Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maynard and others stole over 700 pounds of blasting agent from a Revelation Energy job site. He pled guilty to possessing an explosive as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 842(i)(1). Relying on Maynard’s prior convictions for second-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance in Kentucky and assault during the commission of a felony in West Virginia, the Presentence Report calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines as 24. Maynard argued that neither of the two underlying convictions was a “crime of violence.” The court sustained Maynard’s objection to the West Virginia offense but rejected his objection regarding the Kentucky offense and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines 108 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines label as a “crime of violence” any federal or state law offense punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). The court applied a categorical approach and examined Kentucky’s assault under extreme emotional disturbance statute, which requires that the defendant intentionally cause a physical injury in committing the underlying assault. Extreme emotional disturbance does not negate the intent elements of first or second-degree assault under Kentucky law. View "United States v. Maynard" on Justia Law

Fleming pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), stipulating that his base offense level would be 24, based on his possession of at least 500 grams but less than 2 kilograms of cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. At his sentencing hearing, the district court doubled that, based in large part on a brief local news article that described a recent surge in drug overdose deaths, mostly due to powerful opioids like fentanyl. Neither the article, nor the underlying Ohio state report on which it was based, were provided to the parties before the sentencing hearing. Nor was Fleming notified before the hearing that the court planned to consider the article or the issues it addressed. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as procedurally unreasonable because the court denied Fleming a meaningful opportunity to comment on information that led to a substantial increase in his sentence. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Montgomery pled guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Months after his release the government alleged that Montgomery had been charged with domestic assault and had “possessed/used a controlled substance (marijuana).” The government recommended that Montgomery’s supervised release be revoked with a suggested imprisonment range of 21–27 months, classifying his possession offense as a Grade B violation. Montgomery failed to appear. The court ordered his arrest. The government amended its Petition, adding driving with a suspended/revoked license and theft of property less than $500. Montgomery was arrested and argued that his simple possession conviction was a Grade C violation because it is punishable by less than a year in prison, although 21 U.S.C. 844 provides for an enhanced maximum sentence of two years if the defendant has a prior drug conviction. He claimed that 21 U.S.C. 851 required the government to charge him under section 844 and enhance his sentence under section 851(a)(1) in order to take into account his prior convictions. Because Montgomery was not charged under section 844, he argued, the court could only look to the “basic” one-year sentence for simple possession when classifying his violation. The court concluded that Montgomery committed a Grade B violation and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; a defendant need not have been formally charged under section 844 and enhanced under section 851, because whether the defendant experienced a separate formal prosecution at all for the conduct is irrelevant. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the district court's conditional grant of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and petitioner cross-appealed the denial of relief on several alternative claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan courts adjudicated petitioner's claims on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) elevated standard of review applied. The court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief based on petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims where the state conceded that petitioner's statements to the police were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and the error was not harmless, and trial counsel's failure to challenge the admission of the statements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also held that the prosecutor's comments on petitioner's post-Miranda silence violated due process; reversed the denial of petitioner's Doyle claim; and affirmed the district court's holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. View "Hendrix v. Palmer" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant. The court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress where the evidence failed to establish a fair probability that drug activity was occurring at the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. Furthermore, the good faith exception did not apply because no reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the residence at the time the affidavit was executed. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting a recorded telephone call because it constituted inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus, a cardiologist at Ashland, Kentucky’s KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. His annual salary was around $2.5 million, under KDMC’s per-procedure compensation package. In 2008, HHS received an anonymous complaint that Paulus was defrauding Medicare and Medicaid by performing medically unnecessary procedures, 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(a)(1), 1395y(a)(1), placing stents into arteries that were not blocked, with the encouragement of KDMC. An anti-fraud contractor selected 19 angiograms for an audit and concluded that in seven cases, the blockage was insufficient to warrant a stent. Medicare denied reimbursement for those procedures and continued investigating. A private insurer did its own review and concluded that at least half the stents ordered by Paulus were not medically necessary. The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure subpoenaed records and concluded that Paulus had diagnosed patients with severe stenosis where none was apparent from the angiograms. Paulus had retired; he voluntarily surrendered his medical license. A jury convicted Paulus on 10 false-statement counts and on the healthcare fraud count. It acquitted him on five false-statement counts. The court set aside the guilty verdicts and granted Paulus a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof. A doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram has told a lie; if he does so to bill a more expensive procedure, then he has also committed fraud. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Following Columbus, Ohio robberies, the government obtained an arrest warrant against Satterwhite for interstate robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Satterwhite was arrested. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161 (Speedy Trial Act), “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons.” The deadline in Satterwhite’s case was February 22, 2016. The parties filed six joint motions for waiver and to extend the period while the parties discussed a plea agreement. The court granted these motions, extending the time until August 21. On October 7, the government filed an information and an executed plea agreement, including a binding recommended sentence of 240 months. On November 29, Satterwhite was arraigned. The court accepted Satterwhite’s plea and sentenced Satterwhite to 240 months of imprisonment, noting that Satterwhite’s advisory sentencing range was 471 months. Satterwhite did not challenge the untimely filing of the information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the time limits for the government to file an information or indictment after arresting a defendant are jurisdictional. A defendant who fails to timely move for dismissal on the basis of an untimely indictment waives his right to move for dismissal under the speedy indictment provision. View "United States v. Satterwhite" on Justia Law

