Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion brought by Ohio death-row inmates to enjoin their pending executions. The inmates claimed that Ohio’s midazolam-based, three-drug execution protocol presents a constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering. The court found that they had not established “likelihood of success on the merits.” The plaintiffs have “fallen well short” of proving a risk that Ohio’s execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause serious pain and needless suffering. Psychological pain or mental suffering cannot, alone, make a method of execution unconstitutional; Ohio is not required to prove midazolam’s effectiveness in rendering an inmate impervious to the pain from the two injections that follow. Nor did the inmates identify an available, feasible, and readily implemented alternative that will significantly reduce the risk of pain. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig." on Justia Law

Black was convicted of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and escape or attempted escape from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). He was sentenced to an effective term of life in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Black unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Black then moved for relief under FRCP 60(b). The district court determined that his grounds for relief were second or successive claims under section 2255 and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit, which denied relief. The transferred grounds raise successive claims. Black’s arguments that the district court “applied the wrong standard” to his arguments about counsel’s conflicts of interest and ineffective assistance are "prototypical attacks" on the court's previous resolution. His claim that the Assistant U.S. Attorney “perpetrated fraud on the Court” does not question “the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Black did not argue that the allegedly fraudulent conduct at trial s tainted the assessment of his habeas petition. Because Black presented these claims in a prior application, they “shall be dismissed,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). Black did not cite “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” or “newly discovered evidence” that would establish that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re: Black" on Justia Law

Lee pleaded guilty to three crimes in Tennessee state court, served his sentences, and was released from state custody in 1998. While serving time in federal prison for a subsequent crime, 20 years later, Lee sought permission to file a second 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition attacking his state convictions. The Sixth Circuit denied his motions. Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Lee’s petition regardless of whether he can meet sections 2244(b)’s requirements. Section 2254(a), authorizing district courts to entertain state prisoners’ habeas petitions expressly limits their jurisdiction to petitions filed by persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Lee is no longer in custody, nor on supervised release, pursuant to the state judgment he seeks to attack. That Lee’s state convictions resulted in an enhanced federal sentence does not affect that analysis. View "In re: Lee" on Justia Law

Peffer, a caregiver, grew marijuana for medical-marijuana patients and sold the excess to Beemer’s Medical Marijuana Dispensary. Beemer became a confidential informant. Driving to meet Beemer, Peffer was stopped by Officer Coon, who found marijuana in Peffer’s vehicle. Peffer was arrested. Months later, Child Services and the School District received letters, purportedly from Coon, expressing concern for Beemer’s children. Coon thought Peffer was responsible. Investigating officers had other suspects. Later, Trooper Glentz, investigating the letters, received what appeared to be marijuana seeds in mailed packages. Fliers identifying Beemer as a confidential informant, with an ostensibly official list of charges against Beemer, were mailed to businesses. Various factors pointed to Peffer. Sergeant Stephens obtained a warrant for the Peffer house, authorizing the search of electronic devices, electronic communications, and mailing items. Stephens asserted that the house “may contain evidence of the crime of Impersonating a Police Officer and Witness Intimidation.” After investigation of items seized in the search, prosecutors declined to pursue charges against Peffer. Peffer sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Stephens. The warrant was supported by probable cause. That the affidavit did not allege that Peffer owned a computer or that he kept one at his residence is immaterial because the averment that he used one in the commission of a crime created the presumption that it would be found at his residence. Stephens was entitled to qualified immunity. Even if sending the letters were not criminal under Michigan law, the law on this point was not clearly established. View "Peffer v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Miller was sentenced to death for a 1981 murder. A psychiatrist who examined Miller twice found him competent to stand trial and opined that Miller was not insane at the time of the murder. The court denied Miller’s request to appoint a psychiatrist to assist at trial. His sentence was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his section 2254 habeas petition, considering only the denial of state funds for an independent mental-health expert during the guilt phase of Miller’s trial and a challenge to the jury instructions. Seeking to revisit his ineffective-assistance claim, previously found to have been procedurally defaulted, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012) and Trevino (2013), Miller unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court rulings allow a prisoner to show cause to excuse an otherwise-defaulted ineffective assistance claim by presenting a substantial claim, showing that state law required him to bring that claim during an initial-review post-conviction proceeding, and showing that he received either no assistance or ineffective assistance during that initial state post-conviction proceeding. Given the uncertainty of establishing prejudice, his claim is not “unquestionably meritorious” and he has not presented a clear case of ineffective assistance that overcomes other relevant equitable factors, especially Miller’s lack of diligence in raising his Martinez claim. View "Miller v. Mays" on Justia Law

