Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over four months, Woodson and his accomplices targeted 14 Jared stores in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and New Jersey. While inside a Jared store, Woodson would ask a clerk to see a diamond. An accomplice would then cause a disturbance, drawing the clerk’s attention. With the clerk distracted, Woodson would replace the diamond with cubic zirconia, leave the store with the diamond, and then fence the stolen item to a buyer in Toledo, Cleveland, or New York. The group stole roughly $90,000 worth of diamonds before targeting multiple Grand Rapids area Jared stores on the same day and diverting from their routine, to pry open a display case. A clerk called 911. Officers broadcast descriptions of the men to law enforcement and jewelry stores. Later that day, Woodson was identified leaving another Jared store. When police stopped his vehicle, they found Woodson and his accomplices plus several pieces of diamond jewelry. Woodson pled guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2314, 2315. The district court calculated Woodson’s Guidelines range as 21-27 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence, upholding the imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement based on a finding that a central part of Woodson’s scheme was perpetual relocation to avoid law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The court rejected Woodson’s argument that his practice of returning to his “home base” in Toledo meant he never “relocated” the scheme. View "United States v. Woodson" on Justia Law

In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. View "United States v. Alam" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulding was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. His PSR found Boulding responsible for 650.4 grams of crack cocaine. The district court accepted this finding over Boulding’s objection. The PSR also applied sentencing increases for possession of a dangerous weapon, for Boulding’s role as an organizer, and for obstruction of justice. Boulding’s attorney objected but did not seek a judicial determination because the statutory mandatory minimum (life in prison) controlled Boulding’s sentence. The court stated that the enhancements were justified. Boulding had two prior felony drug convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boulding’s life sentence.In 2018, Boulding sought a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act. The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months but denied Boulding a de novo resentencing hearing and an opportunity to address previously-frivolous objections to sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Boulding is eligible for resentencing and remanded. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, the court held that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction rather than the defendant's conduct. Eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, but discretion to deny resentencing is not unfettered. An eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and must be allowed to raise objections. View "United States v. Boulding" on Justia Law

In 2001, Richardson pled guilty to multiple federal crimes involving crack cocaine. Federal law then punished crack-cocaine offenses much more severely than powder-cocaine offenses. The district court sentenced Richardson to five years in prison followed by four years on supervised release. Richardson served his custodial sentence but during his supervised release, Richardson stabbed someone in the chest. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another 18 months in prison following his state sentence for first-degree assault.While Richardson was serving his state sentence, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; later, the First Step Act made the new sentencing rules retroactive,18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Richardson’s petition for relief under the Act. While Richardson was eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence, the district court properly considered the motion along with “the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), took into account “defense counsel’s objections,” and explained how Richardson’s history and characteristics (including his post-incarceration conduct) weighed against granting the motion. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

While pursuing an outstanding warrant for Buie, Columbia police officers learned that Buie had recently pawned firearms. Viewing surveillance footage from the shops, police saw Buie in possession of a rifle and a shotgun, each of which he exchanged for money. In additional footage, police saw Buie pawn another rifle and another shotgun. Buie pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a firearm.The PSR found that five of Buie’s past Tennessee convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): second-degree burglary, arson, voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated burglary. Buie conceded only that his voluntary manslaughter conviction so qualified. The court excluded his aggravated burglary convictions under Sixth Circuit precedent (Stitt) but rejected Buie’s arguments that his arson and second-degree burglary convictions were not ACCA predicates because Tennessee’s definitions of those crimes were broader than their common-law counterparts—second-degree burglary on the entry element, and arson on the mens rea and act elements.The court found Buie imposed ACCA’s mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the “Stitt” decision, holding that the locational element of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law corresponded with generic burglary, bringing Buie’s aggravated burglary convictions back into play, under ACCA. Buie then argued that the entry element of his burglary convictions was overbroad and that his arson conviction was overbroad. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Buie has committed three violent felonies under ACCA. View "United States v. Buie" on Justia Law

