Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sherman was incarcerated at the Trumbull County Jail where Drennan was a corrections officer. Drennen regularly patrolled the pod where Sherman lived with Rafferty, another female inmate. Three or four times, Sherman complied with Drennen's demand that Sherman expose her breasts to him. Once or twice, Sherman masturbated in Drennen’s presence “because he asked for it.” Sherman does not allege that Drennen ever touched her. Drennen never explicitly threatened Sherman. Sherman was deeply disturbed by Drennen’s demands. As a result of Drennen’s abuse, Sherman’s post-traumatic stress disorder worsened and her night terrors and flashbacks increased in severity. Sherman never reported Drennen to the jail administration because she felt intimidated. Sherman and Rafferty sued Drennen and county officials, alleging Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against Drennen and Monell claims against the officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on every claim except Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim against Drennen, finding that Drennen was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sherman satisfied the subjective component of her Eighth Amendment claim; a jury could conclude that Drennen acted with deliberate indifference or acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing her harm. When Drennen allegedly sexually abused Sherman, it was clearly established that such abuse could violate the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment. View "Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thomas and Gregory arranged to buy cocaine from Burdette at a Lexington Waffle House. They got into Burdette’s car, with Thomas in the back seat. Thomas grabbed Burdette from behind, held a gun to his head, and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him in the leg. Burdette then said the cocaine was across the street with his partner. Thomas shot Burdette three more times. Thomas and Gregory fled. Burdette died. Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Kentucky courts denied post-conviction relief. Thomas sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions. The district court found the petition untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Kentucky definition of murder violated due process because it prescribes two mental states—intent to kill and extreme indifference to human life—as alternative means for the mens rea element. The fact that the jury needed to find was that Thomas either intended to kill his victim or possessed extreme indifference as to whether he killed him; the jury made that finding, View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law

Attorney Boland was an expert witness and defense counsel in child pornography cases. To demonstrate that pornographic images may be altered to appear that minors were engaged in sexual conduct when they were not, Boland purchased innocent stock images of minors and "morphed" them into pornographic images for use in criminal proceedings. The issue of whether Boland committed a crime in creating and displaying these images of child pornography was raised and Boland eventually voluntarily entered into a Pretrial Diversion Agreement, explaining and apologizing for creating the images. Two of the minors, depicted in the images Boland created, won awards under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(f), which provides civil damages for victims of child pornography. Boland filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition; the minors filed an unsuccessful adversary proceeding, asserting their awards were non-dischargeable debts for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6).The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel remanded. Collateral estoppel did not apply on the issue of whether Boland intended to injure the minors since intent was not actually litigated or necessary to the outcome of the prior litigation, but stipulations made through Boland's Diversion Agreement and judicial decisions concerning his liability to the minors established that Boland knowingly created and possessed pornographic images involving images of real children. The bankruptcy court did not consider the legal injury suffered by the minors as a result of the invasion of their privacy and reputational interests. Boland acted without justification, maliciously injuring the minors under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). View "In re Boland" on Justia Law

A woman outside the prison provided an anonymous tip that Parrish, a federal prisoner, was texting her. Officers began a search; found Parrish in a prison bathroom; and saw him pull a cellphone from his pocket, break the phone, and toss it away. They recovered the phone. Parrish pleaded guilty to possession of contraband in prison, a misdemeanor, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). The government asked for a sentence within the Guidelines range of four-10 months. Defense counsel argued that the court should vary downward because the Bureau of Prisons had already disciplined Parrish; that a one-day sentence was commensurate with sentences given to others charged with the same crime; and Parrish had not seen his family in three years and had used the phone to contact friends and family on the outside. The judge stated “he’s contacting somebody that didn’t want him to contact them,” and sentenced Parrish to five months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his 250-month sentence for controlled substance distribution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Parrish’s claim that the judge engaged in unreasonable speculation that he used the phone to harass the woman. Parrish offered no evidence, other than his own statement, to support his claim that he was using the cellphone only to contact his family. The record supported the district court’s reasonable inferences. The court also rejected Parrish’s arguments regarding deterrence and disparities. View "United States v. Parrish" on Justia Law

Officers searched for a fugitive in a house in which Jacobs rented a basement apartment. The house belonged to the fugitive’s brother. They did not find the fugitive. Following the search, plaintiff returned home from work and entered his basement apartment through a backdoor without noticing the officers. He claims that his living area had been ransacked. He ran up the backstairs shouting. According to the officers, Jacobs pointed a gun and shot at them. The officers returned fire and arrested him. Jacob admits he had a holstered pistol but denies that he touched it at all. Contemporaneous with turning to flee and reaching for his holster, Jacobs fell down the steps and was shot in the stomach, shoulder, and leg. Forensic evidence later confirmed that Jacobs did not fire his gun; witness accounts conflicted on whether he pointed the gun at an officer. .After a jury acquitted Jacobs of state criminal charges, he filed “Bivens” action against the officers, alleging excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and civil conspiracy. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding plaintiff’s “garden-variety Bivens” claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in “Ziglar” and “Hernandez” as “run-of-the-mill challenges” to “standard law enforcement operations.” The court dismissed some of the specific challenges for lack of jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal. View "Jacobs v. Alam" on Justia Law

