Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brice, who had been purchasing heroin from defendant “[o]ff and on, for maybe a year and a half,” suffered from hypertension and a mild arrhythmia, tested positive for hepatitis C, and had been an opioid addict for years. In the drug sale in question, Brice purchased half a gram of what he believed to be heroin; it was actually fentanyl. Brice injected approximately a quarter of that half gram intravenously, had a stroke, and entered a coma. He survived with a subarachnoid hemorrhage, anoxic brain injury, liver failure, kidney failure, and heart failure. He recovered his day-to-day functioning after six months of intensive therapy. Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Defendant’s presentence report acknowledged that the district court could increase his sentence above the authorized range based upon USSG 5K2.2, which authorizes departures when “significant physical injury result[s]” from the crime. He objected because the victim had an “extensive and serious history of pre-existing medical conditions." Feola, a doctor of pharmacy, testified that it was possible Brice’s pre-existing health status affected his likelihood of experiencing a drug overdose and that it was possible that his condition could have increased the likelihood of overdose symptoms. The district court increased the defendant’s offense level by six points, which increased his Guidelines range to 51-63 months and sentenced him to 51 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court failed to consider Brice’s “own choices.” View "United States v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Ragland pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His PSR calculated Ragland’s base offense level as 22, based in part on Ragland’s prior conviction for unarmed robbery, a "crime of violence." It applied a four-level enhancement, USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), because the pistol with which Ragland was arrested had an “altered or obliterated serial number.” The gun had been reported stolen and had been used in two shootings, including one the day before Ragland was arrested. Ragland’s Guidelines range was 121-151 months of imprisonment, although the statutory maximum was 120 months. Ragland did not object to his base offense level or the enhancement but objected to a recommendation that the court not grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court gave him full acceptance-of-responsibility credit, reducing his Guidelines range to 87-108 months. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and decided that an upward variance to the statutory maximum—120 months—was appropriate because the circumstances of Ragland’s arrest and his prior record indicated that Ragland was a “significant risk to the public and a significant risk to re-offend.” Ragland did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The Michigan offense of unarmed robbery constituted a “crime of violence” under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3); the court did not commit plain error in applying the enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number on a firearm. View "United States v. Fuller-Ragland" on Justia Law

The Short North Posse gang of Columbus, Ohio (an affiliate of the national Crips gang) conducted brutal home-invasion style robberies and planned and executed the murder of rivals, high-value targets, and cooperating witnesses to support its drug operation. After two months of trial, Ledbetter, Ussury, Liston, and Harris were convicted of RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for their membership in the Posse enterprise. Those four, plus Robinson, were convicted of various murders in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959, and other similar crimes; all received at least one life sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated Ussury’s conviction for the murder of Hill in aid of racketeering, finding insufficient evidence that Ussury acted with the necessary statutory purpose The court vacated Harris’s and Robinson’s convictions for murder by firearm during a crime of violence in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision, that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected other claims, including insufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, and improper testimony. View "United States v. Liston" on Justia Law

Sulik pleaded guilty to cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2), after he sent threatening emails to a member of Congress. The threats followed the representative calling General John Kelly, then White House Chief of Staff, a “disgrace to the uniform he used to wear” and included statements: “You put your family at risk,” “Marines are loyal to their Generals, not low life parasite politicians like you,” and “What are you going to do before I erase you?” The district court concluded that his crime was motivated by the victim’s status as a government officer, triggering a six-level enhancement under USSG 3A1.2. Sulik was sentenced to 48 months in prison. Without the enhancement, Sulik’s range would have been 24-30 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The “official victim” enhancement applies if the victim is a current or former “government officer or employee,” or an immediate family member, and “the offense of conviction was motivated by such status.” A defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s official status alone cannot trigger the enhancement. The comment that triggered Sulik’s threats was a public response to the debate about a matter of great political significance: immigration policy. In at least one email, Sulik referenced the Representative’s official status; the threats were sent “to a campaign email, not a personal address.” While the evidence was “barely sufficient” to support the application of the enhancement, there was no clear error. View "United States v. Sulik" on Justia Law

