Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maxwell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin. The crack-cocaine offense then generated a sentencing range of 20 years to life and the heroin offense generated a range of 10 years to life, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). Applying the 2009 Guidelines, the court treated Maxwell as a career offender and sentenced Maxwell to 30 years. While Maxwell’s appeal was pending, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence but did not apply retroactively. Maxwell sought collateral relief. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his trial attorney violated Maxwell’s rights when he failed to argue that the two conspiracy counts were multiplicitous.On remand, the district court vacated Maxwell’s heroin conviction and imposed a 30-year sentence on the cocaine conviction alone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2018, the First Step Act authorized courts to lower sentences imposed for crack-cocaine offenses “as if” the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act had been the law during the original sentencing. Maxwell unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Fair Sentencing Act does not require plenary resentencing hearings and does not expressly permit a court to reduce a sentence based on other intervening changes in the law, such as those concerning career offender status. Operating within its broad discretion, the court considered and rejected each of Maxwell’s arguments. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Wills was indicted for various methamphetamine-trafficking offenses. The government gave notice under 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1) of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Wills’s prior felony drug conviction. Wills pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, 240 months’ imprisonment.After exhausting his administrative remedies, Wills sought compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) on the basis of “extraordinary or compelling circumstances.” Wills asserted that, if sentenced today, he would not be subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior felony drug conviction would not qualify as a “serious drug felony” under section 401 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Denying Wills’s motion, the district court pointed out that section 401 does not apply retroactively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that other courts have found that the First Step Act’s amendment of the sentence enhancement provisions constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Wills" on Justia Law

Duran transported drugs from California to Ohio on a bus. Duran carried 10 packages of methamphetamine, a total of 4,427 grams. The DEA intercepted Duran, who agreed to cooperate and allowed the government to copy calls, texts, and data from her cellphone. When officers surrounded Rosales, Duran’s contact, in a parking lot, Rosales destroyed his cell phone. Officers found cash totaling $6,962 in Rosales’ pocket. Officers searched his pickup truck and found money orders that matched details sent to Duran. In Rosales’ home, officers found $9,500 in cash. No controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, or drug ledgers were found. The court instructed the jury to find the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy as a whole, rather than just the amount that was foreseeable to Rosales. The jury convicted Rosales on conspiracy and attempt to possess counts and found that the conspiracy involved 4,427 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The court gave a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice because Rosales threw his cellphone down during his arrest but departed down from the Guidelines range and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. There was sufficient evidence to convict on both counts. The court erred in failing to provide defendant-specific jury instructions but the error was harmless because it could not have contributed to a different result. The court remanded for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether the obstruction of justice enhancement applies after making the necessary factual findings. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law

In 2018, Tomes pleaded guilty to drug, firearm, and money laundering charges and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In 2020, Tomes sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that COVID-19, coupled with his increased susceptibility to serious illness because of chronic asthma, constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release and that the law has changed since his sentencing, so he would receive a shorter sentence today. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 “limits the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for compassionate release” and Tomes had not “identified any medical ailments that are so severe they would justify release.” The Bureau of Prisons was taking precautionary measures to prevent an outbreak and Tomes did not show that the Bureau could not treat him if he got sick. The court also rejected his contention that his rehabilitation, strong family support, and apparently inequitable sentence were extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The court “considered each of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors” and found that they did not favor release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. even if a district court wrongly constrains itself to section 1B1.13 to define extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, its decision may be upheld if the court uses section 3553(a) as an independent reason to deny relief. The First Step Act provision cited by Tomes did not apply to his sentence. View "United States v. Tomes" on Justia Law

Taylor robbed a bank at gunpoint. He led the police on a high-speed chase, killed an innocent driver, shot another driver, and abducted a woman and her child. Taylor was convicted of killing a person while avoiding an arrest for bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(e); Taylor’s convictions were affirmed; the Sixth Circuit held that the government did not need to prove Taylor’s intent to kill. In 2005, Taylor moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(a). The district court denied the motion as time-barred. In 2018, Taylor sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing intervening case law to establish the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of section 2255 relief and to establish his eligibility for habeas relief under section 2241; arguing that these cases vindicated his earlier contention that proof of intent to kill was necessary for conviction. Taylor claimed actual innocence based on lack of intent.The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the application for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. If a prisoner can file a section 2255 motion but “fail[s]” to do so or is unsuccessful, a court “shall not . . . entertain[]” his application for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 unless it “appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The "saving clause" is a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction. Taylor’s claim of actual innocence has no basis in the cited precedent. View "Taylor v. Owens" on Justia Law

