Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Garth pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His sentencing guidelines range was originally 70-87 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver triggered the “career-offender enhancement,” which applies when a defendant has more than one prior conviction for either crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which resulted in a range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver counts as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense. View "United States v. Garth" on Justia Law

Lorain Police Department officers, responding after hearing gunshots, spotted the man (Raymore) that McCollough (victim) had seen. They recovered a gun near where McCollough heard a “gun hitting the concrete,” ammunition in that gun, and a magazine with more ammunition in the black Nissan that rolled over McCollough’s hand earlier that night. Testing and DNA evidence connected that evidence with Raymore, who was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Raymore had previous convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year: possession of drugs, assault, aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and aggravated burglary.Raymore was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating his supervised release, consecutive to 110 months for the firearm possession. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was evidence that allowed a jury to conclude Raymore constructively possessed the gun and the ammunition in that gun. Rejecting an argument that the indictment failed to allege a mens rea element required after the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision and that the jury instructions were erroneous for the same reason, the court noted that Raymore stipulated to his felony convictions. The court appropriately enhanced Raymore's Sentencing Guidelines range because Raymore’s prior Ohio assault and aggravated robbery convictions qualified as crimes of violence. View "United States v. Raymore" on Justia Law

Fugate sold stolen firearms and other property that he acquired from co-defendants conducting thefts from automobiles across Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Authorities recovered 25 firearms from Fugate’s residence. Fugate’s wife turned over an additional seven firearms. Fugate admitted that he sold firearms to drug traffickers and gang members and that he knew that some of the firearms were stolen. Fugate pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), The government dropped a charge of receipt, possession, or trafficking of firearms and ammunition, “knowing and having reasonable cause to believe the firearms and ammunition were stolen.” Fugate had a prior conviction for felony possession of firearms by an unlawful user of controlled substances. The court applied a six-level sentencing enhancement because the offense involved at least 25 firearms; a two-level enhancement because some firearms were stolen; a four-level enhancement because Fugate engaged in the trafficking of firearms; and a four-level enhancement because Fugate possessed or trafficked the firearms “in connection with another felony offense.” The calculated Guidelines range was 78-97 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the sentence. Applying an enhancement for possessing or trafficking firearms in connection with another felony—knowingly trafficking stolen firearms was impermissible double-counting under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Fugate" on Justia Law

Ashrafkhan came to the U.S. in 1991 after receiving a scholarship to study at Michigan State University. He earned a Ph.D. with a research focus on pathology and the genetics of cancer. In 2006, he founded Compassionate Doctors, a medical practice outside of Detroit, that was actually a “pill mill,” where unscrupulous doctors wrote fraudulent prescriptions for fake patients. Compassionate billed Medicare for the fake patient visits and collected millions of dollars in Medicare payments over the course of several years. The fraudulent prescriptions were filled by individuals recruited by Compassionate at pharmacies that paid Compassionate kickbacks. Those drugs were then sold on the street, resulting in hundreds of thousands of opioid-based drugs being distributed onto the illegal drug market. Ashrafkhan was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and money laundering and was sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction on “reasonable doubt.” The instruction stressed to the jury the need to base its decision on “the evidence or lack of evidence” and that a reasonable doubt was one that was “still standing” after all of the evidence had been considered. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

McReynolds and 17 codefendants were charged under federal drug laws. McReynolds was charged only under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Only McReynolds went to trial. He admitted selling drugs but argued that he was not a member of the conspiracy. There was testimony that McReynolds was in contact with the conspiracy’s leader every few days to buy drugs. The conspiracy’s supplier and its leader mentioned each of the other codefendants in their plea agreements but did not mention McReynolds. None of the searches returned any evidence associated with McReynolds. A cooperating codefendant testified that McReynolds was a conspiracy member. Confidential informant A.A. testified to buying drugs from McReynolds.The jury returned a guilty verdict and found the amount of controlled substances attributable to McReynolds beyond a reasonable doubt to be “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine. The PSR combined the amounts from the codefendants’ plea agreements with the sales to A.A. for the total quantity of over 750 grams of heroin, over 700 grams of cocaine, and over 250 grams of crack. After a firearm enhancement, McReynolds’ guidelines range was 151-181 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the 151-month sentence. The indictment sufficiently alleged that McReynolds had “knowingly conspired and agreed” with the other coconspirators. A court cannot hold a defendant to the entire conspiracy-wide drug amounts without any particularized findings as to why it is doing so. View "United States v. McReynolds" on Justia Law

