Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, inmates in Michigan prison facilities, were once juveniles housed with adult inmates, a policy that Michigan has since abandoned. They filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims stemming from alleged sexual abuse by adult inmates, which occurred when the policy was in place. Prior suits were dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The inmates had different experiences in filing grievances under a process enacted pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30302. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The parties disputed which administrative process the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust, MDOC’s regular three-step grievance process or PREA but the Defendants unquestionably treated the Plaintiffs’ complaints as PREA grievances. That grievance process was “unavailable” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court characterized the PREA grievance process as: “a classic case of Orwellian doublethink” full of contradictions and machinations that render it “incapable of use.” One inmate adequately alleged retaliation that might excuse following the process. View "John Does 8-10 v. Snyder" on Justia Law

A Tennessee jury convicted Atkins of murdering his stepfather in 2000 when he was 16 years old. A state court imposed a life sentence that renders Atkins eligible for release after at least 51 years’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court later held, in “Miller,” that a sentence of “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” a decision that applies retroactively. Atkins argued that the life sentence he received as a 16-year-old also qualified as a “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment. A state appellate court rejected his claim. The district court denied relief in his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) prohibits a federal habeas court from upending a state criminal judgment unless a state court’s rejection of a constitutional claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Reasonable people can debate a sentencing policy that did not give the 16- year-old Atkins any opportunity for release for 51 years but the state appellate court reasonably distinguished Miller. View "Atkins v. Crowell" on Justia Law

Foster was suspected of conspiring to illegally distribute methamphetamine in southeastern Tennessee. In searching garbage Foster had left on the curb, officers discovered materials indicating methamphetamine use and distribution. With Foster’s consent, agents searched Foster’s residence and discovered methamphetamine, materials used for distributing methamphetamine, and $2,000 in cash. Foster admitted his role in the methamphetamine-trafficking conspiracy. Foster was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & (b)(1)(C) & 846. Foster represented himself, with standby counsel. A prosecution witness, Agent Freeman, repeated informants’ out-of-court statements several times, largely without objection from Foster. After two particularly egregious exchanges, the court intervened. Freeman admitted during a sidebar that he had no personal knowledge of the events he had described. The prosecution argued that the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The district court asked the parties to propose a curative jury instruction. Foster moved for a mistrial, arguing that no jury instruction would cure the error. The prosecutor requested that the trial continue but conceded that if the court believed a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, a jury instruction likely would not cure the harm. The district court granted a mistrial but denied Foster's motion to dismiss the indictment. Foster pled guilty to count one. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly declared a mistrial but, because the prosecution did not intend to cause the mistrial, it rightly concluded that initiating a second trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Calvo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1). He had been previously convicted of felony drug possession, assault, driving under the influence, and illegal reentry. In its sentencing memorandum, the government addressed18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, noting that some people are “impatient for action to protect their perceived economic interests, as promised by our duly enacted immigration policies. Aguilar-Calvo’s sentencing memorandum argued that the district court should not consider such “extraneous, inflammatory, and idiosyncratic views.” The government responded that it did not agree that these concerns are “extraneous,” noting that the guidelines recommend a higher sentence for recidivist illegal reentries and for defendants who have a prior felony conviction. The district court sentenced Aguilar-Calvo to 38 months of imprisonment after a lengthy explanation, citing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Aguilar-Calvo objected to “any consideration of the Government’s arguments about the political debate about illegal immigration.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. At no point in sentencing Aguilar-Calvo did the district court rely on the government’s inappropriate representations, on unreasonable speculation or on erroneous information. View "United States v. Aguilar-Calvo" on Justia Law

In 2011-2012, Godofsky was a doctor at a “pill mill,” the Central Kentucky Bariatric and Pain Management clinic. The clinic accepted payment by only cash (later by debit card), at $300 for the first visit and $250 per visit thereafter, and did not give change. The clinic had thousands of dollars in cash on hand every day, so the manager was armed with a handgun and patrolled the clinic with a German Shepherd. The clinic scheduled multiple “patients” at the same time, every 15 minutes, and was often open until after 10:00 p.m. The clinic received hundreds of “patients” per day, many of whom had traveled long distances and waited for hours for a few minutes with a doctor who would then provide a prescription for a large amount of opioids, usually oxycodone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Godofsky’s conviction for prescribing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), and the below-guidelines 60-month prison term and $500,000 fine, upholding the trial court’s refusal to use a jury instruction titled “Good Faith,” which would have instructed the jurors that his “good intentions” were enough for his acquittal or, rather, that the prosecutor had to prove that he had not personally, subjectively, believed that the oxycodone prescriptions would benefit his patients. View "United States v. Godofsky" on Justia Law