Muskegon Detective Schmidt, an undercover agent, asked a suspected drug dealer, Conkle, to buy some cocaine. The two drove to a house that belonged to White. Schmidt watched Conkle walk into White’s house and reemerge, after which Conkle handed Schmidt three grams of cocaine. About 40 days later, Conkle again took Schmidt to White’s house. In a nearby alley. Schmidt handed Conkle pre-marked cash. Conkle drove by himself to White’s house. Another detective watched as Conkle entered the house, reemerged, and traveled back to Schmidt, where he completed the sale, Schmidt applied for a search warrant within 48 hours of Conkle’s second purchase, citing the two purchases, his training and experience of 17 years, and his confirmation that the home belonged to White. A Michigan state judge approved a “no-knock” warrant. The search uncovered over 20 grams of cocaine, over 30 grams of “crack” cocaine, a stolen semi-automatic handgun, an AR-style rifle, and over $2,500 in cash. The government charged White with being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm to further drug trafficking, possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances, and brandishing a weapon to further drug trafficking.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a motion to suppress. The issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. The key remedy for unjustified no-knock entries is a section 1983 action for money damages, not the exclusion of the evidence. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

A neighbor called 911, telling the dispatcher that Gissantaner, a convicted felon, had a gun. Responding officers found a pistol in Gissantaner’s house, inside a chest belonging to Gissantaner’s roommate. When the government charged Gissantaner with possessing a firearm as a felon, it used DNA-sorting evidence, "STRmix," to link Gissantaner to the gun. Gissantaner moved to exclude the evidence as unreliable under Evidence Rule 702. Gissantaner and the government retained experts, who took competing positions. The district court appointed two experts of its own: One said that STRmix evidence is reliable in general and as applied to this case; the other said it is reliable in general but not as applied to this case.In an interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the “Daubert” factors and held that the evidence should be admitted. The record in this case provides a long proof that STRmix is testable and refutable. At the time of the Daubert hearing in the district court, more than 50 published peer-reviewed articles had addressed STRmix. According to one expert, STRmix is the “most tested and most . . . peer reviewed” probabilistic genotyping software available. STRmix has a low error rate and has garnered wide use in forensic laboratories across the country. View "United States v. Gissantaner" on Justia Law

Riccardi, a postal employee, pleaded guilty to stealing 1,505 gift cards from the mail. The cards had an average value of about $35, a total value of about $47,000. The Sentencing Guidelines directed an increase in Riccardi’s guidelines range based on the amount of the “loss,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1) but does not define “loss.” The court used a $500 minimum loss amount for each gift card no matter its actual value or the victim’s actual harm, based on the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to section 2B1.1, providing that the loss “shall be not less than $500” for each “unauthorized access device." The calculation resulted in a loss amount of $752,500, and a guidelines range of 46-57 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a 56-month sentence and ordered Riccardi to pay $89,102 in restitution, representing $42,102 in cash found at her home and the value of the gift cards.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Guidelines commentary may only interpret, not add to, the guidelines; even if there is some ambiguity in the use of the word “loss,” the commentary’s bright-line rule requiring a $500 loss amount for every gift card does not fall “within the zone of ambiguity.” This bright-line rule is not a reasonable interpretation of, as opposed to an improper expansion beyond, section 2B1.1’s text. View "United States v. Riccardi" on Justia Law

In 1994, Kendrick fatally shot his wife outside a Chattanooga gas station. He insisted that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired without Kendrick pulling the trigger. Before trial, officer Miller accidentally shot himself in the foot while handling the rifle, A jury convicted Kendrick of first-degree murder. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Kendrick raised 77 claims alleging either ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or prosecutorial misconduct. He succeeded in the Court of Criminal Appeals on two IAC claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to both, holding that counsel’s decision not to adduce the testimony of a firearms expert was not constitutionally deficient performance nor was counsel’s failure to introduce Miller's favorable hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. Kendrick’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient in failing to admit Miller’s “excited utterance” statements that he did not pull the trigger when he shot himself but “took great pains to inform the jury that the weapon apparently misfired’ for Miller. It was within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of firearms experts. View "Kendrick v. Parris" on Justia Law

Bethel is serving a capital sentence at CCI. Following Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy, CCI officials implemented a policy prohibiting “orders for printed material placed by third parties through unapproved vendors.” An inmate’s family or friends could only place orders on their behalf through an approved vendor; orders from unapproved vendors had to “be initiated by the inmate and approved by CCI.” If an inmate received a package from an unapproved source, the inmate could return the package at the inmate’s expense or have it destroyed. Officials withheld books from Bethel that were not ordered by Bethel; he received notices explaining why the books were withheld and offering him the option of having the books returned or destroyed. Bethel later learned that other inmates had received religious books, which were initially withheld for being ordered by a third party but were exempted after being reviewed by the chaplain.Bethel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an Establishment Clause claim but remanded Free Speech and Procedural Due Process claims and later affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The “publisher only” policy was neutral and supported by the legitimate penological interest of preventing the entry of contraband into the prison; there were reasonable alternative means for Bethel to acquire these books. Bethel received sufficient process following the withholding of his books through written notice, the grievance procedure, and the ability to return the book. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they did not violate Bethel’s clearly established rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. View "Bethel v. Jenkins" on Justia Law