Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sands pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR recommended a four-level sentencing enhancement because the firearm had an altered or obliterated serial number, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).. The final PSR acknowledged that the serial number in two locations was significantly defaced, but still readable. The district court did not examine the weapon itself but examined photographs that magnified the size of the gun and applied the enhancement, stating that the serial number “is clearly made less legible and is clearly altered for the purpose of trying to mask the identity of this weapon.” The Seventh Circuit instructed the district court that it had the option to reexamine the serial numbers or rely on its prior factual findings and use the “naked eye test” to determine the sentence enhancement’s applicability.At the resentencing hearing, the district court examined the firearm itself and made factual findings that the serial number was not readable in two of the three places it appeared on the weapon and again applied the four-level enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court applied the correct legal framework, and there was no clear error with the factual finding that the gun had an altered serial number. View "United States v. Sands" on Justia Law

In 2018, Brenner pled guilty without a plea agreement to being a felon in possession of a firearm and in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Brenner had three Tennessee felony convictions: aggravated assault in 2005, aggravated assault while acting in concert in 2014, and reckless aggravated assault in 2014. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), Brenner had to be sentenced to a 15-year minimum for her section 922(g) convictions if the government proved that she had three prior convictions for “violent felonies” having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”The district court agreed with Brenner that her reckless aggravated assault conviction is not a “violent felony” and sentenced Brenner to a within-Guidelines term of 110 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit held the government’s appeal in abeyance and dismissed the appeal after the Supreme Court’s 2021 Borden holding that the ACCA’s elements clause does not “include[] offenses criminalizing reckless conduct.” ACCA’s use of the phrase “against another” “demands that the perpetrator directs his action at, or target, another individual,” and “[r]eckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.” Borden analyzed the statute under which Brenner was convicted. View "United States v. Brenner" on Justia Law

Hughey, speeding, passed Michigan State Trooper Easlick, who flipped on his dashcam and stopped Hughey. Hughey’s car was uninsured and unregistered and there was an outstanding warrant for Hughey’s failure to appear. Easlick relayed that Hughey needed to pay the $400 bond on her warrant in cash immediately or he would have to take her to the courthouse. Hughey did not resist arrest. Easlick handcuffed Hughey’s hands behind her back and placed her in his car. Hughey expressed suicidal thoughts, so Easlick took her to the hospital.Hughey alleges that Easlick twisted her arm behind her back as he handcuffed her and did not check for tightness, that her shoulder hurt “[a]lmost immediately,” and that after Easlick removed the handcuffs at the hospital, a nurse observed “rings around [Hughey’s] wrists.” No part of the handcuffing is visible in the dashcam footage.Hughey sued Easlick for excessive force and deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Easlick summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hughey created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Her allegations are enough to satisfy the “handcuffing test” at summary judgment. The dashcam audio does not foreclose the possibility that Hughey repeatedly complained about pain. A plethora of excessive-force handcuffing cases put Easlick on notice that the way that he yanked Hughey’s arm, placed overly tight handcuffs, and ignored her complaints violated her right to be free from excessive force. View "Hughey v. Easlick" on Justia Law

In the Lucas County Corrections Center, prisoners are prohibited from having certain items, including cell phones and tobacco. The FBI organized a sting operation, enlisting an inmate and his girlfriend to approach a guard (Henderson) and offer him money to smuggle contraband into the jail. For $500 Henderson smuggled in a phone and tobacco. Henderson was charged with misdemeanor providing contraband in prison, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(1), and felony Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 18 U.S.C. 1951. A jury convicted Henderson of providing contraband, but could not reach a verdict on the Hobbs Act count.Before Henderson’s second trial on the Hobbs Act count, Henderson again asked the court to instruct the jury that an official act must be “similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.” This time, the court decided that the language was unduly confusing and removed it from the instructions. The government argued that the exercise of government power was Henderson’s decision to insulate the inmate from punishment by not reporting his possession of contraband. It compared a police officer taking a bribe in exchange for not writing a speeding ticket.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Henderson's conviction, upholding the jury instruction. The government’s evidence was sufficient to convict Henderson because the statutory definition of "official act" does encompass his actions. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