Downs pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. On August 2, 2010, the court orally pronounced a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, then the mandatory-minimum. The next day, the President signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced to five the mandatory minimum sentence for Downs's crime. On August 16, 2010, the court entered judgment in Downs’s case. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the Act applied to defendants sentenced after August 3, 2010. Downs moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he was not “sentenced” until the district court entered its judgment. The district court and Sixth Circuit disagreed. The law uniformly treats the date of the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence as the date of sentencing. While his co-defendants had later hearings and were sentenced under the Act, a court needs” legal grounds, not just equitable ones,” to apply the Act. Downs’s counsel was not constitutionally incompetent; the Act said nothing about having any retroactive effect. District courts are generally bound by the sentences they orally pronounce, so a motion for reconsideration would have been futile, as would a direct appeal. View "Downs v. United States" on Justia Law

PMC, an “outlaw” motorcycle club that has existed since 1968, has chapters in Michigan, Ohio, and six other states. PMC has a hierarchical structure, with a national president, vice president, and enforcers. Members wear leather vests, known as “rags,” to display the member’s club and that club’s territory. PMC competes with rival outlaw clubs to be the dominant club within certain territories. Following a shooting during an altercation with a rival gang and after interrupting a plan for retaliation, the government charged Frazier, Odum, and 12 others in a 15-count indictment., Frazier and Odum were severed, and the case against them proceeded separately. A jury convicted Frazier of two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3), and one count of use and carry of a firearm during, and in relation to, a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Odum was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions, improper venue, improper admission of hearsay statements, and due process violations for failure to call a witness or provide certain evidence to the defense. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Akron police officers stopped Patterson’s car. They found an open container of alcohol and a stolen pistol inside it. In state court, Patterson pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and driving with a suspended license. In federal court, he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession. At his federal sentencing hearing, the court treated Patterson’s 2001 Ohio convictions for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines but not under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Sixth Circuit rejected Patterson’s double jeopardy argument under the separate-sovereigns doctrine, agreed that Patterson’s prior convictions were predicate crimes of violence under the Guidelines, but held that the court should have sentenced him as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)). On remand, Patterson argued that the the government had not shown that his prior offenses were three separate offenses. Rejecting the argument, the court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 180 months under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it had issued a limited remand “for resentencing,” which “was not an invitation to start from scratch” because it had already concluded that Patterson’s convictions stemmed from robberies at three different places. In addition, Patterson’s separate-occasions argument was ripe when he first appealed. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Since 2010, federal courts have been reviewing the punishments Michigan may impose on individuals convicted of first-degree murder for acts they committed as children. In the meantime, the Supreme Court has twice ruled that the unique characteristics of youth must factor into sentencing decisions for juvenile offenders facing life imprisonment. Michigan has amended its statutory scheme to implement these rulings. On remand, the district court considered a Second Amended Complaint (SAC), asserting that Michigan’s sentencing scheme and parole system deny youth offenders a meaningful opportunity for release. The court determined that jurisprudential concerns barred Plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The claim based on Michigan statutory law, which has been amended, is moot. Declining to apply “Younger” abstention, the court reasoned that finding that the filing of the SAC required reconsideration of jurisdiction “would both expand and warp an otherwise cabined and clear doctrine.” One claim was properly dismissed under the “Heck” doctrine: a declaration that sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional would necessarily implicate the duration of impending sentences and is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Claims that seek an examination of “policies and procedures governing access to prison programming and parole eligibility, consideration and release” and that the retroactive elimination of Plaintiffs’ accrued good time credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause should not have been dismissed. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Individuals reprogrammed ATMs to dispense $20 bills for each $1 they were supposed to dispense. Requesting $40 at a compromised ATM would deliver 40 $20 bills instead of two. More than $600,000 was taken from ATMs owned by SafeCash Systems. SafeCash investigated and found evidence that a former employee who serviced the machines, Folad, and his friend, Fattah, engineered the scheme. They turned the information over to the government, resulting in several criminal convictions, one-year sentences for Folad and Fattah, and a restitution order. After the scheme ended and after SafeCash determined what had happened, SafeCash replaced 17 of the relevant 18 ATMs in response to a federal regulation requiring that they be accessible to individuals with sight impairments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting an argument that destruction of the ATMs amounted to the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence and violated the defendants’ due process rights. SafeCash, not the government, made the decision to replace the machines. Even if the government had been involved in the destruction of the machines, there was no indication that they contained potentially exculpatory evidence. View "United States v. Folad" on Justia Law