Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Twyford was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1993. Twyford filed a federal habeas petition and sought transport for neurological imaging. Twyford noted that he may have neurological problems due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and a gunshot wound to his head from a suicide attempt at age 13, which cost him an eye and left shrapnel in his head. Dr. Scharre, a neurologist and the director of the Cognitive Neurology Division at The Ohio State University, had evaluated Twyford, reviewed his medical records, and concluded that a CT scan and an FDG-PET scan were necessary for him to evaluate Twyford fully. The Chillicothe Correctional Institution, where Twyford is incarcerated, does not have the equipment to perform this imaging. Twyford alleged that the results could be relevant to his claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, coerced statements, competency, and mitigation evidence. The warden contended that the district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to bring a prisoner to the court in a 2254 action, but not to require that the state transport a prisoner to an outside medical facility and that Twyford was seeking new information that he did not present to the state courts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order granting Twyford’s motion. The court had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to order the warden to transport Twyford for neurological imaging because the results “may aide this Court in the exercise of its congressionally mandated habeas review.” View "Twyford v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Clark robbed three banks, stating that he had a gun. When police attempted to conduct a traffic stop, Clark fled at high speed and hit other cars. A 67-year-old suffered significant injuries. Clark was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) for two of the robberies and pleaded guilty. Clark admitted to committing another robbery. Based on the terms of the plea agreement, the PSR included the Ohio robbery as a “Pseudo Count” for calculation of Clark’s sentencing range. For each of the three bank robberies, the PSR assessed enhancements for a victim sustaining life-threatening bodily injuries during the car chase and for Clark recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Clark argued the enhancements should only apply to the Pseudo Count to avoid unlawful “triple counting,” and because there was an insufficient nexus linking the flight in Kentucky to the two Michigan robberies. The court overruled these objections and sentenced Clark to a total of 235 months' imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. There is no explicit indication that the Sentencing Commission “intended to attach multiple penalties to the same conduct” merely because counts are not grouped together; the stated intent of the grouping guidelines demonstrates that it would be improper to increase a defendant’s sentence based on the same conduct enhancing multiple counts. The court remanded for resentencing without application of the enhancements to all three bank robbery counts. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

While incarcerated and working as a laundry porter at Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility, Rhodes suffered a severe skull fracture and other injuries when an industrial laundry cart—weighing about 400 pounds—fell from a truck and struck her. Rhodes sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process. The court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Jones, an MDOC employee who was driving the laundry truck, and McPherson, an officer who was operating the truck’s hydraulic lift gate when the incident occurred.The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Jones and McPherson on Rhodes’s Eighth Amendment claim but affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Rhodes’s substantive due process claim. Precedent clearly established Rhodes’s asserted Eighth Amendment right before the incident. Although no case precisely dealt with factual scenarios where a prison official flung a 300–400-pound laundry cart at an unprepared prison worker, out-of-circuit cases uniformly held liable prison officials exhibiting deliberate indifference to a known risk in various prison workplaces, sufficient to put a reasonable prison official on notice that recklessly disregarding a known risk to a prison worker’s safety would violate that person’s right to be free from “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” under the Eighth Amendment. With respect to the substantive due process claim, the court held that the state-created-danger doctrine does not apply where a state actor directly causes the plaintiff’s asserted injury. View "Rhodes v. Michigan" on Justia Law

