Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law

The Wenks have a 17-year-old daughter, M, who has an IQ of 70 or below, and requires special education services. M attended high school in Grandview Heights, under an Individualized Education Program (IEP), as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. In 2011, teachers expressed “concerns” about M’s father’s treatment of M. An administrator’s report to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS) included statements and behaviors by M that were thought to indicate sexual abuse and many comments about father’s physical appearance and demeanor. FCCS concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated; the police department dropped its criminal investigation. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Wenks claimed that the report was filed in retaliation for their advocacy to change M’s educational plan, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied the school administrator qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied the Wenks‘s motion for fees and costs for defending the appeal. The right to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the report and a reasonable official would have understood that filing a child abuse report in bad faith violated those rights. View "Wenk v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The district court ordered Case Western School of Medicine to award plaintiff a diploma, despite the university’s determination that he lacked the professionalism required to discharge his duties responsibly. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Lack-of-professionalism finding amounts to an academic judgment to which courts owe considerable deference. The Case Western curriculum identifies nine “core competencies.” First on the list is professionalism. The task of figuring out whether a student has mastered these professionalism requirements falls to the university’s Committee on Students. Although plaintiff did well academically, as exhibited by recommendation letters praising his “academic excellence” in 2011 and 2013, published several articles, and won a special award for “Honors with Distinction in Research,” he received a stinging evaluation about his performance in an internal medicine internship. There were several complaints about his dishonesty, aggressive behavior, lack of preparation, tardiness, poor hygiene, and a DUI conviction. He refused an offer to repeat his internship in order to graduate. View "Al-Dabagh v. Case Western Reserve Univ." on Justia Law

Frieder joined Morehead State University in 2006 as an assistant professor of art history. During his time in probation, Frieder excelled in professional achievement and service but had difficulty teaching. The reviews of his introductory art history class were consistently abysmal. Frieder’s evaluators suggested improvements, asking Frieder to observe other teachers or visit the “Center for Teaching & Learning,” but after four years of renewing Frieder’s contract, the evaluators voted against tenure and the provost and president agreed. Frieder sued, alleging violation of the First Amendment and a Kentucky statute that prohibits disability-based discrimination, KRS 344.040. Frieder argued that his evaluators retaliated against his “idiosyncratic teaching methods,” which allegedly involved context-appropriate uses of the middle finger and that the tenure decision stemmed from his diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which he admitted his evaluators knew nothing about. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No evidence showed that anything other than his poor student ratings and disorganization motivated the tenure decision. View "Frieder v. Morehead St. Univ." on Justia Law

F.H., born in 1994, has cerebral palsy syndrome, asthma, sleep apnea, auditory and visual limitations, and significant learning disorders; he needs a wheelchair or walker and has limited use of his hands. It is difficult for him to use the bathroom without assistance. From 2002 until 2010, F.H. attended four different Memphis City Schools (MCS) and had 11 different aides. F.H. and his mother claim that he was: frequently left unattended in the bathroom, distraught and unable to clean himself; subjected to verbal and physical abuse, on multiple occasions by aides and school personnel; returned to class with dirty underwear; and sexually abused by an aide. His mother’s claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) resulted in a Settlement Agreement. In 2012, F.H. and his mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with claims of retaliation, and of breach of the Settlement Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that claims accruing prior to the Settlement Agreement were barred by the Agreement, and that all other claims required exhaustion under the IDEA. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 did not arise under the IDEA, were not released by the Agreement, and that administrative exhaustion of these claims would be futile. The language of the Agreement and 2004 Amendments to the IDEA, make the Agreement enforceable in court, so that the breach of contract claim does not require administrative exhaustion. View "F. H. v. Memphis City Schs." on Justia Law

