Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Craig was involved in a high-speed shootout in the streets of Akron, Ohio and was apprehended wearing a shoulder holster and with gunshot residue on his hands. His DNA was identified on a firearm discovered in the backseat of one of the vehicles. Craig was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Craig admitted that he possessed a firearm while being a felon but testified that he possessed the gun only long enough to defend himself and his friends during the firefight. On cross-examination, the prosecution played for the jury a video depicting a masked individual (allegedly Craig) rapping and wielding a firearm that was similar to the gun for which he was charged. Craig denied that he was the individual in the video. The prosecution did not attempt to introduce the video into evidence. The district court never issued a limiting instruction about whether or how to consider the video. The prosecution referenced the video in closing arguments. The Sixth Circuit vacated Craig’s conviction. The prosecution had no legal basis to publish the unadmitted and unauthenticated exhibit to the jury, and the error was not harmless. The prosecution did not have a “‘good faith basis’ for cross-examination under Rule 608(b).” View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

Armes pled guilty to five counts of producing, two counts of distributing, and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The images showed him molesting two members of his family--an infant and a toddler. The presentence report related that in 2005 Armes pled guilty to two counts of Kentucky third-degree rape: “According to the Indictment, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a victim that was less than 16 years old . . . while the defendant was over 21 years old.” Armes did not object to those statements. Normally, the minimum prison terms for producing, distributing, and possessing child pornography are 15, five, and zero years (respectively). Those numbers rise to 25, 15, and 10 years for repeat sex offenders, including those with a past conviction under state law “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, [or] abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward.” The district court applied the enhancement, making Armes’s minimum sentence 25 years. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended the maximum possible sentence—350 years. The government asked for 75 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Armes’s 50-year sentence as reasonable. His Kentucky rape convictions triggered the sentencing enhancement; the district court had enough information to determine the particular crime of conviction; that crime categorically qualifies for the enhancement. View "United States v. Armes" on Justia Law

Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. Although required to serve his supervised release in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, which provides a general grant of appellate jurisdiction to review “final” judgments. The court affirmed the denial of the motion on the merits. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Allen was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder for the death of 84-year-old English, whom he knew through a prison ministry. Allen’s thumbprint was found on England’s glasses. Cigarette butts consistent with Allen’s brand and saliva were found in English’s trash. The coroner put English’s time of death between before six a.m. on January 25, 1991. A bus driver remembered picking up Allen near English’s home around six a.m. that day. Allen was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief.Allen claimed he was denied due process because a juror, Worthington, initially indicated that she was not sure that she could be impartial. Worthington stated her brother had been killed two years earlier, that the man charged with the murder was acquitted, and she did not feel justice was done. The judge asked whether she could reach a verdict based solely on the evidence; Worthington said she could. Allen’s counsel stated that witnesses from the coroner’s office who testified at her brother’s trial would testify at Allen’s trial. Worthington stated that she was a bit anxious but denied that her reaction might substantially impact her ability to concentrate on Allen’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the finding that Worthington was unbiased was supported by her testimony and that the judge could legitimately validate her statements because he saw and heard her.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The determination of whether to seat a juror is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court precedent. View "Allen v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

McKinney reported that she had returned home to find her ex-boyfriend, Jones, inside her house, refusing to leave. Jones chased her outside, throwing items. McKinney was hit by a bottle of dish soap. McKinney saw Snipes drive Jones away in a white “Tahoelike vehicle.” Paducah Officer Parrish took steps to corroborate McKinney’s story. McKinney stated that Jones had threatened to kill her and could easily obtain a gun. She repeatedly stated that she planned to get an emergency protective order and that she feared Jones would return once the officers left. Parrish stayed in his car near the house and saw two black males in a white Chevy Suburban at the nearby intersection. Parrish stopped the vehicle. A pat-down of Jones revealed nothing. Parrish arrested him for assault (a fourth-degree misdemeanor) and placed him in the back of his squad car. Jones yelled that the cuffs were too tight. When Parrish checked the cuffs, he spotted a firearm in the back of his cruiser that he had not seen before.Jones, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court suppressed the firearm, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment bars investigatory stops prompted by a completed misdemeanor. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the Fourth Amendment contains no such rule. The court noted the problems inherent in requiring officers to make the bright-line distinction. The proper inquiry looks at the nature of the crime, how long ago it was committed, and the ongoing risk to public safety. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Hobbs pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which forbids felons to possess firearms. The indictment listed three predicate felonies: Assault on a Peace Officer, Attempted Felonious Assault, and Aggravated Robbery with Firearm Specification. Hobbs had served a six-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. The district court determined that Hobbs was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and sentenced him to the statutory minimum, 15 years’ imprisonment. After Hobbs filed his appeal, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which held that to obtain a conviction under section 922(g), “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Hobbs’s indictment did not expressly allege the knowledge element and the district court did not advise him of it when taking his guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the indictment was deficient and that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Hobbs was unable to show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered his plea if he had been told of section 922(g)’s knowledge-of-status requirement. View "United States v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

