Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gardner shared a cell phone with his 17-year-old girlfriend, B.H., to facilitate her “sex dates” with other men. Gardner had advertised B.H. on Backpage.com, arranged her transportation and gave her drugs for the encounters, had threatened B.H. when she did not want to participate, and demanded the money clients paid for. When one of B.H.’s clients turned out to be an undercover officer, she agreed to let police search the phone. B.H. was pregnant at the time. A jury convicted Gardner of trafficking a minor for sex and producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and 2251(a), primarily based on evidence recovered from the phone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Gardner’s challenges to the denial of his motion to suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence. B.H. consented to let officers search the phone and had actual and apparent authority to do so. Photographs on the phone were relevant to show an element of the sex trafficking charge—that B.H. feared that Gardner would cause her “serious harm” if she refused to prostitute herself. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Gutierrez, a citizen of Bolivia, has been a U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident since her 1980 admission. In 2012, she pleaded guilty to credit card theft, Virginia Code 18.2-192(1). She had prior convictions for petty larceny and for prescription fraud, DHS initiated removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on her convictions for petty larceny and prescription fraud, as crimes involving moral turpitude. Gutierrez applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). DHS argued statutory ineligibility because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony in 2012, triggering 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). An IJ concluded that Gutierrez was ineligible for relief. The BIA employed the categorical approach; found Virginia Code 18.2-192(1) overbroad because the statute contained at least one subdivision, under which “a person can be convicted . . . absent proof of an ‘intent to deprive’ the rightful owner of the property.” The BIA then determined that the section was divisible because its subdivisions “criminalize[d] diverse acts, committed with different mental states." The BIA reasoned, given that the evidence that the 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3) “aggravated felony bar ‘may apply’,” applied 8 C.F.R. 1240.8(d) and required Gutierrez to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the bar [was] inapplicable.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where an alien was convicted under a divisible criminal statute and the record is inconclusive as to whether the conviction was for an aggravated felony, such inconclusiveness defeats the alien’s eligibility for relief. View "Gutierrez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested after failing to appear at a child-support enforcement hearing. The judge imposed a sentence of up to 30 days for civil contempt, which could be purged and Richardson released upon payment of $2,500. Two days later, Richardson collapsed in his cell. An overhead camera recorded as officers and medical staff responded. Richardson, lethargic and unbalanced, with blood and saliva coming from his mouth, was trying to stand. The officers told Richardson to “stay down,” pulled Richardson from his cell, and placed him face down on the floor. Despite a jail policy prohibiting placing restrained inmates in a prone position and a medic’s appeal to handcuff Richardson in front, Richardson was handcuffed behind his back and restrained face down. Richardson died after a 22-minute struggle during which he continually stated he could not breathe. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified- and statutory-immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Richardson was sanctioned outside the criminal context, the Fourteenth Amendment governs. The court rejected an argument that, as long as they acted without reckless or malicious intent, the officers could apply any degree of force. Existing precedent gave notice that it “[w]as unconstitutional” to create asphyxiating conditions by “forcibly restraining an individual in a prone position for a prolonged period” when that individual posed no material threat. Because the finding regarding defendants’ “knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” was premised on Richardson’s complaints about his inability to breathe, the qualified immunity inquiry was sufficiently individualized. View "Hopper v. Plummer" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

A dog’s sniff alerted law enforcement to a suspicious-smelling package, which contained methamphetamine. The intended recipient was “B. PERKINS,” at his Belvidere, Tennessee address. A trusted confidential informant had known Perkins for 20 years and had purchased methamphetamine from him within the past six months. Local law enforcement also knew Perkins to be a methamphetamine dealer. Based on this information, DEA officer Warren obtained an anticipatory warrant to search Perkins’s residence. An anticipatory search only becomes effective upon the happening of some triggering condition, which establishes probable cause. Warren proposed that DEA officer Brewer pose as a FedEx driver, knock at Perkins' door with the package in hand, and deliver the package: Delivery to Perkins was the triggering event. Brewer went in with the erroneous impression that he simply needed to deliver the package to someone at the residence. Brewer knocked and a woman came to the door. Brewer asked her if she was expecting a package. “Yes, we are,” she said. Brewer did not ask who she was nor did he confirm that “we” referred to Perkins, nor did he know whether Perkins was present. Brewer simply gave her the package. Officers executed the search. Perkins was not present and did not arrive until an hour later. Perkins was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order granting Perkins’ motion to suppress. The “operative transaction” specified in the warrant did not occur. View "United States v. William Perkins" on Justia Law