Kathleen was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University (CMU). In 2011, her husband Christopher, a CMU student, sponsored a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Shortly after, in accordance with the faculty’s collective bargaining agreement, Kathleen took a semester of sabbatical leave, agreeing to return to CMU for at least a full year following sabbatical or return any compensation received during her leave. While Kathleen was on sabbatical, she became eligible for and requested a pay supplement. Her department recommended denial. The reviewing dean agreed. Kathleen appealed, but resigned before a final decision. CMU requested that Kathleen return her sabbatical compensation. When she refused, CMU sued in state court for breach of contract. Because Christopher’s tuition had been remitted for Spring 2012 as part of Kathleen’s benefits and Kathleen was contractually obligated to repay her benefits for that semester, CMU determined that Christopher had an outstanding tuition balance and placed a hold on his transcript. The couple sued in federal court alleging retaliation because of Christopher’s role in the no-confidence resolution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether CMU filed suit against Kathleen and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript in retaliation for Christopher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. CMU, as represented by its president in his official capacity, cannot shield itself from liability by invoking qualified immunity.View "Benison v. Ross" on Justia Law

Scheick was hired as Principal of Tecumseh High School in 2004, at 51 years of age, and continued in that position until 2010. For the first three years, Scheick was employed directly by TPS. Then, by agreement, the 54-year-old Scheick formally retired from TPS and was hired by the staffing firm PESG to continue working as principal under a three-year contract between TPS and PESG. Under that arrangement, Scheick began receiving pension and health care benefits from the retirement system, and TPS avoided more than $29,000 in payroll and benefit costs per year. The next year, several other TPS employees entered into similar arrangements as cost-saving measures. In early 2010, when Scheick was almost 57 years of age, TPS decided not to renew the contract. Scheick claimed that the contract was not renewed because of his age and filed suit against TPS after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2202(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding a genuine issue of material fact.View "Scheick v. Tecumseh Pub. Schls." on Justia Law

N., an autistic child, born in 2004, was diagnosed with the speech disorder, apraxia. In 2007, N.’s parents enrolled him in district schools, which placed him at St. Rita’s School for the Deaf under an individual education program (IEP). In 2010, N.’s parents became dissatisfied, removed N. from the school, unilaterally placed him at ABS (another Cincinnati private school), and requested reimbursement for the tuition and transportation. The district generated a new IEP. The district and N.’s parents could not agree on placement. Mediation resulted in the district agreeing to reimburse tuition and transportation expenses incurred from August 19, 2010 to November 30, 2010 and to pay a portion of the costs through the summer of 2011. The parties created a tentative transition plan, but N.’s parents balked at its implementation and filed a due-process complaint. A hearing officer rejected their claims, but ordered the district to reimburse the costs of attending ABS during the 2011–2012 school year. The Exceptional Children Appeal Board reversed that “stay-put” decision, holding that ABS was not N.’s “placement.” In a suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482, the district court found that N. had not established that the offer of placement at a district school with an autism-specific classroom was inappropriate, but that N.’s operative placement was ABS, requiring reimbursement. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. IDEA bars a court from ordering reimbursement absent a finding that the district failed to provide a free and appropriate public education.View "N.W. v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Central States, an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, provides health insurance for Teamsters and their families. Guarantee Trust provides sports injury insurance for student athletes. Each of 13 high school and college athletes, all children of Teamsters, holds general health insurance from Central and sports injury insurance from Guarantee. Each suffered an injury while playing sports (most often football) between 2006 and 2009, and sought coverage from both companies. Each time Guarantee refused to pay the athlete’s medical expenses, and each time Central paid the bill under protest. The district court entered a declaratory judgment under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B), that, when coverage of student athletes overlap, Guarantee must pay, and ordered Guarantee to reimburse Central for the payouts to the 13 students. The Sixth Circuit, affirmed in part characterizing the case as a “you first” paradox, or ‘gastonette.” An ERISA plan may coordinate benefits with another policy, but may not redefine the coverage of another policy. Absent the Central plan, the Guarantee policy would cover the sports injuries at issue without question. An ERISA plan must keep doing what it would do in another plan’s absence. That amounts to coordinating benefits, not redefining coverage. View "Cent St, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. First Agency, Inc." on Justia Law