Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Moody v. United States" on Justia Law

Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. View "Andrews v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers Scott and Moore responded to a reported incident of menacing. Two people alleged that Quandavier had driven by their home that night and threatened to kill them and that Quandavier carried guns. Officer Loreaux identified a vehicle fitting the description. Officers Scott, Moore, Schneider, and Loreaux, standing where the vehicle was parked, heard a voice. Thinking that it was likely Quandavier, they knocked on the exterior door of the residence. It swung open. Three officers entered without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Loreaux remained outside. Neither Scott nor Moore recall announcing their presence or identifying themselves. Inside and upstairs, Scott knocked on a closed door. As it opened, Scott “saw the barrel of a rifle pointed at [her] face.” Moore and Schneider also saw Quandavier “nonchalantly” panning the rifle from left to right. Moore reached for its barrel as Scott fired her weapon. Moore did not instruct Quandavier to drop his rifle nor did Scott issue any commands before firing. Quandavier collapsed. The officers immediately radioed for paramedics. Before the officers applied handcuffs or provided first aid, they heard another voice and conducted a sweep. Quandavier died at the scene without receiving medical attention.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, plus state claims, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. The court affirmed as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remanded for evaluation of municipal liability and wrongful death claims. View "Hicks v. Scott" on Justia Law

The DEA had been surveilling Benton and Merida. Merida went inside Benton’s home carrying four kilograms of powder cocaine. Moments later, Merida exited and drove away. DEA agents stopped and searched Merida’s car and executed a search warrant on Benton’s home. In Merida’s car, agents found $94,190. In Benton’s home, they found the four kilograms of powder cocaine and three kilograms of crack cocaine in a safe, with a handgun lying nearby. Benton pled guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & 846. The government dropped a charge of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The PSR calculated Benton’s offense level as 33 based on the underlying drug quantity calculation, which added the four kilograms of powder cocaine and the three kilograms of crack cocaine, deemed to be “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). Benton had 30 prior convictions, including prior offenses for cocaine possession and trafficking, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235-293 months.The Sixth Circuit upheld his 260-month sentence. The court upheld the “relevant conduct” determination and rejected arguments the district court should have granted a downward departure because Benton’s criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and that Benton should not have received a considerably higher sentence than his co-defendant, Merida, who received 84 months of incarceration. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Witnesses told Memphis police that Ward had pulled up in a car, had fired shots at individuals gathered outside, then got out of the car and continued shooting. People returned fire. The witnesses directed the officers to another house, where they found Ward with a gunshot wound to his leg. Officers subsequently found an empty (stolen) pistol and shell casings on the lawn of the house next to the house where they found Ward. Two weeks later, Ward, on crutches, was arrested for trying to rob a pharmacy. Ward has a 2007 state conviction for aggravated robbery and a 2011 federal conviction for brandishing a firearm during a robbery. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm based on the shooting, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and for brandishing a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Ward pleaded guilty to robberyl the government dropped the section 924(c) count. At trial on the felon-in-possession count, Ward stipulated that he had a prior felony. Convicted, Ward was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ward’s argument that his conviction was improper under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding because neither the indictment nor the jury instructions charged that he “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” There was clear evidence that Ward knew he was a felon and that the government could prove it. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

In 2007, a jury convicted Brown as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), (e). Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance: then treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so that court upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Years later the parties agreed that changes to precedent showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under section 2255 and remanded for the court to reinstate his original sentence. The court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Stitt” holding, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 Nance’s holding that a Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act “is once again the law of this circuit.” View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Winburn represented himself at his trial for armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Based on Winburn’s disruptive behavior, the judge removed him from the courtroom and revoked Winburn’s permission to represent himself, then granted a competency evaluation and a mistrial. While Winburn awaited his second trial, the judge permitted Winburn’s stand-by attorney to withdraw because Winburn had sued her and enjoined Winburn from filing complaints or grievances against his new attorney, except to discharge her. Although represented by a new attorney, Winburn moved pro se to dismiss his charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because Winburn’s attorney had not filed it. Winburn filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his retrial and another section 2241 petition challenging the injunction. The district judges denied both and declined to issue certificates of appealability. Winburn filed a notice of appeal for one petition and sought a certificate of appealability for the other. The Sixth Circuit held that state pretrial detainees proceeding under section 2241 may not appeal without certificates of appealability and granted Winburn a certificate on the injunction claim. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the unusual order was constitutionally infirm. The court denied relief with respect to double jeopardy. Winburn failed to exhaust his state-court remedies by a motion to dismiss. View "Winburn v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Dowl pleaded guilty to presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 286. He received a sentence of 30 months of imprisonment plus 24 months of supervised release. On supervised release, Dowl was charged with four new state crimes; failing to inform his probation officer that he had police contact; communicating with his co-defendant despite instructions to the contrary; failing to make payments on his restitution, fine, or special assessment; and failing to get a job. At a hearing, the court reviewed the evidence and allowed Dowl to tell his side of the story. The court deferred judgment on three of the four new state criminal law violations and dismissed the fourth and found Dowl gainfully employed. Dowl had failed to notify his probation officer about police contact, impermissibly communicated with his co-defendant, and did not pay his fines. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court returned Dowl to prison for 11 months, giving Dowl and his attorney the opportunity to raise any objections. Dowl had none.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dowl’s argument that the court committed reversible error by not directly addressing him to solicit an allocution. The court employed the “plain error” standard because Dowl did not raise any objection during his revocation hearing. View "United States v. Dowl" on Justia Law

In 2018, Fowler pled guilty to possession of child pornography and violations of the conditions of his supervised release from a previous conviction for the same. In addition to possessing child pornography, Fowler had failed drug testing, had threatened his parole officer, and had tried to harass his girlfriend to recant her testimony. The district court ordered Fowler to pay a $5,000 special assessment for possession of child pornography under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014. The court also varied upward and sentenced Fowler to the maximum statutory penalty for violating the conditions of his supervised release, imposing a 120-month sentence for possessing child pornography and a consecutive 36-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.The Sixth Circuit vacated as to the assessment and remanded for a determination of indigency. The district court committed plain error by failing to address Fowler’s ability to pay; the parties did not contemplate the $5,000 special assessment as a part of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. The court affirmed the sentence. The district court did not consider an impermissible factor (whether Fowler had actually touched a child) and Fowler had no other challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, View "United States v. Fowler" on Justia Law

Sumlin was convicted of the distribution of drugs that caused the 2015 death of Carrie Dobbins, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), which carries enhanced penalty provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and his sentence to life in prison. The district court properly denied Sumlin’s suppression motion, given that the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking activity and residence that was searched. The court properly admitted testimony by the victim’s sister, Kelly, who was Sumlin’s former girlfriend and had purchased drugs from him. Kelly’s testimony about Sumlin's drug-trafficking and that Sumlin was with Carrie on the day of her overdose was intrinsic proof that was relevant for providing background information and contextualizing the government’s case against Sumlin. Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Sumlin distributed the drugs that caused Carrie’s death. View "United States v. Sumlin" on Justia Law