An undercover FBI agent, posing as a mother, posted a Craigslist ad, indicating that she wanted to talk about “taboo” subjects with an “open-minded” counterpart. Fortner sent the agent an e-mail asking if he could have sex with her children. Fortner and two officers communicated regularly for several weeks. He sent them links to child pornography and asked graphic questions about what he could do with their children. Fortner also requested photographs of one officer’s child. The officer sent a photo of her undercover persona instead. Fortner and one officer agreed to meet. If the introductions went well, the officer promised, Fortner could take things further. At a restaurant, the officer and Fortner discussed his two prior child sex abuse convictions and what he could do with the officer’s child. The officer arrested him. The government charged Fortner with attempting to coerce a minor and committing a felony offense involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), 2260A. Fortner moved to dismiss the second count, arguing that he did not commit an offense involving a minor because the children he sought to coerce were not real. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. A sex offender commits an “offense involving a minor” if, in the course of a sting operation, he attempts to commit a sex crime with a pretend child. View "United States v. Fortner" on Justia Law

In 2002, Beamus was convicted of conspiracy to possess 6.68 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), and related firearms offenses, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He had prior convictions, ranging from misdemeanor unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to felony first-degree manslaughter, with many more in between. The judge imposed a 420-month sentence: 360 months for conspiracy to possess crack cocaine and 60 months for another related firearm offense, to be served consecutively, as required by statute. Since his conviction, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 modified the statutory range for crack cocaine convictions and there was a Guidelines reduction. Beamus moved for resentencing under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court held that his career-offender status under the Sentencing Guidelines made him ineligible. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Beamus was convicted of an offense for which the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalty, and he has not received a reduction in accordance with that Act or lost such a motion on the merits. The First Step Act contains no freestanding exception for career offenders. It makes retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to the statutory range for crack cocaine offenses. View "United States v. Beamus" on Justia Law

Nichols admitted that he had sexually abused young girls on multiple occasions and sometimes documented the abuse in videos and photographs; videos and photographs in his possession depicted graphic scenes of adult men sexually abusing children as young as toddlers. Nichols pled guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography. The district court enhanced his sentence because some of his victims were “vulnerable,” U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1). If 3A1.1(b) did not apply, his guidelines range would be 210-262 months rather than 262-327 months. The court rejected Nichols’s argument that he also possessed material depicting “sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(4)(B), and that the commentary provides that “[i]f subsection (b)(4)(B) applies,” a court should not apply 3A1.1(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where multiple enhancements appear equally applicable, a court should use only the enhancement that “results in the greater offense level.” That is what the district court did, finding that Nichols possessed images depicting sadistic conduct as well as images depicting the sexual abuse of toddlers. View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Officer Nelson learned from Heard, who was previously unknown to Nelson, that Crawford was dealing cocaine. Heard identified Crawford’s driver’s license photograph and provided Crawford’s telephone number. Nelson contacted the Drug Abuse Reduction Task Force and the Hamilton County Heroin Coalition Task Force; both confirmed Heard’s reliability as an informant. Nelson reviewed Crawford’s drug-trafficking convictions. Heard showed Nelson text messages between Crawford and Heard. Nelson obtained a state court warrant to electronically track Crawford’s cellphone. Heard told Nelson that Crawford drove a silver 2003 BMW X5 and, using the license plate number provided by Heard, Nelson learned that the vehicle was registered to Crawford at a Cincinnati residence. Cellphone data placed Crawford near a Florence, Kentucky apartment, leased to Crawford’s wife. Nelson surveilled the apartment. He saw Crawford exit the apartment and leave in the BMW. A warrant issued, authorizing officers to use GPS tracking on that vehicle. Weeks later, Heard completed a controlled drug buy from Crawford. Another search warrant was issued for Crawford’s apartment, where officers found cocaine and $1,390 in tagged bills used in the controlled buy. Mirandized, Crawford incriminated himself, admitting that he sold the cocaine on consignment and that he had placed cocaine under his sink. Crawford unsuccessfully argued that the warrants should not have issued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Crawford’s convictions and 216-month sentence, finding the warrants justified. The informant’s reliability was confirmed by law enforcement agencies and through the affiant officer’s own research. Key information disclosed by the informant proved credible. View "United States v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Wilson recruited people near Escanaba and taught them how to package, transport, price, and sell heroin and crack cocaine. One or two women would travel as passengers to pick up the drugs from Wilson and would conceal the drugs in their vaginal cavities until returning to the Upper Peninsula. The drugs were then removed and sold. Eventually, a member of the conspiracy went to the police with information. They set up controlled buys that confirmed the trafficking of drugs. Subsequent police raids turned up heroin and crack cocaine, cash, a drug ledger, cell phones, and MoneyGram receipts that listed who sent and received money. The police extracted the phones’ call logs and contact lists and obtained call records and subscriber information from the phone companies by subpoena. The phone records revealed a network of coconspirators, including Smith-Kilpatrick, Wilson, his mother, and two others. Wilson and another pleaded guilty. Smith-Kilpatrick and two others were convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Smith-Kilpatrick’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the trial court made evidentiary errors; no rational jury could have convicted her based on the evidence, and her 96-month sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court upheld the admission of records of phone calls and wire transfers, hotel records, and car rental documents and of out-of-court statements by co-conspirators. View "United States v. Smith-Kilpatrick" on Justia Law