Perez-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed in June 2016. He reentered the country days later and was arrested and convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1546 for reentry after deportation and false personation in immigration matters. He was sentenced to time served (140 days) and removed again in December 2016. In June 2018, Perez-Rodriguez was arrested in Ohio on a failure to appear warrant for child endangering. He pled guilty to illegal reentry, Perez-Rodriguez had one prior conviction in 2015 for operating a motor vehicle under the influence (DUI), for which he received probation. Based on this criminal history, his prior count of reentry, and his acceptance of responsibility, Pretrial Services recommended a Guidelines range of 8-14 months' imprisonment. The district court entered a sentence of 24 months, noting Perez-Rodriguez’s DUI conviction, that he “apparently violated his probation,” and the need to deter individuals who demonstrate “a pattern of continuing to violate our laws.”The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding Perez-Rodriguez’s sentence substantively unreasonable, Perez-Rodriguez had one DUI conviction before his first deportation, and he had not been convicted of anything that would endanger the public since that conviction. Perez-Rodriguez does not exhibit an extensive “pattern” of deportation and reentry nor do his past actions present that ongoing risk of harm to the public. View "United States v. Perez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2006 Smithers pleaded guilty to two aiding-and-abetting counts involving cocaine. The government had notified him that it would seek life imprisonment because he had four prior “felony drug offenses,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 851. In the plea deal, the government withdrew its reliance on three of the convictions. Smithers’s remaining “felony drug offense” triggered a mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 months. Smithers also qualified as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines; his guidelines range was 262-327 months. The court imposed a 262-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger Smithers’s 20-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. Because Smithers had pleaded guilty to possessing 50 grams, his mandatory-minimum sentence would have dropped 10 years. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive and gives district courts discretion over whether to reduce this type of sentence. The probation office found that Smithers did not qualify for relief under the Act. His status as a career offender kept his guidelines range the same even after the reduction in his mandatory-minimum sentence.The district court found that Smithers was “eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B)” but held that Smithers did not warrant that discretionary relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to address whether the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3742(a), limited Smithers’s appeal; the government waived that argument. The court did not abuse its discretion when denying Smithers a reduced sentence. View "United States v. Smithers" on Justia Law

In 2014-2015, Flint and Michigan state officials caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of a community with lead- and legionella-contaminated water after the city began delivering Flint River water to its predominantly poor, African-American residents, knowing that it was not treated for corrosion. Flint residents reported that there was something wrong with the way the water looked, tasted, and smelled and that it was causing rashes. In response, the city treated the water with additional chlorine—exacerbating the corrosion, which contaminated the water with hazardous levels of lead and caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. State and city officials failed to stop the delivery of Flint River water and assured the public that the water was safe, knowing it was not. Flint's children will likely be permanently developmentally stunted. Six years later, corroded pipes still infect the water and poison Flint residents. In a consolidated class action, claiming deliberate indifference to the residents being poisoned in violation of their substantive due process right to bodily integrity, the district court denied motions to dismiss with respect to every defendant except State Treasurer Dillon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but remanded the issue of whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of recent holdings; Dillon was not Treasurer at the time of the switch to river water . No legitimate government purpose justifies the city and state officials’ actions. View "Waid v. Snyder" on Justia Law

On October 27, 2010, Spears drove Smith and Chandler to Cincinnati to buy drugs. Chandler left the car and returned, stating that “his man was coming.” The men then heard a voice: “Chandler, where’s my money[?]” Smith saw a bearded African American man in his thirties, of average build. Bullets ripped through the side window., hitting Chandler’s spinal cord. Spears rushed Chandler to the hospital, where doctors placed him on life support. Days later, Chandler regained consciousness. He could control movement only in his eyes. Doctors worked out a system of communicating by blinking. Chandler answered questions from his doctors and communicated with Father Seher, a priest and long-time friend. Chandler communicated that he understood his “likelihood of death” and requested Last Rites rather than the Sacrament of the Sick. Chandler later communicated to police that he knew his shooter; he blinked the letter “O.” Police showed him a photo of Woods, a dealer known on the streets as “O.” Chandler confirmed that Woods shot him. Woods had sold Chandler drugs many times. Chandler owed him money; Woods warned Chandler that “something was going to happen.” The shooting happened 100 feet from Woods’ house. Chandler subsequently suffered an aneurysm. On November 12, he died. Police arrested Woods 200 miles away from his home In jail, Woods told his cellmate (an informant) that he shot someone over a drug debt. At trial, the court admitted Chandler’s identification of Woods as a dying declaration. The jury convicted Woods.The Sixth Circuit rejected his habeas petition, rejecting Woods’ claims that the admission of Chandler’s deathbed identification violated the Confrontation Clause and that the state impermissibly struck a black juror based on race. View "Woods v. Cook" on Justia Law

Over a six-week period, Porter robbed nine different Louisville-area businesses, often using a pistol-grip shotgun. Porter eventually pled guilty to nine counts of Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act. Section 924(c) creates the substantive offense of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence.” Section 924(e) creates a sentencing enhancement for those who possess a firearm after three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that both sections applied to Porter because of his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and three prior convictions for Georgia armed robbery. Since then the Supreme Court has held that the residual clauses in both sections are unconstitutionally vague.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Porter’s sentences. His convictions still qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” based solely on the elements clauses in sections 924(c) and 924(e). Georgia armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. View "Porter v. United States" on Justia Law