Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man wearing a cap, sunglasses, and a jacket entered a bank with an opaque bag across his body. Approaching a teller, he displayed a note, stating that if he got money, “I’ll let Everyone live.” The man placed his right hand into his shoulder bag in a manner that led the teller to believe he was about to pull out a gun. The teller turned over $12,000. The man fled with the cash. Officers retrieved the suspect’s cap, jacket, and sunglasses and matched a fingerprint found on the sunglasses to one in an FBI database, belonging to Tate, who lived close to the bank. Tate’s age and physical characteristics also matched those of the robber. With a warrant, officers confirmed that Tate’s DNA was found on the cap and jacket.Tate pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), the federal bank robbery statute. The court added three levels to Tate’s total offense level (U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)) due to Tate having “brandished or possessed” a “dangerous weapon” during the robbery. Tate argued that he did not possess a dangerous weapon during the robbery. The court cited a Guidelines application note indicating that a dangerous weapon can include using an object in a manner that creates the impression that the object was capable of inflicting serious injury. From the resulting Guidelines range of 41-51 months, the court imposed a sentence of 41 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A robber that uses his concealed hand to reasonably suggest the existence of a weapon as having committed an act sufficient to satisfy section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law

Bradley and Falkowski pressed thousands of pills containing a mixture of alprazolam, acetaminophen, and fentanyl, which were marked “A333” and looked like Percocet pills. On July 5, 2016, a large quantity of those counterfeit pills was distributed in Murfreesboro. On July 6, several victims overdosed, thinking the pills were Percocet. One individual died from the overdose; seven had to be hospitalized.An investigation led to Barrett, Davis, Dogonoski, and Williams. Officers executed a search warrant for Barrett’s home and found approximately 70 Xanax pills. Barrett explained that he had purchased and distributed 150 counterfeit Percocet pills, and had traded (with the overdose victim who died) counterfeit pills for the Xanax found in his home. Williams admitted that he sold the counterfeit pills. In executing a search warrant at Davis’ home, officers found fentanyl, a pill press, and a pill die-stamped with “A333.”Falkowski, Davis, Dogonski, and others made plea deals. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846, eight counts of distribution of a substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury or death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 2, Williams was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, Barrett to 276 months, and Bradley to 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the jury instructions, and to the denials of motions to suppress. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In September-October 2019, Benton Harbor Detective Kovac, undercover, initiated six controlled purchases of methamphetamine, calling the same telephone number each time. The first two transactions involved Davis. The third transaction involved a different individual. Kovac recorded the license plate number on the individual’s truck, determined that it was registered to Burris at an Agard Avenue address, and used the driver’s license photo to confirm Burris's identity. During the following three transactions, officers saw Davis go to and from the Agard address to meet Kovac. At the fifth meeting, Kovac asked for extra methamphetamine. Officers watched Davis walk to the Agard Avenue address, and enter the residence.After the final controlled purchase, Davis was arrested in the yard of Burris’s Agard residence. Officers saw Burris exit from the backdoor and flee, clutching something. Burris crossed an alley, jumped a fence, and crossed Union Street. Burris was apprehended, carrying cash, a cell phone, and a loaded firearm. When the officers searched the path that Burris had followed, they found a bag containing methamphetamine at the location where Burris had jumped the fence. In Burris’s residence, officers found two additional firearms and a digital scale. Convicted of three counts related to methamphetamine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, Burris was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence supported the drug convictions under any standard. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law

In 2007, Montgomery was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine or cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base, and witness tampering. The conspiracy conviction required a mandatory life sentence; he received a separate 360-month sentence for the distribution count. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to sentencing for crack-cocaine offenses retroactive. In reviewing Montgomery’s motion for a sentence reduction under the Act, the district court calculated lower Guidelines ranges of 292–365 months for the conspiracy count and 151–88 for the distribution count, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and varied downwards, imposing sentences of 275 months for the conspiracy conviction and 145 months for the distribution conviction.Montgomery argued that the district court plainly erred when it placed him in Criminal History Category VI instead of Category V. The sentencing enhancement for committing the crimes within two years of being released from prison had been eliminated. The government argued that Montgomery waived that challenge and that any error was not plain because the court’s obligation to sentence Montgomery under the correct Guidelines range was not clear. The Sixth Circuit vacated, classifying the mistake as “invited error,” which is subject to review. Montgomery did not intentionally relinquish a known right (waiver) but he did more than passively stand by as the court erred (forfeiture). Montgomery was no more culpable for the error than the government. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Jacob and Genetta Clark, fundamentalist Christians, believe that their religion requires them to use corporal punishment with their children, ages 16, 14, and 12. Their son went to school with marks from being hit with a belt and reported being abused. Social workers from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) investigated. The children confirmed the use of corporal punishment but stated that they were not abused and felt safe at home.The Clarks allege that they were not timely informed of the first hearing, at which the judge issued an order: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS” without making findings of abuse. A judge later told Jacob that he did not have a Fourth Amendment right to stop the CHFS visits and that if he failed to cooperate, the children could be removed. Jacob alleges that the abuse charges continued as retaliation for his videotaping of a home visit. After several months the abuse cases were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Clarks's Substantive Due Process, Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Free Exercise claims. They failed to demonstrate false prosecution. Social workers have absolute immunity for initiating judicial proceedings. While there is a general right to use reasonable corporal punishment at home and in schools, the Clarks offered no authority that imposing corporal punishment that leaves marks is reasonable. Given the existence of a court order, a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would not have understood that he was violating the Clarks’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Clarks failed to state plausible First Amendment retaliation or Free Exercise claims. View "Clark v. Stone" on Justia Law

