Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Cardin’s fraud conviction and 78-month sentence. Cardin worked with his sister, Natalie, to prepare a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The filing deadline was June 8, 2016. On June 6, Cardin was unexpectedly hospitalized. The following day, Natalie filed the motion, signed “Walter A. Cardin by Natalie J. Cardin,” stating “under penalty of perjury” that she was Walter’s “attorney in fact,” and that Cardin was “otherwise unavailable to sign this motion and submit it in a timely manner.” About two months later, the court sua sponte indicated that it was considering dismissing the motion. Cardin filed a pro se motion for leave to add Cardin's signature to the original motion, with a letter from his prison case manager affirming that Cardin had been hospitalized. Cardin attached a 2015 document, by which he granted Natalie “unlimited” power of attorney to act on his behalf. Twenty-one months later, the court denied both motions.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Natalie satisfied the requirements of a ‘next friend’: an adequate explanation of why the real party in interest could not appear and “truly dedicated to the best interests of the [defendant].” That a putative next friend bears the burden of proving her status does not mean that the prisoner’s views, after the 2255 motion was filed, are irrelevant. Federal courts routinely enter show-cause orders directing parties, after a filing, to provide facts necessary to the court’s jurisdiction. View "Cardin v. United States" on Justia Law

Tarbett, wanted for assaulting an officer, was last known to be staying at Winchester Drive and allegedly had threatened to kill any officer who made contact with him. Burns was patrolling when a radio call described suspicious individuals walking near Winchester Drive. Burns responded and saw two men walking toward him. Burns says one tried to hide his face. Burns exited his car and engaged the men. Edwards identified himself as “Joe Eldridge,” while snickering. Burns patted down Edwards, who “took off” but fell as Burns caught up. The two struggled. Edwards said he was having a seizure. Other officers arrived. Burns eventually handcuffed Edwards. Edwards asked Burns to call 911; Burns threatened him with a taser. Edwards responded, “I feel like I’m going to pass the [expletive] out.” Five people were present when Deputies Burns and Patty escorted Edwards to Patty’s SUV. Edwards got away and began running. Burns grabbed him, his feet lifted off the ground kicking. Edwards kicked Patty near the groin. Burns and Edwards then fell to the ground. Witnesses disagreed on what happened. Sergeant Boyd arrived and saw Edwards lying on the ground, bleeding from his ears.Edwards’s treating physician said that Edwards would not survive because his “skull was fractured in the rear near the spinal cord” and that his injuries were inconsistent with a backward fall unless “he had been on a ladder.” A medical examiner found multiple contusions around Edwards’s head, chest, back, and abdomen, and two “linear, full-thickness fractures” to the occipital bone at the base of the skull and categorized the manner of death as a homicide. Edwards had, earlier that day, jumped across the hood of a running car. In a suit by Edwards’s survivors, the district court denied qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, finding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding reasonableness and violation of Edwards’s clearly established rights. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was premised on factual disputes and not questions of law. View "Adams v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Potts broke into homes to implement identify-theft schemes. One scheme required him to break into a home three times in order to “verify” fraudulent charges he made on the victim’s credit card. He pleaded guilty to unauthorized-access-device fraud and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Aggravated identity theft is not subject to a Guidelines calculation but carries a mandatory two-year sentence, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. Potts’s criminal history category was VI, the highest Guidelines category, resulting in a sentencing range of 30-37 months for unauthorized-access-device fraud. The district court indicated its intent to exceed the Guidelines. Following argument, the court departed upward four levels under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, finding that Potts’s criminal-history category under-represented the seriousness of his criminal history and/or the likelihood that he would commit another crime. The new Guidelines range was 41-51 months; the court varied upward an additional nine months, imposing a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment for unauthorized-access-device fraud. For two counts of aggravated identity theft, the court ordered that Potts’s sentences run consecutively, for a total of nine years of imprisonment. The court specified that Potts’s nine-year federal sentence would be served consecutively to his undischarged term of state imprisonment for domestic violence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable. Potts’s pattern of committing the same crimes in the same way justified the district court’s conclusion that Potts would likely recidivate. View "United States v. Potts" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Dr. Chalhoub of defrauding health care benefit programs under 18 U.S.C. 1347. A Kentucky cardiologist, Chalhoub implanted permanent pacemakers in patients who did not need the devices or the tests that he ordered before and after surgery. On appeal, Chalhoub claimed that the district court repeatedly admitted evidence unduly prejudicial to him—and to which he could not effectively respond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that “some of the government’s tactics here leave something to be desired.” Noting Chaloub’s failure to cross-examine, the court rejected a due process challenge to the admission of testimony by a doctor who claimed to have examined 20 of former Chaloub’s patients but could not name those patients. Chalhoub was not denied a right to be heard and the government did not base its case solely on allegations about those 20 victims. Chalhoub argued that he was severely prejudiced by testimony that he misbilled insurers for other unspecified procedures, but he did not seek clarification or additional information at trial. The court upheld the admission of testimony about Chaloub’s income and expenditures and testimony about his installation of a pacemaker in a former patient. View "United States v. Chalhoub" on Justia Law

