Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officers obtained a search warrant for Robinson’s Ohio apartment after observing him sell drugs outside and making controlled buys from him. When the officers arrived to execute the warrant, Robinson fled and was chased, tackled, and subdued. Police then seized fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine, plus three scales, a blender, packaging materials, three cell phones, and a bag of needles, from the apartment. Two women and a young child were present during the search. Robinson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His pre-sentence report calculated a total offense level of 19. Because Robinson’s criminal history spanned 19 years and yielded a total score of 26, he was assigned to Criminal History Category VI. Robinson faced a statutory maximum of 20 years in prison, but his advisory Guidelines range was 63-78 months. The district court sentenced Robinson to 118 months, invoking its discretion to increase a sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors rather than a specific Guidelines provision. Robinson argued that the court gave excessive weight to certain factors including his continued drug use and recidivism, and to the community-wide harm caused by the opioid epidemic. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court was not indifferent to the sympathetic aspects of Robinson's personal history. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 1996, at Madison Correctional Institution, Stojetz and other inmates stormed a unit housing juvenile offenders. After overpowering the guard, they proceeded to the cell of 17-year-old Watkins and attacked him. Watkins initially escaped but was cornered and stabbed to death by Stojetz and another inmate. Trial evidence indicated that Stojetz and his accomplices (members of the Aryan Brotherhood) killed Watkins, who was black, due in part to his race. Stojetz was charged with aggravated murder with prior calculation with a death-penalty specification--committing aggravated murder while a prisoner in a detention facility. The court accepted the jury's death-sentence recommendation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, rejecting Stojetz’s claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to: question prospective jurors about their views on race; life qualify the jury; accurately describe the nature of mitigating evidence during voir dire; investigate and present evidence; request voir dire of jurors concerning publicity during the trial; object to allegedly improper jury instructions and to incidents of prosecutorial misconduct; and object to opinion evidence regarding, Stojetz’s intent. The court also rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction medical records to show that Stojetz’s throat was cut by another inmate; that the district court abused its discretion in denying a request for access to the grand-jury transcripts; that Stojetz was actually innocent of aggravated murder; and that his death sentence was arbitrary. View "Stojetz v. Ishee" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Cradler of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm. This offense typically carries a maximum imprisonment penalty of 10 years. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a defendant who violates section 922(g)(1) after being convicted of at least three violent felonies or serious drug offenses becomes subject to a mandatory minimum imprisonment penalty of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court sentenced Cradler under the ACCA, to a term of 222 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2011. In 2014, Cradler moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision. He argued that his convictions for sexual battery and third-degree burglary no longer qualified as violent felonies. The government conceded that it lacked the requisite information to support the argument that Cradler’s sexual battery conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The Sixth Circuit granted relief, first declining to address whether Cradler’s motion was timely or procedurally defaulted. FInding the Tennessee third-degree burglary statute divisible, the court applied a modified categorical approach, examined documents pertaining to Cradler’s conviction, and concluded the statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary and does not qualify as the enumerated offense of “burglary.” In so holding, the court abrogated a 2006 Sixth Circuit decision. View "Cradler v. United States" on Justia Law

A DEA agent learned that a particular tractor-trailer traveling to Cleveland likely contained narcotics. When the truck arrived, investigators watched as the driver parked in a fenced-in lot and a car driven by Defendants arrived. The truck's driver unhitched the trailer and drove away. Defendants worked on a compartment underneath the trailer, then drove away. State Troopers stopped them, allegedly for speeding, and a narcotics detection dog alerted to the possible presence of narcotics. The officers searched the car but did not find any illegal items. Officers executed a warrant at the trailer and discovered secret compartments, containing around 92 kilograms of cocaine. Defendants were arrested. Officers seized cell phones with coded messages and a notebook with detailed information regarding the tractor-trailer's arrival. Defendants agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 92 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing cocaine under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which authorizes plea agreements that, if accepted by the court, specify the exact sentence. The agreements applied the “Safety Valve” guideline and reductions for being “minimal participants” acting out of fear and for acceptance of responsibility, and proposed sentences of 36 months’ and 33 months’ imprisonment. The court rejected the agreements, stating that it would not accept any “C agreement.” The court subsequently accepted revised plea agreements, stating that the agreed-upon guidelines calculations were merely advisory. The PSRs’ offense-level calculations mirrored those in the agreements, with one exception. The district court rejected the reductions, resulting in a guidelines range of 120-135 months’ imprisonment and imposed a 10-year sentence on each defendant. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for reassignment to a different judge, for reconsideration of the plea agreement. View "United States v. Cota-Luna" on Justia Law