On May 13, 1987, William and Juanita Leeman were killed in their Hamilton County home. There was no trace evidence nor fingerprints. In 1997, the defendant’s brother and his father informed police that Hughbanks had murdered the Leemans. Hughbanks admitted breaking into the house with two accomplices. Later, Hughbanks said that a fourth man might have been present. Hughbanks admitted to confronting William but stated that an accomplice had stabbed William, Hughbanks stated that he did not know where Juanita was and said that his accomplice had “probably got her first.” Hughbanks acknowledged telling his father, brother, and uncle, “I killed somebody” and that he was by himself when he broke into the home. A jury convicted Hughbanks. The trial court imposed a death sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Rejecting a “Brady” claim, the court found that Hughbanks was not prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose information identifying other suspects; documentation concerning the actions of one of the victims’ sons, that implicated him in the murders; the absence of trace evidence at the scene of the crime that implicated Hughbanks; eyewitness statements that did not match a description of Hughbanks; evidence that impeached the prosecution’s theory of the case; and evidence that impeached the prosecution’s witnesses. The court also rejected Hughbanks’ argument that trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing adequately to investigate, prepare, and present mitigation evidence. View "Hughbanks v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's second Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on five of his requested grounds for relief, and the court granted an expansion of the COA to include two additional claims.The court concluded that petitioner is entitled to relief on his claim that his constitutional rights under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), were violated. In this case, the trial court never conducted a Faretta-complaint hearing and, on both May 14, 1998 and April 23, 1999, petitioner properly invoked his constitutional right to self-representation and is therefore entitled to relief. The court explained that none of the Ohio Supreme Court's reasons for holding that petitioner's April 23, 1999 statement did not properly invoke his constitutional right to conduct his own defense at trial are entitled to Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act deference. Furthermore, when viewed in context, "Is there any possibility I could represent myself?" was a clear and unequivocal reinvocation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. Therefore, in addition to granting the petition based on the trial court's denial of his May 14, 1998 Waiver of Counsel, petitioner's conviction also cannot stand due to the trial court's denial of his April 23, 1999 invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The panel conditionally granted the petition for a writ of habeas relief. View "Cassano v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Pruitt pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His PSR recommended a six-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1), for “assault[ing]” a police officer “in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” Officer Morton testified that he stopped the car in which Pruitt was a passenger. Pruitt, with a firearm visible in his hand, began to run. When Morton caught him, Pruitt attempted to grab Morton’s service weapon while holding his own firearm, then broke free and ran, turning back toward Morton. Morton, believing that Pruitt was about to shoot, fired his weapon, striking Pruitt in the hand. Although Morton's body-camera footage shows that Pruitt was holding his gun by the barrel, Morton testified that he believed Pruitt was holding the gun “the way you traditionally hold the gun.” It is not clear from the video if Pruitt ever pointed his firearm at Morton.The court applied the enhancement and imposed a sentence of 92 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Bodily injury is not a prerequisite to the application of the enhancement but the decision does not make clear why the court found the enhancement applied. Although the district court referred to “assaultive behavior,” it is not clear what conduct the court determined constituted the assault element of the enhancement and why the court found that conduct met the definition of assault. View "United States v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

Officer Dickens submitted an affidavit, seeking a search warrant for 10318 Dove Avenue, a single-family Cleveland residence. Dickens averred that earlier that month a confidential informant disclosed to him that a dealer, Moore, was selling cocaine out of that residence. He described Moore’s race, height, weight, age, and date of birth and disclosed that Moore deployed an extensive electronic surveillance system. Moore had been charged with several past drug crimes, including one prior conviction for drug trafficking. Dickens also described a controlled drug buy between the informant and Moore that occurred earlier that month at the Dove residence, under surveillance. The state court issued the search warrant. Officers detained Moore and found two firearms, two kilograms of cocaine, 100 grams of cocaine base, and materials used to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking. An ATF officer arrived, advised Moore of his Miranda rights, and interviewed Moore.Moore was indicted on five federal counts involving conspiracy, possessing and intending to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possessing firearms while a felon, and possessing firearms to further a drug trafficking crime. Moore unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the affidavit lacked indicia that the confidential informant was reliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Collectively, the information provided demonstrated a fair probability that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Dove. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions.The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses. Were Jarvis sentenced today, his second 924(c) conviction would generate a statutory minimum of five years. Congress expressly chose not to apply this change to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage, Jarvis moved for a sentence reduction under the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the COVID-19 pandemic and the amendments, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The statute excludes non-retroactive First Step Act amendments from the category of extraordinary or compelling reasons, whether a defendant relies on the amendments alone or in combination with other factors. View "United States v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

In 2013, Hack pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mortgage fraud, and wire fraud. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. In addition to terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the court ordered Hack to pay $803,420 in restitution to two mortgage companies, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A). The court set a payment schedule during Hack’s imprisonment and stated: Upon commencement of the term of supervised release, the probation officer shall review your financial circumstances and recommend a payment schedule on any outstanding balance... Within the first 60 days of release, the probation officer shall submit a recommendation to the court for a payment schedule, for ... final approval. The record does not reflect that the court ever set a post-release payment schedule or that the probation officer ever recommended one.During his period of supervised release, Hack moved to modify the restitution order, citing “a one-time opportunity” to obtain financing and proposing to pay the mortgage companies $100,000 and $28,000 in lump sums, attaching declarations from the companies stating that they preferred lump-sum payments over incremental payments. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it did “not have the authority under the MVRA to modify its final Restitution Order into two reduced lump-sum restitution payments.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Hack’s plea agreement barred the appeal. View "United States v. Hack" on Justia Law