Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Spriggs’ bank account was established to receive social security checks. The Spriggs’ great-grandson, Vance, filled out an application in Mr. Spriggs’s name for a debit card to draw on the checking account. Mr. Spriggs had never used a debit card. The Spriggses did not authorize Vance to do so. Bank cameras photographed Vance using the card to withdraw cash. Vance also used the card for personal expenses. At another bank, Vance used Mr. Spriggs’s social security number to establish an account and obtain a $15,000 cash advance. Vance made other, unsuccessful loan applications. Upon being notified by the banks about suspicious activities involving his identity, Mr. Spriggs filed a police report. The police arrested Vance. While searching Vance’s car, the police located a large stash of personal and financial documents belonging to the Spriggses, including bank statements, tax return forms, property-tax bills, and a car title.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Vance’s convictions for access-device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(5), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and his 65-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact after the bench trial, improperly denied a motion for judgment of acquittal, and failed to correctly calculate the loss amount connected to Vance’s charges under Sentencing Guidelines 2B1.1. View "United States v. Vance" on Justia Law

A masked gunman attempted to rob a Columbus Ohio restaurant. Employees escaped and flagged down a police officer. A man, matching the robber's description, discarded distinctive clothing items as he ran away. A pocket contained a handgun matching that used in the robbery. Police apprehended Smith nearby. DNA material matching Smith was found on the discarded items. Smith retained attorney Armengau. Detectives connected Smith to earlier restaurant robberies with “a strikingly consistent method of operation.” They requested cell phone records for a phone number that Smith had given to his probation officer; Smith’s phone had been used near and at the approximate time of most of the robberies.Smith was charged with 18 robberies. Smith’s attorney, Armengau, was indicted for sex crimes. The judge handling Smith’s case recused himself. At Smith’s request, Armengau continued to represent Smith; Armengau’s criminal charges were unknown to the jury. Smith received three continuances. During trial, the prosecutors offered a plea deal for 27 years’ imprisonment. Armengau conceded to the court that he did not share the offer because prior discussions with Smith led Armengau to believe that a 27-year sentence would not be accepted. Smith was present and did not object. The prosecutors stated that the offer would remain open. Smith never asked to discuss a plea. The jury convicted Smith for 12 robberies. With prior-offender gun charges, the judge sentenced Smith to 84 years’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting ineffective assistance and Confrontation Clause claims, based on the Armengau’s stipulation to limit the number of trial witnesses, his failure to communicate the plea offer, and the “conflict” posed by his own criminal charges. View "Smith v. Cook" on Justia Law

In a 2006 Ypsilanti drive-by shooting, two teenagers, inside a mobile home, were killed. Four people, including Tackett, were charged. Tacket was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After unsuccessful state-court proceedings, Tackett filed a federal habeas corpus petition.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even assuming that Tackett’s gun misfired, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Tackett was guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The facts supported an inference of an intent to kill and there was more than enough time for the shooters to take a “second look.” There was evidence that premeditation and deliberation took place during that time. Tackett provided assistance to the other shooters, knowing all the facts known to the shooters. The court rejected Tackett’s argument that he could have been convicted as a principal, or as an aider and abettor and that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction that they had to unanimously agree as to which of these theories was the basis for their verdict. There was no constitutional problem in the fact that two other defendants were convicted of second-degree murder while Tackett was convicted of first-degree murder. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. View "Tackett v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

In 2007, Allen pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court determined that Allen was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, Allen moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, citing his age and participation in numerous prison classes and programs. The government argued that his sentencing guidelines range remained unchanged even though the statutory mandatory minimum penalty had been lowered. The district court denied Allen’s request for a reduced prison sentence, reasoning that the Act precluded it from considering Allen’s post-sentencing conduct.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The First Step Act provision regarding retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act does not prohibit courts from considering a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct when deciding whether to reduce his sentence. Courts may consider all relevant factors when determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under section 404, which does not require courts to ignore all developments that occurred after the defendant committed the covered offense. Congress contemplated that district courts may look to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s familiar framework when deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Grand Rapids police received tips from an organization that receives anonymous information from the public, describing vehicles May-Shaw was using to transport drugs and a specific bag where he kept drugs, money, and a gun. May-Shaw had one felony firearm conviction and two felony drug convictions. The Department began investigating and, for 23 days, watched a parking lot near his apartment building and a covered carport next to that building, where May-Shaw parked his BMW, one of his several vehicles. The surveillance used a camera affixed to a telephone pole on a public street and cameras in a surveillance van parked in the parking lot. After witnessing May-Shaw engage in several suspected drug deals, the police used a drug-detecting dog to sniff the BMW. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics. Officers then obtained a search warrant for May-Shaw’s apartment and all of his vehicles. They found evidence of drug distribution, including cash, wrappers, and cocaine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his to suppress the evidence from his apartment and vehicles. May-Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport such that police surveillance constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the carport within the curtilage of his apartment such that the dog sniff was unconstitutional. View "United States v. May-Shaw" on Justia Law

