Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Camp robbed a store at gunpoint. He pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)(i), Camp faced a 25-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on the 924(c) count because he had a prior conviction for the same offense. The district court also determined that Camp was a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that Camp’s instant Hobbs Act robbery conviction was a crime of violence and that his 2003 federal bank robbery conviction and 1990 Michigan armed robbery conviction were both crimes of violence. Camp received a 372-month prison sentence—the 25-year mandatory minimum on the 924(c) count and 72 months on the robbery and felon in possession counts, to run consecutively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence. Although Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s use-of-force clause, Hobbs Act robbery, which includes threats against property, is not a categorical match with Guidelines extortion. Hobbs Act robbery criminalizes conduct that extends beyond both generic robbery and Guidelines extortion and is not a crime of violence under the enumerated offense clause. View "United States v. Camp" on Justia Law

Wogenstahl was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to death. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, in 1996, Wogenstahl sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and seeking to conduct DNA testing. Ohio courts denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Wogenstahl's 1999 petition for federal habeas relief. In 2014, Wogenstahl again sought a new trial, citing a 2013 Justice Department letter, stating that testimony by an FBI examiner, included “inappropriate” statements that “‘exceed[ed] the limits of the science’ of microscopic-hair-comparison analysis.” State courts denied relief. Wogenstahl sought to file another habeas petition in the district court, arguing that his petition, although second-in-time, was not second or successive.The Sixth Circuit granted permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Wogenstahl is attacking the same state court judgment of conviction and his claims were not unripe at the time of his initial petition. Wogenstahl’s claims fall under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B); he is raising new claims, relying on facts that he only recently discovered. That Wogenstahl did not previously obtain that evidence is not attributable to a lack of reasonable diligence. Wogenstahl has made prima facie showings that the evidence is impeaching; the state suppressed the material in the original police file and made inaccurate statements misrepresenting the hair analysis; and that he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. View "In re Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

McKnight, a bartender, became friends with Fewlas. McKnight rented an apartment in his duplex. For 17 years, McKnight lived in this upstairs apartment with her boyfriend, Kurt. Fewlas and McKnight did not always get along. Fewlas disliked Kurt. Fewlas died, having accumulated more than $2.2 million. McKnight went on a spending spree. She withdrew over $600,000 in 171 different transactions—all in amounts less than $10,000. This suspicious conduct got the IRS’s attention; the IRS suspected that Fewlas had not left his estate to McKnight. Kurt confessed that he had forged Fewlas’s signature on a fake will, prepared by attorney Pioch. His confession resulted in multiple convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim based on the admission of Kurt’s videotaped deposition testimony. Kurt was 76 years old, in poor health, and unable to travel at the time of trial. The court also upheld the admission of testimony concerning handwriting analysis. The court remanded for reconsideration of a motion for a new trial because the court conflated the rules, repeatedly characterizing its task as evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than weighing the evidence for itself. The court vacated the sentences: the court enhanced sentencing ranges after concluding that the defendants caused financial hardship to the putative beneficiary of Fewlas’s estate but the Guidelines did not contain that enhancement at the time of the misconduct. View "United States v. Pioch" on Justia Law

Police arrested Bunkley for attempted murder. Although he was convicted, Bunkley was innocent. When the conviction was overturned, Bunkley sued Detroit on a Monell claim, Investigator Moses for malicious prosecution, and four officers for false arrest and failure to intervene to stop the wrongful arrest. The district court granted the city summary judgment but denied the individuals’ summary judgment motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers assumed that Bunkley and his father were the shooters, even though neither fit the description (other than being African-American and Bunkley’s wearing black clothing); and they did not even question Bunkley about this shooting before arresting him—stating that he was being arrested for a parole violation, which they knew was a lie. “Viewed objectively,” a jury could find that these officers under these circumstances had no reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Bunkley. Moses knowingly withheld Bunkley’s Facebook alibi; withheld from the prosecutor that the victim had rejected a photo array; and made false statements. A jury could conclude that these facts undermine a reasonable belief that Moses had established probable cause to prosecute Bunkley or that the photo-array identification was alone sufficient. The duty of law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent an arrest not supported by probable cause was stated in precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish” this rule. View "Bunkley v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Price pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Price began his first term of supervised release on July 21, 2017. Two urine samples collected the next week tested positive for cocaine. Price admitted the violation. At the recommendation of the probation officer, the court took no action. When Price tested positive for cocaine use on July 28 and August 7, the probation officer recommended revocation. Price admitted using cocaine, pleaded guilty to violating two conditions of his supervised release, and asked that he be allowed to participate in inpatient substance abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration. Ultimately, the district court revoked Price’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. Price argued that it was substantively unreasonable to have imposed a term of incarceration rather than ordering residential inpatient substance abuse treatment and that the new term of supervised release was procedurally unreasonable because it exceeded the maximum length permitted by 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Price’s custodial sentence but agreed that section 3583(h) must be interpreted to require that the maximum term of supervised release be reduced by the aggregate of all post-revocation terms of imprisonment related to the same underlying offense; under this interpretation, 10 months was the maximum term of supervised release that could follow the 24-month term of imprisonment imposed in this case. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

