Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Raja, a citizen of Pakistan, first entered the U.S. in 1990 without inspection. In 1996, Raja pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was sentenced to three-23.5 months’ imprisonment. He served 90 days in a Pennsylvania prison. Nonetheless, in 1998, Raja was granted lawful-permanent-resident status. In 2007, Raja traveled to Pakistan to visit his family. Upon his return, he was detained after officials discovered his conviction. Raja admitted to the conviction and to providing a fraudulent Social Security number to the officers at the time of his 1995 arrest. The government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). An IJ found Raja removable for a controlled-substance offense and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because he had never lawfully adjusted to lawful-permanent-resident status due to his prior conviction. The BIA dismissed Raja’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding the Pennsylvania statute under which Raja was convicted divisible; the portion of the statute under which he was charged is a categorical match to 21 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and is a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) under the “modified categorical approach.” View "Raja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Lobbins was detained at the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center, awaiting trial on federal charges related to his gang membership. Another gang member, Churchwell, was awaiting trial on state charges of murdering a Vanderbilt professor. Churchwell boasted about committing the murder. Inmate Boyd relayed that information to a state prosecutor. Churchwell heard about Boyd’s cooperation and said that he was “going to have Maurice f***ed up.” Lobbins entered Boyd’s cell with a shank and repeatedly stabbed him. The government added a federal charge for witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(A) and 1512(a)(2)(C). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lobbins’s convictions. Lobbins then unsuccessfully moved to vacate his witness tampering sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to section 1512(a)(2)(C) but the district court instructed the jury to apply a lower standard: whether, absent the attack, Boyd “might” have spoken to a federal officer. The Vanderbilt murders were investigated and prosecuted by the state. Boyd spoke to a state prosecutor, not a federal one; there was no evidence that Boyd was reasonably likely to talk to a federal official. The statute requires the likelihood of “communication” to a federal official about “the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” That Lobbins and Boyd were federal detainees does not support any inference that Boyd was likely to talk to a federal official about Churchwell. Had the jury been properly instructed, it would have probably voted to acquit. A defense lawyer’s failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction that materially lightens the government’s burden of proof is typically deficient performance. View "Lobbins v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, English was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old acquaintance while she was asleep. The court sentenced English to 21-180 months’ imprisonment. English has been released. After the trial,“Juror A” revealed that her father had sexually abused her at age eight. English was granted a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating English’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A state court denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review, using routine language. English's federal habeas petition was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deference to the state courts was improper because the district court failed to make the requisite determination that English’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits and applied de novo review. The court found that reasonable jurists could disagree on whether English was denied a fair trial. English made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Juror A’s failure to disclose; the evidence that Juror A would have known that her past abuse was relevant at voir dire; and inconsistencies in her account at the evidentiary hearing, all indicate deliberate concealment, permitting an inference of bias. View "English v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

In 1981, at 18 months old, Carter was removed from his mother, who suffered from schizophrenia. After several foster homes, Carter was adopted when he was 10 years old. In 1997, Carter went to live with his adoptive grandmother, Prince. He was subsequently incarcerated. Carter was released from jail, let himself into Prince’s home, and killed her. He took extensive measures to cover the crime, took money, and left, stopping to steal a license plate. Prince had been stabbed 18 times, had suffered blunt-force head trauma, and had been anally raped. Semen was identified as Carter’s. Carter was detained and, after his Miranda warnings, confessed. At a pre-trial competency hearing, Carter was shackled because he had attempted to commit suicide several times. The court concluded that Carter was competent based upon the testimony of a court-appointed licensed psychologist. Carter entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense expert, Dr. King. noted “several subtle signs of a psychotic disorder, ”including inappropriate laughter, auditory and visual hallucinations, and Carter’s musing about killing his lawyer. The judge again found Carter competent, noting that even King acknowledged that the issue was borderline. Carter interrupted opening statements to express his desire to plead guilty and insist that he did not want to attend the trial. After asking whether he would be removed if he “acted up,” he lunged at the judge. Defense counsel stipulated that Carter would monitor the proceedings via television. In 1998, Carter was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. Carter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging that he was incompetent at trial and that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly recognized Carter’s suicide attempts, his “disagreements with counsel[,]” his desire to “enter a plea and get it over[,]” and his “lung[ing] at the judge.” While Carter’s evidence of incompetence may be “enough,” the question is whether such evidence compels a determination of incompetence. Carter failed to carry his burden under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). View "Carter v. Bogan" on Justia Law

