Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael, a licensed pharmacist at Chapmanville's Aracoma Pharmacy, separately co-owns another West Virginia pharmacy and one in Pennsylvania. The government suspected that Michael used the pharmacies to distribute on-demand prescription drugs, worth more than $4 million, over the Internet. A grand jury returned a multi-count indictment. Count 7 charged Michael with fraudulently submitting a claim for payment to Humana for dispensing medication that was never dispensed (18 U.S.C. 1347). Count 8 charged him with committing aggravated identity theft by using the “identifying information” of a doctor and a patient “in relation to the [health care fraud] offense” (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (c)(11)). Michael had submitted a claim to Humana indicating that A.S. (doctor) had prescribed Lovaza for P.R., including the doctor’s National Provider Identifier and the patient’s name and birth date. A.S. was not P.R.’s doctor and did not issue the prescription. Section 1028A requires a person to “assume the identity” of someone else; the district court held that the statute covered only “impersonation,” and dismissed Count 8. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To “use” a means of identification is to “convert to one’s service” or “employ” the means of identification. Michael used A.S. and P.R.’s identifying information to fashion a fraudulent submission, making the misuse of these means of identification “during and in relation to” healthcare fraud. View "United States v. Michael" on Justia Law

Michael, a licensed pharmacist at Chapmanville's Aracoma Pharmacy, separately co-owns another West Virginia pharmacy and one in Pennsylvania. The government suspected that Michael used the pharmacies to distribute on-demand prescription drugs, worth more than $4 million, over the Internet. A grand jury returned a multi-count indictment. Count 7 charged Michael with fraudulently submitting a claim for payment to Humana for dispensing medication that was never dispensed (18 U.S.C. 1347). Count 8 charged him with committing aggravated identity theft by using the “identifying information” of a doctor and a patient “in relation to the [health care fraud] offense” (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (c)(11)). Michael had submitted a claim to Humana indicating that A.S. (doctor) had prescribed Lovaza for P.R., including the doctor’s National Provider Identifier and the patient’s name and birth date. A.S. was not P.R.’s doctor and did not issue the prescription. Section 1028A requires a person to “assume the identity” of someone else; the district court held that the statute covered only “impersonation,” and dismissed Count 8. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To “use” a means of identification is to “convert to one’s service” or “employ” the means of identification. Michael used A.S. and P.R.’s identifying information to fashion a fraudulent submission, making the misuse of these means of identification “during and in relation to” healthcare fraud. View "United States v. Michael" on Justia Law

Higdon pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 15 years in prison as an armed career criminal based in part on a 1984 North Carolina conviction for discharging a firearm into an occupied structure. The offense requires an application of force to an occupied structure, but not to the occupants themselves. Higdon did not appeal but moved to set aside his sentence after the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the offense was not a “violent felony” under the Act's remaining provisions because it does not involve the use “of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Under the North Carolina statute, the projectile can miss the structure’s occupants altogether—with no physical force applied to the person of anyone—and yet the shooting can satisfy all the elements of the offense. The elements might satisfy a requirement that the defendant act recklessly, but that requirement is separate from the one that the force be used “against the person of another.” View "Higdon v. United States" on Justia Law

Following a spate of home-invasion robberies around Dallas, police interrupted a robbery attempt that fit the pattern. The robbers fled on foot. Later that day, police arrested Olaya after finding him in a stolen vehicle with a suspected accomplice. The police inventoried the vehicle’s contents, took custody of a cell phone, and obtained a warrant to search the phone. An officer reviewed the phone's contents by hand, found potentially incriminating evidence, took screenshots, then stored the phone in an evidence storage facility. Texas officials then merged their investigation with a federal investigation focused on a multistate criminal enterprise and transferred the phone to the FBI for analysis. The Bureau searched the phone based on the state warrant. Meanwhile, Texas officers came to suspect that Castro had organized the robberies. They followed a signal coming from a stolen cell phone to a house where Castro lived. Officers watched the home, searched it twice, and conducted a brief search of Castro’s cell phones after obtaining her consent. Based on this evidence, a different Texas judge issued search warrants for Castro’s two phones. Officers searched each phone and found incriminating evidence about the robberies. The federal government charged Castro and Olaya with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The defendants successfully moved to suppress the cell-phone evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that each search complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Castro" on Justia Law

