Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During the execution of a warrant to arrest Penney while he was selling 200 pounds of marijuana, Penney fired shots, injuring two federal agents. In 2005, Penney was convicted of 15 drug and firearm offenses and an attempt to kill a federal agent. The SIxth Circuit affirmed Penney’s sentence of 895 months’ imprisonment. In 2011, Penney’s counsel filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, which was denied as meritless. The court denied Penney’s pro se motion to amend because he was represented by counsel and no order of substitution had been entered. While Penney’s appeal was pending, he moved to amend the judgment, arguing that denial of his motion to amend created a “manifest miscarriage of justice” because “valid claims of actual innocence and unauthorized detention [could] trump time and procedural bars.” The court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability. The Supreme Court denied Penney’s certiorari petition. In 2015, Penney’s counsel moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the court erred when it denied Penney’s motion to amend. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The miscarriage of justice exception applies to untimely Rule 60(b) motions and motions to amend but Penney failed to make the required showing of actual innocence. View "Penney v. United States" on Justia Law

Duke was sentenced to a 156-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit wire fraud but failed to self-surrender. A warrant issued for his arrest, a new indictment was filed, charging Duke with failure to surrender for a sentence, and Duke was arrested. At the arraignment, defense counsel requested that Duke be transferred to the prison to which he had originally been designated to report or to a prison in Milan, Michigan. The government opposed Duke’s request, instead requesting that Duke be transferred to a local facility. Duke “yelled ‘you f**cking b**ch’ and ran towards the government attorney.” He “grabbed the victim by the back of the victim’s head[,] struck the victim with his fist several times[, and] smashed the victim’s head into a table repeatedly. The victim’s legs were pushed into the table during the attack, causing bruising.” People within the courtroom “subdued” Duke, who was convicted for the assault. At sentencing, the court determined that the table was a “dangerous weapon” under the Guidelines Manual, triggering sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 97-month sentence, rejecting an argument that those enhancements constitute impermissible double counting for the same conduct. View "United States v. Duke" on Justia Law

In 1999, 12-year-old C.M. left home. Her sister and her sister’s boyfriend searched the neighborhood. Returning home, they found C.M. disoriented. C.M. stated that she had been at the neighboring Mills house and Mills had smoked marijuana with her and fondled her. They confronted Mills in front of his sons and contacted the Lewisburg, Tennessee police. Mills was indicted. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) reported that semen was found in C.M.’s underwear. C.M. then stated that Mills had engaged in sexual intercourse with her. A DNA analysis by Jenkins indicated a 0.3% chance that the DNA belonged to a Caucasian other than Mills but contradicted C.M.’s claims about Valium and marijuana. Mills was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and casual exchange of a controlled substance. In a habeas proceeding, the Federal Public Defender sent the evidence to a private DNA laboratory, SERI, which was unable to retest the same portions of the underwear. Using the “same analysis techniques” on an adjacent section, SERI concluded that it contained semen from two males, neither was Mills. After serving 11 years in prison, Mills was released. The state overturned Mills’s convictions. Mills suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1985, against the Assistant District Attorney General, Jenkins, and a police investigator, in their individual and official capacities; the TBI Director in his official capacity; Marshall County; and the city, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of claims against Jenkins for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and a Brady claim. Jenkins may be able to provide evidence that SERI's analytic methods differed, that the evidence available was not exculpatory, or that her actions were negligent at worst. View "Mills v. Barnard" on Justia Law

Officer Turner responded to reports that a woman was intoxicated at Wal-Mart. Turner found the woman, Lakes, who was “clearly under the influence.” Lakes stated that she was with Lewis, who was in his truck and would drive her home. Officers approached Lewis’s truck. It was dark outside and the windows were tinted. Turner looked inside and saw Lewis asleep on the passenger side. Officer Cloyd and Lakes went to the front-passenger side; either Cloyd or Lakes opened the door. The interior light went on, causing Lewis to startle and enabling Turner to see that Lewis had a clear plastic baggie on his lap. Lewis tossed the baggie over the console onto the back floorboard. Turner suspected that the baggie contained marijuana, shined his flashlight onto it, and observed that it contained “like a bluish color stuff.” Turner opened the door, inspected the bag closely, and saw that it contained pills. Lewis appeared to be under the influence. Lewis and Lake were arrested. The bag was tested; it contained 493 oxycodone and 5 Xanax. Four Xanax pills were found on Lewis’s person. Lewis was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Lewis’s motion to suppress. The officers’ purpose was to find Lakes a safe ride home, they were not investigating a crime. Lewis’s subsequent behavior gave Turner probable cause to search the truck under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Fontana, in his 50s, posed as a 16-year-old to chat with a 15-year-old female living near Detroit. Fontana claimed that his computer’s camera was broken and convinced his victim to take off her shirt. He recorded this act, then used the threat of publishing this recording online to force her to perform sexual acts, which he recorded and used as additional leverage. He forced her to be in front of her web camera at certain times, to sleep in a certain position, to ask for permission to go out, and to convince a 14-year-old friend to perform sexual acts for him. The girl’s mother contacted the police. Following extradition from Canada on 12 child pornography-related charges, Fontana pleaded guilty to four charges. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the judge considered that, after Fontana’s arrest, investigators discovered images of up to 50 victims, including minors, none of whom were the basis for Fontana’s extradition. Fontana argued that consideration of the additional victims violated the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty’s “specialty” requirement that he only be detained, tried, or punished for the crimes for which he was extradited. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. The treaty does not preclude taking into account activity that is not the basis of the extradition in determining punishment for the crimes on which the extradition was based, at least as long as such consideration did not affect the statutory range of that punishment. View "United States v. Fontana" on Justia Law

