Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Griffith was arrested after a failed robbery attempt and was held at Franklin County Regional Jail. Griffith suffered seizures six days into his detention. He was sent to a local hospital, where he suffered another seizure, and was then airlifted to the University of Kentucky Hospital. He recovered but continues to suffer headaches and other negative symptoms. Griffith sued county defendants and SHP, a private medical company that provides medical services at the jail, and SHP medical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he received unconstitutionally inadequate medical care. Griffith argued that the defendants were deliberately indifferent because they failed to adequately monitor him for drug withdrawal, allowing his vomiting to progress to the point of dehydration, which led to his kidney failure, which caused his seizures.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Griffith failed to establish that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the nurse knew or should have known that Griffith’s vomiting evinced a substantial risk to his health or that he was experiencing severe withdrawal symptoms. Griffith made no effort to obtain further care other than two sick call slips he filled out in detox; there is no evidence that the nurse would have expected that he had not responded to the treatment provided. Even a failure to follow internal processes does not, alone, indicate deliberate indifference. View "Griffith v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Schrank visited the dark web and downloaded “nearly 1,000 images of babies and toddlers being forcibly, violently, and sadistically penetrated.” After a government investigation identified Schrank, he confessed and pled guilty to possession of child pornography 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of 97-120 months in prison. The district court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 12 months’ home confinement. The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. It both “ignored or minimized the severity of the offense” and “failed to account for general deterrence.” On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence, criticizing the appellate court’s “second-guess[ing]” and saying that she refused to impose a sentence that “does not make sense.” The judge said that Schrank’s misconduct—accessing the dark web over the course of five days and downloading nearly 1,000 images of children being raped—was “much less exaggerated” than “the Sixth Circuit judges realize.” The Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for resentencing, ordering that the case be reassigned on remand. A sentence is substantively unreasonable when it is not “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender.” View "United States v. Schrank" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to drug charges. Simmons’s judgment became final on September 22, 2016, He had until September 22, 2017, to file a motion to vacate. On August 13, 2018, Simmons moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and cited Section 2255(f)(2), which provides “[t]he limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action.” Simmons explained that, after his sentencing, he returned to state custody until December 2016 and served time at Wayne County Jail after that. Simmons claimed that those law libraries did not have federal law materials, which was an impediment to filing a 2255 Motion. He arrived at a federal facility on August 29, 2017. He claimed that the only way to obtain Section 2255 materials there was to request them but “you have to know what you need.”The district court dismissed, finding that Simmons had not sufficiently alleged what specific legal materials he was missing and how the lack of those materials prejudiced his ability to pursue his section 2255 rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if a lack of federal materials, combined with a lack of a legal assistance program, constituted an unconstitutional impediment, a prisoner is required to allege a causal connection between the purported constitutional impediment and how the impediment prevented him from filing on time. Simmons did not. View "Simmons v. United States" on Justia Law

A fight broke out between federal penitentiary inmates. When another inmate attempted to intervene, Flores and another inmate attacked the intervenor, stabbing him at least six times with prison-made “shanks.” The victim was transported to a hospital to treat large lacerations on his back, two smaller cuts to his side, one large cut on his hand, and another on his calf. CT scans showed that the victim’s left shoulder blade was fractured by one of the punctures and revealed deep bruising caused by internal bleeding and air pockets introduced by the puncture wounds.Flores was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3). The victim refused to cooperate and, at trial, testified for the defense, denying that Flores attacked him and characterizing his injuries as “minor” and his wounds “superficial.” He conceded during cross-examination that prisoners who testify for the government are at risk of being assaulted or killed. The jury convicted Flores. The district court imposed a five-level sentencing enhancement because the victim suffered “serious bodily injury,” and sentenced Flores to 110 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the enhancement justified. The victim experienced “extreme pain” as a result of Flores’s assault and needed significant medical intervention. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2003, Lee, age 21, was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct after he pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old whom he met at a bar that required patrons to be at least 18 years old to enter. He completed his 12-month custodial sentence. From 2004-2018, Lee consistently violated the conditions of his parole, most often by failing to comply with sex offender registration laws and location monitoring. Lee was punished and incarcerated for each of those violations. In 2018, while on parole, Lee was a passenger in his girlfriend’s car. Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop and instructed Lee to exit the vehicle. Lee attempted to flee. Officers tackled him and discovered that he was in possession of an unregistered firearm. Lee pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j) and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, reflecting an upward variance of almost two years from the high end of Lee’s 30-37 months guidelines range, purportedly due to Lee’s criminal history.The Sixth Circuit vacated. A court may vary upward from a defendant’s advisory guidelines range based on criminal history and a specific need for deterrence, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). But here, nothing uniquely problematic about the defendant’s criminal history demonstrates a specific need for deterrence beyond that already captured in the guidelines range. Lee’s criminal history has little bearing on the instant offense; it does not justify the two-year upward variance. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

