Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kozerski owned two construction companies in Detroit. He formed the second one, CA, to bid on Veterans Administration contracts set aside for small businesses owned by service-disabled veterans. Kozerski does not have a service-related disability. He convinced J.R., a service-disabled veteran, to pretend to be the company’s owner. CA handled six contracts. Kozerski forged J.R.’s signature and sent the government emails supposedly from J.R.. For five contracts, Kozerski did not pay J.R. anything, lying to him that CA did not receive any contracts after the first one.The government eventually discovered the scheme and charged Kozerski with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Kozerski pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended a loss amount of $9.5 million to $25 million, calculated by adding the amounts the government paid CA on all six contracts without crediting the value of the work performed on the contracts: $11,891,243.45, resulting in a Guidelines range of 37-46 months. Kozerski argued the loss should be the amount of profit a qualifying veteran-owned business would receive from the contract, yielding a guidelines range of eight-14 months. The district court adopted Kozerski’s formula and sentenced him to a year and a day. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s calculation of the loss as the aggregate difference between Kozerski’s bids and the next-lowest bids, about $250,000. View "United States v. Kozerski" on Justia Law

Thomas pled guilty to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Thomas had several prior Michigan law drug convictions, including convictions for delivery of heroin and for possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The court concluded that those convictions made Thomas a career offender under the Guidelines, resulting in a sentencing range of 140-175 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 140-moth sentence. The Guidelines define a controlled-substance offense as “an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” If the least culpable conduct criminalized by a statute falls outside the U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 definition, a conviction under that statute does not qualify as a controlled substance offense. The Guidelines define both distribution and possession with the intent to distribute as controlled-substance offenses. Under federal law, “distribution,” means “delivery,” “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C. 802(8).. Michigan defines “delivery” the same way. There is no meaningful difference between the federal offense of distribution and the Michigan offense of delivery. Nor is there any substantive difference between possession with the intent to distribute under federal law and possession with intent to deliver under Michigan law. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit earlier held that the district court miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines range for Mongtomery’s sentencing, but explained that “the record shows that the district court would have imposed its sentence regardless of the Guidelines range” and the error was harmless. One feature of the sentencing hearing was that the court stated, “If the guideline calculation is determined to have been wrong, the Court would have imposed the same sentence under Section 3553(a) considering those factors as a whole.” Montgomery noted that the statement is part of the standard sentencing colloquy, even in cases where the parties do not object to the Guidelines calculation.The Sixth Circuit denied a rehearing while acknowledging that there is no reason to give any weight to boiler-plate language designed to thwart a deserved resentencing. The purpose of harmless-error analysis is to avoid resentencing in cases where the district court certainly would have announced the same sentence had it not erred..That aim is not served by a standard-issue pledge that the district court would have come to the same result under section 3553(a) had it calculated the Guidelines range correctly. Montgomery brought the argument too late so that it is inappropriate for consideration. The court issued an opinion “to voice our skepticism that a standard sentencing colloquy like the one at issue here should weigh into our harmless-error analysis in future cases.” View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Ouza was arguing with her son, Hassan. Ouza’s daughter, Maysaa called her father, Mohamad. Mohamad went to Ouza’s house, in violation of Ouza's Personal Protection Order. Maysaa called the police. When Officer Dottor arrived, the men were gone. The case report identified Ouza as the “victim” of domestic violence. After Dottor left, Mohamad returned and pushed into the house, causing Ouza to fall. A struggle ensued. The women pushed Mohamad out of the house. Maysaa called 911 and reported that her father was hitting her mother. Dottor and Officer Derwick arrived. Mohamad, standing outside, told a false story that Ouza had attacked him. Dottor placed Ouza under arrest and handcuffed her. Mohamad then said, “I was trespassing. I hit her. ... She was just defending herself.” Ouza alleges that she told Dottor several times that the handcuffs were too tight. Ouza was released from custody the next day. The prosecutor declined to prosecute. Ouza alleges that she continues to suffer physical injury from the excessively tight handcuffing.In Ouza’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with regard to Ouza’s excessive force claim; a ruling that the officers spoiled evidence (audio and video recordings), without a sanction of an adverse inference; and a ruling that the municipality is not liable. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Dottor with regard to false arrest claims. View "Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights" on Justia Law

Wingate was charged with one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a); two counts of pharmacy robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2118(a); three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Wingate was on parole for second-degree murder at the time of the robberies), 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and one count of conspiracy to commit those crimes, 18 U.S.C. 371. Nearly all of the indicted co-conspirators pleaded guilty. A jury convicted Wingate on all nine counts; he was sentenced to 684 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Wingate subsequently filed a section 2255 motion, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine more of the government’s witnesses and for “failing to move to suppress the identification obtained as a result of a suggestive photo lineup” and that his convictions for bank and pharmacy robbery were improperly classified as crimes of violence under section 924(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of those claims. Wingate cannot demonstrate prejudice as a result of his attorney’s purportedly ineffective assistance. The district court was right to conclude that sections 2113(a) and 2118(a) are crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause. View "Wingate v. United States" on Justia Law