In 2010, Ewing was tried as the shooter in a gang-related shooting. Ewing claimed that he was attending a funeral when the shooting happened and that the shooter was Washington. Ewing put on alibi witnesses and a jailhouse informant who testified that Washington had bragged about the shooting. On the second day of deliberations, the jury asked the court to declare that it was deadlocked. The court refused. On the fourth day of deliberations the jury returned a verdict against Ewing on all counts, including first-degree murder. About two months later, Juror Byrnes filed an affidavit stating that two fellow jurors had brought up information that was not part of the trial evidence, coming from Facebook postings and “googling” information about gangs. Ewing sought a new trial, alternatively requesting an evidentiary hearing to further develop the facts surrounding the allegedly tainted jury deliberations. The state did not object to an evidentiary hearing. The court denied the motion outright, finding that the internet information was duplicative of what the jury had learned from the trial evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Ewing sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held that the state court’s determination was contrary to clearly established law and that “the internet information may have tainted the jury,” and ordered a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The appropriate remedy was a hearing to consider whether a new trial is warranted. View "Ewing v. Horton" on Justia Law

King pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition and received a sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment. His three years of supervised release began in 2015. Two years, later the Probation Department filed a notice detailing multiple violations, including unauthorized use of drugs and failure to comply with substance abuse treatment. King was also suspected of moving to a new residence without informing his probation officer, possessing a firearm, and selling cocaine from his new residence. In searching King’s residence, officers discovered airsoft pistols, marijuana, scales, and a cell phone. King was hiding in a closet with his hands down the back of his shorts. Officers arrested and transported him to the Akron Federal Courthouse. During a strip search of King, officers discovered a baggie containing cocaine and cocaine base. King pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). King’s probation officer filed an updated violation report. The court noted that the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 30-37-month prison sentence for the drug convictions and 24-30 months for the supervised release violations. The statutory maximum term for the supervised release violations was 24 months. The court sentenced King to 36 months in prison: 30 months for King’s drug convictions and six months for supervised release violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The judge sufficiently explained why he ordered that the sentence for the supervised release violations run consecutively to the sentence for the drug convictions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Molina, born in El Salvador, grew up in an area where the “18th Street” gang was active. The gang attempted to recruit Molina. Molina claims that his uncle was murdered in 2008 for refusing to join the gang. Molina moved to San Vicente, which was in MS-13 gang territory. MS-13 pressured Molina to join and beat him up several times when he refused. In 2012, at age 15, Molina illegally entered the United States. He was granted permanent resident status in 2014 as a Special Immigrant Juvenile, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), 1255(h). In March 2016, Molina pled guilty to assault with intent to rob, unarmed. Removal proceedings (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)) were initiated, alleging that Molina had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) within five years of his admission for which a sentence of at least one year could be imposed. Molina’s conviction was vacated because he did not receive the constitutionally-required advice about the immigration consequences of his plea. He then pled guilty to felonious assault. The IJ denied Molina’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA sustained the CIMT removal charge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Molina reasonably relied on Sixth Circuit precedent holding that the Michigan felonious assault statute is not categorically a CIMT. Molina’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT are moot. View "Hernandez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In an act of road rage, Bedford fired two shots at a truck driver while they both headed westbound on Interstate 40 in Tennessee. The truck driver, P.D., was employed by P&R, a private trucking company that had a contract with the United States Postal Service (USPS) to transport mail, and was carrying U.S. mail. Bedford was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a person assisting officers and employees of the United States, while that person was engaged in the performance of official duties, and in doing so, using a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b). Bedford moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, contending that P.D. was not an officer or employee of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1114. The district court denied the motion, finding that the driver was a person assisting a federal officer or employee and fell within the statute’s reach. Bedford now appeals that denial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When a private mail carrier, pursuant to formal contract, carries U.S. mail on behalf of the USPS, he assists an officer or employee of the United States in the performance of official duties. View "United States v. Bedford" on Justia Law

After the FBI arrested Monea for money laundering, he told his attorney that the undercover agent coerced him into committing the crime. Much of the sting operation had been recorded; the threats Monea claimed were not on the recordings. He then claimed that the government tampered with evidence. After the jury convicted him Monea found a witness (the trustee of the Monea Family Trust) claiming that the undercover FBI agent lied on the stand. He sought habeas relief, claiming his trial counsel ineffectively pursued the evidence-tampering claim by not adequately following up on an assertion that the recordings had been tampered with, or that the government’s star witness perjured himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. The district court “thoroughly considered” the affidavits presented by Monea and concluded that they could not overcome the government’s contrary evidence. It is not enough for Monea to argue that a different attorney would have done a better job. Monea provided no new evidence and no new arguments that would have altered the trial court’s denial of his outrageous-conduct defense. Monea bore the burden of proving perjury and “mere inconsistencies” in the agent’s testimony were not enough to sustain the claim. View "Monea v. United States" on Justia Law