Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An average “dose” of methamphetamine weighs between one-tenth and one-quarter of a gram; there are 28.3 grams to an ounce. Potter confessed to selling 10 pounds. Potter, had been convicted of seven prior drug offenses. His prior statements about his drug sales supported his conviction for a different conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine that used similar methods, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. His prior drug offenses supported his mandatory life sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejecting an argument that the police elicited his statements after he invoked his “Miranda” right to an attorney and violated the Edwards v. Arizona bright-line rule to stop questioning. Potter initially told the agents he did not wish to speak to them. They honored his request; it was Potter who initiated the exchange with them the next day. Before that interrogation, Potter received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. The court also rejected arguments that the Eighth Amendment prohibited his mandatory term of life because the child-focused logic of Miller v. Alabama should expand to cover adults who commit nonviolent offenses and that the court should have sustained his relevancy and prejudice objections because his statements discussed different actors (not charged in the indictment) and an earlier time, before the indictment’s start date. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior Ohio convictions: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, and was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice, unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence. Subsequently, in "Johnson," the Supreme Court found ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and held that courts must apply Johnson retroactively. Williams filed a third motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualified as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding that Ohio felonious assault in Ohio requires the use of physical force and is an ACCA elements clause predicate offense. The district court held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that that the Johnson holding was not implicated. The en banc court then remanded. On remand, the panel vacated the sentence, first holding that Williams qualifies for review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Williams was not convicted of an ostensibly enumerated crime and it seems clear that the judge relied decisively on the residual clause in determining that Williams’s conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Investigating robberies in Michigan and Ohio in 2010-2012, the government obtained court orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) to obtain Carpenter’s cell-site location information. Unlike other provisions of the SCA, the court-ordered production mechanism in section 2703(d) does not require law enforcement to get a warrant before acquiring such records. Carpenter’s wireless carriers were to provide “the locations of cell/site sector (physical addresses) for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls.” MetroPCS produced records spanning 127 days. Sprint produced two days of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio. The government used the records to establish his physical proximity to many of the robberies: Convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related gun charges, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 1951(a), Carpenter was sentenced to more than 100 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant supported by probable cause. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. The unconstitutionality of the government’s search was not clear until after the Supreme Court ruling. The FBI agents who obtained Carpenter’s information acted in good faith, reasonably relying on the SCA. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Fazica was arrested for drunk driving and taken to the Bloomfield County Police Department, and then to Oakland County Jail, which was alerted that she was intoxicated, yelling, and spitting. A Cell Extraction Team met Fazica upon her arrival. She alleges that they roughly removed her from the vehicle and immediately applied a spit hood that nearly entirely obscured her vision. The Team handcuffed her in a bent-over position, handled her forcefully, and threatened her with a taser. The entirely male team took Fazica to a room where she was made to lie on her stomach and was strip-searched. Her pants were torn off her; one officer placed his hands on her genitals and another groped her breasts. Fazica was then made to walk to a cell wearing only her bra and the hood. The hood prevented her from attributing certain specific acts to specific officers. Fazica sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that four officers used excessive force. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, arguing only that Fazica cannot show each officer’s personal involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. The district court denied their motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each defendant either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts. View "Fazica v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ruska drove a 19-year-old woman down a two-track road in rural Michigan, stopped the car, and revealed he had a handgun. The woman asked him several times to take her home, but Ruska raped her three times. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge: assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The court sentenced him to one year in jail. After his release, Ruska raped another woman and pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 10-15 years in prison. Within two years after he was discharged on parole, Ruska attacked another woman and raped her repeatedly over several days until the police found them in the Hiawatha National Forest, which is under federal territorial jurisdiction. Ruska pleaded guilty to kidnapping and three counts of sexual abuse. The district court sentenced him to life in prison for each count. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The “three strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), mandated a life sentence. Ruska’s 2002 conviction under Mich. Comp. Laws 750.84,1 qualified as a serious violent felony under the elements clause of the three strikes statute. View "United States v. Ruska" on Justia Law

