Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kathleen was a tenured professor of geology at Central Michigan University (CMU). In 2011, her husband Christopher, a CMU student, sponsored a vote of no confidence in the president and provost of the university. Shortly after, in accordance with the faculty’s collective bargaining agreement, Kathleen took a semester of sabbatical leave, agreeing to return to CMU for at least a full year following sabbatical or return any compensation received during her leave. While Kathleen was on sabbatical, she became eligible for and requested a pay supplement. Her department recommended denial. The reviewing dean agreed. Kathleen appealed, but resigned before a final decision. CMU requested that Kathleen return her sabbatical compensation. When she refused, CMU sued in state court for breach of contract. Because Christopher’s tuition had been remitted for Spring 2012 as part of Kathleen’s benefits and Kathleen was contractually obligated to repay her benefits for that semester, CMU determined that Christopher had an outstanding tuition balance and placed a hold on his transcript. The couple sued in federal court alleging retaliation because of Christopher’s role in the no-confidence resolution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether CMU filed suit against Kathleen and placed a hold on Christopher’s transcript in retaliation for Christopher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. CMU, as represented by its president in his official capacity, cannot shield itself from liability by invoking qualified immunity.View "Benison v. Ross" on Justia Law

Scheick was hired as Principal of Tecumseh High School in 2004, at 51 years of age, and continued in that position until 2010. For the first three years, Scheick was employed directly by TPS. Then, by agreement, the 54-year-old Scheick formally retired from TPS and was hired by the staffing firm PESG to continue working as principal under a three-year contract between TPS and PESG. Under that arrangement, Scheick began receiving pension and health care benefits from the retirement system, and TPS avoided more than $29,000 in payroll and benefit costs per year. The next year, several other TPS employees entered into similar arrangements as cost-saving measures. In early 2010, when Scheick was almost 57 years of age, TPS decided not to renew the contract. Scheick claimed that the contract was not renewed because of his age and filed suit against TPS after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2202(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding a genuine issue of material fact.View "Scheick v. Tecumseh Pub. Schls." on Justia Law

N., an autistic child, born in 2004, was diagnosed with the speech disorder, apraxia. In 2007, N.’s parents enrolled him in district schools, which placed him at St. Rita’s School for the Deaf under an individual education program (IEP). In 2010, N.’s parents became dissatisfied, removed N. from the school, unilaterally placed him at ABS (another Cincinnati private school), and requested reimbursement for the tuition and transportation. The district generated a new IEP. The district and N.’s parents could not agree on placement. Mediation resulted in the district agreeing to reimburse tuition and transportation expenses incurred from August 19, 2010 to November 30, 2010 and to pay a portion of the costs through the summer of 2011. The parties created a tentative transition plan, but N.’s parents balked at its implementation and filed a due-process complaint. A hearing officer rejected their claims, but ordered the district to reimburse the costs of attending ABS during the 2011–2012 school year. The Exceptional Children Appeal Board reversed that “stay-put” decision, holding that ABS was not N.’s “placement.” In a suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482, the district court found that N. had not established that the offer of placement at a district school with an autism-specific classroom was inappropriate, but that N.’s operative placement was ABS, requiring reimbursement. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. IDEA bars a court from ordering reimbursement absent a finding that the district failed to provide a free and appropriate public education.View "N.W. v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Central States, an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, provides health insurance for Teamsters and their families. Guarantee Trust provides sports injury insurance for student athletes. Each of 13 high school and college athletes, all children of Teamsters, holds general health insurance from Central and sports injury insurance from Guarantee. Each suffered an injury while playing sports (most often football) between 2006 and 2009, and sought coverage from both companies. Each time Guarantee refused to pay the athlete’s medical expenses, and each time Central paid the bill under protest. The district court entered a declaratory judgment under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B), that, when coverage of student athletes overlap, Guarantee must pay, and ordered Guarantee to reimburse Central for the payouts to the 13 students. The Sixth Circuit, affirmed in part characterizing the case as a “you first” paradox, or ‘gastonette.” An ERISA plan may coordinate benefits with another policy, but may not redefine the coverage of another policy. Absent the Central plan, the Guarantee policy would cover the sports injuries at issue without question. An ERISA plan must keep doing what it would do in another plan’s absence. That amounts to coordinating benefits, not redefining coverage. View "Cent St, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. First Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1993, Dr. Dargie was a student at the UT College of Medicine. In 1994, Middle Tennessee Medical Center agreed to pay Dargie’s tuition, fees, and other reasonable expenses for attending UT. After graduation and completion of his residency, Dargie was required to repay MTMC’s grant by either working as a doctor in the medically underserved community of Murfreesboro for four years or repaying two times the uncredited amount of all conditional award payments he received. MTMC paid UT $73,000 on Dargie’s behalf. After completing his medical training in 2001, Dargie chose to practice in Germantown, near Memphis. In 2002, Dargie repaid $121,440.02. In 2005, the Dargies filed an amended tax return for 2002, claiming they had “inadvertently omitted an ordinary and necessary business expense” on their Schedule C for the $121,440 repayment. The IRS disallowed the deduction under I.R.C. 162. The Dargies sued. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the repayment was a personal expense and, regardless, no deduction would be allowed under I.R.C. 265(a)(1) because the amount was allocable to income the Dargies had received tax-free. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the repayment a personal expense.View "Dargie v. United States" on Justia Law

