Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Gatewood was convicted of two counts of kidnapping and one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce. The court determined that Gatewood’s four prior Arkansas robbery convictions qualified as serious violent felonies and imposed a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), the federal three-strikes statute.In 2016, Gatewood moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his robbery convictions had been deemed serious violent felonies only under the residual clause. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause had been found unconstitutionally vague in the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision. Gatewood filed his motion within a year of Johnson. The government argued that Johnson could not render the motion timely because it applied only to ACCA. The government also argued procedural default. The Supreme Court decided “Davis” in 2019, finding the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause, which is nearly identical to the three-strikes residual clause, unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Gatewood’s motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the government concedes that Gatewood’s motion was timely in light of Davis, Gatewood procedurally defaulted the vagueness claim by failing to raise it on direct review. Gatewood cannot establish cause by showing that his claim cut against circuit precedent at the time of his appeal. From Gatewood’s sentencing to the 2002 conclusion of his appeal, the tools to construct his present vagueness claim existed; no Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it. View "Gatewood v. United States" on Justia Law

On July 24, 2020, the district court denied Payton’s motion for compassionate release or a reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). A notice of appeal, dated August 9, was filed in the district court on August 10. A defendant’s notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed in the district court no later than 14 days after the challenged judgment or order is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). A section 3582(c) motion is a continuation of the criminal proceedings, so the 14-day deadline applies. Rule 4(b)(1)(A)'s deadline is not jurisdictional but is a claims-processing rule; the government can waive an objection to an untimely notice. If the government raises the issue of timeliness, the court must enforce the time limits.In response to the government’s motion to dismiss, Payton asserted that the prison has been “on an institution-wide lockdown and getting copies in this environment is problematic” and argued excusable neglect. Rule 4(b)(4) authorizes the district court to extend the time for filing an appeal for up to 30 days if the court finds “good cause” or “excusable neglect.” The Sixth Circuit remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to determine whether Payton has shown excusable neglect or good cause. View "United States v. Payton" on Justia Law

Ruffin was convicted for a drug-trafficking scheme. The court calculated Ruffin’s guidelines range as 30 years’ to life imprisonment. Ruffin had a blood disorder that had caused him to suffer four strokes. He regularly used a wheelchair due to paralysis on his left side. Ruffin suffers from heart problems, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and blood clots. When balancing the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the court expressed concern over Ruffin’s witness-tampering and prior convictions.Ruffin has served 10 years of his 25-year sentence. In May 2020, Ruffin sought early “compassionate release” under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), claiming that his health conditions exacerbate the risks from COVID-19, creating “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for relief. The court initially noted that the Sentencing Commission defined “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for relief to cover only medical conditions that substantially diminish a defendant’s ability to provide “self-care” in prison, U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii). Next, the court noted that the Commission’s guidance required Ruffin to show that, if released, he would not be a “danger” to the community, section 1B1.13(2), and noted his extensive criminal record. Lastly, the court held that section 3553(a)'s factors counseled against reducing the sentence. Ruffin argued that, after the First Step Act, courts may find extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those listed in the commentary.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, the statute gives courts discretion to deny relief under a balancing of section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors. The district court denied relief not just because no extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, but also because those factors weighed against his release, and did not abuse its discretion when balancing those factors. View "United States v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