Attorney Boland was a technology expert for defendants charged with possessing child pornography. Boland started with innocuous online stock photographs of young girls (Doe and Roe) and manipulated the photographs on his computer to create images of the girls engaged in sex acts, to support arguments that it was possible the pornography his clients downloaded was also doctored. An Oklahoma federal prosecutor claimed that the exhibits were actionable. The judge told Boland to delete the images. Boland instead shipped his computer to Ohio and continued using the exhibits in court although 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(C) defines “child pornography” as any image which is morphed to make it appear that a real minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Ohio federal prosecutors offered Boland pre-trial diversion in lieu of prosecution; Boland admitted he violated federal law. Federal prosecutors identified the girls and told their parents what Boland had done. They sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2255, which provides minimum damages of $150,000 to child pornography victims. They won a combined $300,000 judgment. Boland filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit reversed the discharge of the debt, citing 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The debt arose from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” The court rejected Boland’s “implausible pleas of ignorance.” The act itself is the injury. Doe and Roe had to prove only that Boland knew he was dealing with child pornography and knew the girls' images depicted real minors. View "In re: Boland" on Justia Law

An undercover FBI analyst posted a photo of an “adult female in a provocative pose” with the text “Anybody into [child pornography]" on the Whisper social media application. In private messages, the analyst described herself as a 36-year-old female with a 12-year-old daughter and told Vinton that she was “into incest and young,” Vinton stated that he liked “incest and younger women” and asked “you want me to f*** your daughter . . . [a]nd you[?]” The analyst said that she and her daughter had done this before with her fictitious husband. Vinton asked what specific sexual acts the daughter would perform. At Vinton’s suggestion, the analyst sent a photo of the fictitious daughter. Vinton sent photos of himself and of male genitalia. Vinton stated “there is a lot of risk” but affirmed his desire to pursue a meeting. When Vinton arrived for that meeting, he was arrested and indicted for using a facility of interstate commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce an individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court dismissed the indictment concluding that, as a matter of law, a reasonable juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Vinton had the requisite intent.The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Vinton argued that there was “insufficient evidence” that he had the “requisite intent to solicit a minor.” It was improper for the court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence before trial; intent is a question of fact, reserved for the jury View "United States v. Antonio Vinton, Jr." on Justia Law

At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. View "Bey v. Falk" on Justia Law

The Playpen website, a message board for advertising and distributing child pornography, is within the “dark-web,” protected by the “Tor hidden service network,” rendering the website relatively inaccessible. A foreign law enforcement agency alerted FBI agents of its suspicions that a U.S.-based IP address was used to house Playpen. Agents identified the server and executed a search warrant, which allowed them to create a duplicate server at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. The FBI assumed administrative control of the website, then obtained a search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to employ a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to unmask anonymous users. The NIT warrant led the District Court of the Southern District of Ohio to issue a search warrant that allowed authorities to search Bateman’s residence and computer where they found over 599 illicit images of children. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence and for a "Franks" hearing, to question Agent Macfarlane, who submitted the affidavit to obtain the NIT warrant. The search of Bateman’s home was valid under the good-faith exception. Agent Macfarlane’s affidavit provided a detailed and sufficiently specific picture of Playpen and of the NIT program; it accurately described the locations to be searched, which necessarily included locations outside of the Eastern District of Virginia, and accurately described the NIT’s operation as triggered only when an activating computer’s signals entered the Eastern District of Virginia. View "United States v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Giles County contracted with private probation companies to supervise people it convicted of misdemeanors. Probationers sued Giles County, its Sheriff, the probation companies, and some company employees, alleging RICO violations, civil conspiracy, improper debt collection, and constitutional violations. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on a claim that the county and sheriff violated the probationers' “substantive right against wealth-based detention” by detaining them after arrest until they pay bail because the bail amount is set “without reference to the person’s ability to pay,” outside the person’s presence, and without determining whether the person poses “a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” The injunction permits bail based on evidence of the probationer’s ability to pay, the necessity of detention, and the alternatives to bail. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the probationers should have sued the state judges who determine the bail amounts instead of suing the county and sheriff who enforce them. The plaintiffs can sue the sheriff, regardless of whether he acts for the state or the county while judges have absolute immunity from suits based on their judicial acts, except in matters over which they clearly lack jurisdiction. View "McNeil v. Community Probation Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Mason, a Sheriff’s Department investigator, and uniformed officers were tracking Harrelson, a fugitive, whose vehicle was previously seen outside the home of Wooden and Harris. They approached the home. Mason, who was not in uniform, knocked on the door, while the uniformed officers dispersed. Wooden answered. Mason asked to speak with Harris and to step inside, to stay warm. According to Mason, Wooden responded “Yes.” Mason and an officer entered the home. As Wooden walked down the hallway, the officers saw him pick up a rifle. When they told him to put the weapon down, Wooden did so. Mason knew Wooden was a felon. The officers handcuffed and searched Wooden, finding a holstered loaded revolver. Harris gave the officers permission to search the home. The officers did not find Harrelson but found another rifle. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wooden admitted that he possessed all three firearms and ammunition. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Wooden unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court Wooden was classified as an armed career criminal based on Georgia convictions: a 1989 aggravated assault, 10 1997 burglaries, and a 2005 burglary. Wooden argued that neither the aggravated-assault nor burglary offenses qualified as violent felonies and that the 1997 burglaries arose out of a single occasion and were a single ACCA predicate. The court rejected those arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, seeing no improper deception or “definite and firm” basis for discrediting the district court’s assessment that Wooden consented to Mason entering his home View "United States v. Wooden" on Justia Law