Reiner’s convictions arose from a 2011 Macomb County home invasion. Eisenhardt, age 69, was stabbed in the neck; jewelry was taken from her house, including a ring from Eisenhardt’s finger. Eisenhardt survived but suffered declining health after the stabbing and died months later. Police in New York apprehended Reiner days after the incident, on unrelated suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. At his Michigan murder trial, the court admitted the statements to the police, in which a pawnbroker identified Reiner as having pawned Eisenhardt’s ring. The pawnbroker died before trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Reiner’s conviction, finding the Sixth Amendment error harmless.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The evidence presented at trial “paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene.” The statements that caused the Sixth Amendment violation were the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Reiner v. Woods" on Justia Law

State Trooper King saw Lott’s vehicle slow down on I-75 as it came into view; Lott was driving with “arms locked out.” King interpreted that as a sign of nervousness. King followed Lott for three-fourths of a mile in the left lane while vehicles passed on the right, then pulled Lott over. King stated that he was not going to issue a citation but ran Lott’s driver’s license for outstanding warrants and flagged down Trooper Reams, who had a K-9 in tow. Based on Lott’s nervousness and proximity to the roadway, King asked him to step out of the vehicle. King did not check the warrant search. Lott refused King’s request for consent to search his vehicle. King stated that “we’re going to utilize the K-9.” According to King, Lott responded, “I have a little bit of marijuana in the console.” The K-9 alerted after a “free air sniff.” King located marijuana in the console, then searched the vehicle. In the trunk, King found heroin, other drugs, and money. The Troopers estimated that five-10 minutes elapsed between the stop and the K-9 sniff. Lott was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The traffic stop was initiated constitutionally and was not impermissibly extended. Lott did not dispute that he was impeding traffic; the marijuana admission occurred within the temporal scope of the tasks incident to the traffic stop. View "United States v. Lott" on Justia Law

Detective Shockley, investigating whether methamphetamine was being sold at Alexander's mother's house, learned that Alexander’s driver’s license was suspended. Shockley saw Alexander drive away, stopped him and saw a bank deposit bag on the passenger seat and a safe in the backseat. Shockley arrested Alexander for driving on a suspended license and conducted a search, finding a baggie with methamphetamine residue, drug paraphernalia, and $11,000 in cash. Shockley found 35 grams of methamphetamine in Alexander’s waistband. The SUV was towed. The next day, Shockley obtained a warrant for the safe and discovered a loaded pistol. Days later, Shockley saw Alexander leave the house in a Lincoln and called another officer, who stopped him. Shockley arrested Alexander. After Alexander said, “I don’t care,” Shockley searched the vehicle, and found 113 grams of methamphetamine.Charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm as a felon, Alexander unsuccessfully moved to suppress both stops. Classified as a career offender, he was sentenced to 216 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. The inventory search exception did not apply absent evidence of standardized procedures but the inevitable-discovery doctrine salvaged the first search. Alexander consented to the second search. The court vacated the sentence; the government conceded that the case should be remanded for resentencing without the career-offender enhancement. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In 2017, a jury found Austin guilty of drug and gun crimes. The district court sentenced him to 255 months of imprisonment plus five years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While Austin’s appeal was pending, he filed a pro se “Motion to Request Audio Recordings,” seeking permission to access the backup audio recordings for his arraignment and sentencing hearing. He believed that the certified, written transcripts were erroneous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. When an audiotape is merely a backup to the court reporter’s stenographic record (as here), the audiotape is the personal property of the court reporter and there is no public entitlement to the audiotapes except for “arraignments, changes of plea, and sentencings filed with the clerk of court.” The court reporter must file either a transcript or an electronic recording; a litigant is not automatically entitled to both. A transcript is presumed to be a correct representation of the proceedings, 28 U.S.C. 753(b). Austin did not provide the district court with any reason to distrust the accuracy of the transcripts. View "United States v. Austin" on Justia Law

Torres was a long-time employee at Vitale’s Italian Restaurants located throughout Western Michigan. Although Torres and other Vitale’s employees often worked more than 40 hours per week, they allege that they were not paid overtime rates for those hours. Vitale’s required the workers to keep two separate timecards, one reflecting the first 40 hours of work, and the other, reflecting overtime hours. The employees were paid via check for the first card and via cash for the second. The pay was at a straight time rate on the second card. Torres alleged that employees were deprived of overtime pay and that Vitale’s did not pay taxes on the cash payments.Torres sought damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961. The district court dismissed, holding that the remedial scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, precluded the RICO claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The claims based on lost wages from the alleged “wage theft scheme” cannot proceed. However, the FLSA does not preclude RICO claims when a defendant commits a RICO-predicate offense giving rise to damages distinct from the lost wages available under the FLSA. The court remanded Torres’s claim that Vitale’s is liable under RICO for failure to withhold taxes. View "Torres v. Vitale" on Justia Law