In January 1996, Coleman killed Stevens to keep her from testifying against him at his trial on charges of drug trafficking. A jury convicted him for aggravated murder (with a capital-specification for his killing a witness and a firearm-specification) and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to death and four-and-a-half years in prison.Coleman unsuccessfully sought relief on direct appeal, then unsuccessfully pursued state post0conviction relief. While Coleman’s first petition for post-conviction relief was pending, he returned to the trial court in 2002, with a motion for relief from judgment, a motion for a new trial, and a successive petition for postconviction relief, all raising claims of actual innocence and that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of “Brady.” The court dismissed the petition without a hearing, The Ohio appellate court affirmed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition. The decision of the Ohio court of appeals, that a purported confession by another inmate lacked credibility and was not “Brady” material, neither contravened nor unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The state court evaluated the totality of the mitigation evidence and reweighed it against the evidence in aggravation to reasonably conclude that Coleman experienced no prejudice from his counsel’s conduct in failing to raise certain mitigation arguments. View "Coleman v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Burks was a Gangster Disciple member with leadership and enforcement responsibility. On November 3, 2012, another member, Hardison, went to a Clarksville, Tennessee club, where members of the rival “Bloods” attacked him. Hardison called Burks. The Disciples found Wright, a Blood who had helped attack Hardison, partying without his crew. During the ensuing fight, someone shot Wright in the leg. He staggered toward the door and collapsed. Someone fired another shot into Wright’s abdomen. Wright collapsed and died. The government claims Burks shot Wright.At trial, prosecutors presented three informants to tie Burks to the killing. A jury convicted Burks on all charges. The court granted him a new trial on four counts, deeming the verdict for those counts against the manifest weight of the evidence. The government appealed. Months later, the government realized it had not disclosed two investigation reports. Burks unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on two counts not subject to the new trial order, claiming a "Brady" violation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. It discounted one informant’s grand jury testimony without a valid reason and discredited the other informants’ trial testimony based on contested facts that are generally resolved by juries. The evidence did not weigh heavily against the verdict but set out a straightforward narrative that the jury could reasonably believe. View "United States v. Duncan Burks" on Justia Law

In 1986, Mitchell, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury of raping two white women in Tennessee. It is undisputed that the prosecution’s decision to strike a black prospective juror violated the Supreme Court’s 1986 holding, Batson v. Kentucky. The district court granted relief on Batson grounds in 1995, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Mitchell had to first establish “cause and prejudice” for failing to develop the claim before the state court. Multiple remands left Mitchell in a “procedural thicket.”In 2012, the Supreme Court decided "Martinez," holding that when a state limits the consideration of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to collateral review, a habeas petitioner may establish cause for procedural default if state post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland and the underlying claim has “some merit.” The holding changed prior law--that post-conviction counsel’s “ignorance or inadvertence in a post-conviction proceeding,” including failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, does not qualify as cause to excuse procedural default.The Sixth Circuit then granted Mitchell a conditional writ of habeas corpus, concluding that “Martinez” enables Mitchell to show the necessary “cause,” and authorizes him to raise his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim and to seek redress through a Rule 60(b) motion. View "Mitchell v. Genovese" on Justia Law

Cordero and Velasquez, convicted of conspiring to commit murder for hire and conspiring to distribute one kilogram of cocaine, argued that their convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and challenged the admission of other-acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). They also raised sentencing claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the court did not plainly err in trying the defendants together. The record demonstrates a sufficient factual basis for their guilt on the charged offenses. The intent-to-murder, pecuniary-value, and conspiracy elements of murder for hire were met; the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of conspiring to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 846. The court correctly admitted the challenged bad-act evidence, as that evidence served permissible purposes under Rule 404(b) and was probative of contested issues in the case. The court accurately and succinctly conveyed the permissible purposes of Rule 404(b) evidence when it instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of defendants’ other crimes “only as it relates to the Government’s claim on Defendants’ intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.” The court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to calculate Cordero’s base offense level. A limited remand is required; Velasquez, who was incorrectly sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

In 2011, Michigan narrowed the crimes covered by the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) making Hart, who had been a juvenile offender, no longer a “sex offender.” Local officials required him to continue registering as one. In 2013, Hart registered an incorrect address and, in January 2014, he failed to update his address. The defendants arrested Hart each time, using warrant requests incorrectly representing that he was required to register under SORA. The first time, Hart spent the night in jail; the second time, he served 19 months in prison. When prison officials realized the mistake, they released Hart and his convictions were vacated.Hart sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation. The court denied motions to dismiss by employees of the city police and county sheriff’s departments, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and Monell claims, as well as the defamation claim against registration officials; reversed regarding the defamation claim against three officers; and remanded. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hart, a reasonable officer could not believe that Hart was subject to SORA’s requirements based solely on his inclusion in the database. Without additional evidence, it is impossible to determine individual culpability. View "Hart v. Hillsdale County" on Justia Law