Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officer Joseph Danzy responded to a call about two suspicious men in an Akron neighborhood. He found Rauphael Thomas and Jesse Gray standing on the sidewalk. One thing (a Terry frisk) led to another (a tussle on the ground), which led to another (the discharge of Thomas’s concealed pistol). Thomas sprinted away, and Danzy shot him. Thomas died. His mother and estate administrator, Sherry Wilkerson, filed constitutional and state-tort claims against the officers, the City of Akron, and its police department. The district court denied Danzy summary judgment on one claim, which Danzy appealed. Wilkerson cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on the other claims. The Sixth Circuit agreed Danzy was not entitled to summary judgment on the Terry stop-and-frisk; the Court agreed Wilkerson was not entitled to judgment in her favor on the other claims raised. View "Wilkerson v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2006, a federal jury convicted Victor Castano of drug and firearms crimes. At a subsequent trial in 2015, Castano was convicted of suborning perjury and obstructing justice regarding the 2006 trial, among other crimes. His sentence could be enhanced due to his 2006 felony convictions. Fearing such enhancement, Castano petitioned the district court for a writ of coram nobis to challenge his 2006 firearms conviction. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding Castano’s petition ultimately failed because he did not show fundamental error that would justify this extraordinary remedy, and he lacked sound reasons for failing to seek earlier appropriate relief. View "United States v. Castano" on Justia Law

In 2016, commercial air pilot Sean Fitzgerald showed up for work "rip-roaring drunk." He was set to fly in the morning, so he readied the jet for take-off: he conducted a walk-around safety check before entering the cockpit, where he calibrated the altimeter, programmed the flight-management system, turned on the auxiliary power unit, and requested flight clearance from air- traffic control. Before passengers boarded, Fitzgerald’s co-pilot recognized his inebriation and alerted airline executives, who in turn notified local law enforcement. Fitzgerald was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. 342, which makes it a crime to operate a common carrier while intoxicated. A jury convicted Fitzgerald, and the district court sentenced him to one year and one day in prison and to three years of supervised release. On appeal, Fitzgerald contended that the actions he performed were not enough to operate the aircraft within the meaning of section 342, that the jury was wrongly instructed, and that the district court erred at his sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Frank Richardson appealed his conviction for aiding and abetting he use of a firearm during a crime of violence. On his first appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence in full. But while that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that part of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a violent felony was unconstitutionally vague. Although Richardson was not convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that Johnson nonetheless called part of his conviction into question. Richardson contends that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) was unconstitutional because its definition of the term, "crime of violence," was similar to the language at issue in Johnson. The Court granted Richardson’s petition, vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment, and remanded. In turn, the Sixth Circuit vacated Richardson’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Richardson’s original sentence should stand in light of Johnson. Without determining whether section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Richardson’s conviction under 924(c)’s force clause, which supplied a separate definition of "crime of violence." The Court also concluded its remand limited the district court’s inquiry to Johnson-related issues and that the district court properly refrained from considering Richardson’s other arguments about alleged deficiencies in the indictment and the trial court’s jury instructions - arguments that he could have raised in his first appeal but did not. Finally, the Sixth Circuit held Richardson’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The district court granted Stephen Mitchell habeas relief and gave him a sentence of time-served with three years of supervised release. Both Mitchell and the United States appealed. Since those appeals were filed, the Sixth Circuit decided substantially-similar cases. At the time of his sentencing, Mitchell’s three prior convictions qualified as “violent” felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), meaning Mitchell was subject to the ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. Applying the ACCA, the trial judge sentenced Mitchell to 250 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. But after the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s so-called residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, and then applied that holding retroactively, Mitchell filed for habeas relief. Mitchell argued that without the ACCA’s residual clause, his prior felonies no longer qualified as “violent” under the ACCA. Therefore, he said his 250-month, ACCA-enhanced sentence was invalid. Without the ACCA, the maximum sentence Mitchell could have served for his felon-in-possession conviction was ten years. But Mitchell had already served seventeen years by the end of his habeas proceeding. So the district court decided to release Mitchell from custody and correct his sentence to “time- served.” The district court also re-imposed Mitchell’s original three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's habeas relief insofar as it held that Mitchell’s burglary conviction was not a “violent” felony under the ACCA. The district court’s judgment as it related to Mitchell’s sentence was vacated and remanded for a determination of whether: (1) a time-served sentence that is equivalent to a term-of-months sentence above the statutory maximum is invalid; and (2) a district court has the discretion to select appropriate proceedings for correcting a sentence—so long as the corrected sentence complies with substantive and procedural reasonableness. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Rodriguez-Penton moved from Cuba to the U.S. when he was 15. He is a lawful permanent resident. Rodriguez-Penton was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess Oxycodone, retained counsel Butler, and initially cooperated but stopped because he feared for his family’s safety. The government offered Rodriguez-Penton plea deals but he entered an open guilty plea. Rodriguez-Penton’s Cuban citizenship arose during the hearing: the court stated that there was no need to review the civil rights one forfeits by pleading guilty; inquired whether, due to Rodriguez-Penton’s citizenship, there would be an early sentencing; and asked about an Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer, but did not advise Rodriguez-Penton that pleading guilty might have adverse immigration consequences and sentenced him to a 121-month prison term. Rodriguez-Penton alleges that he learned of the deportation risk after sentencing, during a meeting with his prison counselor. Rodriguez-Penton appealed, represented by Butler, arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. After hearing testimony from Butler and an interpreter, a magistrate concluded that Butler merely told Rodriguez-Penton that he did not have to worry about deportation. Rodriguez-Penton testified unequivocally that he “would not have gone to trial, even if he could not have negotiated a better plea arrangement.” The district court dismissed his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims has changed in the context of non-citizens faced with criminal charges. Rodriguez-Penton asserted that his decision-making process would have been different if he had been properly advised; the government has not offered any countervailing evidence that Rodriguez-Penton could not have secured a more favorable plea. View "Rodriguez-Penton v. United States" on Justia Law