On March 31, 2014, the government obtained a single 30-day electronic surveillance order authorizing the wiretapping of cell phones used by Williams (TT1), and TT2 used by Cooper. The government intercepted Cooper’s TT2 calls for two weeks, including a call on April 12. Cooper made no more calls on TT2; the government confirmed this through a confidential informant on April 14 and ended its TT2 surveillance. On April 16, the government provided the TT2 wiretap recordings to the district court to be sealed. The government did not intercept any conversations from TT1 because Williams had stopped using it. When the government charged Cooper with drug trafficking, he twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence gathered directly or derivatively from the TT2 wiretap, citing the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), claiming that the TT2 application did not establish the necessity for the wiretap and that the government did not seal the TT2 recording “immediately” and requesting a “Franks” hearing on his claim that the TT2 application’s supporting affidavit had material misrepresentations and omissions. Cooper entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 396 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the application included a 52-page affidavit, prepared by a knowledgeable officer, stating that the government had been investigating Cooper and his drug-trafficking organization for six months, during which traditional investigative methods had been attempted. Statements cited by Cooper were not misleading; the government complied with section 2518. View "United States v. Jamal Cooper" on Justia Law

Susany conspired with Courtney and Quinn to obtain explosives to crack safes at jewelry and coin shops. They planned to finance their purchase of explosives by breaking into shops. Susany and Quinn met with an FBI confidential informant to discuss procuring explosives, then met again to talk about the informant participating the in break-ins. Susany, Courtney, and the informant planned the details of a break-in. In the early hours of April 19, 2013, Susany, Courtney, and the informant arrived at the store. Courtney served as a lookout. Susany cut the phone line and activated a jamming device to block the alarm system's cellular backup. Officers arrived and arrested them shortly after the alarm was cut. Susany pled guilty to conspiracy to knowingly receive and transport explosive materials, 18 U.S.C. 371, 842(a)(3)(A), and 844(a). The district court imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the district court erred in failed to reduce Susany’s base offense level by three points under USSG 2X1.1(b)(2), the error was harmless. That Guideline applies when the defendant and the co-conspirators have not completed all the acts necessary for the substantive offense. The court instead granted a three-level downward variance based on the nature and circumstances of the offense and reduced Susany’s base offense level to 10, yielding a Guidelines range of 21-27 months; the error resulted in a lower range than would have resulted under the correct calculation. View "United States v. Susany" on Justia Law

At the age of 19, Barcus had sex with a 12-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery against a victim less than 13 years old in Tennessee, spent three years in prison, is subject to “community supervision for life” under Tennessee law, and is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). After his release from prison, Barcus cut off his ankle monitoring bracelet and fled to Texas. He went to Kentucky but failed to register as required. Arrested, Barcus pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR classified Barcus as a Tier III sex offender, which corresponds to a base level of 16, and recommended special conditions of supervised release, including mental health and drug treatment, participation in a sex offender treatment program, psychosexual assessment, and complete polygraph testing. The district court adopted the PSR calculations and sentenced Barcus to a within-guidelines term of 30 months in prison with a five-year term of supervised release with the special sex offender conditions. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court incorrectly classified him as a Tier III sex offender because his qualifying Tennessee conviction is broader than the comparable offense under SORNA. The comparable federal offense requires Barcus to have acted with intent; the Tennessee offense does not. View "United States v. Barcus" on Justia Law