Federal officials received a tip from Canadian authorities that Lynde was trading child pornography online. An investigation uncovered that he had exchanged 62 images on the online application “Kik.” Executing a search warrant at Lynde’s home, federal agents recovered 322 images and five videos of child pornography. The images showed prepubescent minors, including toddlers, engaged in genital-to-genital intercourse with adult males. Lynde pleaded guilty to receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), which carries a statutory maximum of 20 years, 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(1). Lynde’s presentence report applied five USSG 2G2.2 enhancements: Lynde’s offense involved children under 12, Lynde knowingly distributed child pornography, the child pornography presented sadistic or masochistic conduct and the sexual abuse of a toddler, Lynde had used a computer, and Lynde possessed over 600 images, With no criminal history, he faced a Guidelines range between 151-188 months. The district court decided that a Guidelines sentence would be “longer than necessary” under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), considering that almost all child pornography involves computers, Lynde’s family circumstances, and otherwise exemplary life, and imposed a 97-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to USSG 2G2.2, based on the fact that the Sentencing Commission has criticized the section in a report to Congress. View "United States v. Lynde" on Justia Law

From childhood on, Faulkner’s life was plagued by sexual misconduct. A stepbrother sexually abused Faulkner when he was nine years old. And Faulkner’s father was convicted and classified as a sex offender for filming Faulkner’s 13-year-old stepsister while she was showering. For a time, Faulkner overcame his upbringing, graduating high school and enlisting in the Navy, where he served for two years before being discharged under honorable conditions. In the years that followed, Faulkner had convictions for shoplifting and drunk driving and began to act upon his long-harbored sexual attraction to young girls, abusing his five-year-old niece and her half-sister. He began filming and sharing videos of his activities and was eventually pleaded guilty to child-pornography related offenses. Faulkner was sentenced to 570 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the Sentencing Guidelines required the district court to “group” together at sentencing his respective charges for production and attempted production of child pornography, which would have resulted in a lower offense level for purposes of calculating Faulkner’s Guidelines range. The court also rejected challenges to his sentence as both substantively and procedurally unreasonable. The court noted that Faulkner’s offense level was 43, so the Guidelines range was life in prison, regardless of his criminal history, View "United States v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

Anthony, his brother Christopher, their sister Sharon, and Sharon’s husband, Durand, sought tax refunds for 21 separate fictitious trusts that they created. They were successful in obtaining refund checks based upon many of these returns, receiving over $360,000. They were convicted of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit identity theft, and illegal monetary transactions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that insufficient evidence supported Sharon’s convictions; that insufficient evidence supported the finding that Anthony and Sharon knew that they were using the names and personal identifying information of real people; that Anthony and Christopher were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because their state-bar grievances against their attorneys created conflicts of interest; that the indictment was duplicitous regarding the aggravated-identify-theft charges and the district court failed to cure this defect by issuing a specific unanimity jury instruction; that the court’s aiding-and-abetting jury instruction was legally incorrect, and that insufficient evidence supported the court’s aiding-and-abetting jury instruction. View "United States v. Gandy" on Justia Law

Havis pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a lengthy criminal record. The district court concluded that his 20-year-old state conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines and increased his base offense level. Havis unsuccessfully argued that delivering cocaine does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” and that it was unclear whether his state conviction was for delivery or sale. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the categorical approach. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The lower court erred relying on the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to section 4B1.2(b), which states that a controlled substance offense “includes ‘the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’” Unlike the Guidelines themselves, commentary to the Guidelines never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment; commentary has no independent legal force. To make attempt crimes a part of section 4B1.2(b), the Commission did not interpret a term in the guideline itself—no term in section 4B1.2(b) would bear that construction but added an offense not listed in the guideline. The text of section 4B1.2(b) control and makes clear that attempt crimes do not qualify as controlled substance offenses. View "United States v. JHavis" on Justia Law

Doutt obtained child pornography online using a video conferencing application that was being monitored by the federal government. Charge with receipt of child pornography, Doutt agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. Among other incidents, Doutt admitted that he had engaged in sexual activity with a boy, M.R., nearly 40 years earlier. Doutt stated that he was 16 and M.R. was “a year or two younger.” Doutt later changed his response and recalled that M.R. was 11 or 12. These sexual encounters continued for several years. After Doutt pleaded guilty, the court applied a sentencing enhancement for a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5). “Sexual abuse” is defined by reference to various criminal statutes— including one that forbids sexual activity with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 “if the perpetrator was at least four years older than” the minor. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court erred when it simply took Doutt’s age, subtracted M.R.’s age, and concluded that Doutt was four years older than M.R. “A straightforward days-and-months approach” applies to 18 U.S.C. 2243: “at least four years” older means at least 1,461 days (365 multiplied by four, plus one leap day) or 48 months older. The age difference between M.R. and Doutt could have been merely three years and one day. View "United States v. Doutt" on Justia Law