Firefighters, including Sparks, responded to a fire at the Pritchard residence. Sparks lost consciousness and died days later. Sparks suffered from coronary disease, hypertension, and diabetes and had not been taking his prescribed medications. Pritchard had arranged for his wife, children, and dog to be out of the house that morning. Pritchard indicated to several people that he was responsible for the fire and gave investigators a false alibi. In persuading his wife, Brandi, to cooperate with his plan to burn the house to collect insurance proceeds, Pritchard recounted previous fires that he started to collect insurance money. Pritchard used threats of violence to coerce Brandi not to confess. Pritchard and Brandi were charged with malicious destruction of property by fire, 18 U.S.C. 844(i), which permits punishment for arson causing death, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Brandi pleaded guilty.At Pritchard’s trial, a physician for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health testified that firefighting “triggered” Sparks’s fatal heart attack; he could not conclude that Sparks would not have had a heart attack independent of the fire. Pritchard’s counsel unsuccessfully objected to evidence about Pritchard’s previous arsons, emergency protective orders obtained by Brandi, and cell phone information obtained without a warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Pritchard's conviction and 360-month sentence. The jury had sufficient evidence that Sparks' death was “a direct or proximate result of [Pritchard’s] conduct." View "United States v. Pritchard" on Justia Law

Koger, an inmate of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), is a practicing Rastafarian. Between 2006 and 2018, Koger made several religious-practice accommodation requests, including requests to grow his dreadlocks, keep a religious diet, observe fasts, and commune with other Rastafarians. Alleging that ODRC’s responses were inadequate, Koger brought these claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several ODRC officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Koger has not shown that the prison’s grooming policy, which provides for an individualized determination of whether an inmate’s hair is “searchable,” prevents him from growing his locks naturally and, therefore, cannot “demonstrate that [the] prison policy substantially burdens [his] religious practice.” It is not clear that ODRC denied Koger the ability to commune with fellow Rastafarians. The court reversed in part. The defendants did not present any government interest to justify the denial of Koger’s religious diet requests. Koger sufficiently alleged equal protection violations. View "Koger v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Igboba was convicted on 18 counts under 18 U.S.C. 286, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 18 U.S.C. 287, and 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (b), and (c)(5), based on his participation in a conspiracy to defraud the government by preparing and filing false federal income tax returns using others’ identities. He was sentenced to 162 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and required to pay restitution, special assessment, and forfeiture sums.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that when the district court increased his base offense level based on the total amount of loss his offense caused, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), it failed to distinguish between the loss caused by his individual conduct and that caused by the entire conspiracy and that the district court erred in applying a two-level sophisticated-means enhancement, section 2B1.1(b)(10). the district court could rightly attribute $4.1 million in losses to “acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by” Igboba. The court noted his “sophisticated” use of technology and multiple aliases. View "United States v. Igboba" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hugueley stabbed correctional counselor Steed 36 times, stopping only after his homemade weapon broke off. Hugueley testified that he had planned the attack because Steed “had a smart ass mouth.” The jury convicted Hugueley of first-degree murder. Hugueley waived the presentation of any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The jury considered several aggravating factors. In 1986, Hugueley was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. In 1992, he was convicted of first-degree murder after killing another inmate. In 1998, Hugueley was convicted of attempted first-degree murder after stabbing another inmate, The jury sentenced Hugueley to death. Tennessee law requires an automatic appeal from a death sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. Hugueley originally raised ineffective assistance of counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings, but he waived the claim when he voluntarily withdrew his petition. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hugueley’s argument that he should have been declared incompetent to withdraw that petition, and that the state-court procedures that determined that he was competent were procedurally deficient or, alternatively, that his state post-conviction counsel was ineffective and caused his default. View "Hugueley v. Mays" on Justia Law

Ware was convicted in 1997 of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. At the time, adherence to the federal sentencing guidelines was mandatory; the jury did not make any drug amount finding. The court did not specify the particular sentence for each count nor specify under which provisions of section 841(b)(1) Ware was sentenced. In 2003, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ware’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief under Apprendi. In 2019, Ware moved for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act.The district court concluded that Ware was eligible for relief but denied Ware’s motion as a matter of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ware’s argument that the court abused its discretion by insufficiently considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), putting undue weight on the legislative purpose of the First Step Act, and inadequately considering that Ware’s statutory sentencing range would be lower under current law. The district court assessed at length three of the section 3553(a) factors that it deemed most relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, under Apprendi, Ware’s statutory maximum would have been lower because specified drug amounts were not found by the jury or charged in the indictment but that this factor did not weigh heavily in favor of granting relief, due to concerns regarding disparities with other similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law