Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

X pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. While serving his sentence at a North Carolina federal correctional institution, X heard another inmate state that “if you ever want to get rid of a body, hogs is the way to go” and that “it was easy to kill someone without leaving evidence.” X told the FBI and police about the comments. X subsequently persuaded the inmate to confess to the murder of his adopted daughter. The inmate led the police to where he and his wife had disposed of the body. The inmate and his wife pleaded guilty to the murder. The government filed a motion to reduce X’s sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on his substantial assistance and recommended that the court reduce X’s prison sentence by 12-18 months.The district court granted the motion the same day that the motion was filed and reduced X’s prison sentence by 12 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded and issued a redacted opinion. The district court erred in ruling without giving X the opportunity to present evidence and argument. View "United States v. ____ ____" on Justia Law

Nelson pleaded guilty to distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the parties disputed whether Nelson’s prior Ohio conviction for attempted rape of a minor qualified as a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement. The district court sentenced Nelson to the enhanced statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nelson’s argument that his attempted rape conviction under a statute that does not require that the defendant have physical contact with the victim, did not trigger the section 2252(b)(1) enhancement, which applies to prior convictions “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Sexual abuse covers actions that “injure, hurt, or damage for the purpose of sexual or libidinal gratification.” Applying the categorical approach, the court examined the elements of the Ohio statute, not the specific facts underlying the conviction, and reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “relating to” is broad. An attempt conviction “clearly stands in some relation to or pertains to the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” and qualifies as a predicate offense for the enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hudson was shot and killed in his Louisville apartment. Detective Roberts sought DNA testing for items at the murder scene. DNA on a hat came back “consistent with a mixture” from Lester, Baker, and an unknown person. Lester and Baker had been implicated by a witness. The case went cold. In 2012, Roberts interviewed Sullivan, an inmate who had contacted the police years before about the murder. Sullivan had dated Hudson and had been friends with Jasmine (the woman living with Baker,). She stated that Jasmine had told her that Baker killed Hudson “over money.” Roberts then interviewed Jasmine, who stated that, on the day of the murder, she, Baker, and “Desean” went to Hudson’s apartment. The men emerged from the apartment with bandanas covering their faces. Baker confessed that he murdered Hudson. Jasmine could not recall “Desean’s” last name and pronounced his first name differently from how Lester pronounces it. She identified Lester’s photo array picture as “Desean.”At trial, Jasmine distanced herself from her identification of Lester. The jury acquitted Lester. Baker was convicted after a second trial. Lester had spent 20 months in jail and three months in home confinement. After his acquittal, he sued Roberts and the Louisville Metro Government.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary-judgment rejection of malicious-prosecution claims against Roberts. The Fourth Amendment and Kentucky law required only probable cause for Lester’s pretrial detention and prosecution. Jasmine’s earlier identification of Lester, combined with corroborating evidence like DNA, met that standard. View "Lester v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Hampton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. His 204-month sentence was eventually reduced to 180 months based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. Hampton sought a further reduction by way of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Hampton had to exhaust all administrative rights, or, alternatively, wait 30 days after the warden’s first “receipt of [his] request.” Hampton sought administrative relief but filed his motion with the district court before the warden’s 30-day response period had run. The court opted to hold the motion “until the 30-day window ran” and later denied Hampton’s motion “for the reasons stated” in the government’s brief, without further explanation.The Sixth Circuit remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, district courts facing defendant-filed motions seeking release under section 3582(c)(1)(A) should analyze whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction and whether the applicable section 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. It is not clear whether the court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals searching for Milliron in Ohio, based on an outstanding Florida warrant, located Milliron driving his truck. Milliron led the Marshals and local police on a 35-mile chase, hurling glass bottles and makeshift plastic Molotov cocktails toward the officers' vehicles. Milliron eventually crashed into a building. Milliron’s truck was a mobile methamphetamine lab. Milliron's “one-pot methamphetamine” Molotov cocktails contained flammable liquid and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Milliron had 13 rounds of ammunition in his pocket. Milliron was charged with: using a dangerous weapon to forcibly interfere with federal officers performing official duties, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b); possession of a firearm not registered to him; carrying and using a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence; possession of products which may be used to manufacture methamphetamine; intent to manufacture approximately 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; and being a felon-in-possession of ammunition. Milliron pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7.Months later, Milliron unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea, arguing “counsel acknowledge[d] that his representation . . . was deficient” because he had failed to explain that an 18 U.S.C. 111(b) conviction “requires that the defendant intended to cause injury.” With a two-level enhancement for possessing a “dangerous weapon,” a three-level enhancement because a dangerous weapon was possessed and its use was threatened, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Milliron’s Guidelines range was 77-96 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 110-month sentence. The appeal waiver bars review of Milliron’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. The district court correctly assigned the sentencing enhancements. The sentence was reasonable; Milliron “was a violent offender, both on the day in question and previously.” View "United States v. Milliron" on Justia Law

