Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 2012-2015, Bradley and others drove patients to Detroit doctors, paid them for their prescription refills, and stored the pills in various places, including a house Bradley owned. Bradley recruited O’Neal to live in the stash house and accept pill deliveries. She received deliveries of 300 pills (usually oxycodone) every day. Other participants handled similar amounts. The group shipped pills to Buchanan in Nashville, who sold the pills to redistributors. Buchanan deposited the payments into bank accounts that belonged to Bradley, Bradley’s wife, and Jones. An indictment charged 18 individuals with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone and oxymorphone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Count 2 charged Bradley, Buchanan, and two others with conspiring to launder the operation’s proceeds, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)(h). Bradley pleaded guilty. The court ordered Bradley to forfeit currency and real property that he used in the conspiracy and at least a million dollars in cash, 21 U.S.C. 853(d), reasoning that the gross proceeds of the drug-distribution and money-laundering schemes reached a million dollars. The order applied the million-dollar judgment jointly and severally to Bradley and his co-defendants. The court sentenced Bradley to 17 years. The Sixth Circuit upheld the reasonableness of his sentence and found no plain error in the drug-quantity determinations but concluded that precedent forbids the joint-and-several nature of the forfeiture order. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

In 2012, Raines pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court concluded that Raines was subject to a statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), because he had a 1991 Michigan conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, a 2002 federal conviction for distributing cocaine base, and a 2002 federal conviction for collecting credit by extortionate means. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. In 2016, Raines filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, citing Johnson v. United States (2015), which held the ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected that argument, reasoning that Raines’s assault conviction qualified under the ACCA’s force clause, his drug-distribution conviction qualified as a serious drug offense, and his extortion conviction qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-crimes clause. After holding that Raines’s Johnson claim was properly before the court on appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated. Raines’s 2002 conviction under 18 U.S.C. 894(a)(1), for collecting credit by extortionate means should not have been counted as a violent felony under the ACCA because it is not covered by the use-of-force clause and it is not equivalent to the generic crime of “extortion.” View "Raines v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant was convicted for felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)(e); his statutory maximum sentence was 10 years’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Defendant to 24 years, under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which overrode the statutory maximum and required a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. While incarcerated, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(C); possession of heroin by an inmate, 18 U.S.C. 1791(d)(1)(C); and conspiracy, section 371, and was sentenced to an additional 151 months, to be served consecutively to his existing term. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause and later held that the rule applies retroactively. Defendant sought resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 2255. The court found the motion meritorious, but rather than conducting a full resentencing proceeding, corrected Defendant’s sentence by memorandum opinion. Defendant had already served 12 years. His Guidelines range, absent the ACCA enhancement, was 51-63 months. Believing that a period of over-incarceration can be calculated and credited toward a consecutive sentence, Defendant asked the court to impose a Guidelines-range sentence--a specific term of months. The court instead imposed a corrected sentence of “time served.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court could not lawfully impose a sentence of more than 10 years’ imprisonment; “time served” equated to a term in excess of the statutory maximum. The sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Smith was confronted in her yard by McGowan and Jones, who pointed a gun. Shots were fired. Smith’s boyfriend, Goldston, ran to protect her. McGowan ran away. Goldston chased him and returned with a sawed-off shotgun. The ensuing confrontation was video-recorded by a neighbor. Goldston paced with the gun, “waving it around in a threatening manner.” Jones tried to grab the gun. When a police officer arrived, the men ran into the woods. The officer gave chase, finding a sawed-off shotgun in the woods. Goldston, charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), raised a defense of justification but was convicted. The district court increased Goldston’s sentencing level for possession of an operable firearm in connection with an aggravated assault and found that Goldston was an armed career criminal,18 U.S.C. 924(e). Goldston had seven prior felony drug convictions under Tenn. Code. 39-17-417(a) involving Schedule II controlled substances: five for sale or delivery and two for possession with intent to resell. Goldston’s total offense level under the ACCA produced an advisory guideline range of 262-327 months in prison, with a mandatory minimum of 15 years. The district court, based on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), sentenced Goldston to 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Goldston’s argument that he should not have been classified as an armed career criminal, as the term “deliver” in Tennessee law is broader than the term “distribute” in ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense.” View "United States v. Goldston" on Justia Law