The Thomas M. Cooley Law School, accredited by the ABA, enrolls more students than any other U.S. law school and plans to expand. Cooley charges full-time students tuition of $36,750 per year, exclusive of other costs, and, according to U.S. News & World Report, has the lowest admission standards of any accredited law school. The school has a very low retention rate. In a 66-page complaint, 12 graduates claimed that the school disseminated false employment statistics, upon which they relied as assurances that they would obtain full-time attorney jobs after graduating. The graduates did not obtain the kind of employment the statistics advertised; some found employment at all. They claimed that, had they known the truth, they would not have attended Cooley or would have paid less tuition, and sought, among other relief, partial tuition reimbursement, which they estimated for the class would be $300,000,000. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Michigan Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the facts. The complaint shows that one of the statistics on which they relied was objectively true and reliance on the statistics, without further inquiry, was unreasonable. View "MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School" on Justia Law

Hill, Director of Risk Management for Detroit Public Schools invited Washington to submit a proposal for a wellness program for DPS employees. Washington and others joined Associates for Learning (A4L) and submitted a proposal quoting $150,000 for a pilot study. Contrary to DPS policy, Hill did not open competitive bidding or execute a written contract, and made payments by wire transfer, rather than by check. Hill, who later left DPS testified that he met with Washington to discuss larger amounts. Washington paid Hill five percent of the invoice amount for assistance in getting the invoices paid. Invoices totaling more than a million dollars for “future work” were paid. The partners met in public places to distribute cash. Washington was convicted of conspiracy to commit program fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 666, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956. The district court enhanced Washington’s base offense level by 22 levels, finding that Washington was an “organizer or leader” and that the amount of loss to DPS was more than $2.5 million, and sentenced her to 84 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington was not prejudiced by errors made by counsel and that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

German law requires all children to attend public or state-approved private schools. The Romeikes, parents of five young children, feared that the public school curriculum would influence their children against Christian values” and chose to home-school. The government imposed fines for each unexcused absence. Once, police went to the Romeikes’ house and escorted the children to school. The next time, four adults and seven children from the Romeikes’ home-schooling support group intervened, and the police, reluctant to use force, left the premises without the children. The family traveled to the U.S. to seek asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), which applies to those who have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Board of Immigration Appeals found that German authorities have not singled out the Romeikes in particular or home-schoolers in general for persecution and denied their petition. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the decision. The German law does not on its face single out any protected group, and the Romeikes did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the law’s application turns on prohibited classifications or animus based on any prohibited ground. View "Romeike v. Holder" on Justia Law

The parents and the grandmother of two black children sued the Nashville Board of Public Education on behalf of their children and all black students in the District whose school assignments were adversely affected by the elimination of the mandatory noncontiguous transfer zones. They allege that the Rezoning Plan eliminated the desirable practice of being bused to a good, racially diverse school and replaced it with two inferior choices: staying in a bad, racially isolated neighborhood school or being bused to a bad, racially diverse school. They claim that has led to resegregation in violation of the students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the Board. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the change serves legitimate state interests in school under-utilization. The Plan actually solved the problem that many schools were operating at levels below what their resources and infrastructure would permit, while other schools were overflowing. The court stopped short of endorsing the Plan, noting that certain students in poor neighborhoods had to share textbooks; that the racial achievement gap apparently exists much as before; and that Nashville public-school students as a whole continue to do poorly after the Plan. View "Spurlock v. Fox" on Justia Law