Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mizori pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; his PSR recommended a finding that Mizori had acted as a manager or supervisor within a conspiracy. A police investigator and an informant testified that Mizori had played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Mizori did not call any witnesses. The district court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.Mizori sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel’s failure to offer any witnesses at the sentencing hearing amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Mizori attached supporting affidavits from three co-conspirators. Almost four years later the district court denied Mizori’s motion. Mizori, then confined in a high-security Special Housing Unit, “SHU,” had 60 days— until September 15, 2019—to file a notice of appeal but had no access to stamps or a law library. He was confined in the SHU until September 29. Days later, Mizori timely moved, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.The district court denied his motion, stating that “Mizori has not met his burden of establishing excusable neglect" but did not address whether Mizori had shown “good cause” for an extension, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), the ground on which Mizori sought relief. The Sixth Circuit held that Mizori does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion and that the district court abused its discretion by denying that motion. View "Mizori v. United States" on Justia Law

Greene was booked into the Crawford County Jail after having his bond revoked for attending a plea hearing while intoxicated. Over the next four days, Greene began hallucinating and exhibiting other symptoms of delirium tremens, a life-threatening complication of alcohol withdrawal that the Sixth Circuit has recognized as an objectively serious medical need. Greene ultimately suffered acute respiratory failure. He died four days later. Crawford County officials did not provide any medical care to Greene before his incapacitation but only sought a mental health evaluation from a Community Mental Health Authority and purportedly relied on that evaluation in deciding not to seek medical assistance.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to Greene’s medical need and that Crawford County is liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of not providing medical care to inmates suffering from delirium tremens, the district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to some county officials and denied Crawford County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Greene experienced a clearly established life-threatening medical condition for at least two days. The defendants did not provide any medical assistance during that time. The court dismissed Crawford County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Greene v. Crawford County" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip, Cleveland police arranged for a controlled buy from Hall at his residence, using a confidential informant. The next day, officers executed a search warrant for Hall’s residence. They recovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. This cycle was repeated the next month. Weeks later, officers saw Hall conducting a drug transaction in a parked vehicle; they pulled him over, searched the vehicle, and arrested him. He was released from custody with an ankle monitor. Police received information that Hall was continuing to sell drugs and conducted another controlled buy, followed by a search of Hall’s residence, where they recovered drugs, cash, and a cell phone. Officers monitored his telephone calls from the jail, executed another controlled buy, and recovered from Franklin’s vehicle roughly 500 grams of cocaine, 300 grams of heroin, a loaded gun, and marijuana. They found $1,000 on Franklin’s person, $60 of which was the prerecorded money from that day’s controlled buy, and two cell phones that had used to schedule the controlled buys.Hall and Franklin were convicted of drug and firearm offenses; each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the sufficiency of the evidence and to the racial composition of the jury. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence found in Hall’s vehicle and the district court’s admission of certain testimony by officers. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigations searches social media for people soliciting sex from children and saw that Hruby, a Texas resident, was advertising as a “[g]randpa looking for open family.” Posing as the mother of two girls under the age of 12, Detective D’Hondt responded; during the sexually charged conversation that followed, D’Hondt concluded that Hruby had molested a child. Hruby flew to Kentucky to meet D’Hondt’s children but was arrested when he landed. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Hruby admitted that his friend “sent” his five-year-old daughter “to bed” with him. Investigators found child pornography on Hruby’s cell phone.Hruby was charged with crossing state lines with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The government was permitted to offer Rule 414(a) evidence: Hruby’s online messages regarding his history of child molestations and his post-arrest confession. Under Rule 414(a) a court may admit evidence that a defendant previously molested a child to show that he is inclined to molest children if the evidence is offered on a relevant matter. The court rejected Hruby’s argument that the statements should be excluded under Rule 403 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hruby’s convictions, rejecting his argument that the government should have to corroborate a Rule 414(a) confession before the jury can consider it. View "United States v. Hruby" on Justia Law

