Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Tennessee Judicial Drug Task Force and the Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Abdalla for suspected narcotics trafficking. The Tennessee judge who signed the warrant permitting officers to search Abdalla’s residence on New Hope Road only had jurisdiction in DeKalb County but the warrant, in one place, listed an address on Carey Road in Trousdale County. This error resulted from the officer using a previous warrant as a template and failing to erase all vestiges of that document. Abdalla argued that a warrant cannot be valid if it contains a mismatch between the residence in the authorization section and the residence that the police searched and that a judge’s failure to notice an address outside his jurisdiction in a warrant’s authorization section demands the inference that the judge impermissibly rubber-stamped the warrant. The affidavit supporting the warrant listed the correct address and county at the top of the first page; the warrant itself directed officers to the correct address by providing step-by-step directions along with a detailed description of Abdalla’s residence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Abdallah’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, and his 168-month sentence. The warrant’s singular incorrect address posed almost no chance of a mistaken search. Despite the government’s irregular mistake, this clerical error case demands the usual result for technical mistakes that threaten no constitutional harm. View "United States v. Abdalla" on Justia Law

In 1993, Willman was convicted for violating a Michigan sexual assault law. He served 10 years in prison and completed parole. Willman registered on Michigan’s sex offender registry. Congress, in 2006, passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901 to “make more uniform" a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems, that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost. SORNA “made it a federal crime for a sex offender who meets certain requirements to ‘knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration’” Willman challenged the Michigan law and SORNA. The district court dismissed the Michigan defendants and directed them to not enforce the 2006 and 2011 amendments to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act against Willman. The court declared that the duration of Willman’s registration under Michigan law had ended and that he should be removed from that registry. The court later dismissed the federal claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sex offender’s obligations under SORNA are independent of any duties under state law. The court rejected Willman’s arguments that SORNA is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, as double jeopardy, as violating the Fifth Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment, as overbroad and vague, as violating his privacy rights, and as violating his right to travel. View "Willman v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 2005, Williams pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). Williams’s PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 262-327 months' imprisonment. The government filed a notice of a prior felony drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. 851, which made Williams subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. The court sentenced Williams to 262 months.The 2018 First Step Act authorized district courts to reduce defendants’ sentences for certain drug offenses, 132 Stat. 5194. Although the Act reduced Williams’s mandatory minimum sentence to 10 years, his Guidelines’ range remained the same. Williams sought resentencing under the Act, citing his good conduct in prison: he had not failed a single drug test, had helped 13 other prisoners earn their GEDs, and had held the same job for over eight years. The district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and concluded that “the 262-month within guideline sentence originally imposed remains sufficient and necessary to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, to provide just punishment, and to provide deterrence.” The court did not address Williams’s post-conviction conduct.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Williams's post-conviction conduct occurred after his initial sentencing, so the record for his initial sentence provides no indication of the court’s reasoning. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 1984, two 17-year-old Caucasian students were car-jacked, sodomized, robbed, and murdered by Taylor and Wade, both African-Americans. A witness picked Wade from a line-up. Wade confessed, naming Taylor as the sole shooter. Convicted, Wade received a life sentence. Taylor’s trial began in 1986, before "Batson," The controlling law about racial animus in peremptory challenges was "Swain." In selecting Taylor’s jury, the prosecutor had nine peremptory challenges; he used four to strike African-Americans, leaving only one African-American on the jury after Taylor’s counsel removed an African-American woman with a peremptory challenge. Taylor’s counsel raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The prosecutor responded, “almost incoherently.” The court rejected the challenge, stating: “I believe the issue being addressed ... [Batson] as to whether it is permissible to exercise your peremptory strikes whichever way you wish to. I don’t know, but the record is clear as to what has been done in this case.” The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of Taylor’s guilt. The judge found Wade unavailable to testify pending his direct appeal and allowed the prosecutor to play Wade’s tape-recorded police statement. The jury convicted Taylor. The court sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s Batson and Confrontation Clause claims. On collateral attack, Taylor also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Based on Taylor’s limited argument, the prosecutor’s otherwise non-discriminatory conduct, and the absence of an indisputable pattern of discriminatory strikes, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s denial of Taylor’s Batson claim was not necessarily an unreasonable application of Batson. Even if evidence that Taylor produced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing had been presented at trial, Taylor could not have prevailed on a Swain claim, so his counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce that evidence. Any Sixth Amendment error was harmless. View "Taylor v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Sherrill, Poindexter, and Somerville were indicted on multiple counts arising out of their attempted robbery of Edwards, a drug dealer, during which Edwards was killed. Following a jury trial, all three were convicted of attempting to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Hobbs Act) and the knowing use or carry of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.924(c) and 2, or aiding and abetting those crimes. Somerville was also convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, section 924(j)(1).The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Upholding the district court’s decision not to sever the trials, the court rejected a Confrontation Clause claim. The prosecution appropriately redacted all names from Poindexter’s statement, which was introduced at trial, and substituted neutral terms that could have referred to any of the individuals allegedly involved in the robbery. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that the probative value of photographs purportedly suggesting that Sherrill was affiliated with a gang equaled or outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentences. View "United States v. Somerville" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C is a contagious, progressive virus that can lead to cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, and ultimately death. There is no vaccine for hepatitis C. Doctors previously treated the virus using interferons; that treatment brought little success and severe side effects. In 2011, the FDA approved new direct-acting antivirals that halt the progress of hepatitis C and eventually cause the virus to disappear. In 2015, the cost of a single course of treatment using direct-acting antivirals was $80,000-$189,000. By the time of trial, those prices was $13,000-$32,000.A 2016 policy specified that the Tennessee Department of Corrections would provide the antivirals only to infected inmates with severe liver scarring. By 2019, approximately 4,740 of Tennessee's 21,000 inmates had hepatitis. Under a 2019 guidance, every new inmate is tested for hepatitis C. Inmates who test positive undergo a baseline evaluation; an advisory committee of healthcare professionals evaluates each infected inmate and determines his course of treatment. The guidance establishes criteria that make antivirals available to “individuals [who] are at higher risk for complications or disease progression," includes a series of procedural steps for local providers, and provides for continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their treatment plan.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of inmates' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The 2019 guidance showed reasonable medical judgment to care for the class of infected inmates. While the best course of action might be to treat all infected inmates with antivirals, the defendant could not spend more than was allocated and had repeatedly sought budget increases. View "Atkins v. Parker" on Justia Law