Fletcher was convicted of importuning a minor under Ohio law. Under the terms of his probation, Fletcher “[a]greed to a search without warrant of [his] person, [his] motor vehicle or [his] place of residence by a Probation Officer at any time.” During a routine visit, his probation officer noticed that Fletcher had two phones. The officer stated that he was going to search the phones and observed that Fletcher responded nervously and began looking through one of them. Fletcher initially resisted but ultimately unlocked the phone. The officer, searching through the phone, saw an image of child pornography. Detective Carter executed a warrant to search the phone, which contained child pornography that had been downloaded from the internet and that had been filmed by the phone itself. Carter forwarded the videos filmed on the phone to federal agents. For the downloaded child pornography, Fletcher pled guilty in state court, to pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor. For the videos filmed on the phone, Fletcher was charged in federal court with conspiracy to produce child pornography and production of child pornography. His motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his cell phone was denied. Fletcher was sentenced to 35 years in prison, to run concurrently with his 10-year state sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The probation officer did not have reasonable suspicion to search Fletcher’s cell phone and Fletcher’s probation agreement did not authorize the search. View "United States v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Wilson was arrested after he ran from a routine traffic stop. Police searched the area where Wilson was apprehended and discovered two baggies of cocaine and a loaded handgun. Wilson, with previous convictions for multiple felonies, pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A typical section 922(g) violation carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, 18 U.S.C 924(a)(2); but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), imposes a 15-year minimum if the offender has three prior “violent felony” convictions, section 924(e)(1). Wilson objected to an ACCA enhancement, arguing that his prior conviction under Ohio Revised Code 2911.01(A)(3) ((A)(3) Aggravated Robbery was not a violent felony because one could be convicted “even when the victim of the crime suffered little or no actual physical injury.” The court concluded that one of Wilson’s aggravated robbery convictions was not an ACCA violent felony.The Sixth Circuit vacated the 79-month sentence. The 2019 precedent on which the district court relied did not answer whether (A)(3) Aggravated Robbery is a violent felony. The Sixth Circuit found the statute “twice divisible,” so that a modified categorical approach should be applied, and remanded. The sentencing court should determine what crime, with what elements Wilson was convicted of and determine which predicate “theft offense” formed the basis of Wilson’s (A)(3) Aggravated Robbery conviction. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Keahey and McGill lived with their daughter and two boys, the product of McGill’s prior relationship with Hampton. Hampton came to the house, pulled out a knife, charged Keahey, and stabbed him in the back. Keahey and McGill never identified Hampton as the assailant. McGill and the children moved in with her mother, Joyce. Despite a criminal history that prohibited firearm possession, Keahey got a gun. Weeks later, Keahey and McGill planned to meet at the doctor’s office for their daughter’s appointment. Keahey decided to instead go to Joyce's house. Joyce testified that when Hampton arrived with his boys, Keahey fired at an unarmed Hampton and chased Hampton down the sidewalk. A knife found at the scene was locked and closed. Keahey testified that he shot Hampton in self-defense because Hampton had charged at him with a knife. Keahey claims that, as he retreated, he heard a gunshot and saw Hampton, gun in hand, coming toward him. After shooting Hampton twice, Keahey fled.An Ohio trial judge found Keahey failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction. State courts rejected his arguments on appeal and on collateral review. Keahey filed a federal habeas petition, citing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. View "Keahey v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Police searched Palos’s residence on suspicion of drug trafficking and found narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. Palos admitted that he had purchased the firearm “off the streets.” It was later confirmed to be stolen. Palos, previously convicted of two separate drug trafficking offenses in state court, pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). With a Guidelines range of 87-108 months, he was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence, in part. Palos's 2010 conviction under Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(1), which criminalizes “knowingly . . . “sell[ing] or offer[ing] to sell a controlled substance” no longer qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” so that his Guidelines base offense level was miscalculated. Statutes that criminalize offers to sell controlled substances are too broad to categorically qualify as predicate ‘controlled substance offenses.’” The court upheld a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm, rejecting an argument that Palos had no knowledge that the firearm was stolen. The court noted the absence of a scienter requirement in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4). Palos’s firearm was stolen at the time Palos unlawfully possessed it and section 2K2.1(b)(4) is a strict liability enhancement. View "United States v. Palos" on Justia Law

Pilot Flying J, headquartered in Knoxville, operates hundreds of truck stops nationwide and sells billions of gallons of diesel fuel annually to trucking companies. Employees in Pilot’s direct-sales division falsely promised discounted fuel prices, and then secretly shorted the customers through deceptive invoicing and rebate techniques. Several pled guilty.The Sixth Circuit reversed conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) and mail fraud (section 1341) convictions of three defendants. The district court had allowed the government to play audio recordings in which one defendant, Pilot's President, is heard using deeply offensive racist and misogynistic language, reasoning that if the defendant was reckless enough to use language that could risk public outrage against the company, he was a “bad businessman,” and as a bad businessman, he was also reckless enough to commit fraud. “This is vintage bad character evidence—and precisely the type of reasoning the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid.” None of the Rules of Evidence support the recordings’ admissibility and, even if somehow otherwise admissible, the recordings are a “textbook violation” of Rule 403, because the risk of unfair prejudice eviscerates any purported probative value. View "United States v. Wombold" on Justia Law

The warrant to search Blomquist's father's property permitted a full search of the property, including outbuildings. Officers encountered Blomquist walking out of a chicken coop. He waived his rights, took the officers to the garage, and gave them paperwork, which he said authorized a medical-marijuana operation. They returned to the chicken coop. Blomquist took them inside and showed them several rooms full of marijuana plants, explaining that he moved the plants to nearby greenhouses in warmer weather, then took the officers there. Blomquist never suggested that the structures were on someone else’s property, nor was there any visible evidence indicating as much. Blomquist took the officers back to his father’s garage and let them into a locked attic room that contained 37 pounds of pre-packaged marijuana. Blomquist’s medical-marijuana operation was not legal because he had a federal drug felony on his record and he stored more marijuana than distributors were allowed to possess. He admitted to selling marijuana to a drug dealer (who lacked a medical marijuana card). Blomquist had also broken several federal laws.Charged with manufacturing, possessing, distributing, and conspiring to distribute marijuana. 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Blomquist moved to suppress the evidence. Blomquist established that the chicken coop and greenhouses were on his cousin’s property, which was not covered by the search warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Blomquist consented to the more expansive search. View "United States v. Blomquist" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCormick was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. The district court sentenced McCormick under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on defendants with three prior violent felony convictions, citing McCormick’s prior convictions for Kentucky third-degree burglary. Those burglaries occurred during a 16-day period, 19 years earlier, just after McCormick turned 18. The court recognized that McCormick’s offenses did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. The district court examined more than the Kentucky statute to conclude that McCormick “pled guilty to each of the essential elements of [generic] burglary.” The court sentenced McCormick to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum, varying downward. McCormick’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court incorrectly concluded that McCormick could not bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to challenge his illegal sentence based on the Supreme Court's 2016 "Mathis" decision, which explicated the “categorical approach” and requires courts to rely solely on the state statute's text to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicates where the state statute is divisible and lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy the listed elements. Based on Mathis, McCormick’s prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates. The 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause authorized him to seek relief from his unlawful sentence through a section 2241 petition. View "McCormick v. Butler" on Justia Law