Hymes pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C). Hymes had multiple prior state convictions. The district court initially sentenced Hymes to 188 months’ imprisonment. While Hymes’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided “Havis” (2019), casting doubt over the district court’s reading of the Sentencing Guidelines in Hymes’s case. On remand, with the career offender provision off the table, Hymes faced a Guidelines range of 110-137 months imprisonment. Hymes argued that his prior driving offenses artificially inflated his criminal history score and that several post-incarceration developments warranted a variance, including his behavior in prison and the COVID-19 pandemic.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 124-month sentence. The district court, acting on a limited remand, did not abuse its discretion in evaluating Hymes’s criminal history or rehabilitation arguments. A district court is not required to consult the Sentencing Commission’s collected data in order to avoid sentencing disparities. In two separate sentencing proceedings, the district court thoughtfully explained why a sentence near the bottom of the Guidelines range was appropriate and, citing Hymes’s recent drug trafficking convictions, concluded that Hymes was a chronic recidivist and that a sentence below the Guidelines recommendation would be inappropriate. View "United States v. Hymes" on Justia Law

In 1996, two 17-year-olds, Harris and Gaines, approached soldiers at the Fort Campbell Army base. Attempting to rob them, Gaines pulled out a handgun, which discharged. A bullet struck Private Alonso-Caravia, killing him. Harris and Gaines pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1111, aiding and abetting attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 2111, and aiding and abetting using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 924(c). The district court sentenced Harris to 420 months plus a consecutive 60-month prison term for the section 924(c) conviction.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Harris argued that the consecutive 60-month sentence must be vacated because it is possible that the court imposed that punishment under the unconstitutionally vague “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that the sentence cannot be saved under the “elements clause” of section 924(c)(3)(A) because neither of his other convictions could have been considered a “crime of violence” under then-existing precedent. Harris cannot establish harm that he suffered from any error. At best, Harris can show that the record of his sentencing is silent as to whether the court relied upon 924(c)(3)’s elements clause or residual clause when imposing his sentence. The 18 U.S.C. 2111 crime of aiding and abetting attempted robbery necessarily constitutes a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

Gillispie was convicted of two 1988 rapes and spent more than 20 years in prison before Ohio courts vacated his convictions, based on his claims of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and actual innocence. Gillispie brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Moore, the police officer responsible for much of the investigation and the identification of Gillispie as the likely perpetrator. Gillispie alleges that Moore suppressed exculpatory evidence, arranged an unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedure, fabricated inculpatory evidence, assisted in maliciously prosecuting him, and destroyed exculpatory evidence. Moore claims entitlement to qualified immunity. The district court determined that each of Gillispie’s claims should proceed to trial.The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Moore’s argument on appeal is simply a challenge to the district court’s determinations that genuine issues of material fact exist on the core claims. Defendants cannot appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. “An appeal choosing to take this tack anyway delays the administration of our justice system and is a waste of judicial resources.” View "Gillispie v. Miami Township" on Justia Law

Presley pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to burglarize more than 90 pharmacies, 18 U.S.C. 2118(d), and to assault of a police officer, 21 U.S.C. 2118(c). Presley had attempted to flee from arrest by speeding off in a car, almost striking the arresting officer, and had led a high-speed chase through residential areas before becoming stuck in a yard. Presley received a full reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He stipulated to “specific offense characteristics” for the conspiracy count: the burglary involved a structure other than a residence, the offense involved more than minimal planning, and the loss was more than $20,000 but less than $95,000. The court added one level because a controlled substance was taken, two levels for possession of a crowbar as a “dangerous weapon,” six levels for the assault of the officer, and two levels for the risk created to others by Presley’s flight. During his plea colloquy, Presley twice confirmed that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney and was “giving up the right to appeal the sentence to be imposed.” With a Guidelines range of 92-115 months, after addressing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a 102-month sentence.Though Presley’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, he challenged his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. Presley knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and was aware of the consequences; both his appellate waiver and his plea agreement are enforceable. View "United States v. Presley" on Justia Law