In 2001, Davis pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Davis’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In 2016, Davis filed a petition for habeas corpus, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, which invalidated ACCA’s residual clause and arguing that his aggravated assault convictions were no longer ACCA predicate crimes. The district court agreed, noting that the Sixth Circuit had already concluded in 2011 (McMurray) that reckless aggravated assault did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s use-of-force clause The court determined that Davis could have been sentenced only under ACCA’s residual clause and was entitled to “Johnson” relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Tennessee reckless aggravated assault, section 39-13-102(a)(1), under which Davis was convicted is a crime of violence under ACCA’s use-of-force clause. The court noted that in 2016 the Supreme Court (Voisine) overruled McMurray by holding that the ACCA’s use-of-force clause encompassed reckless conduct. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Jackson was convicted of armed bank robbery, carrying and brandishing a firearm during the bank robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on two prior convictions for Ohio aggravated robbery and one for Ohio attempted robbery, the court designated Jackson an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and sentenced him to 360 months. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause (Johnson). Jackson moved to vacate his sentence. In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that Johnson’s logic applied to the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause. Nevertheless, at Jackson’s subsequent resentencing, the court found that his prior convictions were crimes of violence under the Guidelines and resentenced Jackson to 346 months. In 2017, the Supreme Court (Beckles) upheld the Guidelines’ residual clause, abrogating the Seventh Circuit decision. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 798, deleting the Guidelines residual clause, was not in effect at Jackson’s 2016 resentencing. The Seventh Circuit then held that Jackson’s earlier convictions amounted to crimes of violence under the residual clause but that the court committed procedural error by failing to explain the sentence. On remand, Jackson argued that he should be subject to the 2016 guidelines, without the residual clause. The court disagreed and resentenced Jackson to 244 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When a court of appeals reverses a sentence imposed “in violation of law,” it must remand for resentencing under the guidelines in effect at the time of the previous sentencing. The Commission did not make the amendment retroactive and characterized the deletion not as “clarifying” but as a “matter of policy.” While deleting the residual clause resolved an ambiguity, it did not clarify existing law but eliminated that law and made new law. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Robinson and two cohorts sold the victim a large amount of crack cocaine on credit, beat the victim when he was unable to pay, and, extorted from the victim’s parents for roughly $1,000. A Michigan jury convicted Robinson of extortion, delivery of a controlled substance, unlawful imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Based on his Presentence Investigation Report, the sentencing court scored multiple variables that went beyond the elements of the offenses for which Robinson was convicted, including the number of victims and exploitation of a vulnerable victim, resulting in higher minimum-sentence ranges than would have been warranted without those judge-found facts. The judge imposed concurrent sentences, the longest being 38-480 months for the delivery-of-a-controlled-substance conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit conditionally granted habeas relief, limited to Robinson’s sentence. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee to mean that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt,” Alleyne v. United States (2013). The Michigan court violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right by using judge-found facts to score sentencing variables that increased his mandatory minimum sentence,“ which “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "Robinson v. Woods" on Justia Law

Convicted on drug and weapons charges in 1996, Charles received a sentence of 35 years. Charles obtained a sentence reduction, to 24 years plus four months) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s change to the crack cocaine guideline. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible for the reduction. On remand, the district court reimposed Charles’ original 35-year sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that its previous decision gave the district court “the opening to correct an illegality” through a new sentencing. The order stated clearly that the remand was “for purposes of entering an order that rejects Charles’ section 3582(c)(2) motion.” A district court must respect the scope of the remand. Section 3582(c)(2) limits who is eligible for relief. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible, Charles’ sentence is not “illegal” in a way that permits relief by the courts from this final sentence. Although the Supreme Court has held that facts elevating a crime’s penalty, such as drug quantities, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, those decisions do not apply to final sentences like this one. The court recognized that Charles has achieved “[a]n extraordinary record,” of rehabilitation and of “good works.”Executive clemency provides Charles another avenue for relief. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

Ayers, an experienced Kentucky criminal-defense attorney, was indicted in 2008 on five counts of failing to file state tax returns. Ayers represented himself throughout the 21 months between his indictment and trial, but never formally elected to do so. He never waived his right to counsel on the record, filed a notice of appearance, or moved to be allowed to proceed pro se. The court allegedly failed to inform him at his arraignment that he had a right to counsel and never subsequently sought to determine whether Ayers’s self-representation was a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. When Ayers asked for a continuance a day before trial was scheduled to begin so that he could hire an attorney with whom he attested he was already in negotiations, the court denied his request and forced him to proceed pro se. Ayers was convicted. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held that trial courts need not “obtain a waiver of counsel” before allowing “experienced criminal trial attorneys” to represent themselves. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that Ayers did not validly waive his right to counsel. View "Ayers v. Hall" on Justia Law