Chase was convicted of kidnapping, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, unlawful imprisonment, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Michigan court imposed two consecutive terms of 25-80 years’ imprisonment on the criminal sexual conduct counts, to be served concurrently with terms for the other counts. Michigan’s sentencing guidelines allowed a sentencing court to depart from the guidelines’ mandatory sentencing ranges upon a showing of “a substantial and compelling reason,” using “prior record variables” and “offense variables.” In Chase’s case, the court increased Chase’s minimum sentencing range based on offense variables that had not been found by the jury, such as serving as a “leader” and causing bodily injury and serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment.Days after Chase’s sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in “Alleyne,” that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact that increases a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence be found by a jury, not a judge. Chase did not raise an “Alleyne” claim on direct appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court did not determine that Alleyne rendered its sentencing scheme unconstitutional until 2015.The Sixth Circuit granted Chase habeas relief, excusing the procedural default. Because there is a reasonable probability that, but for his appellate counsel’s error, Chase would have received relief from the Michigan Supreme Court, he has shown prejudice. A decision upholding the sentencing court’s use of judge-found facts to raise Chase’s mandatory minimum sentence would be contrary to clearly established federal law,. View "Chase v. MaCauley" on Justia Law

Fleischer pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (Victim 1), 18 U.S.C. 2551(a), and one count of receipt and distribution of visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2552(a)(2). The parties agreed to dismiss Count Four, charging Fleischer with the exploitation of a minor victim (Victim 2), 18 U.S.C. 2551(a). The plea agreement included a section labeled, “RELEVANT CONDUCT,” which contained Fleischer’s admission to the offense conduct involving Victim 2. The district court sentenced Fleischer to a within-Guidelines sentence of 447 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court rejected Fleischer’s arguments that the district court committed error in applying to his sentence both a multiple count adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(d)(1), based on his conduct in relation to Victim 2, and a pattern of activity enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(B)(5), and by placing an unreasonable amount of weight on the “seriousness” of his conduct as a sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Fleischer" on Justia Law

Less than an hour after a Brown County, Ohio jail officer was captured on video yelling in Goldson’s ear, “I’d like to break your fucking neck right now,” multiple correctional officers apparently discovered Goldson hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to the sprinkler escutcheon in his cell, in what the officers now characterize as a suicide. Goldson’s sister claims that Goldson’s hanging was staged. The district court acknowledged that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Goldson was capable of hanging himself, mainly due to the physical layout of the cell and Goldson’s physical characteristics but nonetheless granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence as to a specific theory of how Goldson died. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, reinstating claims against two correctional officers relating to Goldson’s death. The court affirmed with respect to other defendants and claims. View "Bard v. Brown County" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lisa was found dead in her driveway. Investigators focused on McCary, Halvorson’s former boyfriend. After hearing of a $10,000 reward, Woodfork alleged that McCary had paid him and England to murder Lisa. Woodfork wore a wire, allowing the police to record a conversation between him and England. England complained about McCary’s not having paid him in full and made threats. Police subsequently brought England to the station for questioning, telling him that he had been recorded. England stated, “go on and lock me up then and call my lawyer … I don’t know what you’re talking about.” The interrogation continued. England ultimately admitted that he was present at the murder but claimed only to have punched Lisa, which knocked her down, and that he attempted to talk McCary out of further violence. He claimed that Lisa was alive when they departed the scene. The prosecution’s theory was that the two planned to make it appear that Lisa was accidentally run over by her own truck and that they knocked her to the ground, accelerated the truck backward, and broke her windpipe. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed England’s conviction and life sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the trial court erroneously admitted his confession, that improper admission of hearsay statements from the deceased victim was erroneously deemed harmless error, and that the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. View "England v. Hart" on Justia Law