Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stermer was charged with killing her husband by setting him and their house on fire. At trial, the Michigan prosecutor used a fire expert to support its claim but Stermer’s counsel never retained or consulted with an expert. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misrepresented her testimony, and disparaged her while bolstering other witnesses. Stermer’s counsel did not object. Stermer was convicted of felony murder in the course of committing arson and was sentenced to life in prison.Stermer sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Stermer’s petition, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing and applied an incorrect standard of review. Even with significant deference under habeas review, Stermer is entitled to a new trial. It was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the fairness of Stermer’s trial was not irreparably harmed by the prosecutor’s closing. The state’s case was relatively weak, the prosecutor relied heavily on Stermer’s statements and repeatedly called her a liar while misstating her own testimony; Stermer was clearly denied due process. Trial counsel stood by while the prosecutor bolstered the credibility of other witnesses and called her a “diabolical, scheming, manipulative liar and a murderer.” The record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert. View "Stermer v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2006, Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment, even though his Guidelines advisory sentencing range would otherwise have been 168-210 months. The district court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. In 2018, Smith asked for review under the First Step Act, which empowers district courts to reduce a prisoner’s sentence by applying the Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, retroactively by increasing the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The district court concluded that Smith was eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the First Step Act, but declined to grant one, concluding that his original sentence remained appropriate. Smith’s guideline range after applying the retroactive amendments would be 77-96 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. If the district court decides to impose or refuse to reduce a sentence outside the applicable guideline range, “the court must ‘ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”’ This variance is major. The district court did not adequately explain why Smith should not receive at least some sentence reduction. Beyond relying on the court’s analysis at the original sentencing hearing, the court only briefly discussed the nature and circumstances of Smith’s offense and the need to protect the public. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officials raided stores selling legal cannabidiol (CBD) products and arrested their owners. All charges against the owners were eventually dismissed and expunged. Plaintiffs, 17 store owners, alleged violations of their constitutional rights to be free from false arrest, unlawful seizure, and unlawful prosecution, and their right to equal protection. They also alleged a civil conspiracy to violate those rights and attached documents revealing communications between law enforcement officials, expressing doubts about the CBD products’ purported illegality and concerns regarding the planned arrests and raids.The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity or qualified immunity for their alleged misconduct during the investigation; the sheriff claimed quasi-judicial absolute immunity and qualified immunity for his actions related to the investigation and arrests. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, except with respect to the denial of qualified immunity to the sheriff, concerning equal protection. The facts, taken as true and construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, support the inference that the prosecutors erroneously advised that the plaintiffs were selling illegal CBD products even though the prosecutors knew or should have known that they had no evidence of the products’ illegality. Their actions were objectively unreasonable because their probable cause determinations rested on the inconclusive lab results. The complaint did not establish that the sheriff engaged in selective enforcement. View "Rieves v. Town of Smyrna" on Justia Law