Sorrells, looking out of a window, saw men arguing. She knew Johnson, Levingston, and Grace from the neighborhood. Johnson knocked Grace to the ground. Sorrells saw the men standing over Grace, followed by flashes from their guns. Sorrells contacted the police 10 days later, saying she was “[o]ne hundred percent” sure Johnson and Levingston were the shooters. Sorrells asked for witness protection. At a rescheduled pre-trial hearing in front of Levingston, Sorrells expressed doubt, stating she was not wearing her glasses that night. At trial, Sorrells said that she changed her testimony based on what other people were saying and that she genuinely grew unsure. The court instructed the jury that it could consider Sorrells’ prior statements “as testified by her” only to impeach her credibility but that it could consider the prior statements and a recorded conversation through a detective’s testimony as substantive evidence under an exclusion to Ohio’s hearsay rule. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition. Levingston did not establish that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or relied on unreasonable fact findings, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). That Sorrells may have been a “witness” against Levingston when she spoke to police does not matter because Levingston had the opportunity to “confront” Sorrells at trial, for cross-examination. The nature of a police investigation does not permit cross-examination by the suspect’s attorney at the time of the initial statement. View "Levingston v. Warden, Warren Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Sorrells, looking out of a window, saw men arguing. She knew Johnson, Levingston, and Grace from the neighborhood. Johnson knocked Grace to the ground. Sorrells saw the men standing over Grace, followed by flashes from their guns. Sorrells contacted the police 10 days later, saying she was “[o]ne hundred percent” sure Johnson and Levingston were the shooters. Sorrells asked for witness protection. At a rescheduled pre-trial hearing in front of Levingston, Sorrells expressed doubt, stating she was not wearing her glasses that night. At trial, Sorrells said that she changed her testimony based on what other people were saying and that she genuinely grew unsure. The court instructed the jury that it could consider Sorrells’ prior statements “as testified by her” only to impeach her credibility but that it could consider the prior statements and a recorded conversation through a detective’s testimony as substantive evidence under an exclusion to Ohio’s hearsay rule. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition. Levingston did not establish that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or relied on unreasonable fact findings, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). That Sorrells may have been a “witness” against Levingston when she spoke to police does not matter because Levingston had the opportunity to “confront” Sorrells at trial, for cross-examination. The nature of a police investigation does not permit cross-examination by the suspect’s attorney at the time of the initial statement. View "Levingston v. Warden, Warren Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Sweeney’s parental rights over his daughter, T.R., were terminated after he was convicted of raping his niece. He had no contact with T.R. during his 10-year imprisonment. Upon his release from prison in 2013, Sweeney began contacting T.R. via Facebook and text message. By 2015, when T.R. was 14, their communications had turned sexual and included the mutual sending of explicit pictures, detailed discussion of sex acts, and plans to meet for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts. T.R. alerted her adoptive parents, who contacted DHS, which alerted Sweeney’s parole officer. During a meeting with his parole officer, Sweeney indicated that he owned a cellular telephone that he had left at a homeless shelter. A parole officer and DHS officers went to the homeless shelter and secured the phone’s media-storage card, which DHS later searched pursuant to a warrant. Sweeney was convicted of production and receipt of child pornography, attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual conduct, and commission of a sex offense against a minor while required to register as a sex offender, and received a sentence of 55 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred: in admitting evidence derived from the media-storage card; by applying a two-level enhancement (USSG 2G2.1(b)(5)), which applies when the defendant is the victim's “parent” because his parental rights were terminated; and in imposing a sentence that was procedurally unreasonable for failure to address mitigation arguments. View "United States v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

As a school principal, Buendia took kickbacks from Shy. Detroit Public Schools (DPS) paid Shy for supplies he never delivered. Some of the money came from the federal government. The FBI searched Shy’s home and found a ledger of kickbacks Shy owed Buendia. Buendia was convicted of federal-programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting her argument that the district court violated her constitutional right to present a complete defense when it excluded evidence of her kickback expenditures and the alleged receipts of expenditures for school purposes. The right to present a complete defense yields to reasonable evidentiary restrictions. The court correctly excluded as irrelevant evidence of how Buendia spent the kickback money and correctly excluded the receipts of school expenditures as hearsay. Regardless of how Buendia eventually spent the money, she “corruptly solicit[ed]” it because, by awarding contracts to Shy in exchange for kickbacks, she subverted the normal bidding process in a manner inconsistent with her duty to obtain goods and services for her school at the best value. Nor did the government open the door" by introducing testimony that Buendia bought massages using a gift card from Shy to show that she accepted kickbacks. View "United States v. Buendia" on Justia Law

In 2012, after attempting to sell a sawed-off shotgun, Richardson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Based on Richardson’s three prior Georgia burglary convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Richardson did not appeal but subsequently brought a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, alleging that in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 "Johnson" decision, his burglary convictions no longer qualified as predicate "violent felonies" under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. ACCA defines “violent felony” to include “generic burglary,” “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” While the Georgia burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than the generic definition because it includes vehicles, railcars, watercraft, and aircraft in its list of covered locations covered, the court employed the modified categorical approach and concluded that the law is divisible. Richardson’s state court indictments make clear that his convictions involved three elements: an unlawful entry into a dwelling house or building with intent to commit a crime therein. View "Richardson v. United States" on Justia Law

Comey was the administrator of her brother, Warehime's, estate. Martin and Simons fraudulently took ownership of Warehime’s property. Martin, a nurse, accessed Warehime’s medical records without authorization so that Simons could fabricate a story about a relationship with Warehime that would make the putative property transfer look legitimate. Martin recruited a patient to “take [Comey] out.” The patient contacted the police. Before the government brought criminal charges, the probate court entered judgment against Martin and Simons. Martin pled guilty to using interstate commerce facilities with the intent to commit murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and obtaining individually identifiable health information. The government agreed to move for a three-level reduction in the Guidelines “[i]f the defendant continues to demonstrate that he has accepted responsibility.” Before sentencing, Martin filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the probate court judgment, asserting facts that contradicted the guilty plea. The government brought Martin’s motion to the sentencing hearing. Had Martin received the reduction, his guidelines range would have been 87–108 months. The court imposed a sentence of 144 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Martin then filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys advised him to file the Rule 60(b) motion. The government submitted documents contradicting that position but containing some inconsistencies. The court denied Martin’s motion without a hearing. Martin then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter the judgment. The court denied the motion, stating that “[a]lthough [Martin] asserts that there are facts in dispute, [he] offers no proof beyond mere self-serving allegations.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Martin presents more than mere assertions of innocence; his motion contains factual allegations about the deficiencies of his attorneys’ advice. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law