Elias pled guilty to drug possession and distribution conspiracy; in 2017, she was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. She is confined at FPC Alderson, with a projected release date of November 2024. Elias filed a pro se “Emergency Motion for Immediate Release Due to COVID-19” in April 2020. In June, with appointed counsel, she filed a supplemental motion for a reduction of her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that her hypertension exacerbated her risk of serious injury or death if she were to contract COVID-19. Elias requested that the warden file a compassionate-release motion and appealed the denial, satisfying the exhaustion requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate release motions under the First Step Act. In determining that there were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the district court properly considered the CDC guidance, which then did not include hypertension; reviewed a scientific journal which stated that “there is as yet no evidence that hypertension is related to outcomes of COVID-19”; examined the BOP’s webpage and noted there were no reported cases at FPC Alderson; and concluded that speculation that COVID-19 could spread to FPC Alderson was insufficient to justify Elias’s release. View "United States v. Elias" on Justia Law

Jackson and Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Both received elevated sentences. Jackson was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a).. Combs was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment due to his career-offender status, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Combs’s Kentucky trafficking offense categorically qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines; U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 covers all the conduct under the Kentucky statute and the district court properly deemed Combs to be a career offender. The court rejected Combs’s argument that distribution requires a commercial aspect. Jackson recruited and supervised participants, he held a substantial amount of the cash proceeds, and the conspiracy involved seven individuals. The court also rejected Jackson's challenge to the mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence he received in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), due to his prior marijuana-trafficking conviction. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Silvestre-Gregorio, then age 16, entered the U.S. illegally in 2001. He was detained within weeks. At his removal hearing, he did not have an attorney but was assisted by an interpreter and a social worker. The interpreter spoke Spanish; Silvestre-Gregorio spoke little English and some Spanish; his native tongue was a regional dialect of Guatemala. He answered open-ended questions in Spanish, including where he was born and how he crossed the border. The IJ had to repeat some questions and explained to Silvestre-Gregorio his ability to appeal and his right to be represented by retained counsel. The IJ asked several times whether he would like time to find an attorney. Silvestre-Gregorio declined, saying that he wanted to finish his case that day. Silvestre-Gregorio was removed from the U.S. in June 2001. Silvestre-Gregorio returned to the U.S. in 2002. He accumulated convictions for domestic assault, public intoxication, theft, DUI, and driving without a license.In 2018, he was charged with unlawful reentry of a removed alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Silvestre-Gregorio argued that his 2001 removal violated his right to due process and could not be the basis for a section 1326 conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Silvestre-Gregorio could understand the interpreter during his removal hearing and did not have a constitutional right to government-provided counsel or to be notified of discretionary relief (voluntary removal). View "United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio" on Justia Law

In 2013, Henry was convicted of three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), each related to the associated bank robbery count. A defendant’s first 924(c) conviction then carried a minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration; each additional 924(c) conviction carried a 25-year sentence, even if the convictions were part of the same indictment. Henry was sentenced to 730 months’ incarceration: 70 months for each bank robbery, to be served concurrently and 60 months for the first 924(c) count and 300 months each for the second and third counts, each to be served consecutively. Following a remand, the court sentenced Henry to 738 months’ incarceration.The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Dean” decision, permitting courts to consider mandatory-minimum sentences imposed under section 924(c) when determining the sentence for other counts. Congress passed the First Step Act, under which only a defendant who has a prior final 924(c) conviction is subject to the escalating mandatory-minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)). Henry argued that the 2018 remand meant that the court had not imposed a sentence before its enactment so that he could benefit from the amendment and have a total mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years. The district court sentenced Henry to 60 months for the bank robberies plus 55 years under 924(c). The Sixth Circuit reversed. The language of the limited remand in Henry’s case requires the district court to revisit the sentences for his 924(c) convictions and to resentence him in accordance with the First Step Act. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Mahaffey and another were arrested at the Cincinnati Airport for suspected drug trafficking. Each possessed luggage containing about 40 pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana. Hidden within one of Mahaffey’s marijuana parcels was four pounds of methamphetamine. They were charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. The government did not establish that Mahaffey knew about the methamphetamine. A jury convicted him of all counts and attributed to him 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. The district court then imposed a mandatory-minimum sentence of 10 years.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding its precedent that a drug-trafficking conviction under section 841 does not require proof that the defendant knew the type or quantity of controlled substance involved in the offense. The Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding did not abrogate that precedent. Rehaif involved possession of firearms; its scienter focus is not a new legal development or a fit for section 841. It is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequence of their unlawful acts. Mahaffey knew that his planned conduct was wrongful. That he did not appreciate the exact consequences of his predetermined criminal conduct, that it “involved” large amounts of methamphetamine under section 841(b)(1), makes no difference for purposes of his decision to unlawfully possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. View "United States v. Mahaffey" on Justia Law