Sergeant Faith of the Detroit Fugitive Apprehension Team, tasked with arresting “Marvin Seales a/k/a Roderick Siner,” met Officer Zberkot at a food processing plant. A manager led them to Seales. Seales protested, “You got the wrong guy.” Faith handcuffed Seales and drove him to the precinct. Zberkot drafted a report. Other officers handled the rest of the process. Seales repeatedly told Zberkot that he was innocent and asked Zberkot to check his identification. Seales spent two nights in the precinct. At his arraignment, the judge called People "versus Roderick Siner.” Asked for his name, Seales said “Marvin Seales.” He later thought “I better say, Roderick Siner, I understand these charges” to “get past that point.” Seales spent two weeks in the Wayne County Jail. Seales filed a grievance but signed a medical intake form “Siner” because he wanted to make sure he could get medical attention if needed. No one investigated his claims. At his preliminary examination, the victim stated that Seales was not the man who shot at him. The case was dismissed.Seales sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected claims against Detroit and Wayne County. Zberkot unsuccessfully raised several immunities. The Sixth Circuit rejected Seales’ unlawful arrest claim as a matter of law due to the similarities between Seales and the true suspect but allowed the unlawful detention claim to proceed. A jury awarded Seales $3.5 million. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting its prior decision that there was probable cause to arrest Seales and that Zberkot handled the case for fewer than three hours. View "Seales v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Freeman pleaded guilty to felony murder in 2001. An Ohio trial court sentenced Freeman to 15 years to life imprisonment, followed by post-release control for the maximum period allowable. Freeman failed to appeal. After four unsuccessful motions to withdraw his guilty plea, Freeman collaterally moved in state court to vacate his conviction and sentence in 2015. He argued the sentencing court’s imposition of post-release control was “contrary to law” and that his felony murder conviction was improper because there was no evidence he committed an underlying violent felony. The state appeals court granted Freeman relief in part, agreeing that Ohio law does not provide for post-release control for felony murder and stating that “a sentencing entry that incorrectly imposes postrelease control does not render the entire sentence void. Only that portion of the judgment that improperly imposes postrelease control is void.” On remand, in 2017, the trial court “vacated and replaced, nunc pro tunc” the journal entry from Freeman’s original sentencing, leaving intact its original sentencing journal entry except for the single sentence discussing post-release control. Freeman then filed a 28 U.S.C 2254 petition, challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed Freeman’s petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A limited resentencing that results in a better-than-before sentence does not constitute a new “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), which imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions. View "Freeman v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered J.H. deceased in her home with drug paraphernalia and .58 grams of fentanyl. Text messages in J.H.’s cellphone indicated that she had attempted to buy or had bought drugs from Jeffries earlier that day. Officers, impersonating J.H., texted Jeffries and requested more drugs. Jeffries went to J.H.’s home. A search of Jeffries’s car revealed 1.69 grams of fentanyl and a cellphone containing J.H.'s text messages. In Jeffries’s pocket, the officers found $446 and 36.14 grams of fentanyl.Jeffries was charged with possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute and distributing fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Two medical experts testified that the amount of fentanyl in J.H.’s system was “significantly above the lethal level” and that no other “anatomical issues” could have caused J.H.’s death. Jeffries asked the court to instruct the jury that, to impose section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement, the government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of J.H. was the natural and foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions.” The instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the use of the drugs that Jeffries distributed, J.H. would not have died; there is “but for” causation where use of the drugs, combined with other factors to produce death and death would not have occurred without the incremental effect of the drugs. After the jury convicted Jeffries, the court held that it had erred by failing to include the proximate-cause jury instruction and granted a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for sentencing. Section 841(b)(1)(C) requires proof of only but-for causation. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

In 2006, Foreman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine powder, and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Foreman admitted that he was responsible for approximately 135 grams of crack cocaine and 250 grams of cocaine powder. Foreman had a final Guidelines range of 322-387 months; he was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment with respect to each drug conviction, to run concurrently, and 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearms conviction, to run consecutively. When the First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Foreman sought relief.The district court held that Foreman was not entitled to a plenary resentencing and declined to revisit his career offender status or hold an in-person hearing, then weighed the new statutory range applicable to Foreman’s drug offenses, his recalculated Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and reduced Foreman’s total sentence to 172 months on each drug offense, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the firearms offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the First Step Act entitles a defendant to a plenary resentencing. First Step Act resentencings are not shielded from review for reasonableness; the district court thoroughly explained its rationale, carefully examining Foreman’s circumstances, the amended penalty provisions, and the resulting changes to Foreman’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Foreman" on Justia Law

In 2006, Smith was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder or 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine powder; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court imposed a mandatory minimum life sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act subsequently lowered the penalty for cocaine-base offenses, made retroactive through the First Step Act. Smith moved for relief and received a reduced sentence of 360 months, the bottom of the new Guideline range for the counts impacted by the Fair Sentencing Act, to run concurrent to his existing 360-month sentence for his powder cocaine count that was not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have imposed a below-Guideline sentence for all counts. The First Step Act is a limited grant of authority to impose a reduced sentence for certain offenses and does not require a plenary resentencing proceeding. Even assuming the court’s obligation to explain its reasons for imposing the modified sentence was akin to that which applies in initial sentencing, the court's use of a modified AO 247 form order to explain its decision was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Moody v. United States" on Justia Law

Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. View "Andrews v. Wayne County" on Justia Law