The FBI began monitoring Pitts after he made social media posts encouraging Muslims to pursue military training. Pitts expressed a desire to meet with an al-Qaeda operative; the FBI deployed an undercover agent to play that role. The two planned a bombing in downtown Cleveland. The FBI arrested Pitts after he pitched follow-up attacks in Philadelphia and San Francisco. Pitts pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, threatening the President, and threatening the President’s family and was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit rejected, as meritless, arguments that the district court improperly accepted his plea because there was no factual basis for it in the record, because he was not competent to enter it, and because he did not understand its terms. The change-of-plea proceedings, the PSR, and the affidavit attached to the complaint provided a factual basis for Pitts’s guilty plea, establishing that Pitts intended to provide material support— including his personal efforts—to al-Qaeda, that Pitts knew al-Qaeda had engaged in terrorism, and that he had made substantial steps toward the commission of the crime. The only professional opinion in the record, arranged at Pitts’s counsel’s request, found Pitts competent. There was nothing that gave the court “reasonable cause” to consider Pitts incompetent. The court did not address sentencing arguments that were barred by the appellate waiver in Pitts’s valid plea agreement. View "United States v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Cuyahoga County planned for CCCC to house detainees and prisoners from nearby communities in exchange for significant payments. CCCC was already severely overcrowded and understaffed. In March 2018, Cleveland transferred inmates to CCCC. In May, the County Council agreed that CCCC’s issues were “mission-critical” but no action was taken.On June 20, 2018, Johnson was detained at CCCC, awaiting trial for petty theft. During intake, a nurse noted that he was “likely a suicide risk" having previously attempted self-harm. No protective action was taken. Days later, Johnson told a nurse that he was “suicidal.” No action was taken. CCCC correctional officers were aware that Johnson was a suicide risk. On June 29, Officers placed Johnson in solitary confinement for allegedly trying to steal food; no one checked on him. That evening, Johnson was found hanging in the cell. CCCC lacked a device for cutting him down. On July 1, Johnson died.The Department of Justice reviewed and reported CCCC's “appalling conditions,” including medical staff lacking proper licenses, mental health appraisals not being conducted in a timely manner, and deliberate use of food deprivation as punishment. CCCC housed 2,420 individuals; its capacity was 1,765. There were 96 correctional officer vacancies.Moderwell sued corrections officers and executives under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants judgment on Eighth Amendment claims and dismissed an excessive force claim against the executives but concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged excessive force against the officers and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the executives. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against the officers rely on the same facts as the excessive force claims, so denying qualified immunity did not impose additional discovery burdens. Whether precedent clearly established a right that was violated by the executives requires factual development. View "Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

Owens was convicted of five counts of possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)), one carjacking, four counts of bank robbery by force or violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. A single section 924(c) conviction carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Each subsequent 924(c) conviction then (2004) triggered an additional 25 years, even if those convictions were part of a single indictment. If Owens had agreed to cooperate, the government would have allowed him to plead guilty to a single count. After Owens rejected the government’s offers, he was convicted and sentenced to 1260 months.Owens’s co-conspirators pleaded guilty and were sentenced, respectively, to 21 months, 33 months, 39 years, and 25 years of incarceration. In 2019, Owens sought resentencing, noting that he would not be subject to the same lengthy sentence if sentenced today because the First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. 924(c), so that his sentence would be 25 years. Appointed counsel argued that Owens was punished for going to trial and emphasized his “remarkable” record of rehabilitation. Owens then moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Owens’s motion, concluding that the disparity between Owens's sentence and the sentence that he would receive today was not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. The court did not consider any other factors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, directing the court to consider whether Owens’s rehabilitative efforts and the lengthy sentence he received because of exercising his right to a trial may, in combination with the First Step Act’s changes, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

Frei, age 48, used Facebook to contact teenage girls until the Metro Nashville Police Department became aware of his activities. Convicted of eight counts of child-exploitation-related crimes, including four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. 2251, Frei was sentenced to 318 months' imprisonment and lifetime supervised release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction regarding 18 U.S.C. 2251 and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Pattern Jury Instruction 16.01 explains that the jury must find: That the defendant employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced] a minor, to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct; 16.01(2)(C) defines the phrase “for the purpose of” as meaning that the defendant acted with the intent to create visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct, and that the defendant knew the character and content of the visual depictions. Frei proposed adding: The defendant must have engaged in sexually explicit conduct with the specific intent to produce a visual depiction. It is not enough for the government to simply prove that the defendant purposely produced the visual depiction. The Pattern Jury Instruction allowed Frei to argue that he did not have sex with his victim for the sole purpose of creating the visual depictions. Section 2251(a) does not have a sole-purpose provision. View "United States v. Frei" on Justia Law

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “three-strikes rule,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), provides that a prisoner accrues a strike when he brings a frivolous lawsuit. After three strikes, the Act prohibits inmates from filing those lawsuits without paying the initial court fee. Simons, a Michigan prisoner, broke a prison window. Prison officials removed money from his commissary account to make repairs. Simons filed a pro se complaint, targeting this seizure of funds as a violation of state and federal law. The district court allowed Simons to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), then screened Simons’s lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and rejected Simons’s federal claims on the merits. The court stated the dismissal would count as a “strike.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simon’s challenges to the underlying dismissal lacked merit. The court’s “opinion” calling the dismissal a strike is not a judgment, and will not, alone, prohibit Simons from filing a free lawsuit in the future. Section 1915(g) calls on a later court that has before it a civil action brought by the prisoner to engage in a backward-looking inquiry and determine whether the prisoner “on 3 or more prior occasions” has brought an action or appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that [it was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” View "Simons v. Washington" on Justia Law