Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Myers entered Sullivan’s home without permission, pointed a gun, and demanded drugs. The two went outside to Sullivan's car, where Sullivan saw her neighbor, Baker, and attempted to whisper to call the police. Myers grabbed Sullivan and threatened Baker. Baker ran away and called the police, who arrived and arrested Myers. Myers pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recommended that Myers be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and two separate initiations of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Myers argued that initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine is not an ACCA “serious drug” offense. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A state conviction qualifies as “a serious drug offense” if it involves "manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed. Initiation of the methamphetamine manufacture process carries a maximum term of 10 years or more. The Tennessee legislature’s intent to criminalize steps in the methamphetamine manufacturing process, including actions short of the actual manufacture, does not remove the offenses from the ambit of the ACCA. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

Based on a five-page-long search-warrant affidavit—which included evidence from a confidential informant and other sources, a controlled buy, direct police-officer surveillance, and Christian’s history of drug trafficking arrests—a magistrate determined that there was probable cause to search 618 Grandville Avenue, Christian’s home, for evidence of drug trafficking. That search uncovered a large amount of heroin, some cocaine and marijuana, and two loaded guns. Christian was convicted of various drug and firearm crimes. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court's denial of Christian's motion to suppress evidence. On rehearing, the en banc court affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting Christian's "attempt to isolate and explain away each piece of evidence," and contradict the factual assertions of the officers who watched the house. Viewing the “totality of the circumstances,” through the “lens of common sense,” as the Supreme Court has instructed, the conclusion is inescapable: there was probable cause to believe that a search of 618 Grandville would uncover evidence of drug trafficking. “Most readers of the affidavit would have been surprised if it did not.” View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Medicare pays for doctors’ home visits if a patient is homebound. Mobile Doctors offered physician services to homebound Medicare beneficiaries, hiring doctors who assigned their Medicare billing rights to the company. Upon receipt of payment, Mobile would pay the physician-employee a percentage of what Mobile received from billing Medicare. Many of Mobile’s patients did not actually qualify as homebound. Some doctors signed certifications for additional unneeded treatment from companies that provided at-home nursing or physical therapy services—companies that had referred the patients to Mobile. Mobile submitted Medicare codes for more serious and more expensive diagnoses or procedures than the provider actually diagnosed or performed. Mobile instructed physicians to list at least three diagnoses in the patient file; if the doctors did not list enough, a staff member added more. Mobile only paid the physicians if they checked at least one of the top two billing codes. Doctors who billed for the higher of the top two codes were paid more. Mobile also paid for “standing orders” for testing, although Medicare prohibits testing done under standing orders. Daneshvar joined Mobile as a physician in 2012. After following Mobile’s policies Daneshvar was convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud but found not guilty of healthcare fraud; he was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Daneshvar’s trial was fair; none of the district court’s rulings during that proceeding should be reversed. There was no reversible error with his sentencing. View "United States v. Daneshvar" on Justia Law

Petitioner robbed a restaurant of approximately $200-300. Attorney Walwyn represented petitioner. Days before trial, the state offered that petitioner plead guilty in exchange for a 20-year sentence. He allegedly rejected that offer. Convicted, he was sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, eight years for one conviction of aggravated assault, 10 years on the other aggravated-assault conviction, and eight years for evading arrest, all to be served consecutively. On appeal, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and his sentences. Tennessee courts rejected his motion for postconviction relief, in which he raised was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. At a hearing, he testified that his attorney never advised him of the plea offer until years later. Throughout the post-conviction proceedings, petitioner maintained his innocence and speculated that he may have been misidentified. Walwyn testified that he “did relay the offer” but petitioner told him “he was not taking any time.” The state court also considered a claim that Walwyn conveyed the offer but did not advise petitioner of the much higher sentence he could face. The court reasoned that, despite the disparity between the offer and the possible sentence, petitioner could not show prejudice because he was uninterested in taking any plea offer. The district court dismissed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee court did not act contrary to federal law and was not unreasonable in determining that petitioner was uninterested in taking any plea. View "Johnson v. Genovese" on Justia Law

