Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Lang shot and killed Cheek and Burditte during a botched drug deal. Lang was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder and for aggravated robbery with firearm specifications. After two witnesses had testified, the prosecutor notified the court that Cheek’s father recognized Juror 386 as the daughter of the woman married to Cheek’s brother. After two more witnesses testified, the judge and counsel questioned Juror 386; she acknowledged she met Cheek once and had attended her funeral. She learned of Cheek’s death from her grandfather and from newspapers. She denied talking to others about the case and was excused by agreement. The court confirmed that Juror 386 had not spoken with and would have no contact with other jurors, then told the jurors that she was excused because “she may have had a relationship with ... somebody.” The court asked the jurors as a group whether Juror 386 had talked about knowing someone involved in the case and stated: “I take it by your silence that she did not.” Neither attorney asked to question them individually. The jury returned a guilty verdict. After taking mitigation evidence, the judge imposed a death sentence. Lang unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court reasonably concluded that counsel’s approach to mitigation did not result in ineffective assistance; Lang suffered no prejudice from his attorney’s failure to request individual voir dire of the jurors. View "Lang v. Bobby" on Justia Law

Knoxville police stopped Malone for driving with unlit tail lights. A handgun was found under Malone’s seat and he was charged as a felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A witness-intimidation charge was added after Malone asked his sister lie to officers about who bought the gun, section 1512(b)(1). He pleaded guilty. The Presentence Report classified Malone as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1),(e)(2)(B)(ii), based on three prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated assault, federal drug trafficking, and Kentucky second-degree burglary. He contested the classification, arguing that his Kentucky conviction was incorrectly considered an ACCA predicate offense because the crime’s elements are broader than generic burglary’s. The district court sentenced him to the ACCA-minimum 15 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Kentucky second-degree burglary categorically qualifies as generic burglary under the ACCA. Generic burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” In Kentucky, “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling.” View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

Stevenson is serving life in prison in Michigan for first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Stevenson’s state motion for relief from judgment was denied. Stevenson filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in the Western District of Michigan, which was denied as untimely. Days before the Western District dismissed the first petition, Stevenson filed another 2254 petition in the Eastern District, which, upon learning of Stevenson’s earlier petition, dismissed the second as “duplicative.” Noting that the second petition sought to raise three grounds not mentioned in the first petition, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Eastern District abused its discretion by failing to transfer the second petition to the Western District because a subsequent 2254 petition filed while the petitioner’s initial petition is still pending should be construed as a motion to amend the initial petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. On remand, the Eastern District transferred the case to the Western District, which transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit for consideration as an application to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 1631). The Sixth Circuit remanded, noting that it already determined that the second petition was not second or successive but should be construed as a motion to amend the first petition. View "In re Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Carruthers and Montgomery assaulted three people, robbed them, then buried them alive. The bodies were found buried in a Memphis cemetery, a week after they disappeared. Carruthers’ family retained Wharton to represent him. Wharton was allowed to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. The court appointed Nance. Carruthers repeatedly complained about Nance; the court appointed other attorneys, who ultimately withdrew. Massey was appointed and was given permission to withdraw because his family was receiving threats from Carruthers. Between January and April 1996, the court denied Carruthers’s five motions to appoint new counsel. Carruthers represented himself during the guilt and sentencing phases. A Tennessee jury convicted Carruthers of three counts of first-degree, premeditated murder and imposed a death sentence for each. State courts affirmed on direct appeal and denied Carruthers post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus relief, in which Carruthers argued that he was denied counsel at critical stages of the proceedings in violation of Supreme Court precedent (Cronic), that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in ordering him to proceed pro se, and that he was not competent to stand trial or to represent himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Carruthers procedurally defaulted his Cronic and competency claims, and the state court’s decision that Carruthers forfeited his right to counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. View "Von Carruthers v. Mays" on Justia Law