Maben, a Michigan prisoner, was in line for lunch. The server provided Maben with half a serving, dumping out the rest, stating that he “was doing as told.” Before Maben could speak to a supervisor, Thelen, a prison guard, “began yelling,” “shut the fuck up if you wanna eat.” The supervisor “acknowledged the severely inadequate portion,” and gave Maben the full portion. Thelen stated “if you’re going to complain then you’re going to get a misconduct,” then issued Maben a ticket. Maben claimed that he never became disruptive, but has had shortened portions ever since, because of Thelen's retaliation. A hearing officer found Thelen’s statement “more credible” without viewing video footage, Maben was found guilty of creating a disturbance and lost privileges for seven days. The court rejected Maben's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; factual findings made at Maben’s minor misconduct hearing do not have preclusive effect in federal court. The court declined to adopt the “checkmate doctrine,” which provides that when a prison body finds that a prisoner has committed an actual violation of prison rules and the finding is based on some evidence, it "essentially checkmates" a retaliation claim. Maben introduced sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court affirmed summary judgment on Maben’s official-capacity claim, citing the Eleventh Amendment. View "Maben v. Thelen" on Justia Law

The Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP), designed to increase recruiting to the Air National Guard during the “War on Terror” was run by Docupak, a private corporation. Docupak selected and trained Recruiting Assistants (RAs) to find and direct potential airmen to full-time recruiters. The program paid a $1,000 pre-loaded gift card upon actual enlistment of a potential airman and another $1,000 upon the airman’s completion of training. The RAs were to identify individuals that were not already working with a full-time recruiter and were prohibited from splitting the payment with full-time recruiters. Osborne, a full-time recruiter, was accused of referring names of pre-existing recruits to RA Andolsek so that they could claim the incentive, with kickbacks to Osborne. Osborne was charged with aiding Andolsek in embezzling from the Department of Defense, 18 U.S.C. 641; 18 U.S.C. 2, which “caused” the Department to reimburse Docupak for $9,000. Andolsek pleaded guilty and testified against Osborne. Osborne argued that the funds were stolen from a private contractor, so they only violated Docupak’s internal policy, not a federal regulation. The Sixth Circuit reversed Osborne’s conviction. No reasonable jury could have found that the funds were something of value to the government beyond a reasonable doubt, given the evidence of control. The government did not retain a reversionary interest in the funds and imposed few restrictions. Docupak gave the government access to information, but the government did not retain the right to conduct audits. View "United States v. Osborne" on Justia Law

The Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP), designed to increase recruiting to the Air National Guard during the “War on Terror” was run by Docupak, a private corporation. Docupak selected and trained Recruiting Assistants (RAs) to find and direct potential airmen to full-time recruiters. The program paid a $1,000 pre-loaded gift card upon actual enlistment of a potential airman and another $1,000 upon the airman’s completion of training. The RAs were to identify individuals that were not already working with a full-time recruiter and were prohibited from splitting the payment with full-time recruiters. Osborne, a full-time recruiter, was accused of referring names of pre-existing recruits to RA Andolsek so that they could claim the incentive, with kickbacks to Osborne. Osborne was charged with aiding Andolsek in embezzling from the Department of Defense, 18 U.S.C. 641; 18 U.S.C. 2, which “caused” the Department to reimburse Docupak for $9,000. Andolsek pleaded guilty and testified against Osborne. Osborne argued that the funds were stolen from a private contractor, so they only violated Docupak’s internal policy, not a federal regulation. The Sixth Circuit reversed Osborne’s conviction. No reasonable jury could have found that the funds were something of value to the government beyond a reasonable doubt, given the evidence of control. The government did not retain a reversionary interest in the funds and imposed few restrictions. Docupak gave the government access to information, but the government did not retain the right to conduct audits. View "United States v. Osborne" on Justia Law

The FBI obtained access to the physical computer running Playpen’s “dark” website, which contained significant child pornography, and kept the website running to catch its patrons. The site required a browser “mask” to conceal users’ IP addresses, so the FBI placed a digital bug in the fabric of the website, to create a digital fingerprint. After collecting identifying data on Playpen’s individual users, the FBI sought separate warrants, explaining how they cross-referenced the user’s digital fingerprint with an IP address, the "Playpen" items the user had viewed, and the physical location of the computer. distinguishing the machine from others at the same address. The warrant affidavit outlined Tagg’s five hours on Playpen but did not state whether Tagg actually viewed or downloaded illegal files. The magistrate approved the warrant, stating that officers had established probable cause that Tagg violated 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). Searching Tagg’s home, police found 20,000 child pornography files on his personal computers. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant valid. Visiting a website containing child pornography creates a reasonable inference that the user has stored child pornography on a computer; that the website contains both legal and illegal material does not automatically negate probable cause. An officer of reasonable caution would suspect that Tagg had accessed Playpen with “intent to view” child pornography, and that evidence would be found on his home computer. Tagg browsed the site for an extended period, clicking on blatant child pornography advertisements. View "United States v. Tagg" on Justia Law