Woodside, a Florida resident, participated in a 24-person conspiracy to distribute pain pills in Middle Tennessee. He pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. The Sixth Circuit vacated his 170-month so that the district court might better explain the quantity of drugs attributable to him. On remand, the district court, without further hearing, imposed the same sentence and explained its reasoning—including the drug quantity on which it based Woodside’s sentence—in a written amended judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Woodside’s argument that the district court erred by not affording him a new sentencing hearing and violated 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) by not stating the new explanation for his sentence “in open court.” The limited remand did not entitle Woodside to a new sentencing hearing or new procedures. Even if the district court erroneously attributed to Woodside drugs sold by others, Woodside would still have been sentenced according to the same base-offense level; any error was therefore harmless. View "United States v. Woodside" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gilmore pleaded guilty to federal offenses and began serving a 188-month sentence. South Carolina, planning to charge Gilmore with assault and battery and failure to pay child support, filed a detainer, requesting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons notify it before releasing him. The Bureau notified Gilmore under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. If he asked South Carolina to resolve the charges, the state would need to try him within 180 days. The Bureau notified the Solicitor of Richland County, South Carolina that Gilmore requested final disposition. Months later, that office replied that it “ha[d] no charges pending” and speculated that any charges originated in the Sheriff’s Department. The Bureau forwarded Gilmore’s request to the Magistrate Court. No one responded. Four years later, South Carolina sent another detainer request for failure to pay child support. Gilmore wrote the South Carolina judge that he had tried to resolve the matter for years; the detainers made it difficult for him to complete rehabilitative programs. No one responded. Gilmore filed federal habeas petitions. The South Carolina district court transferred both petitions to the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In naming the federal warden, Gilmore sued the wrong official--South Carolina was responsible for the alleged harm. The court noted that Gilmore should determine whether a violation of the Act states a cognizable federal habeas claim; whether exhaustion applies; and whether any limitation on a criminal charge applies. View "Gilmore v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Nakhleh entered a post office with an open package. An employee stated that he would have to tape his box closed and that she could not give him free tape. Nakhleh left to buy tape, returned, and sealed his package but had lost his shipping label. Nakhleh accused the workers of hiding it but eventually looked inside the box and found the label. Nakhleh refused to touch the label because “it’s got pollutant on it.” Another customer eventually affixed the label and taped the box. The post office then processed Nakhleh’s package. Nakhleh left but returned and asked for his package. When an employee stated that she could not return his package because it had been processed, Nakhleh became loud and irate. He paced, taking photos and asking employees for their names. Employees were unable to serve other customers and called the police. Officers arrived and asked Nakhleh what he needed from his package. Nakhleh replied (twice), “What if it’s a bomb?” The post office was closed for two hours while a Postal Inspector examined the package. Nakhleh was found guilty of causing a disturbance in a post office, 18 U.S.C. 3061(c)(4)(B), sentenced to six months’ probation with anger management treatment and fined $1,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that Nakhleh engaged in “conduct which create[d] loud and unusual noise” in the post office and that interfered with postal operations. View "United States v. Nakhleh" on Justia Law

Farrad was released from custody. Months later, informants reported observing Farrad in possession of firearms. Officer Garrison, using an undercover account, became Farrad's Facebook friend. Farrad’s Facebook photos included one showing what appeared to be three handguns on a closed toilet lid, uploaded on October 7, 2013. Execution of a warrant to search Facebook’s records yielded photos showing a person who looks like Farrad holding what appears to be a gun; others show a close-up hand holding what appears to be a gun. None show a date or unique distinguishing feature. The person in the photos has distinctive tattoos. Facebook records revealed that the photos were uploaded on October 11. Farrad was charged with having, “on or about October 11, 2013, . . . knowingly possess[ed] . . . a firearm.” The government argued that the photos were self-authenticating business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Defense counsel argued that the photos did not authenticate who took the pictures or when they were taken. The court admitted the photos. Garrison testified that criminals are likely to upload photos of criminal deeds soon after committing those deeds. Hinkle testified about the similarities between the photos and a real gun. No witness claimed to have seen Farrad with a gun. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Farrad’s conviction. The district court’s error in deeming the photographs self-authenticating business records was harmless because admission was proper under Rule 901(a). Hinkle was qualified, his testimony was relevant and reliable. Admitting Garrison’s testimony was harmless error because defense counsel did not argue a “date theory.” View "United States v. Farrad" on Justia Law

Slusser pleaded guilty in 2011 as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), waiving his right to “file any motions or pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 or to collaterally attack [his] conviction[] and/or resulting sentence,” except challenges involving ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. The court determined that he had at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses and sentenced him to 180 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), noting a 1994 burglary, 2011 delivery of cocaine, and 1999 aggravated assault and burglary. Slusser did not appeal. In 2012, Slusser filed an unsuccessful section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Slusser filed an application in 2016 for authorization to file a second or successive section 2255 motion, citing the Supreme Court's invalidation of ACCA's residual clause in Johnson v. United States (2015). The Seventh Circuit allowed the filing. The district court denied his motion and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In his negotiated plea agreement, Slusser waived his right to argued that his 1999 Tennessee conviction for Class C aggravated assault no longer qualifies as a “violent felony.” View "Slusser v. United States" on Justia Law

Williams, a CPA, was manager or co-owner of Sexton’s Kentucky companies. Flynn was the office manager. From 2006-2010, they secured loans by misrepresenting the businesses’ assets and the identity of the true borrowers. The total amount disbursed from the banks was $8,160,400. Sexton and Williams submitted applications for higher loan amounts ($13,600,000 and $13,800,000) toward the end of the time period involved, but those funds were never disbursed. In 2016, the three and a bank loan officer were charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) (Count 1) and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. The indictment also alleged forfeiture to the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 982(a)(2)(A), and 28 U.S.C. 2461(c). Sexton pleaded guilty to Count 1. The government moved to dismiss Counts 2–24. Sexton’s PSR gave Sexton a four-level increase for being an organizer or leader under USSG 3B1.1(a); one criminal history point under USSG 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(m), and 4A1.2(f) for a 2005 California sentence for willful infliction of corporal injury to which Sexton pleaded nolo contendere; and two criminal history points under USSG 4A1.1(d) for committing the instant offense while on probation for the California sentence. Sexton’s guideline imprisonment range was 97–121 months. The court sentenced Sexton to 109 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that sentence and orders that he pay $2,637,058.32 in restitution and forfeit property to the government, including a money judgment of $2,534,912. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law