Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The warrant to search Blomquist's father's property permitted a full search of the property, including outbuildings. Officers encountered Blomquist walking out of a chicken coop. He waived his rights, took the officers to the garage, and gave them paperwork, which he said authorized a medical-marijuana operation. They returned to the chicken coop. Blomquist took them inside and showed them several rooms full of marijuana plants, explaining that he moved the plants to nearby greenhouses in warmer weather, then took the officers there. Blomquist never suggested that the structures were on someone else’s property, nor was there any visible evidence indicating as much. Blomquist took the officers back to his father’s garage and let them into a locked attic room that contained 37 pounds of pre-packaged marijuana. Blomquist’s medical-marijuana operation was not legal because he had a federal drug felony on his record and he stored more marijuana than distributors were allowed to possess. He admitted to selling marijuana to a drug dealer (who lacked a medical marijuana card). Blomquist had also broken several federal laws.Charged with manufacturing, possessing, distributing, and conspiring to distribute marijuana. 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Blomquist moved to suppress the evidence. Blomquist established that the chicken coop and greenhouses were on his cousin’s property, which was not covered by the search warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Blomquist consented to the more expansive search. View "United States v. Blomquist" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCormick was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. The district court sentenced McCormick under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on defendants with three prior violent felony convictions, citing McCormick’s prior convictions for Kentucky third-degree burglary. Those burglaries occurred during a 16-day period, 19 years earlier, just after McCormick turned 18. The court recognized that McCormick’s offenses did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. The district court examined more than the Kentucky statute to conclude that McCormick “pled guilty to each of the essential elements of [generic] burglary.” The court sentenced McCormick to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum, varying downward. McCormick’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court incorrectly concluded that McCormick could not bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to challenge his illegal sentence based on the Supreme Court's 2016 "Mathis" decision, which explicated the “categorical approach” and requires courts to rely solely on the state statute's text to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicates where the state statute is divisible and lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy the listed elements. Based on Mathis, McCormick’s prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates. The 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause authorized him to seek relief from his unlawful sentence through a section 2241 petition. View "McCormick v. Butler" on Justia Law

French, with two others, confronted the victim at gunpoint as she was driving, demanded that she exit her car and after she complied, drove away in her vehicle. Weeks later, the three men committed a second carjacking, against an elderly man who lived in a retirement community. The victims and his co-defendants testified at French’s trial. French did not present any evidence. French was convicted of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The PSR recommended a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 246 months: 78 months’ imprisonment on each carjacking count, to be served concurrently, and 84 months’ imprisonment on each section 924(c) count, to be served consecutively.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. French’s challenge to the credibility of witnesses is not a valid basis for overturning his conviction. The court also rejected French’s contention that he cannot be legally convicted of both offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court properly applied the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice on the basis of French’s attempt to intimidate a witness by posting a Facebook message about his co-defendant's testimony. View "United States v. French" on Justia Law

Alston received a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 for his prior convictions under Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(1), which criminalizes offers to sell drugs. Alston’s initial Guidelines range was 188-235 months. The parties jointly requested a two-level variance that would reduce his range to 151-188 months. The district court sentenced Alston to 169 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the sentence. Since 2019, the Sixth Circuit has held that attempt crimes such as offers to sell do not qualify for the 4B1.1 career-offender enhancement. The district court appears to have applied the career-offender enhancement to Alston based on his prior drug-trafficking convictions under Ohio law prohibiting persons from “[s]ell[ing] or offer[ing] to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” Statutes that criminalize offers to sell controlled substances are too broad to categorically qualify as predicate controlled substance offenses under 4B1.2. View "United States v. Alston" on Justia Law

Kidis, driving home, after drinking heavily, caused a minor accident, exited his vehicle, and fled. Officer Reid attempted to arrest Kidis; he fled with a handcuff attached to his wrist. He jumped barbed-wire fences before entering a wooded area. Eventually, Kidis surrendered, lying face down, his hands stretched out above his head. Kidis asserts that Officer Moran thrust his knee into Kidis, punching and strangling Kidis, yelling that he was going to “teach [him] to . . . run.” Kidis pleaded guilty to resisting and obstructing a police officer, operating a motor vehicle with high blood-alcohol content, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.Kidis filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against both officers. Rejecting Kidis’s deliberate indifference claim, the court found that Kidis could not prove that either officer was aware of Kidis’s medical needs. The court rejected an excessive force claim against Reid. A jury found that Moran used excessive force but that Kidis did not prove that this force caused his injuries. The jury awarded Kidis $1 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The court rejected the officers’ motions for attorneys’ fees but awarded Kidis $143,787.97 in fees. The Sixth Circuit reversed the punitive damages award but otherwise affirmed. Measured against the harm and compensatory damage findings, the punitive damages award runs afoul of due process principles. On remand, the court is to reduce the award to no more than $50,000. View "Kidis v. Reid" on Justia Law

