Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hamm, addicted to opioids, drove from Mt. Sterling, Kentucky to Cincinnati daily, to buy fentanyl. In Mt. Sterling, he and his wife used some of the drugs and gave the rest to their roommate, Myers, a drug dealer. Myers diluted, divided, and sold her share. Hamm found a new Cincinnati supplier: Shields. A few hours after Hamm returned from visiting Shields and giving Myers her share, Myers sold three packets of opioids. The customer died that night from an overdose. Police traced the drugs to Myers and arrested her and Hamm. After her arrest, Myers smuggled her remaining drugs into the jail and gave them to her cellmates, who lost consciousness but survived. Myers died by suicide a week later.A jury convicted Hamm and Shields of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and two counts of distributing carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. On the latter two counts, the jury applied a statutory sentencing enhancement for distribution resulting in death or serious bodily injury, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years for Hamm and a mandatory life sentence for Shields (who had a prior felony drug conviction). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to a remark in the prosecutor’s closing argument and to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court vacated the sentences. The jury instructions on section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement misstated the law. View "United States v. Hamm" on Justia Law

Paulus, a cardiologist at KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. Audits indicated that in multiple cases Paulus reported a higher degree of blockage in his patients’ arteries than their angiograms reflected, inserted a stent, and billed insurers. Before Paulus was indicted, the government informed him that its consultants had reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 were unnecessary and that KDMC’s consultants had reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures and found 75 angiographic films with minimal blockage. A jury convicted Paulus of healthcare fraud and making false statements relating to healthcare.Before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” indicating that KDMC's independent experts had reviewed 1,049 of Paulus’s cases and flagged 75 procedures as unnecessary. KDMC offered to refund Medicare for those procedures. Paulus knew that KDMC had identified 75 of his procedures as problematic but did not know that KDMC had reviewed 974 other procedures that it apparently found non-problematic. The government had planned to use the Letter at trial but KDMC objected. After an ex parte hearing, the district court held that the information was inadmissible and ordered that the parties not disclose any more information about the KDMC Review. The district court denied Paulus’s motion for a new trial, sentenced Paulus to five years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,156,102.23 in restitution.The Sixth Circuit vacated. KDMC's attorney-client privilege claims did not justify and ex parte hearings and the evidence withheld from Paulus violated his Fifth Amendment rights under “Brady.” The Letter had “potential exculpatory value” and Paulus lacked a readily available means to get the missing details. Paulus was prejudiced and “it doesn’t matter how blameless” the prosecution was. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Ashford was driving while intoxicated, speeding at over 100 miles per hour and changing lanes without a turn signal. An officer followed him, using his lights to indicate that Ashford should pull over. Ashford did not comply. Backup cruisers arrived and forced him to stop. Ashford complied with instructions to show his hands but ignored instructions to turn his engine off. Officer Raby and his police dog, Ruger, arrived. Raby reached through the window, unlocked Ashford's door, and pulled it open. The officers told Ashford to step out of the vehicle. He did not comply. Ashford’s SUV was in drive and his foot on the brake was the only thing stopping it from lurching forward into a police cruiser. Ashford claims he was afraid to retract a hand into the passenger compartment to turn the key. Ashford tried to explain this to the officers. Officers warned him that Raby would use the dog. Raby commanded Ruger to attack. Raby stepped in, grabbing Ashford’s arm and lowering it for Ruger to bite. Raby and Ruger pulled Ashford out of the car. At a hospital, Ashford was treated for puncture wounds and superficial injuries to his forearm. Ashford sued Raby under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Raby based on qualified immunity. Existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, View "Ashford v. Raby" on Justia Law