In 2010, the defendants formed PremierTox, a urinalysis testing company: Doctors Peavler and Wood owned a substance abuse treatment company, SelfRefind; Doctor Bertram previously worked for SelfRefind. Bottom and Walters owned a drug testing service and laboratory. Physicians at clinics ordered urinalysis tests to check if their patients used illicit drugs and to monitor their medications. PremierTox was to receive those urine samples, perform the testing, and report back. In October 2010, SelfRefind began to send frozen urine samples to PremierTox for testing, but PremierTox did not have the correct equipment. In 2011, after PremierTox bought the necessary, expensive machines, they broke down. Urine samples from SelfRefind piled up. PremierTox started testing them between February and April 2011 and finished testing them in October. Over the same period, it tested and billed for fresh samples as they came in, aiming for a 48-hour turnaround. PremierTox billed insurers, saying nothing about the delays. The defendants were charged with 99 counts of health care fraud and with conspiracy. A jury acquitted them of conspiracy and 82 of the health care fraud charges and convicted them of 17 health care fraud charges. The trial judge imposed sentences of 13-21 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 1347 by requesting reimbursement for tests that were not medically necessary. View "United States v. Walters" on Justia Law

Davis is incarcerated for the assault and murder of Marsha Blakely. His conviction was based on the testimony of an eye-witness, Avery, who changed his story several times before trial. Corroborating evidence permitted the jury to credit Avery’s trial testimony that implicated Davis. Years later, Avery recanted his testimony, claiming that he did not witness Blakely’s murder and that he admitted this to the prosecutor before testifying against Davis. Davis filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on the prosecution’s alleged knowing presentation of Avery’s perjured testimony at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s petition, which was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Davis’s petition was untimely and he cannot show a credible claim of actual innocence to overcome the statute of limitations. For a petitioner to establish entitlement to the actual-innocence exception, he must support his allegations of constitutional error with new, reliable evidence, such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence, that was not presented at trial. Davis has not undermined the evidence that corroborates Avery’s trial testimony, and his only proof of innocence, Avery’s recantation affidavit, is unreliable and, in the circumstances, insufficient to establish innocence. View "Davis v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Michigan’s statutory scheme for resentencing individuals who were convicted of first-degree murder and received mandatory sentences of life without parole for acts they committed as children. Plaintiff’s 2016 amended complaint (SAC) addressed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, (2016), and Michigan’s 2014 amendments to its juvenile sentencing scheme. The SAC included allegations that Michigan’s policies and procedures governing parole deny Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); that deprivation of Plaintiffs’ good time and disciplinary credits in Section 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (Count V); and Defendants have failed to provide the Plaintiffs with access to programming, education, training, and rehabilitation opportunities in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI). The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VI. On remand, the district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count V and class certification, and ordered permanent injunctive relief that prohibited Defendants from enforcing or applying the credit elimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 769.25a(4)(c), which was enacted in 2014 and eliminates credits for individuals who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile first-degree murder convictions, unconstitutional. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

After Maslonka robbed two banks to support his drug habit, he pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to armed robbery as a third habitual offender. During his plea-negotiation process, Maslonka began to cooperate with federal authorities in a separate federal investigation. Maslonka did not cooperate to the full satisfaction of the federal authorities. The state prosecutor withdrew the favorable plea offer. Maslonka brought a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. Even assuming Maslonka’s attorney was constitutionally deficient, Maslonka has not shown that this deficiency prejudiced him. Maslonka has not shown a reasonable probability that his counsel could have persuaded the state prosecutor not to cancel Maslonka’s plea. The court noted that the Supreme Court has not fully answered the “difficult question” of “the duty and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargaining process” and rejected an argument that a counsel’s mere physical absence from a critical stage of a proceeding, based on the counsel’s own failure to be present rather than any denial by the state, can constitute a constructive denial of counsel under Supreme Court precedent. View "Maslonka v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

Harrington was convicted in 2009 of seven drug offenses, including conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute heroin and at least 50 grams of cocaine base, resulting in death (Count 1); and distributing heroin, resulting in death (Count 7). Citing 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851, the government filed notice that Harrington was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of a 2002 felony drug conviction. The district court sentenced Harrington to concurrent terms of life in prison on Counts 1 and 7, and 360 months on each remaining count. In 2014, the Supreme Court held, in Burrage, that where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision unless such use was a but-for cause of the death or injury. Harrington unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. In 2017, Harrington filed a second petition. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Harrington’s claim is properly construed as one of actual innocence. Because Burrage is retroactive, Harrington is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him, if given the proper jury instruction. View "Harrington v. Ormond" on Justia Law

Thomas is a Michigan state prisoner who was convicted of several crimes, including assault with intent to commit murder, after he participated in a violent 2005 home invasion. Thomas unsuccessfully challenged in state court his conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. He then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found that Thomas assaulted Harrison, with an actual intent to kill Harrison, in circumstances where a successful killing would have been murder. The Michigan courts stated that “[n]o actual physical injury is required for the elements of the crime to be established,” and that “[a]n assault may be established by showing . . . an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” Any inconsistency in interpreting Michigan law is not a ground for federal habeas relief. “Bottom line, Thomas’s case was not an “extreme malfunction[]” of the Michigan criminal justice system.” View "Thomas v. Stephenson" on Justia Law