In 2013, Smith pleaded guilty to three federal counts stemming from his armed robbery of a Sevierville, Tennessee pharmacy. He was sentenced to 262 months in prison, the bottom of the Guidelines range, as a career offender based in part on his prior North Carolina state conviction for common-law robbery. He also had a South Carolina drug-trafficking conviction. A defendant qualifies as a career offender if he was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the sentence in light of its 2015 "Johnson" decision, which cast the constitutionality of the Guidelines’ residual clause into doubt. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again held that North Carolina common-law robbery does qualify as a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). The court cited the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Beckles v. United States, clarifying that the Guidelines’ residual clause remains valid after Johnson. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hernandez pled guilty to conspiring to distribute two kilograms of cocaine. Hernandez was to receive the two kilograms from a larger, 28-kilogram shipment of cocaine as payment for an outstanding debt. At sentencing, the district court held Hernandez responsible for all 28 kilograms because he volunteered to locate the whole shipment after it had gone missing prior to delivery. Hernandez objected to that finding and, in the alternative, a minor-participant reduction for his reduced role in the conspiracy. He also objected to a two-point enhancement for maintaining a drug-involved premises. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All 28 kilograms of cocaine were within the scope of the conspiracy. Hernandez knew the precise scope of the conspiracy, unlike low-level members of the enterprise, such as couriers. The district court also noted that Hernandez was unique among participants in that he stood to reap a significant benefit from the conspiracy’s success, rendering him “quite high on the ladder.” He secured the abandoned warehouse for at least three separate shipments of marijuana, and expected to be paid handsomely for each effort. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Harris, a registered stockbroker, and his co-conspirators, including government witness Durand, agreed to recommend shares of Zirk de Maison’s companies to clients in exchange for commissions. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority began an investigation and questioned Harris and Durand on wire transfers from certain organizations controlled by de Maison. The two told investigators that the deposits resulted from selling expensive watches, and sent letters to FINRA summarizing this fictitious explanation. After Harris was arrested, he purportedly called and texted Durand on multiple occasions, instructing him to stick with their story. Durand later admitted that the watch story was entirely false. Harris was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1348, 1349; obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1503, and three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court sentenced Harris to 63 months’ imprisonment and $843,423.91 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by not allowing Harris to introduce a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment of a government witness. The court upheld the admission of government summary exhibits and a jury instruction relating to stockbroker’s fiduciary duties. Harris presented a colorable claim of extraneous influence on a juror, so the court abused its discretion by failing to hold a "Remmer" evidentiary hearing or by denying defense counsel’s request to question the juror and his friend. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. The Sixth Circuit subsequently concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard, which requires three separate findings for a diagnosis of intellectual disability: the individual exhibits significant deficits in intellectual functioning—indicated by an IQ score “approximately two standard deviations or more below the mean,” roughly 70; the individual exhibits significant adaptive skill deficits—such as “the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances” in specified skill sets; and the deficits arose while the individual was still a minor. Hill’s IQ ranges from 48 to 71; his disability was documented before he reached age 18. Ohio courts gave undue weight to Hill’s behavior in prison. Hill was universally considered to be intellectually disabled by teachers, administrators, and the juvenile court system. Hill consistently performed very poorly in school; there was consistent documentation that he had trouble maintaining proper hygiene despite reminders; he had trouble making friends and responding appropriately to authority figures; he was described as vulnerable to exploitation. View "Hill v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. The Sixth Circuit subsequently concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard, which requires three separate findings for a diagnosis of intellectual disability: the individual exhibits significant deficits in intellectual functioning—indicated by an IQ score “approximately two standard deviations or more below the mean,” roughly 70; the individual exhibits significant adaptive skill deficits—such as “the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances” in specified skill sets; and the deficits arose while the individual was still a minor. Hill’s IQ ranges from 48 to 71; his disability was documented before he reached age 18. Ohio courts gave undue weight to Hill’s behavior in prison. Hill was universally considered to be intellectually disabled by teachers, administrators, and the juvenile court system. Hill consistently performed very poorly in school; there was consistent documentation that he had trouble maintaining proper hygiene despite reminders; he had trouble making friends and responding appropriately to authority figures; he was described as vulnerable to exploitation. View "Hill v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Caudill and Goforth broke into White’s home and beat her to death with a hammer when she refused to give them money to buy drugs. After ransacking her home, they loaded her body in the trunk of her car, drove to an empty field, doused the car with gasoline, and set it on fire. A Kentucky jury convicted the two of murder, robbery, burglary, arson, and tampering with evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Caudill’s convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. The district court denied Caudill’s federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts reasonably rejected her Batson claim and that her lawyers did not provide ineffective assistance by choosing not to call additional witnesses during the penalty phase. Caudill’s claim made too much of Batson’s “sensitive” inquiry language. The Supreme Court has never directed courts to make detailed findings or to solicit the defense attorney’s views before ruling on a Batson motion. Caudill’s jury selection lasted several days. The judge was there the entire time. He observed the demeanor of the jurors and heard their answers. He listened to the prosecutor’s questions, watched the strikes, and considered the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. The state judge could have explained more fully why those explanations convinced him that no discrimination was involved but the ruling did not violate clearly established law. View "Caudill v. Conover" on Justia Law