Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19. View "Wilson v. Williams" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted for knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture of heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The government filed a notice that Smith was subject to an increased statutory maximum sentence under section 841(b)(1)(C) due to a prior state felony drug-trafficking offense. Pleading guilty, Smith waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence save for five enumerated circumstances, including the right to appeal the determination that he was a career offender. The PSR indicated that Smith was a career offender based upon one prior state felony drug trafficking conviction and a state felony conviction for five counts of aggravated robbery. Smith argued that the First Step Act rendered his section 841(b)(1)(C) statutory enhancement invalid and that his state convictions were no longer predicate offenses for determining career-offender status. Smith asked to withdraw his guilty plea, citing the First Step Act and his contention that his state aggravated-robbery conviction was not a crime of violence.The district court rejected Smith’s request to withdraw his plea and imposed a within-Guidelines 150-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arguments regarding the First Step Act’s application to section 841(b)(1)(C) were not among the five issues Smith preserved for appeal. Employing the categorical approach, Smith’s violation of Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(2) is a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Confidential informants told Grand Rapids DEA agents that brothers Phillips and Lee bought and sold kilogram-level quantities of heroin and cocaine in Grand Rapids, Benton Harbor, and Kalamazoo. The investigators conducted surveillance of the brothers moving packages between “stash houses,” recovered drug-related products from “trash pulls” at those locations, and made controlled buys of drugs from their associates, and concluded that they got their drugs from interstate semi-truck shipments. They obtained authorization to tap the brothers' cell phones. Based on the wiretaps, the government observed the brothers arranging additional shipments of drugs and ultimately arrested 17 members of the alleged conspiracy and executed 20 search warrants, uncovering approximately $1,300,000, 13 kilograms of cocaine, 19 kilograms of heroin, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 50 pounds of marijuana, three handguns, and an assault rifle. The brothers cooperated and provided evidence against Castro, Howard, and Tatum. Castro sold Phillips heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in kilogram-level quantities and used long-haul truck drivers to move drugs from California to Grand Rapids. A truck driver also agreed to cooperate. The brothers sold drugs to Howard and Tatum.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Castro, Howard, and Tatum for conspiring to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The district court properly authorized the wiretaps, properly admitted evidence obtained from them, properly concluded that the evidence supported the convictions, and properly sentenced Castro to 504 months’ imprisonment, Howard to 120 months, and Tatum to 84 months. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Over four months, Woodson and his accomplices targeted 14 Jared stores in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and New Jersey. While inside a Jared store, Woodson would ask a clerk to see a diamond. An accomplice would then cause a disturbance, drawing the clerk’s attention. With the clerk distracted, Woodson would replace the diamond with cubic zirconia, leave the store with the diamond, and then fence the stolen item to a buyer in Toledo, Cleveland, or New York. The group stole roughly $90,000 worth of diamonds before targeting multiple Grand Rapids area Jared stores on the same day and diverting from their routine, to pry open a display case. A clerk called 911. Officers broadcast descriptions of the men to law enforcement and jewelry stores. Later that day, Woodson was identified leaving another Jared store. When police stopped his vehicle, they found Woodson and his accomplices plus several pieces of diamond jewelry. Woodson pled guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2314, 2315. The district court calculated Woodson’s Guidelines range as 21-27 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence, upholding the imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement based on a finding that a central part of Woodson’s scheme was perpetual relocation to avoid law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The court rejected Woodson’s argument that his practice of returning to his “home base” in Toledo meant he never “relocated” the scheme. View "United States v. Woodson" on Justia Law

In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. View "United States v. Alam" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulding was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. His PSR found Boulding responsible for 650.4 grams of crack cocaine. The district court accepted this finding over Boulding’s objection. The PSR also applied sentencing increases for possession of a dangerous weapon, for Boulding’s role as an organizer, and for obstruction of justice. Boulding’s attorney objected but did not seek a judicial determination because the statutory mandatory minimum (life in prison) controlled Boulding’s sentence. The court stated that the enhancements were justified. Boulding had two prior felony drug convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boulding’s life sentence.In 2018, Boulding sought a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act. The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months but denied Boulding a de novo resentencing hearing and an opportunity to address previously-frivolous objections to sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Boulding is eligible for resentencing and remanded. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, the court held that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction rather than the defendant's conduct. Eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, but discretion to deny resentencing is not unfettered. An eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and must be allowed to raise objections. View "United States v. Boulding" on Justia Law