Sexton entered a bank and presented a note, stating that he was robbing the bank. The teller retrieved $1,610 from a drawer and gave it to Sexton, who took the money and the note and left the bank. Sexton was arrested later that day and charged with bank robbery by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Sexton pleaded guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. The PSR concluded that the guideline range was 63-78 months of imprisonment, but recommended a five-level upward departure to reflect the inadequacy of Sexton’s criminal history category, pursuant to USSG 4A1.3,1 resulting in a guideline range of 100-125 months. The PSR recommended a sentence of 120 months. Sexton emphasized that the robbery was nonviolent and fueled by his need to obtain money to satisfy his drug addiction and argued that the PSR failed to explain why it recommended a five-level upward departure. The district judge, agreeing that Sexton’s extensive criminal history merited an upward departure, imposed a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment, noting that a two-, three-, or four-level upward departure all would permit the 96-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the departure was not substantively unreasonable and that the sentence was adequately explained. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Sexton entered a bank and presented a note, stating that he was robbing the bank. The teller retrieved $1,610 from a drawer and gave it to Sexton, who took the money and the note and left the bank. Sexton was arrested later that day and charged with bank robbery by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Sexton pleaded guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline range. The PSR concluded that the guideline range was 63-78 months of imprisonment, but recommended a five-level upward departure to reflect the inadequacy of Sexton’s criminal history category, pursuant to USSG 4A1.3,1 resulting in a guideline range of 100-125 months. The PSR recommended a sentence of 120 months. Sexton emphasized that the robbery was nonviolent and fueled by his need to obtain money to satisfy his drug addiction and argued that the PSR failed to explain why it recommended a five-level upward departure. The district judge, agreeing that Sexton’s extensive criminal history merited an upward departure, imposed a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment, noting that a two-, three-, or four-level upward departure all would permit the 96-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the departure was not substantively unreasonable and that the sentence was adequately explained. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Kimberly and defendant argued on the phone. Defendant went to the home of Kimberly’s aunt (Taylor), where Kimberly was staying and told her that if she did not come out, he was going to “set it off.” After hanging up the phone and declining to leave the house, Kimberly heard gunshots, glass breaking, and the security alarm. A gun was found between a storm door and an inner door. The glass on the door was broken. At trial, Taylor testified she was awakened by the gunshots, that she heard defendant’s voice outside, and that she received a phone call from her alarm company. On that call, which was admitted into evidence, Taylor and Kimberly identify defendant as the shooter. Kimberly stated defendant was “dangerous” and had a history of domestic violence. The court also admitted two 9-1-1 calls made by Kimberly, one during the incident and one a few hours later, when she was concerned that defendant had returned. Those calls also referenced defendant’s history of domestic violence. The Memphis Police Department arrived and recovered the gun, which belonged to Kimberly. She testified that she reported it stolen a year earlier. Defendant was arrested, convicted as a felon in possession of a handgun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 109 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and upholding the admission of evidence containing references to prior domestic abuse. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Reid pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. The court calculated Reid’s guidelines range as 151-188 months and sentenced him to 170 months’ imprisonment. Reid’s sentence was later reduced to 145 months, following the government’s Rule 35(b) motion. In 2014, Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 retroactively reduced the base offense levels in USSG 2D1.1(c), under which Reid was sentenced. Reid’s amended range is 130-162 months and, because Reid was previously granted a Rule 35(b) downward departure, he was eligible for a comparable reduction to 125 months. Reid moved, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), to reduce his sentence, citing the guideline amendments and his post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct. The government took no position but noted that Reid had incurred disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, for possessing “drugs/alcohol” and tobacco. The court denied Reid’s motion, stating that “Defendant’s disciplinary infractions while incarcerated indicate that he has not gained respect for the law… all-the-more troubling given that Defendant was on federal supervised release when he committed the instant offense.” The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, reasoning that section 3582(c)(2), grants appellate jurisdiction only when a sentence was imposed in violation of law; was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines; is greater than the guideline range; or was imposed for an offense for which there is no guideline and is plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Reid" on Justia Law

As voir dire was about to commence at Bickham’s state court trial, officers cleared the public from the courtroom. Bickham’s counsel objected, citing Presley v. Georgia (2010), which established that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is violated when a court excludes the public from jury selection. In response, the judge stated that removing spectators was necessary so that the jury panel of 52 people would not be intermixed with the audience, and that once the panel was in, those who fit separately from the jury could be allowed in. Counsel stated: I understand. After jury selection, counsel raised the matter again. The judge noted that only two seats had remained after the panel was seated and that no request had been made for those seats. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Bickham’s convictions for second-degree murder, armed robbery, assault with intent to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, finding that Bickham procedurally defaulted his Sixth Amendment claim when he did not make a contemporaneous objection to the courtroom's closure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, agreeing that Bickham's claim was procedurally defaulted for failing to make a timely objection to the exclusion of the public. View "Bickham v. Winn" on Justia Law

In 2003, Potter pleaded guilty to various drug and gun crimes, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on repeat offenders—those who have three or more previous convictions for a “violent felony.” After the district court sentenced Potter as a repeat offender, the Supreme Court (Johnson v. United States), held that the Act;s residual clause violates the Constitution’s prohibition against vague criminal laws. Potter asked to be resentenced in a successive 28 U.S.C. motion, claiming he did not qualify as a repeat offender. The district court declined the request on the ground that he sentenced Potter under a different clause (the enumerated-crimes clause) of the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the same district court judge who sentenced him was in a better position than anyone else to know why he applied the Act and because at all events Potter did not meet his burden of showing that the court used the residual clause to increase his sentence. View "Potter v. United States" on Justia Law