mahaffey’s marijuana parcels was four pounds of methamphetamine. They were charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. The government did not establish that Mahaffey knew about the methamphetamine. A jury convicted him of all counts and attributed to him 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. The district court then imposed a mandatory-minimum sentence of 10 years.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding its precedent that a drug-trafficking conviction under section 841 does not require proof that the defendant knew the type or quantity of controlled substance involved in the offense. The Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding did not abrogate that precedent. Rehaif involved possession of firearms; its scienter focus is not a new legal development or a fit for section 841. It is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequence of their unlawful acts. Mahaffey knew that his planned conduct was wrongful. That he did not appreciate the exact consequences of his predetermined criminal conduct, that it “involved” large amounts of methamphetamine under section 841(b)(1), makes no difference for purposes of his decision to unlawfully possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. View "United States v. Mahaffey" on Justia Law

Theriot drove the vehicle from which Matthews shot an AK-47, killing a pregnant woman and injuring three others. Theriot admitted to getting the gun, which he illegally owned. One witness testified that Theriot made the decisions on where to go that night and intentionally drove his truck to the house and slowed down when he drove by. After the shooting, Theriot wiped the gun clean of prints; he was the last person seen with the gun. He urged witnesses to lie for him.In a Michigan state court trial, a jury convicted Theriot of second-degree murder, three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, assault of a pregnant individual causing death to fetus, and felony-firearm, The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Theriot leave to appeal.In a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Theriot argued that the state trial court violated his constitutional rights when it prohibited him from questioning witnesses about his demeanor after the shooting (allegedly violating his right to present a defense and his right to confrontation) and prohibited him from admitting jailhouse telephone call recording excerpts into evidence (allegedly violating his right to present a defense). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief without reaching the merits. Theriot procedurally defaulted his claims and did not persuade the court to excuse his default. View "Theriot v. Vashaw" on Justia Law

Hill drove Henderson, to a controlled drug buy, where Henderson sold an undercover officer 83.5 grams of methamphetamine. Two weeks later, Henderson met an undercover investigator at a hotel for another controlled purchase and called Hill to bring the drugs to the hotel. Hill’s sister drove Hill to the hotel, where police surrounded their vehicle. They recovered five ounces of crystal methamphetamine from Hill’s person.Hill pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, stipulating that he had been convicted of felonies under Michigan law, that he served over 12 months in prison for each felony, and that his release from prison for each offense was within 15 years of the charged offense. He acknowledged that he had “at least one ‘serious drug felony’ conviction” under 21 U.S.C. 802(57). Hill unsuccessfully objected to the PSR’s imposition of the career-offender enhancement and failure to apply the mitigating-role adjustment. The court calculated Hill’s initial guideline range as 262-327 months, applied a downward departure based on substantial assistance, and imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Hill should not have been classified as a career offender because his past Michigan convictions do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under USSG 4B1.1 and that he should have been given an offense-level reduction for being a minor participant under USSG 3B1.2. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Willis was charged in Kentucky state court with murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The gun charge was severed from the other charges before trial. Willis obtained a directed verdict on the drug charge and was acquitted on the murder charge; he was convicted of the lesser offense of reckless homicide and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The federal government indicted Willis as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) the following month. The Commonwealth dismissed the state gun charge. Willis filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss for prosecutorial vindictiveness, then moved to dismiss based on double jeopardy, reasoning that he was previously convicted of committing reckless homicide with the same handgun.The district court denied that motion, holding that neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel applies when two sovereigns prosecute a defendant based on the same underlying conduct. Willis was not the victim of a “sham prosecution,” an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Willis’s appeal. In addition to his double jeopardy claim being barred by the dual sovereignty doctrine, Willis did not have a colorable claim because the federal offense and the state crime have different elements. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

Budzynski pleaded guilty to five counts related to fraudulently obtaining Social Security benefits totaling $48,306 in overpayments. She was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay restitution and a special assessment. Months later, the probation office discovered Budzynski withdrawing money at a casino. Budzynski acknowledged that she frequently visited casinos. The district court imposed new conditions prohibiting Budzynski from gambling and requiring her to submit to searches when there is a reasonable suspicion that she violated a condition of her probation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Discretionary conditions of probation must be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)” and “involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. 3563(b). The no-gambling condition is reasonably related to the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The provisions were directed at securing Budzynski’s restitution payments and were not overly broad. Budzynski had yet to make a full payment toward restitution in the three months since her probation began. Preventing her from gambling obviously serves to preserve her ability to meet the restitution obligation resulting from her fraud. View "United States v. Budzynski" on Justia Law

Thompson sold heroin to a confidential informant. After the second controlled buy, police obtained a warrant to search the apartment where the transactions occurred. On their way to execute the warrant, police encountered Thompson and a passenger driving away from the apartment, stopped the vehicle, and arrested Thompson. During their search of the vehicle, officers found multiple bags of heroin and cocaine. Officers later discovered a loaded handgun under the back seat’s folding mechanism. Thompson’s fingerprints were not found on the gun. A Michigan jury convicted him of three drug crimes and four gun crimes. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that a rational jury could infer Thompson constructively possessed the gun. Citing the “well-known relationship between drug dealing and the use of firearms as protection,” the court found that the gun’s proximity to both Thompson and the drugs sufficed to create a jury question.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thompson’s federal habeas petition, rejecting his insufficient-evidence claim and claims of ineffective assistance and the denial of an impartial jury. Thompson, as the SUV’s driver “is held to a higher level of accountability" for its contents. Considering Thompson’s proximity to the gun and the evidence of his drug dealing, the Michigan Court of Appeals provided more than enough support for a fair-minded jurist to conclude that a rational jury could convict him of constructively possessing the gun. View "Thompson v. Skipper" on Justia Law