Defendant is a member of the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation. Before his arrest and incarceration, he resided on the Isabella Reservation in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan with his wife and his step-daughter, B.J. Defendant repeatedly sexually abused B.J. and his nieces for several years when the three were young children. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison for three counts of aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), one count of sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2242(2), and one count of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(2); 15 years in prison for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2243(a); and three years in prison for one count of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of evidence of his past sexual assaults pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 403 and that his victims witnessed him physically assault his wife pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. View "United States v. Mandoka" on Justia Law

The government sought forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4),(6), (7); 18 U.S.C. 981) of bank accounts, real properties, vehicles, and $91,500 in U.S. currency, related to its investigation into Salouha and Sbeih. Salouha allegedly illegally sold prescription drugs through his Ohio pharmacies, 21 U.S.C. 841. Salouha and Sbeih allegedly laundered the receipts through their accounts, 18 U.S.C. 1956. Sbeih and his wife filed verified claims to seven of the personal bank accounts. Sbeih was indicted but failed to appear. The court issued an arrest warrant, lifted the stay on the civil forfeiture case and scheduled a status conference. Sbeih’s counsel sought permission for Sbeih not to attend, as he was in Israel. Sbeih alleged that he was in danger of losing his Jerusalem permanent residency permit if he left Israel. The court granted the motion. The government moved to strike Sbeih’s claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. The court waited to see whether the Salouhas, Sbeih’s codefendants, were able to reenter the country, but ultimately granted the government’s motion to strike Sbeih’s claim and ordered forfeiture. While section 2466 requires the government to prove that the claimants had a specific intent of avoiding criminal prosecution in deciding to remain outside the U.S., it does not require that that intent be the sole or principal intent. In this case, however, government did not meet its burden of proving that Sbeih was not returning to the U.S. to avoid prosecution View "United States v. $525,695.24" on Justia Law

The government sought forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4),(6), (7); 18 U.S.C. 981) of bank accounts, real properties, vehicles, and $91,500 in U.S. currency, related to its investigation into Salouha and Sbeih. Salouha allegedly illegally sold prescription drugs through his Ohio pharmacies; Salouha and Sbeih allegedly laundered the receipts. Salouha and his wife claimed several assets. Salouha was indicted but failed to appear. The court issued an arrest warrant. Permission for Salouha to attend a status conference regarding the forfeiture via telephone was denied. Salouha, his pregnant wife and four children, had moved to Gaza after the asset seizure; travel restrictions made their return difficult. Salouha did not attend. The government moved to strike his claims under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. The court waited to see whether Salouha could return with the help of the State Department. Salouha did not to respond. The court struck the claims but did not order forfeiture. Seven months later, the court approved a Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Decree of Forfeiture, under which Salouha’s wife withdrew her claims to all but a house and car. The remaining properties, claimed by the Sbeihs, were ordered forfeited the following month. Weeks later the Salouhas unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly credited the government's uncontested statements, and relied on the knowledge of Mrs. Salouha’s return, to conclude that Salouha was deliberately staying outside U.S. jurisdiction to avoid prosecution. View "United States v. $525,695.24" on Justia Law

Ferguson pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that at least three of Ferguson’s eight Tennessee convictions were violent felonies that triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ferguson’s three aggravated burglary convictions no longer count; Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute sweeps more broadly than the generic definition. Ferguson’s five burglary convictions do trigger ACCA. Tennessee’s burglary statute provides that: A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner: (1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault; (2) Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building; (3) Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault; or (4) Enters any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault or commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault. The Supreme Court defines “generic burglary” as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sylvester was indicted on February 26, 2003. There were multiple superseding indictments. Sylvester went to trial on September 13, 2005 and was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, felon in possession of a firearm, possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, diazepam, hydrocodone, and codeine, using interstate travel to acquire and transport five kilograms of cocaine, traveling in interstate commerce to acquire five kilograms of cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sylvester moved to vacate his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to pursue Speedy Trial Act claims. The district court dismissed, finding that Sylvester failed to show that he was prejudiced. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the Speedy Trial Act was violated and those violations would have led to a dismissal of the charges brought under the First and Second Superseding Indictments, Sylvester’s counsel rendered deficient performance, however, there is no evidence of prosecutorial bad faith and Sylvester did not show that the court would have dismissed the charges with prejudice. View "Sylvester v. United States" on Justia Law