In 2007, Alexander pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base; the offense carried a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life imprisonment. The PSR attributed to Alexander 258.58 grams of cocaine base and Alexander was designated a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 360-month sentence. In 2019, Alexander filed a pro se motion for a reduced sentence, citing section 404 of the First Step Act, which made retroactive certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Under the Fair Sentencing Act, an offense involving 50 grams of cocaine base carries a statutory maximum of 40 years of imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and his guidelines range became 262-327 months. Alexander asserted that “[a] sentence of 262 months would be reasonable.”The district court reduced his sentence to 262 months. Alexander appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing that would permit him to argue in support of a sentence outside the reduced guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent with a plenary resentencing. Alexander did not raise his arguments that he should have received a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and concerning his post-offense rehabilitation and serious medical condition in his motion for a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter[] the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated. View "In re: Franklin" on Justia Law

Davis, an African American inmate, claims that officer Gallagher called him “Bubba” and “boy.” Davis stated he might file a grievance over Gallagher’s perceived racism. Later that day, Davis encountered Gallagher. According to Davis, Gallagher “searched” Davis and planted heroin in Davis’s pocket and wrote an incident report which falsely alleged that Davis possessed heroin. Davis was placed in administrative segregation and was tested for drug use. The test came back negative. Gallagher’s version is that he saw Davis put something in his pocket, “shook [Davis] down,” and discovered a rock-like substance, which proved to be heroin. Davis claims that Inspector Miller told him that he would be released from segregation only if he revealed who had supplied him with drugs and threatened to make Davis “suffer.” A jury found Davis not guilty of felony heroin possession by a prisoner.Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being placed in solitary confinement; First Amendment retaliation for threatening to file a grievance; malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment); and substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court ultimately rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. View "Davis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

J.H., a 14-year-old pretrial detainee, was placed in segregated housing in Williamson County’s juvenile detention facility after other juveniles alleged that he threatened to assault them. J.H. suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (PANDAS), which often manifests in psychiatric symptoms. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, J.H. alleged that his placement in segregated housing for a month in 2013 amounted to unconstitutional punishment; that a detention monitor, Cruz, sexually assaulted him during this period, as a result of Williamson County’s failure to train Cruz; and that during that period, officials failed to provide adequate medical care.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The official is entitled to qualified immunity. While the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive in relation to the verbal threats he made, the right at issue was not established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013. J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals, none of whom requested that the facility make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault; it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. View "J.H. v. Williamson County" on Justia Law

Four men from Miami drove to Louisville to set up chiropractic clinics. Lezcano, the mastermind, decided to file false claims with the patients’ insurers and get paid for treatments that never happened. The others, Chavez, Betancourt, and Diaz joined in. The plan worked due to aggressive marketing. The conspirators recruited and paid patients both to come to the clinics and to recruit others. Many of the patients worked at the Jeffboat shipyard. Jeffboat (through its claim administrator, United Healthcare) paid the clinics more than $1 million for fake injections of a muscle relaxant. The government discovered the scheme and brought criminal charges. Chavez went to trial, claiming he had no idea that Lezcano was cooking the books. Convicted of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit money laundering for purposes of concealment. Chavez was sentenced to 74 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and a related challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument; two hearsay arguments; three objections to the jury instructions; and a sentencing argument. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. View "Bailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Faber pled guilty to receiving pornographic images of minors and was sentenced to prison. Faber transitioned to supervised release, with conditions barring him from possessing sexually explicit images and from possessing or using digital devices. Faber eventually moved into an apartment with Gieszer. Probation officers visited their apartment and discovered that Faber had electronic devices without permission, containing sexually explicit material. Gieszer denied that either he or Faber had any digital devices and tried to hide the devices. The district court sentenced Faber to another prison term followed by supervised release, with a condition that Faber not have contact with Gieszer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Faber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his probation officer, alleging violation of his religious freedom by separating him from Gieszer (Faber’s spouse in their Wicca religion). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Faber unsuccessfully filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and a second section 1983 suit. The district court again revoked Faber’s supervised release because he communicated with Gieszer by email and sentenced him to imprisonment with supervised release, continuing the “no contact” condition. Faber did not appeal but later moved to eliminate the no-contact order under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2), citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Section 3583(e)(2) allows a court to modify or rescind a condition of supervised release only within 14 days. View "United States v. Faber" on Justia Law