McNeill was convicted in 1995 and sentenced to death in Ohio state court for aggravated murder. Seeking federal habeas relief, McNeil argued that the prosecution failed to turn over material under Brady v. Maryland and created a false impression in violation of Napue v. Illinois. The alleged Brady material included two police reports, one summarizing an interview with the prosecution’s primary witness, Rushinsky, who initially failed to—but ultimately did—identify McNeill as the killer, and the other detailing a potential suspect who was quickly dismissed as a suspect. It also included three audio recordings, one of the same Rushinsky interview addressed in the report, a second Rushinsky interview, and an interview with a potential alibi witness.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. None of the evidence was material under Brady. The only favorable, undisclosed evidence was the Rushinsky report, which would have given McNeill more material with which to impeach Rushinsky. The wealth of other evidence on which the jury could have relied, plus the fact that Rushinsky did actually identify a photo of McNeill before trial, indicates that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of McNeill’s trial would have been different if the prosecution had turned over the report. The prosecution did not create a false impression by playing the audio recording of Rushinsky identifying McNeill without clarifying that Rushinsky initially failed to identify McNeill. View "McNeill v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. In 2018, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard. The Supreme Court vacated.On remand, the panel again granted Hill relief on his “Atkins” claim, but, following en banc review, affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. the state court decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Ohio court considered evidence of Hill’s past abilities including Hill’s medical history, public school records, and prior standardized test results, and evaluated criteria mentioned in Atkins such as intellectual functioning, adaptive skills, and the onset age of disability. In light of the evidence presented, it was not unreasonable for the Ohio court to rely on the reasoned judgment of two experts over another. Hill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on its merits. View "Hill v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Phillips, currently incarcerated for a 2001 armed bank robbery, filed a pro se motion seeking to waive the accumulated interest on his $51,086.10 restitution sentence. He had not challenged that order on appeal or when the court set up a payment plan in 2005. As of December 2019, Phillips’s outstanding principal balance was $13,191.04, with $25,550.51 owed in interest.The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a restitution order post-sentencing. Phillips argued that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3612(f)(3), which provides: If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest under this subsection, the court may-- (A) waive the requirement for interest; (B) limit the total of interest payable to a specific dollar amount; or (C) limit the length of the period during which interest accrues.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although the circuits are split on the issue, and the statutory language is not clear, the fairest reading of the statute is that the district court’s power to waive interest on restitution because of a defendant’s inability to pay can be exercised not only at initial sentencing but also at a point after initial sentencing in light of changed circumstances regarding the ability to pay. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At about 4:30 a.m., an anonymous 911 call reported a break-in at neighboring apartment 103, with screaming, Seven Southfield Police officers responded, entered the building, and heard screaming but could not identify the source; the door to 103 was not broken. The officers determined that the window was not a point of entry; they received no response to intermittent knocking. The dispatcher called the anonymous caller back; the caller said that she “can’t be positive what apartment it was coming from.” After about eight minutes, Mitchell opened the door to 103. She denied that there were any problems. Although none of the officer noticed any injuries on Mitchell or saw any signs of suspicious activity, they pushed their way inside, injuring Mitchell’s knee. Mitchell continued to object to the warrantless entry. The officers arrested Mitchell’s guest, Williams, allegedly employing unnecessary force. The officers found no evidence of illegal activity in the apartment. Charges against Williams for resisting arrest and obstruction of police were dismissed.Mitchell and Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting unlawful entry and excessive force. Williams also asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution. Certain claims were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to Williams on his false arrest claim for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the officers’ qualified immunity motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and Mitchell’s excessive force claim. View "Williams v. Maurer" on Justia Law

A deputy observed a vehicle swerving in traffic and initiated a stop. Kerns was operating the vehicle. When the car stopped, Kerns’s prior romantic partner exited and yelled that Kerns had kidnapped her at gunpoint. Kerns was arrested. He admitted to driving from Kentucky to Colby’s Michigan residence and threatening to kill her family if Colby did not leave with him. Colby had jerked the wheel of the car to get the deputy's attention. Kerns was indicted for kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)), interstate domestic violence (2261(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (924(c)(1)(a)(ii)). After being found competent to stand trial, Kerns pleaded guilty to kidnapping and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Kerns confirmed he had reviewed the PSR and had no objection to its findings. The court explained that the recommended sentencing range for the kidnapping count was 87-108 months’ imprisonment and that the section 924(c) count carried a mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Kerns to 192 months: 108 months on the kidnapping count plus months on the firearm count. The court also referenced a fine. Neither party objected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an inconsistency existed between the court’s oral reference to a fine of $1,000 and its imposition of a total fine of $2,000. The guilty plea was valid and the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kerns" on Justia Law

Based on activity related to former Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes’ campaign for the U.S. Senate seat held by Mitch McConnell in 2014, Emmons and Lundergan (Grimes’s father) were convicted for knowingly and willfully making unlawful corporate contributions aggregating $25,000 or more, Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30118, and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; willfully causing the submission of materially false statements, 18 U.S.C 1001(a)(2) and 2; and the falsification of records or documents, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on corporate contributions as applied to intrafamilial contributions from a closely-held, family-run corporation. Such contributions present a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The district court adequately distinguished between independent expenditures and contributions in the jury instructions. The district court properly admitted evidence of Lundergan’s uncharged acts in connection with Grimes’ campaigns for Kentucky Secretary of State as res gestae evidence and under 404(b). The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Emmons had the requisite intent to cause unlawful corporate contributions and the Grimes campaign to submit false campaign-finance reports. View "United States v. Emmons" on Justia Law

Warren pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His plea agreement bound the parties to “recommend that the Court impose a sentence within” Warren’s Guidelines range, calculated at 51-63 months, and prohibited either party from “suggest[ing] in any way that a departure or variance” from Warren’s Guidelines range “is appropriate.” Before sentencing, the district court notified Warren that it was considering an upward variance and ultimately sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history,” the “extreme variance” based solely on Warren’s criminal history was “inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.”On remand, the district court again circulated a notice of possible upward variance. At the hearing, the court asked the parties to discuss the potential variance. The prosecuting attorney stated that she “wanted to clarify something that defense counsel brought up because she is asking the Court to have a standard of reliance upon this.” The prosecutor acknowledged the existence of a plea agreement, which “the government has no intention of violating” but indicated that, had the full extent of Warren’s history been known, there would have been a different recommendation. The Sixth Circuit vacated the 96-month sentence imposed on remand as substantively unreasonable. The government breached Warren's plea agreement. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law