Cruz pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in sexual activity; receiving child pornography; and transporting child pornography. Cruz, then 37, had maintained a two-year online relationship with the 12-year-old victim before he picked her up in California, traveled across the country, and had sex with her on multiple occasions.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 188 months' imprisonment. Imposing a two-level offense enhancement on Count 1 for “unduly influenc[ing] a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct,” USSG 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), was not an abuse of discretion. The presumption of undue influence is triggered if there is a difference of 10 years between the defendant and the victim. Here, there was a difference of 25 years. Even if that were not the case, any claimed error is harmless. The application of the enhancement did not alter Cruz’s Sentencing Guidelines range or resulting sentence because Cruz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment at the top of the Guidelines range established by Counts 2 and 3, which did not include the undue-influence enhancement. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Officer Render saw a new warrant to arrest Baker for receiving stolen property. A judge had issued this warrant on the ground that Baker had received a stolen Nextbook tablet. The subject who pawned the tablet revealed that the tablet was purchased in Madisonville from Baker. Render and Officer Knelson met at the listed address, which appeared to be a hybrid residence and pawnshop, with a sign flashing “open.” Through the windows, Render could see merchandise and a man. The door was locked. The man voluntarily let him in and acknowledged that he was Baker, In response to a request for identification, Baker walked through a door. According to Render, officers should maintain visual contact with arrestees to ensure they are not getting firearms, so he followed Baker. The door led to a kitchen and then another door led to another area, where Baker retrieved his wallet. Render noticed jars of marijuana and a rifle in plain view and asked Baker if he was a convicted felon. Baker confirmed he was. Render left to secure a search warrant. Knelson searched Baker incident to his arrest and found crack cocaine. With a search warrant, officers found more crack cocaine, marijuana, firearms, and methamphetamine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Baker's motion to suppress the evidence. The officer acted reasonably in monitoring Baker’s movements. The affidavit supporting the warrant contained enough of a connection between Baker and a crime that the officers could reasonably rely on the judge’s probable-cause finding. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Trooper Malone stopped Snoddy for speeding and learned that there were Georgia warrants out for Snoddy’s arrest, including for drug crimes. Malone and another officer arrested Snoddy on the warrants. Malone suspected that Snoddy might have drugs in the car. Immediately after making the arrest, the officers sought consent to search the car. Snoddy refused. Malone stated, “I’m gonna have to get the car towed ... and we have to do an inventory on the car.” Malone repeatedly asked Snoddy for consent, warning Snoddy that if he did not consent, the car would be inventoried. Roughly eight minutes after the arrest, Malone called the tow truck but continued to seek consent. About five minutes after calling the truck, Malone began conducting an inventory. Malone discovered and seized approximately one pound of methamphetamine, two handguns, and a set of scales.Snoddy unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs and guns. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Snoddy conceded that the traffic stop was lawful, that his arrest was valid, that it was within Malone’s discretion to impound the car, and that an inventory was required once Malone decided to tow the car. Snoddy did not challenge the scope of the search. The district court did not err in rejecting his argument that the decision to impound and inventory the car was a pretext for a warrantless investigative search. View "United States v. Snoddy" on Justia Law

Griffith was arrested after a failed robbery attempt and was held at Franklin County Regional Jail. Griffith suffered seizures six days into his detention. He was sent to a local hospital, where he suffered another seizure, and was then airlifted to the University of Kentucky Hospital. He recovered but continues to suffer headaches and other negative symptoms. Griffith sued county defendants and SHP, a private medical company that provides medical services at the jail, and SHP medical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he received unconstitutionally inadequate medical care. Griffith argued that the defendants were deliberately indifferent because they failed to adequately monitor him for drug withdrawal, allowing his vomiting to progress to the point of dehydration, which led to his kidney failure, which caused his seizures.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Griffith failed to establish that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the nurse knew or should have known that Griffith’s vomiting evinced a substantial risk to his health or that he was experiencing severe withdrawal symptoms. Griffith made no effort to obtain further care other than two sick call slips he filled out in detox; there is no evidence that the nurse would have expected that he had not responded to the treatment provided. Even a failure to follow internal processes does not, alone, indicate deliberate indifference. View "Griffith v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Schrank visited the dark web and downloaded “nearly 1,000 images of babies and toddlers being forcibly, violently, and sadistically penetrated.” After a government investigation identified Schrank, he confessed and pled guilty to possession of child pornography 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of 97-120 months in prison. The district court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 12 months’ home confinement. The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. It both “ignored or minimized the severity of the offense” and “failed to account for general deterrence.” On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence, criticizing the appellate court’s “second-guess[ing]” and saying that she refused to impose a sentence that “does not make sense.” The judge said that Schrank’s misconduct—accessing the dark web over the course of five days and downloading nearly 1,000 images of children being raped—was “much less exaggerated” than “the Sixth Circuit judges realize.” The Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for resentencing, ordering that the case be reassigned on remand. A sentence is substantively unreasonable when it is not “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender.” View "United States v. Schrank" on Justia Law