Beginning when G.L. was 15 years old, Paauwe, an elementary school teacher, engaged in an online relationship with G.L., a special needs girl living several states away. Paauwe persuaded her to perform sexual acts and “punishment” on herself. During the two-year relationship, Paauwe amassed a collection of child pornography depicting G.L. and recorded an illicit video of a student and videos of himself masturbating at school. Paauwe eventually responded to an undercover officer’s sex-related social media post and “expressed disturbing views.” When officers interviewed him, Paauwe admitted that he struggled with sexual urges toward young girls and to viewing child pornography. A search of Paauwe’s phone revealed several images of child pornography, some depicting children as young as five engaged in sex acts with adults.Paauwe pleaded guilty to coercion and enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Paauwe objected to the imposition of a five-level sentencing enhancement for “engag[ing] in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” arguing that U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b)(1) contemplates offenses against multiple minors. Application Note 4(B)(i) to 4B1.5(b)(1) indicates that the Guideline applies to a defendant who engages in prohibited sexual conduct with a single minor. Paauwe argued that an application note may not expand a Guideline’s scope. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 420-month sentence, stating that Paauwe’s enhancement follows from the plain terms of the Guideline itself. View "United States v. Paauwe" on Justia Law

In 1997, Sexton pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery; an Ohio state court judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Sexton later argued that Ohio law required a three-judge panel to receive his plea and impose the sentence and that he was not aware of that purported error nor was he told about his right to appeal his sentence. Within 13 months, he wrote to the Ohio Public Defender, which replied with a form that Sexton could use to pursue pro se claims pro se. Two weeks later, Sexton filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence, focused on Sexton’s co-defendant, who apparently testified against him and received a more lenient sentence. Sexton made assertions that amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred and failing to state any claims warranting either relief or an evidentiary hearing.Sexton says that in 2017 he learned, from another inmate, that he should have been sentenced by a three-judge panel. Sexton filed an application for leave to file a delayed appeal with the affidavits from Sexton and the other inmate. Ohio courts denied Sexton’s application. The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of his federal habeas petition; 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D) made timely Sexton’s claim that he was denied due process and equal protection in 2017 when the Ohio court denied his motion for leave to file a direct appeal. View "Sexton v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

After almost 20 years as a Reynoldsburg detective, Tye was charged with a federal drug trafficking offense. While awaiting a preliminary hearing, Tye committed suicide in his cell at the Delaware County Jail. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to Tye’s serious medical need, with state-law claims for wrongful death and survival, the district court denied summary judgment to officers Foley and Wallace, finding that neither was entitled to federal qualified immunity or immunity under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts and inferences as found by the district court do not, as a matter of law, show that either officer was aware that Tye posed a “strong likelihood” of attempting suicide. During the intake process, Tye denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Foley reported no visible signs of distress, noting only that Tye was a “peace officer.” Tye was later seen by a nurse, who ministered her own physical and mental health assessments, and again denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Tye later met with a mental health clinician, who reported only “[n]ormal [f]inding[s]” with respect to demeanor, mood, thought process, behavior, affect, and cognition. View "Downard v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 1993, Snow was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and conspiracy to kill a person while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, sections 846 and 848(e)(1)(A). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 327 months as to Count 1 and life imprisonment as to Count 2. Snow sought reduction of his Count 2 sentence under the First Step Act, which allows district courts to apply retroactively certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Snow’s motion, finding Snow ineligible for relief. A First Step Act “covered offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified" by the Fair Sentencing Act.” The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for certain offenses involving cocaine base by increasing the drug quantities required to trigger certain sentencing ranges and generally requires only adjustment to a new, lower sentencing range. The Fair Sentencing Act did not reduce the sentencing range for Snow’s section 848(e)(1)(A) conviction. The elements of that conviction no longer amount to an offense under section 848; there is no applicable sentencing range. The elimination of statutory penalties is not a “modification” of statutory penalties. The Act states that a court may “impose a reduced sentence” for a covered offense “as if [the changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act] were in effect” when the offense was committed. If the district court revisited Snow’s Count 2 sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect, it could not “impose” any sentence. View "United States v. Snow" on Justia Law

Police found Moore dead with a syringe in one hand, his cell phone beside him. Officers obtained a search warrant. The cellphone revealed text messages between Moore and “Joe,” indicating that Joe had delivered drugs to Moore’s address. Officers identified “Joe” through his cellular telephone number, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Moore’s death had “resulted from a mixture of cocaine and fentanyl toxicity,” consistent with the drugs purchased from Joe Ward. Six months later, officers searched Ward’s curbside trash and found mail addressed to Ward, “loose marihuana, cigar wrappers, and a plastic bag that appeared to contain illicit drugs at one time.” Ward “has an extensive criminal history which includes charges of felony drug possession, trafficking in drugs, and weapons violations.” Based on that information, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Ward’s residence. During the search, officers seized approximately a kilogram of heroin, some cocaine and some hashish, five firearms, ammunition, drug packaging material, a partial bag of syringes, and a digital scale.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the suppression of that evidence. The government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Ward’s drug-dealing and his home. The “good faith” exception does not apply. Undated charges, without further information, plus the lone trash pull are not probative of whether Ward used his residence to traffic drugs. The affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law