In 1997, Leavy and friends broke into the home of 71-year-old Terry and waited for Terry to return from visiting his wife at a nursing home. The young men ambushed him, binding his hands and feet with duct tape and weighted him down in a bathtub they had filled with water and kerosene. Terry died. Leavy and his friends took $20 and some household items. A Tennessee jury convicted Leavy of first-degree murder and other crimes. He was sentenced to life in prison. Leavy's habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied in 2006. Leavy moved for relief from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) in 2017.The district court denied the motion and entered a formal judgment on September 12, 2018. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, filed on October 9, as untimely. Litigants generally have 30 days from the entry of a final judgment or final order to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a). Leavy claimed that he mailed a timely notice of appeal in September but no record of this filing appears on the district court’s docket and Leavy’s application for a certificate of appealability makes no mention of it. He did not submit a copy of the purported document with his show-cause response and gave only a vague description of mailing the document, saying only that he handed it to prison officials, not that he paid for postage. View "Leavy v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body.The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him.Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. View "Howse v. Hodous" on Justia Law

Detective Yasenchack saw Williams enter and then exit Gilbert's Jeep Cherokee within a few seconds at an intersection known for drug activity, shoving a plastic bag into his shorts as he exited. Yasenchack stopped Williams and recovered half a pound of cocaine. Williams pleaded guilty to state drug-trafficking charges. Two weeks later, Yasenchack saw Gilbert driving the Jeep and conducted a traffic stop. He smelled marijuana but his search only turned up a large amount of cash. Yasenchack later learned that Gilbert had convictions for drug possession, trafficking, and possessing a weapon while under disability. Yasenchack began surveilling Gilbert and searching the trash outside Gilbert’s residence. He found scale weights, a vacuum-sealed bag and zip-lock bags. Gilbert moved. Yasenchack searched the trash at Gilbert’s new residence but found nothing suggestive of trafficking. Yasenchack again searched Gilbert’s trash and discovered a vacuum-sealed bag containing “crumbs” later confirmed to be marijuana.An Ohio judge authorized a warrant for Gilbert’s home, which officers executed the following day. Officers discovered four kilograms of heroin (some laced with fentanyl), a handgun, $119,000 in cash, and drug-trafficking tools. After a Franks hearing and denial of his motion to suppress, Gilbert pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute a mixed drug and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonably well-trained officer in these circumstances would not know to disregard a judicial determination that probable cause existed, so the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Holland, a songwriter, sold his song-rights to music companies, in exchange for royalty payments. Holland failed fully to report his income. In 1986-1990, the IRS levied Holland’s royalty assets and recovered $1.5 million. In 1997, the IRS informed him that it intended again to levy those assets. Holland converted his interest in future royalty payments into a lump sum and created a partnership wholly owned by him, to which he transferred title to the royalty assets ($23.3 million). The partnership borrowed $15 million, for which the royalty assets served as collateral. Bankers Trust paid $8.4 million directly to Holland, $5 million in fees, and $1.7 million for Holland’s debts, including his taxes. The IRS did not assess any additional amounts against Holland until 2003. In 2005, the partnership refinanced the 1998 deal, using Royal Bank. In 2012, the IRS concluded that the partnership held the royalty assets as Holland’s alter ego or fraudulent transferee and recorded a $20 million lien against the partnership.In an enforcement suit, the partnership sold the royalty assets. The proceeds ($21 million) went into an interpleader fund, to be distributed to the partnership’s creditors in order of priority. The government’s lien ($20 million), if valid against the partnership, would take priority over Royal Bank’s security interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment for Royal Bank. Transactions to monetize future revenue, using a partnership or corporate form, are common and facially legitimate. Holland received adequate consideration in 1998. The IRS’s delay in making additional assessments rather than the 1998 transfer caused the government’s collection difficulties. View "United States v. Holland" on Justia Law