Boucher pleaded guilty to assaulting a member of Congress. The government sought a 21-month sentence, at the low end of Boucher’s guidelines range. The district court sentenced Boucher to 30 days’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit denied Boucher’s motion to dismiss the government’s appeal. Boucher’s plea agreement says nothing about waiving the government’s right to appeal. The prosecutor agreed to seek a 21-month sentence and recommend an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction in return for the agreement and kept that promise, so the plea was supported by consideration. In addition, U.S. Attorneys have no right to control appeals by the government. That authority rests with the Solicitor General. The written plea agreement “supersede[s] all prior understandings, if any, whether written or oral, and cannot be modified other than in writing signed by all parties or on the record.” Whatever Boucher may have believed, the four corners of the plea agreement restrict his appellate rights, not the government’s or anyone else’s. View "United States v. Boucher" on Justia Law

On November 22, 1997, around 1:30 a.m., Miles demanded money from brothers Maher and Ziad, outside of Maher’s Cincinnati Save-Way store. The brothers complied but Miles shot them with an assault rifle. Cincinnati police hypothesized that Issa, a Save-Way employee, hired Miles to commit the murders because Linda, Maher’s wife, offered Issa money to kill her husband. The state charged all three with aggravated murder. Miles refused to testify at Issa’s trial although he had testified in Linda’s trial. The prosecution had revoked Miles’s immunity the day before he was to testify. The court concluded that Miles was unavailable and allowed the admission of Miles’s out-of-court statements, through the testimony of siblings who were Miles’s teenage friends at the time of the murders. A jury acquitted Linda; Miles received a life sentence. Issa received a death sentence. In 2003, Issa filed his initial habeas petition. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability for grounds including failure to call Linda as a witness and admission of the siblings’ testimony about Miles’s hearsay statements. The Sixth Circuit ordered a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The admission of Miles’s hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause under then-governing Supreme Court law and was not harmless. The Ohio Supreme Court did not consider the “totality of the circumstances,” which show that the statements are not trustworthy. The statements were the only direct evidence implicating Issa in a murder for hire. View "Issa v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers obtained a warrant, searched defendants’ home, and found over 2,000 grams of heroin, marijuana, drug-distribution paraphernalia, and a large amount of cash. The district court suppressed the evidence, holding that because the warrant application so failed to connect defendants’ home with drug-trafficking activity, no reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant; the warrant application established enough of a basis to believe that at least one of the defendants was engaged in a continual, ongoing drug-trafficking operation and that drug-related contraband was, therefore, likely to be found in his home. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Whitis brothers and Pyles drove to Louisville to pick up drugs for distribution. On the way home, Kentucky State Trooper Ramsey noticed their car traveling over the speed limit. Ramsey learned that the car’s owner had an outstanding arrest warrant. Ramsey approached and noticed Pyles stuffing something under a pile of clothes in the back seat. An occupant rolled down the window. Ramsey smelled marijuana and called for backup. Officers searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and over 200 grams of methamphetamine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and Whitis’s 200-month sentence. Once an officer discovers that a car’s owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, he needs only reasonable suspicion that the owner is in the vehicle; Ramsey had reasonable suspicion to stop this car. Ramsey consistently stated that, before he stopped and approached the car, he could not determine the gender of the back-seat passenger and could not tell whether there were more passengers in the vehicle. Ramsey’s testimony was not so internally inconsistent or implausible that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. The district court did not explicitly discuss Whitis’s health but showed familiarity with the arguments in Whitis’s sentencing memorandum. It looked at the section 3553(a) factors and explained that it was imposing a sentence above the guidelines range because the range understated Whitis’s criminal history. View "United States v. Pyles" on Justia Law