Berkshire has a long history of mental health issues. Berkshire was incarcerated, 2001-2014, for second-degree home invasion. He began to improve while he was in the Macomb Correctional Facility's Residential Treatment Program (RTP). Berkshire was a Housing Unit Representative on a “Warden’s Forum.” After Berkshire brought complaints, Dr. Dahl unilaterally raised Berkshire’s Global Assessment Functioning score so that Berkshire was ineligible for RTP. Berkshire claims the move was retaliation. Once discharged from RTP, Berkshire deteriorated. Berkshire’s care was overseen by Beauvais, the unit chief of the outpatient mental-health program; Sermo, a psychologist with that program; and Dr. Pozios, a private doctor working for the government. Berkshire had homicidal thoughts and engaged in self-injury. Eventually, Berkshire attempted suicide; Beauvais and Sermo transferred Berkshire to a Crisis Stabilization Program, stating that they “could not transfer [Berkshire] to Mars.” Berkshire claims that the three exhibited deliberate indifference to Berkshire’s serious medical needs. After Berkshire attempted suicide, he was restrained. When Berkshire requested a bathroom break. Sergeant Nelson told Berkshire to “hold it” and that he was going to “stay just like that until [his] mental illness goes away.” Sergeant Nelson never returned, leaving Berkshire to lie in his own urine and feces for several hours. In Berkshire’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to all the defendants. Berkshire produced sufficient evidence to show violations of clearly established constitutional rights. View "Berkshire v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Officers, attempting to serve a civil levy on Watson, knocked on the door of Watson’s presumed residence until Watson came outside. Watson said that the house belonged to his girlfriend, who was inside, and that he did not live there. Watson actually rented the house with his girlfriend. Watson said that he did not have keys and could not get back inside. The officers asked Watson whether he had anything against which they could levy then told Watson that he was free to leave. After Watson left, the officers walked around the house's exterior to “look for items that could possibly be levied.” They smelled marijuana coming from the crawl-space vent; they claim that they saw partially smoked marijuana joints outside. The “joints” were never tested. The officers obtained a search warrant for the residence later that day based on that evidence, previous complaints about activity at the residence, Watson’s criminal record, and a confidential informant's tip. Inside, they located a large amount of marijuana and evidence indicative of its sale and use. Tennessee courts suppressed the evidence. In Watson's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court agreed that Watson’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, but held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under clearly established law, Watson did not disclaim his privacy interest in the residence, and the property was not abandoned; the officers exceeded the scope of their implied license to enter and remain on the curtilage. View "Watson v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Mayes was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924 (e)(1) based on five previous convictions for serious drug offenses under Kentucky law. Mayes argued that because the Kentucky legislature reduced the maximum penalty for three of his offenses from 10 years to five years in 2011, the ACCA designation should not apply. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held on at least two occasions that Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.110 does not retroactively mitigate sentences that were “pronounced” before the legislature changed the law. The case is controlled by the Supreme Court’s 2011 McNeill holding that a court must consult the law that applied at the time of the previous conviction to determine whether that conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense within the meaning of ACCA. View "United States v. Mayes" on Justia Law

Dennis committed several drug offenses, leading to a mandatory life sentence in 1997. In 2017, President Obama commuted his sentence to 30 years. Dennis filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, arguing that he should have faced only a 20-year mandatory sentence because one of his Ohio convictions did not count as a felony under the recidivism enhancement. The district court held that it had no authority to question the commuted sentence and dismissed the petition as moot. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition on the merits, finding the Ohio conviction qualified for the enhancement; it was for a drug crime, and Ohio law allowed more than a year of punishment for that crime. Because the commutation did not alter the reality that Dennis continues to serve a sentence and could obtain a sentence of fewer than 30 years if he obtained the requested relief, the petition is not moot. Generally, a prisoner who receives a presidential commutation continues to be bound by a judicial sentence. The commutation changes only how the sentence is carried out by switching a greater punishment for a lesser one. The altered sentence does not become an executive sentence in full, free from judicial scrutiny with respect to mistakes the courts may have made. View "Dennis v. Terris" on Justia Law

Senn testified that he saw Winkler and Jenkins in his yard. Jenkins dropped a gasoline jug and ran into the woods with Winkler. Senn told his wife, Sherri, to call the police and fired shots into the woods. Senn smelled gasoline and saw that it had been poured on his porch, the side of his house, and on his cars. Sherri testified that her brother, Abercrombie, had a long-running feud with Winkler. Abercrombie lived approximately 100 yards from her house. Sherri testified that, days before the incident, her sister-in-law played for her a voicemail message from Winkler, stating: “You are going to die, you are going to burn.” Winkler unsuccessfully moved to impeach Senn with his previous felony conviction for reckless endangerment. Winkler unsuccessfully objected to Sherri’s testimony as inadmissible character evidence. Convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder and for attempted aggravated arson, Winkler appealed. His counsel filed the trial record, except for the transcript of his motion for a new trial. Without it, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the evidentiary issues for plain error, found none, and affirmed; that court also denied Winkler’s post-conviction petition, stating that counsel's failure to prepare an adequate appellate record does not, alone, amount to ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, rejecting his argument that under Supreme Court precedent (Entsminger (1967)), failure to file a portion of the record entitled him to presumed prejudice in the ineffective-assistance analysis. View "Winkler v. Parris" on Justia Law

Michigan prisons allow Wiccan inmates to worship as a group for eight major holidays (Sabbats). Wiccans celebrate other holidays (Esbats) 12-13 times a year. Wiccans are not permitted to congregate on Esbats and permits Wiccan inmates to use candles and incense only in the prison’s chapel. Cavin asked the Department of Corrections to allow him and other Wiccans to celebrate Esbats together. Officials denied his request. He filed suit, requesting injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), and sought damages. At summary judgment, the court ruled that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the damages claims against the Department of Corrections; that Chaplain Leach deserved qualified immunity; and that only Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for religious accommodation could proceed. After a bench trial, the court rejected Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, concluding that the prison’s regulations implicate but do not burden Cavin’s exercise of religion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of qualified immunity and the denial of appointed counsel but vacated with respect to injunctive relief under RLUIPA, remanding for a determination of whether the Department’s policy survives scrutiny under RLUIPA. A policy substantially burdens religious exercise when it bars an inmate from worshipping with others and from using ritualistic items. View "Cavin v. Michigan Department of Corrections" on Justia Law