DEA agents waited along I-94, for a black Toyota Camry. The previous evening, agents had arranged for a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Soto, who agreed to drive the shipment from Chicago to Detroit. Agents obtained a warrant to track the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents spotted Soto’s Camry, matching it to the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents noticed a RAV4 behind Soto, driving at approximately the same speed as the Camry and changing lanes at the same time, concluded that the cars were traveling “in tandem” and asked Michigan State Police to pull over both cars. As a trooper pulled up, the RAV4 slowed to 53 miles per hour, under the minimum speed limit. The trooper effectuated a stop. The RAV4’s driver, Belakhdhar, and his passenger provided identification, explaining that they were driving to visit someone in the hospital. Belakhdhar consented to a car search. Failing to find any contraband, the trooper let them go. DEA continued surveilling the vehicle, determined that Belakhdhar lacked legal immigration status, and requested that Border Patrol stop the car. During that second stop, another agent walked a drug dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the back bumper. Opening the trunk, the agents discovered hidden heroin hidden and arrested Belakhdhar. The court suppressed the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a matter of law, the district court erred to the extent it held that tandem driving with a vehicle suspected of drug activity cannot, alone, support reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Belakhdhar" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior convictions under Ohio law: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, which subjected him to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice unsuccessfully filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions to vacate his sentence. In 2015, (Johnson) the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and subsequently held that Johnson had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Williams filed a third motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding (Anderson), that committing felonious assault in Ohio necessarily requires the use of physical force and is an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause. The district court then held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that Anderson remained controlling precedent. The Sixth Circuit, en banc, subsequently overruled Anderson and held that a conviction for Ohio felonious assault no longer categorically qualifies as a violent felony predicate under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court then remanded Williams’ case. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Louisville police watched 2429 Elliott Avenue based on a tip that Shanklin was growing marijuana there. The tip came from a “reliable confident[i]al informant,” who stated that within the last 48 hours, he/she had seen “numerous” marijuana plants inside the residence and that he/she believed that Shanklin was the “only occupant.” McKinney and other officers observed Shanklin exit the house and enter a vehicle. McKinney followed Shanklin to a parking lot. McKinney and other officers approached Shanklin, confirmed his identity, and had a K-9 sniff Shanklin’s car. The dog alerted. A search of the car revealed a small amount of marijuana leaves in the trunk. Other officers watched the residence to ensure that no one exited or entered. An officer testified that when he approached the house, he observed marijuana plants in the backyard and noticed a “strong smell of marijuana.” McKinney obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered 51 marijuana plants, a marijuana pipe, a digital scale, letters addressed to Shanklin, and personal items associated with Shanklin, including car registrations, photographs, and a prescription. There were a few bills addressed to Shanklin’s mother and others. In the “front bedroom,” officers located a loaded pistol on the nightstand, a digital scale, and a magazine focusing on growing marijuana.Shanklin was convicted under Kentucky law for cultivating marijuana but was found not guilty of a firearm enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Shanklin’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2)) and 63-month sentence. The court upheld the denial of Shanklin’s motion to compel the government to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and the application of a sentencing enhancement for using or possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense. The government provided sufficient identification evidence to sustain Shanklin’s conviction. View "United States v. Shanklin" on Justia Law

Davis’s co-defendant, Young, contacted 16-year-old S.S. on Facebook to ask if S.S. and her sister were trading sex for drugs. S.S. and her sister drove to meet Young, who said he had friends who would pay for sex. Davis and another man got in their car. S.S.’s sister stated, “she’s 17.” Young directed S.S.’s sister to drive to Fort Wayne, Indiana. S.S. engaged in prostitution that night, splitting the proceeds with Young. S.S.’s sister drove S.S. back to Ohio. That evening, S.S.’s sister returned S.S. to Fort Wayne, where she engaged in sex acts for money and had sex with Davis. Davis and Young prostituted S.S. again, days later. Davis was convicted of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor, two counts of transportation of a minor with intent to engage in prostitution, and three counts of sex trafficking of a minor. The court noted a 16-year age gap between S.S. and Davis and applied an enhancement for exerting "undue influence" over S.S., split Davis’s offense conduct into three groups (for each day of prostitution), calculated Davis’s Guidelines range as life imprisonment, and orally pronounced a sentence of life imprisonment. The next day, the court convened “a continued hearing” and sentenced Davis to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the grouping of Davis’s offense conduct but vacated the sentence and remanded for factual findings relating to the undue-influence enhancement. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Wandahsega was convicted of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(5), after Wandahsega’s then-six-year-old son, H.D.W., told his grandmother and others that Wandahsega had touched him inappropriately. Wandahsega and H.D.W. are Native Americans and lived on the Hannahville Reservation. After his mother’s death, H.D.W. split his time between his maternal grandparents and Wandahsega’s apartment. Wandahsega denied touching his son but said that he sometimes blacks out from drinking and did not know what, if anything, he might have done to H.D.W. The Michigan State Police Forensic Laboratory found saliva on the inside rear portion of a pair of H.D.W.’s underwear, and testing established that the saliva contained a mixture of both H.D.W.’s and Wandahsega’s DNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Wandahsega’s conviction and 288-month sentence, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing H.D.W. to testify by closed-circuit television and upholding the district court’s evidentiary rulings concerning the testimony of medical professionals and others about what H.D.W. told them. The court upheld the district court’s decision to deny Wandahsega the opportunity to present to the jury a video of a supervised visit between H.D.W. and Wandahsega. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Wandahsega" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Morales-Montanez and Acosta of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The Sixth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, but vacated, finding that remarks made by the prosecutor rose to the level of flagrant misconduct and deprived Morales-Montanez and Acosta of a fair trial, The prosecutor’s misconduct included “vouching,” by referring to a detective’s “fine work,” voicing his opinion that two key defense witnesses lacked credibility, and commenting on the defendant’s religious practices and beliefs. The remarks were not incidental and were apparently intentional. The evidence against the two was not overwhelming, and any one or several of the prosecutor’s improper comments may have tipped the balance toward conviction. View "United States v. Acosta" on Justia Law