In 2001, Richardson pled guilty to multiple federal crimes involving crack cocaine. Federal law then punished crack-cocaine offenses much more severely than powder-cocaine offenses. The district court sentenced Richardson to five years in prison followed by four years on supervised release. Richardson served his custodial sentence but during his supervised release, Richardson stabbed someone in the chest. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another 18 months in prison following his state sentence for first-degree assault.While Richardson was serving his state sentence, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; later, the First Step Act made the new sentencing rules retroactive,18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Richardson’s petition for relief under the Act. While Richardson was eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence, the district court properly considered the motion along with “the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), took into account “defense counsel’s objections,” and explained how Richardson’s history and characteristics (including his post-incarceration conduct) weighed against granting the motion. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

While pursuing an outstanding warrant for Buie, Columbia police officers learned that Buie had recently pawned firearms. Viewing surveillance footage from the shops, police saw Buie in possession of a rifle and a shotgun, each of which he exchanged for money. In additional footage, police saw Buie pawn another rifle and another shotgun. Buie pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a firearm.The PSR found that five of Buie’s past Tennessee convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): second-degree burglary, arson, voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated burglary. Buie conceded only that his voluntary manslaughter conviction so qualified. The court excluded his aggravated burglary convictions under Sixth Circuit precedent (Stitt) but rejected Buie’s arguments that his arson and second-degree burglary convictions were not ACCA predicates because Tennessee’s definitions of those crimes were broader than their common-law counterparts—second-degree burglary on the entry element, and arson on the mens rea and act elements.The court found Buie imposed ACCA’s mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the “Stitt” decision, holding that the locational element of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law corresponded with generic burglary, bringing Buie’s aggravated burglary convictions back into play, under ACCA. Buie then argued that the entry element of his burglary convictions was overbroad and that his arson conviction was overbroad. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Buie has committed three violent felonies under ACCA. View "United States v. Buie" on Justia Law

Perez-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed in June 2016. He reentered the country days later and was arrested and convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1546 for reentry after deportation and false personation in immigration matters. He was sentenced to time served (140 days) and removed again in December 2016. In June 2018, Perez-Rodriguez was arrested in Ohio on a failure to appear warrant for child endangering. He pled guilty to illegal reentry, Perez-Rodriguez had one prior conviction in 2015 for operating a motor vehicle under the influence (DUI), for which he received probation. Based on this criminal history, his prior count of reentry, and his acceptance of responsibility, Pretrial Services recommended a Guidelines range of 8-14 months' imprisonment. The district court entered a sentence of 24 months, noting Perez-Rodriguez’s DUI conviction, that he “apparently violated his probation,” and the need to deter individuals who demonstrate “a pattern of continuing to violate our laws.”The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding Perez-Rodriguez’s sentence substantively unreasonable, Perez-Rodriguez had one DUI conviction before his first deportation, and he had not been convicted of anything that would endanger the public since that conviction. Perez-Rodriguez does not exhibit an extensive “pattern” of deportation and reentry nor do his past actions present that ongoing risk of harm to the public. View "United States v. Perez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2006 Smithers pleaded guilty to two aiding-and-abetting counts involving cocaine. The government had notified him that it would seek life imprisonment because he had four prior “felony drug offenses,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 851. In the plea deal, the government withdrew its reliance on three of the convictions. Smithers’s remaining “felony drug offense” triggered a mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 months. Smithers also qualified as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines; his guidelines range was 262-327 months. The court imposed a 262-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger Smithers’s 20-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. Because Smithers had pleaded guilty to possessing 50 grams, his mandatory-minimum sentence would have dropped 10 years. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive and gives district courts discretion over whether to reduce this type of sentence. The probation office found that Smithers did not qualify for relief under the Act. His status as a career offender kept his guidelines range the same even after the reduction in his mandatory-minimum sentence.The district court found that Smithers was “eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B)” but held that Smithers did not warrant that discretionary relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to address whether the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3742(a), limited Smithers’s appeal; the government waived that argument. The court did not abuse its discretion when denying Smithers a reduced sentence. View "United States v. Smithers" on Justia Law